Chapter 5: What happened to domestic programmes? The intriguing case of Islamic Relief Worldwide

Susannah Pickering-Saqqa

8,000 words

Introduction

Islamic Relief Worldwide's Global Strategy 2017-2021 includes as part of its Goal 2 the commitment to "Manage sustainable domestic programmes in established partner countries, supported primarily by appeals and grants" (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2016:6). These "domestic programmes" have developed in what IRW term "Partner Offices" (PO) which were originally established for fundraising and so are located within the global north or parts of the global south where funding is available. There are currently twelve POs in the Islamic Relief Worldwide federal structure.

In 2016 I was invited by IRW's Humanitarian Academy for Development (HAD) to research the extent, challenges, and potential of the domestic programmes (DP) in six of its independent affiliate POs: Canada, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden, and USA – and also in the UK. IRUK is integrated into IRW structurally and does not have its own board/independent affiliate status but does have one of the federation's larger domestic programmes. The findings of this research were shared with the CEO and Board in December 2018 and published on the HAD online portal in early 2019 with a subsequent blog published by BOND in April 2019 (Pickering-Saqqa, 2018; Pickering-Saqqa, 2019a).

The purpose of this paper is to revisit the data collected for this research, using Bourdieu's theory of practice, specifically the concepts of 'habitus' and 'doxic' fields or domains (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). In doing so, I hope to go beyond the original empirical findings (see Pickering-Saqqa, 2018) to understand what has happened to the strategic commitment to the DPs and reveal deeper understandings for practitioners and scholars of their significance and challenges. This is worth doing now as the development NGO sector reassesses its role in a post-Covid-19 era (CIVICUS, 2020; Cooney, 2020) and IRW enters a new strategic planning period.

I begin by situating domestic programming empirically, using examples from IRW and Oxfam International's work. The second section briefly outlines the methodology used in the original research and the theoretical framework, defining habitus and doxic domains and how they are operationalised in this paper. The final section explores the findings, considering how the DPs both reinforce and rupture the organisational habitus of IRW, the doxic domain of "international development" and the challenges this poses for IRW.

Situating "Domestic Programmes"

It is important to establish at this point what exactly IRW's domestic programmes are as the term "domestic programmes" is fraught with the assumptions and expectations of the international development sector, explored later in this section. It is, of course, difficult to generalise across seven countries in contexts as varied as Canada, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden, UK and USA. The uniting factor across all seven DPs is that they are interventions for social change in communities in these countries using campaigning and service delivery via short-term projects and longer-term programmes. For example, during the water crisis in Flint, USA in 2016, Islamic Relief USA used its network of volunteers to distribute bottled water in partnership with the Flint Islamic Center (Carstensen, 2016). IR Canada's web site (at the time of writing) is collecting funds for PPE and hygiene kits for Canadians in need and says:

> *We firmly believe that charity starts at home. This is how real change takes root in the most impactful way. Our efforts in Canada are focussed on youth development, women empowerment, violence survivors, indigenous communities, newcomer/refugee support.*

The origins of each DP are rooted in the varying contexts of the POs. Figure 1 below sets out the diversity of these contexts using a range of metrics from the Human Development Index (HDI) to the percentage of Muslims in the population in 2016-17.

<<Insert Figure 5.1 here>>

5.1 The Diversity of IRW domestic programmes

The earliest occasion for IRW domestic work appears to be the IR USA response to the Oklahoma Tornadoes of 1996 and 1998 and its seasonal work in the mid-1990s, including the annual Day of Dignity. IR USA formalized its US programme in 2004 (after Hurricane Katrina), motivated by a sense among Muslim organisations post-9/11 that they needed to become part of the fabric of US society. These responses influenced thinking in IR UK, where staff began to consider moving beyond a UK Hardship Fund to a more strategic approach to UK programming. The UK DP has had several 'starts': the first, in 2010 followed the IRW organisational review and IRW's work on using multi-dimensional understandings of poverty (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008). The review committed to a more structured and resourced community development programme in the UK in response to disproportionate levels of deprivation among Muslim communities in the UK (Centre on Migration Policy and Society, 2008).

Islamic Relief Malaysia began its DP in two phases: the first, in 2006 when seasonal work around Ramadan and Qurbani began, and the second, in 2011 when it began its Family Assistance Programme. This led to the development of a 'hybrid' model for IR Malaysia, becoming both Partner and Field office. This is also the case for IR South Africa, which began its DP and work as a Partner Office at its establishment in 2003. Although not specifically cited in interviews, clearly one of the main drivers behind the DPs in Malaysia and South Africa is the relatively low HDI global rankings, 59 and 81 respectively. However, with Malaysia showing decreasing levels of income inequalities and South Africa still with one of the highest global rates of income inequalities, these are two very different scenarios.

The most recently established DPs are in Canada, Germany, and Sweden in 2015. Canada's DP has its motivations in the need to build roots in Canada, especially conscious of the historical injustices experienced by First Nation communities. The programmes in Germany and Sweden were established in response to the inability of state agencies to cope with the numbers of refugees arriving from Syria and other areas of conflict in 2015. The national infrastructure of Germany is described as 'overwhelmed' by the arrival of between 7,000 and 10,000 people a day in late 2015. Likewise, IR Sweden used its existing networks of volunteers, mosques and people with Arabic and Dari language skills to respond to the arrival of 163,000 refugees into Sweden in 2015. However, before 2015 IR Sweden provided small ad hoc support for people with drug and alcohol addictions.

Subsequently, IRW has published a mid-strategy review in which the purpose of POs is described as raising funds and implementing local programmes (IRW, 2020: 55). However, there are mixed messages about the DPs. There is no mention of domestic programmes under its review of Strategic Goal 2 progress. A map of IRW's global reach in 2019 includes 1,188 people in UK with no other domestic programme mapped. The work with vulnerable people in the UK is highlighted but no similar focus given to any of the other DPs (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2020:9-10; 45). This is surprising given the acknowledgement of the percentage of IRW income from POs: Islamic Relief USA, Canada, Sweden, and Germany contributed respectively 22%, 15%, 10% and 8% of IRW's 2019 income.

Moreover, in the international NGO (INGO) sector these IRW DPs are preceded by decades of consultation and internal debate by Oxfam GB about whether to establish a domestic UK Poverty Programme (UKPP). Previous research on the UKPP has found that Oxfam GB considered this idea in various forms between 1972 and 1995 when it eventually launched the programme. There is empirical evidence that the programme adds value to Oxfam GB via a range of legitimating strategies. These include making visible the relationship between poverty and powerlessness and shifting conceptions of poverty beyond an approach in which the poor are always "othered", distant and 'over there". The UKPP also enables Oxfam GB to respond to critiques of INGOs as unable to put into practice changing approaches to development, such as the universality of the SDGs and civic rootedness (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019b). At the time of writing (2021), Oxfam GB's UKPP focuses on the undervaluing of women's care work and sits within a strategy that prioritises work in the most fragile and vulnerable communities in the world to address the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change and gender justice (Oxfam GB, 2020: 28). Oxfam America's domestic programme was established in 1992 in response to a three-part rationale. Firstly, there was a growing conviction that poverty was caused by systemic issues and should be understood from a global perspective. Secondly, Oxfam had much it could contribute from its global experience to addressing the interconnected issues of poverty, hunger and marginalisation faced by communities in the US. Finally, it was a response to the accusation of inconsistency by southern partners (Bennett, 2002). It is currently most visible in its disaster response work in Puerto Rico, its campaign against immigration policies at the US-Mexican border and its work with migrants working in US agriculture to secure their rights.

Having set out some of the roots and contemporary nature of domestic programming, the chapter now turns to a consideration of their contemporary significance. The issue of 'domestic programming' of INGOs such as Islamic Relief Worldwide has taken on a higher profile in recent years. This, I argue, is related to four interconnected factors impacting the development sector.

Firstly, the arrival of refugees in Europe from conflict in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and Yemen has raised the profile of the amount of development aid budgets spent 'at home' on refugee support, accounting for much of the increase in DAC-EU aid budgets. Countries such as Germany and Sweden, for example, increased their ODA spending in 2015 by 25.9% and 36.8% respectively. This has raised questions in the public domain about the legitimacy of spending aid budgets 'at home' (Jones, 2016). Secondly, the agreement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has fostered a more universal approach to development. The goals apply equally to both the Global North and South, reflecting changing development geographies and understandings of poverty.

Thirdly, there is a growing public awareness of issues of inequalities in the Global North made visible by events such as the Grenfell Tower fire in London, 2017 and the Flint water crisis in the USA. This has led to local advocacy campaigns around, for example, a #domesticDEC and local government accountability. The role of INGOs in this regard has been under scrutiny; see for example BOND's research around the changing role of UK-based INGOs (BOND, 2015). The global Covid-19 pandemic has further heightened our awareness of embedded inequalities and has prompted INGOs again to re-focus their work (Oxfam GB, 2020; McVeigh, 2021).

Fourthly, accountability and trust issues are now high on the agenda of governments, donating public and INGOs after the revelations in March 2018 of sexual misconduct and abuse of power in the humanitarian sector. This means that INGOs are strategizing as to how to regain this trust and demonstrate visibly their accountability to all they serve. In the case of IRW, with a headquarters in Birmingham, UK, their domestic programme in the UK sends a very clear message to UK-based supporters that it values their generous donations, is accountable to UK-based community donors and is committed to 'giving something back' to these communities.

IRW's domestic programmes are, therefore, situated in very particular geo-political and institutional contexts which make them worthy of attention today.

Methodology

The research into seven of IRW's domestic programmes was undertaken from March 2017 to August 2018 in three phases. The first phase focused on understanding the scope of the domestic programmes and establishing systems to collect and capture data. A research workshop with four Islamic Relief HAD staff in May 2017 agreed data collection approaches. A survey was undertaken of partner offices to understand the extent of each of their domestic programmes. In phase two a total of 39 interviews were conducted with 16 staff, 5 donors, 10 local partners and 8 beneficiaries. The final analysis and write-up phase of the research ran August – September 2018. To supplement the data from the 39 interviews, 23 sources of Islamic Relief 'grey literature', such as annual reports, presentations, draft and agreed strategies, were mined for data.

The seven key findings of the research were shared with IRW through a full research report published on IRW's HAD website (Pickering-Saqqa, 2018), two briefing papers for Partner Offices and IRW HAD staff, two presentations for the IRW Family Council meeting and staff (December 2018) and a blog in 2019 (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019a). Findings and analysis were later disseminated at three academic conferences between 2019 and 2021.

Theoretical Framework

In choosing to use Bourdieu's theory of practice as the theoretical framework for this analysis, I concur with arguments for the 'pragmatic deployment in empirical research' of *some* of his concepts, rather than taking on the multiple dimensions of his theory of practice (Wacquant, 2014: 118; Wacquant, 2018; 90). This flexible approach to Bourdieu's concepts has already been used within development studies and NGO research to investigate, for example: NGO-funder relations (Ebrahim, 2005:18); humanitarian decision-making (Krause, 2008); how development projects persist (Beck, 2017); entrepreneurship amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan (Refai et al, 2018); NGO accountability in Sri Lanka (Kuruppu and Lodhia, 2019), and INGO auditing (Goddard, 2020; Crewe and Mowles, 2021). There has to-date been no use of this framework to examine INGO domestic programmes and its potential in a post-Covid-19 world.

This chapter deploys the specific concepts or analytical tools of 'habitus' and 'doxic domain'. As I discuss below, these concepts are valuable as they have resonance and analytical potential for deeper more nuanced understandings of domestic programming. Others have provided very full explanations and summaries of Bourdieu's wide-ranging theory of practice (see, for example, Wacquant, 2018). I draw on these and my own reading of Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977) to provide these brief definitions.

The social structures in which we live are themselves structured by the intersection of power and physical space. These social structures can be seen as a 'matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions' (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977: 83). In other words, what we understand, perceive, choose, like and do are shaped by the world we live in and combine to create our 'habitus' – or our sense of what is 'normal'. This, in turn shapes practice in a way which can appear coherent and common sensical: as Bourdieu puts it 'history turned into nature' (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977: 78). However, habitus does not rigidly determine the future, as it is possible for events to re-shape or de-stabilize habitus, as Refai et al (2018) argue in the case of Syrian refugees arriving in Jordan. There has been debate whether 'habitus' can be applied to organisations, such as NGOs (Lizardo, 2004). This chapter builds on the argument that 'organisational habitus' is a legitimate and valuable concept as long as this is seen:

> *…not as the self-expressions of a singular actor, but rather, as compromise products of a whole complex of negotiations and contestations unfolding over time within that organisation* (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 19)

Thus, this chapter will explore the IRW organisational habitus.

I referred above to the need for the theoretical framework to have resonance with and analytical potential for the empirical findings of research. For this reason, the chapter also uses the concept of 'doxic domain' to describe and investigate the field of practice known as 'international development' in which IRW works. This brings together Bourdieu's concepts of 'doxa' and field. A 'field of practice' is a network of specialist knowledge and practice held together by common, if unstable, interests and understandings. This concept can be applied, for example, to international development in which relations between agencies such as the Department for International Development (incorporated in to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in 2020), the World Bank, Islamic Relief Worldwide are held together by shared approaches to what 'development' is. This study prefers the term 'domain' over 'field' as it distinguishes between Bourdieu's notion and the usage of the term 'field' in development studies as it refers to the geographical site of development or research (Jakimow, 2013).

The structuring processes and practices within a domain can bring about an alignment between the way issues are described and understood and the way they are, or 'a conformity between words and things, between discourse and reality' (Bourdieu, 1996). For example, the problem analysis undertaken for a USAID intervention in Egypt not only shapes the nature of the problem to be addressed (agricultural production or the military-industrial complex), and the subsequent project design, but also controls and perpetuates understandings of development itself, as a process applied to a distant 'object' (Mitchell, 1995). By shaping understandings of development this can create the appearance of universality or a natural order, which is, in fact constructed.

The immediate appeal of this understanding of 'domain' to this chapter is that it allows for an interrogation of the process by which the domain of international development is constructed, maintained, and potentially disrupted. I have argued elsewhere that Islamic Relief UK operates at the nexus of three domains: international development; Islamic belief and practice; the needs of Muslim communities in the UK (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019c). Each of these domains is constituted of networks of organisations, common practices, and codes of behaviours.

The '*doxa*' is the universe of the 'undiscussed' and self-evident beyond debates between orthodox and heterodox, which at least acknowledge other possibilities (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). Another way of thinking about this concept is the silent 'rules of the game'. The 'doxic domain' thus offers considerable analytical possibilities when applied to the domain of international development and the domestic programmes of INGOs. It provides a tool with which to query what might sit within the *doxic domain* of international development and what the implications are of moving its boundaries.

There are two key characteristics of the doxic domain of international development. Firstly, the doxic silence about the boundaries of the domain with the unspoken assumption that 'real' development only takes place in the global South. Cowen and Shenton (1996) argue that from the 1940s "The subject of development is that of the imperial state, before and after dismemberment, while its object is taken to be colonial and Third World peoples" (5). This is expressed through the structures, governance, policies and programmes of development agencies and the actions of donors.

Students and scholars of development studies have until recently taken for granted that the focus of their work and gaze is the global South (Lewis, 2014). This north-south binary has been challenged to some extent by the work of development ethics (Goulet, 1997), the universality of the SDGs and the rise of non-DAC donors (Mawdsley, 2012). However, the dominant paradigm that the object of international development is 'over there' not 'here' persists (Jones, 2000; Horner, 2019). Secondly, this domain is maintained and perpetuated through the practices of the agencies and individuals who work within it. So, for example, the 'over there-ism' of images used by development NGOs in their marketing and fundraising work which place development as something done at a distance rather than nearer to home contributes to the maintenance of this doxic domain (Dogra 2012; Kothari, 2014; Scott et al., 2018).

The interplay between the two concepts of habitus and doxic domain is succinctly explained by Kuruppu and Lodhia (2019: 183).

> *Various powerful actors can enact symbolic violence and inculcate doxa into a field. These experiences may embed themselves within individual (and organisational) habitus.*

Thus, the concepts of *habitus* and domain enable the analysis to capture the dynamic relationship between IRW and the social and political landscape in which it is situated. This facilitates a better understanding of domestic programmes. The chapter now puts these concepts to work, reaching a theoretically informed understanding of how IRW's domestic programmes contribute to the maintenance and/or de-stabilising of the organisational habitus and the doxic domain of international development.

Discussion

There is already evidence that Islamic Relief UK's habitus is situated at the nexus of three distinctive domains: international development; Islamic belief and practice, and the UK's Muslim communities (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019c). These three sources of legitimation are referenced in its Global Strategy for 2011–2015:

> …we will be moving away from a 'needs based' approach to poverty and

> development, and towards a ‘rights based’ approach which recognises that poor and suffering people have rights over us, as defined in the Qur’an and Sunnah.’ (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010: xx/39)

The UK domestic programme mobilises understandings of poverty and deprivation that reflect international development norms and practices and make sense to IR’s largely UK Muslim donating public and their understandings of their zakat obligations[1]. Acknowledgement of the disproportionate deprivation levels of Muslim communities in the UK is at the heart of the domestic programme. Muslims are, for example, more likely to suffer from double exclusion resulting from poor housing and Islamophobia (Perry and El-Hassan, 2008). They are disproportionately represented in indicators of deprivation such as housing, economic activity, and health (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015). The UK domestic programme, therefore, is an expression of and sits comfortably within the organisation’s existing habitus as illustrated in Figure 2.

<<Insert Figure 5.2 here>>

Figure 5.2: Islamic Relief UK *habitus*: Multiple domain model

Does the evidence from the other six domestic programmes point to a similar situation? At the federal level of Islamic Relief Worldwide, a powerful expression of this same organisational habitus is the policy document, *An Islamic perspective on Human Development* (Aminu-Kano, 2014). This document actively engages with dominant themes in the international development domain, such as definitions of poverty, non-material understanding of wellbeing, inequalities, sustainability, and governance. It asserts a rich intellectual heritage which pre-dates ‘international development’ scholarship, for example, citing the twelfth century scholar Imam Abu-Hamid Al-Ghazali’s work on the nature of human wellbeing. He identifies five essential dimensions of human wellbeing: faith, human-self, intellect, posterity, and wealth. These dimensions underpin IRW’s *Maqasid* (objectives) framework with human dignity at its centre. In acknowledging the multi-dimensionality of human wellbeing, it prompts us to consider that human development needs might be found beyond simplistic binaries of ‘developed’/’undeveloped’ countries.

> *The implications of this are that such an environment can only be created in societies that work to remove sources of human deprivation in multiple dimensions. This is contrary to the prevailing view of development focused on economic growth alone.* (Aminu-Kano, 2014: 3)

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[1] Zakat is the tax paid by observant adult Muslims based on their surplus wealth and distributed to those in need. The distribution is considered to be an act of justice rather than charity in which the beneficiary has rights over the donor, whose wealth is purified by the act of giving. It is seen as a mechanism for reducing economic and social inequalities and funding social services (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014: 22)

We can begin to see in the above example a dynamic tension within the IRW habitus between the domains of international development and Islamic belief and practice. However, this tension over the nature of ‘development’ is nothing new to the international development domain, with a broad consensus among scholars who work on social development that it cannot be reduced to economic prosperity and measures of Gross Domestic Product alone (Goulet, 1980; Deneulin and Alkire, 2018) and that attempts to do so are not ultimately effective (Tiwari, 2021).

Beyond the federal level of IRW there are indications from the data collected across the remaining six DPs in Canada, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden, USA that they sit at the nexus of this three-part habitus. This is shaped by the varied socio-political contexts in which they operate (see Figure 1) and structures and reinforces their practices as DPs. In 2014, the IR South Africa team decided to shift their focus to advocacy, in response to rising xenophobia, culminating in violent clashes in the townships where forced migrants were felt to be competing with local communities over scarce resources. Inspired by Islamic Relief’s paper, *The Rights of Forced Migrants in Islam* (Kidwai, 2014), IR South Africa collaborated with a grassroots organisation, the Muslim Refugees Association South Africa, to organise ‘conversations’ between communities in Cape Town where forced migrants lived. Here we see a convergence of the concerns of the international development community with that of South African Muslims and their religious beliefs.

In a context of global concern about forced migration particularly after the 2011 crisis in Syria, this IRW publication raises similar concerns to that of the Swiss Federal Commission on Migration (Zetter, 2014) such as the inadequacy of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the principles, and modalities of protection of migrants. The practical actions of IR South Africa responded to the needs of communities in conflict with migrants, inspired by the principles of their faith and that of their Muslim supporters. This example also reveals some tensions between the domain of Muslim community needs and Islamic belief and practice around how and on whom zakat can be spent. Data from South Africa suggests a clear perception and practice amongst donors, beneficiaries and partners that zakat funds can only be spent on Muslim communities. This does not align with IRW’s (unpublished) zakat policy which suggests all those in need, Muslim and non-Muslim, can benefit from zakat funding, while acknowledging this is an arena of contestation and interpretation amongst Islamic scholars.

The DPs in Germany and Sweden demonstrate a similar convergence of the three domains. The programmes in both countries were established in response to the inability of state agencies to cope with the numbers of refugees arriving from Syria and other areas of conflict in 2015. The national infrastructure of Germany is described as ‘overwhelmed’ by the arrival of between 7,000 and 10,000 people a day in late 2015. Likewise, IR Sweden used its existing networks of volunteers, mosques and people with Arabic and Dari language skills to respond to the arrival of 163,000 refugees into Sweden in 2015. The urgent and longer-term needs of increasing numbers of displaced people is one of the starting points for recent research into the future of the humanitarian eco-system (IARAN, 2017). IRW's 2017-2021 strategy identifies this as the number one issue impacting the future external operating environment for IRW. In 2015, Stockholm Mosque in collaboration with the Swedish Church and Islamic Relief Sweden supported a total of 4000 refugees from the Middle East and North Africa through what became known as the 'Good Neighbours Platform'. Stockholm mosque responded by opening the door for refugees to sleep inside the mosque and storing and distributing clothes and food. The Chair of Stockholm Mosque described this as part of the mosque's religious and humanitarian duty' and said:

> *Our mosque is the biggest mosque in Stockholm and in Friday prayer, our mosque accommodates 2000-2500 individuals. These individuals donate to the mosque and this donation forms the main source of financing .... This does not only contribute to the Muslim League but also to Islamic Relief Sweden. Islamic Relief Sweden has an office inside the mosque which they use intensively for fundraising and programme delivery.*

Islamic Relief Sweden coordinated the Platform, provided the food, clothes and other subsistence while churches hosted language teaching and cafes. The platform includes around 80 Swedish professionals such as medical doctors, lawyers and teachers volunteering to offer counselling, mentoring, training, Swedish language lessons and legal services.

There are two areas of tension felt within the DPs of Germany and Sweden. First is the growth of xenophobia and islamophobia. This is illustrated starkly by a story told by IR Germany staff who recounted a concern that the IRW logo (an image of a mosque with two tall minarets superimposed onto a globe) may need to be removed from the gifts they distribute to children at community fairs and via charity shops "in case they have right wing parents". Secondly, zakat is perceived as not a suitable funding source for DPs in some cases. This issue arises in IR Canada, UK and USA too, reflecting the contested nature of international zakat scholarship (IRW, 2014). One partner says:

> *Normally people want their zakat to go abroad. [Donors] need information raising and awareness of the needs. It is not clear enough that Zakat can and should be spent within Germany.*

Both these areas of tension potentially de-stabilise the IRW habitus, pulling their work into uncomfortable territory and beyond their areas of usual and visible practice. This is where we see the dynamic and structuring potential of habitus to bring about change in practice when previously 'unthinkable' alternatives are considered (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977: 77).

IR Canada's DP is a responsive grant programme structured around four strategic priorities: vulnerable youth, gender-based violence, refugee support and First Nations. Refugee support has dominated their work recently due to the arrival of Syrian refugees. One of their partners is the Muslim Resource Center for Social Support and Integration which identified the gap between the needs of the Muslim communities in Canada and service provision.

> *We build capacity within the Muslim community leaders to better understand the issue of violence and we help service providers understand how to better work with Muslim families impacted by family violence. We have been able to see the number of children entering care reduced because of one program with IR.*

IR USA funded 130 DP projects in 2016, including 8 US-based emergency responses, reaching over 120,000 beneficiaries. They run the DP as a responsive grant programme with four strategic priorities: refugee resettlement; food security and livelihoods; health; and disaster response and reduction. Seasonal programmes such as Ramadan and Qurbani are aligned to these thematic areas. This includes the Annual Day of Dignity at the end of Ramadan.

Once again, in these two DPs the convergence of the three domains of international development, Muslim community needs, and Islamic belief and practice is in evidence. This enables the DPs to be supported and respected and aligns them with IRW wider policy on human development. This stable organisational habitus gives the programmes sustainability and strategic 'protection'. However, there are also indications of tensions around funding which unsettle this habitus and make these programmes vulnerable. As noted above, the issue of whether zakat is an appropriate source of funding for DPs is alive in both IR Canada and IR USA. Older generations of Muslims in both Canada and the USA tend to consider that zakat should be spent according to need assessed by physical and material hardship. Together with this generation's ties to the countries of their birth, this results in a prioritisation among older Muslim donors of the needs of those in Syria or Iraq. As a Canadian donor puts it:

> *The older generation's attitude seems to be, regarding zakat, that you send the money where it is most needed, and in their cases, it's overseas. For the younger generation, all they want is an organisation they can trust, and they put the money there.*

In contrast, a US partner says:

> *I think that the millennials are the ones that are really thinking outside the box... and they're the ones that are saying that we need to invest our money in our community.*

This suggests that with generational shifts comes a rupturing of the IRW organisational habitus as the domains of Islamic belief and practice and Muslim community needs shift and re-configure. This may indicate a change of practice in the future.

An additional funding consideration that is visible in the data from DPs in Canada, UK and US is that of the attitude of Islamic Relief's own fundraisers to the DPs. A former IRW executive acknowledges that fundraisers:

> *…are much happier to sleep in the bed of international humanitarian response rather than in the bed of the local Domestic Programme. It's [fundraising for DPs] back breaking, it's a headache, but it is v strategic because it connects you ....*

Another member of staff said:

> *Often times they have a goal of what they want to raise in a year and when things get tight and they have to decide whether they're gonna do a meal for Syria or a clinic for Texas, the clinic will lose every time.*

Programme staff working on DPs challenge fundraising colleagues to find new ways to fundraise for local domestic communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. If DPs are a strategic priority, as the IRW Global Strategy, 2017-2021 suggests, fundraising and marketing teams need to be encouraged and resourced to enable this to happen. Some Partner Offices questioned whether there was really a desire within IR to conduct domestic programming as opposed to fundraising. This is rooted in the apparent tension in the identity and purpose at the heart of DPs. Are they programmes to meet real priority needs or are they fundraising or volunteer development vehicles? Or can they be both? This is related to the fundamental issue of whether IRW is an organisation funding 'international programmes' and how far its work maintains or challenges the doxic domain of international development.

The concept of a doxic domain is particularly useful when considering ideas perceived as counter-intuitive or contradictory, such as INGOs having domestic poverty programmes (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019a). The chapter's contention is that the organisational habitus of IRW is situated at the nexus of three domains: that of Islamic belief and practice, Muslim community needs and international development. Our focus here is the international development domain, its unspoken assumptions, and unasked questions. As I have outlined above, there are two key characteristics of the doxic domain of international development: the doxic silence about the boundaries of the domain, and the practices which maintain and perpetuate this domain.

However, the norms within and boundaries of each domain are dynamic and can be impacted by the organisational *habitus* of its constituent members (Lizardo, 2004). This means that the shifts within the IRW organisational *habitus* noted above have potential implications for the doxic domain of international development. I outline here some of the evidence for the interplay between and possible maintenance and rupture of the domain by the IRW DPs in the seven countries under discussion.

The aspects of the DPs which appear to provide mutual support to the doxic domain of international development are its funding and donor assumptions. It is taken for granted, for example, that priority will always be given to funding international causes which attract widespread publicity and that remaining funds are allocated to domestic work. This is in part because people associate Islamic Relief with its high-profile international work, for example in Syria and Palestine.

> *people will watch and see famine and disasters in another country and say, 'Canada is a great country, no one dies from hunger' and 'why do we need work domestically'?*

> *They know that we help international beneficiaries, when I meet donors outside, they know that we give to Palestine, Syria, not Malaysia.*

In addition, is the primary fundraising function of the Partner Offices which situates the domestic programmes at the heart of the 'gift economy' (Mawdsley, 2012: 147) and structures of 'trusteeship' (Cowen and Shenton, 1996: 472). This means that the achievement of any meaningful social change or justice through domestic programmes is subsidiary to the relationship of trusteeship. This relationship enables donors to perceive themselves as knowing and moral while their unreciprocated giving "allows social inequality to be naturalized as the 'normal order of things'" (Mawdsley, 2012: 149). This set of power relations between donor and recipient is at the heart of the doxic domain of international development. This is further maintained in the DPs by specific practices. For example, a lack of staff capacity, minimal profile and visibility in public facing communications, domestic partner selection processes and insufficient resource for donor education. There is a notable lack of enthusiasm amongst fundraisers for the DPs: *I think it would be a real challenge to fundraise for a [X country] project in the absence of a specific disaster.*

However, there is also evidence of the IRW DPs rupturing and challenging the doxic domain of international development. Areas of new debate are emerging through the DPs which may otherwise have remained silent. Firstly, young Muslims in the countries of the seven POs are faced with a range of challenges. These include lack of skills for jobs, livelihoods and relationships, mental health concerns and social media scrutiny. At the same time, they have enormous aspirations and ambitions, want to be active citizens, and have new ideas to offer about the fulfilment of their religious and social obligations. This is 'Generation M' who have significant economic and creative potential (Janmohamed, 2016). Their faith-inspired approach to their obligations as global citizens opens up new possibilities in the international development domain. There is some evidence of this already in the role that Muslim community organisations with IRW DPs played in the responses to the Flint water crisis in the USA and Grenfell Tower fire in the UK. The post-disaster response was coordinated largely by faith-based agencies with their teams of young volunteers very visible. This led to the discussion about the need for a domestic equivalent of the Disasters Emergency Committee (Plastow, 2018). The National Emergencies Trust was established to play this role in 2019 (Cooney, 2019). Its Assistant Director, Fundraising (at the time of writing) previously worked at both DEC and Islamic Relief.

The DPs bring new experience and understandings to IRW staff, partners and beneficiaries.

> *I only knew that Islamic Relief supported projects in the UK after I got involved in Approachable Parenting, then I knew. Apart from that I just saw all the fundraising that goes on for things overseas, so I didn't know but I think that's great. I think when you give money and when you give to charity you should give far but you should also give near as well because shouldn't we be mindful of what's going on in our doorstep. I think it's great and I think Islamic Relief need to talk more about it.*

The DP work pushes at the boundaries of what is understood by 'development' to include within it parenting skills, mental health counselling, language lessons for refugees. As illustrated in the quotation above, this begins to shape a more inclusive approach to development in which more people can feel involved. There is also evidence that in doing this work there is a growing awareness amongst IRW staff, partners, and donors of broader multi-dimensional understandings of human wellbeing, aligned with IRW's *maqasid* framework and the universalist thrust of the SDGs. As I have argued elsewhere, DPs enable donors to see that poverty and deprivation relate to power and powerlessness and not just material scarcity (Pickering-Saqqa, 2019c).

For IRW internally the DPs are a potential vehicle for debating how *zakat* can be spent, bringing together the views of religious scholars, individual and institutional donors, young people (including IR volunteers) and their community partners. The value of zakat (and other Islamic financial instruments) to the international development domain is now widely acknowledged (Aziz, 2020; Bilo and Machado, 2019; Ismail, 2018) but its power to re-shape the domain has perhaps not been recognised. Although funding and fundraisers play a role in maintaining the current 'gift economy' approach of international development, there are also possibilities for them to rupture this doxic domain by bringing creative and radical ideas into the realm of discussion and debate, rather than remaining in doxic silence. This has resonance with Goulet's much earlier call for the term 'development' "to be redefined, demystified, and thrust into the arena of moral debate… [where] it may open up new perspectives" (1971: xix).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored seven domestic programmes within the Islamic Relief Worldwide 'family', seeking to gain a greater understanding of IRW's strategic commitment to the programmes and their wider challenges and significance. At another level it has sought to make use of Bourdieu's theory of practice to provide these insights, wielding the conceptual tools of habitus and doxic domain in revisiting the original empirical data.

This process has proved fruitful and reveals several interesting tentative conclusions about IRW's organisational habitus. Firstly, all seven domestic programmes are situated at the nexus of three domains of practice: international development, Muslim community needs and Islamic belief. This supports earlier findings in relation to Islamic Relief UK and suggests a dynamic organisational habitus for the domestic programmes underpinned by IRW's policy and approaches to human development and forced migration. Secondly, the organisational habitus is experiencing tension with the push-pull between these three domains in each of the DPs. This is evidenced in the debates about the use of zakat as a legitimate source of funding for DPs and the context of xenophobia and Islamophobia in which most of the DPs operate.

There are further conclusions about the relationship between the DPs and the doxic domain of international development. Firstly, the funding and donor assumptions of the DPs reinforces this doxic domain, maintaining silences and the taken-for-granted nature of "the rules of the game" and the dominance of the 'gift economy' approach in the domain. Some IRW fundraising practices and strategic decisions about resourcing and marketing perpetuate these assumptions. However, there is evidence of significant areas where the DPs can begin to change mindsets and challenge the doxic domain of international development. This is especially the case where the DPs create space for new ways of thinking and debates about what development is, where it happens, who is included in it and how it is funded. These are important considerations for scholars and practitioners as they face the challenges of working in a post-Covid-19 world.

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