School of Social Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies.

University of East London.

PhD research in progress.

Yearbook I

CONTENTS

Preface.


Chapter 1. Cigdem Esin: “Sexuality narratives of two generations of ‘modern’ women in Turkey.”

Chapter 2. Henriette Gunkel: “What do we see when we look at ourselves?’ visual dissidence towards (post)colonial sex/gender organisations within post-apartheid South African culture.”

Chapter 3. Aygen S. Kurt: “Realising Turkey’s potential within the European Information Society project.”

Chapter 4. Patricia K. Litho: “Conceptualising feminism in Africa: is it merely politics of naming?”

Chapter 5. Ulrike Vieten: “Situated outlooks on discourses of Europeanised cosmopolitanism: all inclusive or exclusive?”

Concluding discussion.

Appendix I List of the pre-2005 PhD entrants to the School, and their research topics.

Appendix II Derek Robbins: “The Conflict of the Faculties” (Keynote address given at “Contexts, Fields, Positions: Situating Cultural Research”, a Postgraduate conference at the University of East London, May 25-26, 2006, organised by PhD students in the School with funding from the Arts & Humanities Research Council).
Preface

The School of Social Sciences and the School of Cultural and Innovation Studies of the University of East London merged in the autumn of 2004 to constitute the School of Social Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies. The merger brought together almost 50 registered PhD students in each School. This seemed an ideal opportunity to organise PhD student seminars which would explore the boundaries between the disciplines which had traditionally been represented in the two different Schools of the university.

Since October, 2004, therefore, there have been five discrete series of seminars which have attempted to provide a framework within which PhD students can situate their personal research in relation to the research of others and in relation to different intellectual perspectives within the broad field of the Humanities and Social Sciences. These seminars have been framed in slightly different conceptual ways in part to meet the needs of students at different stages in their research, differentiating mainly, for instance, between the initial stage in which a research project is proposed for registration and the subsequent stages in which research is undertaken and findings are prepared for submission. The five series were:

1. Semester A, 2004/5. This was designed for the 2003/4 student cohort in their second year. Student presentations were framed by an introduction to the reflexive sociology of research proposed by Bourdieu et al in The Craft of Sociology (1991, 1968).

2. Semester B, 2004/5. The 2003/4 cohort in their second year were joined by the 2004/5 cohort, post registration. Student presentations in every session were matched with presentations given by active staff researchers in the School.

3. Semester A, 2005/6. Student presentations for the 2003/4 and 2004/5 cohorts, culminating in the student-led organisation of a national conference on Inter-disciplinarity in the Humanities and Social Sciences funded by the AHRC, with guest speakers, including representatives of the relevant AHRC and ESRC inter-disciplinary committees.

4. Semester A, 2005/6. This was distinct from 3 above and was designed for the 2005/6 cohort in their first year as part of their preparation for submitting registration documentation. Student presentations were framed by introductory sessions on the state of German social theory in the 1960s; the state of French social theory in the 1960s; the Franco-German social theory debate of the 1980s; concluding with a session on the state of contemporary social theory in Britain with a view to enabling students to contextualise their own work.

5. Semester A, 2006/7. Student presentations framed by introductory sessions which presented the changing social conditions in the UK for the production of Humanities and Social Science Research from 1945 to the present, focusing on the post-war work of Karl Mannheim; the emergence of New Left cultural analysis in the 1960s; and the post-1980s implications of the work of journals and publishing houses founded at that time such as Theory, Culture and Society, and Polity Press.

The organisation of these seminars has been based on two related principles, both of which are themselves scrutinised during all the series:

a. that the relationship between disciplines is not to be understood abstractly or historically by reference to an idealist philosophy of knowledge but, rather, to be understood in terms of the changing social conditions of production of knowledge.

b. that an intrinsic part of the process of undertaking research is that researchers, including PhD students are agents who modify in their practice the conceptual structures within which they operate – that there is a constant tension whereby
the logics of discovery which may be non-disciplinary often have to be expressed in disciplinary discourses.

In March, 2007, the university's Graduate School invited Schools to apply for funding to encourage Interdisciplinary Research Seminars. The successful bid from the School of Social Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies sought funding which would, in part, enable the limited publication of Yearbooks of PhD research in the School which would reflect the ethos and the intellectual character of the sessions of the seminar series.

Yearbooks I and II are the outcomes from this internal funding from the Graduate School and are the results of collaboration and discussion between myself, contributing students and other PhD students during the period of this funding from April to July, 2007. Yearbook I represents the character of the first three of the series described above, whilst Yearbook II is based on the last two.

The form and purpose of the seminars and of these associated publications relate substantially to my engagement with the thought and practice of Pierre Bourdieu. Put boldly, the form and purpose have been designed to encourage a reflexive sociology of social and cultural research. It is completely appropriate that these Yearbooks should reflect my involvement in the processes of discussion – pursuing my own intellectual project through participation in the projects of PhD students, not as a lector transmitting pre-established knowledge and information but as an auctor seeking to foster new insights and approaches. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the contributions are examples of 'work in progress' and are assembled in the same spirit as encouraged Bourdieu to establish his own journal in 1975 to publish research activity rather than findings, which, accordingly, he named the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. The student papers have their origins in work leading towards the completion of their PhD theses. In some cases they have been presented only internally whilst in other cases they have been presented at conferences and are being prepared for publication elsewhere. It is important to stress that these are not finished pieces of work and are published here without prejudicing either the possibility of other, modified publication or the views of examiners of final theses.

The intention of each Yearbook is to represent the ethos of the seminars but, again, it is important to emphasize that in no sense are the contributions properly 'representative'. In each case, an appendix gives information about the research activity of registered PhD students in the School. Of these, only a proportion has found it possible to attend regularly the fortnightly seminar series. Of those who have attended regularly, only a proportion have been able to spare precious time to become involved in this publication project. The contributions are, therefore, unashamedly random indications of the totality. There has been no selection of contributions, either in terms of the supposed quality of the work or in terms of relevance to any thematic principle guiding the collection. Each Yearbook includes a discussion of the contents, as a virtual Table ronde of contributors, and this chapter does enounce some ex post facto consensus about each collection, but it remains the case that the 'organizing' principle of the texts is based on a commitment to articulated 'difference' or dissensus.

There is a progression from Yearbook I to Yearbook II. My Introduction to Yearbook I explores the analogy between the construction of a research culture for PhD students within a multi-disciplinary School and the historical construction in Paris in the 1960s of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, reinforced ideologically by the publication, in 1968, of Le métier de sociologue. (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968, 1991). The emphasis of this collection is on the social encounter of persons from different cultural backgrounds, coming together almost arbitrarily at UEL from 2004 to 2007. The emphasis of Yearbook I is on the way in which inter-disciplinary work is perhaps based on this social encounter within an institutional setting as much as on the abstract relations between instituted disciplines. The second appendix to Yearbook I reproduces the paper which I gave at the student conference which was the climax to 2005/6 in which I tried to set the work which we had undertaken in
the seminars in the context of discussion of the way in which Bourdieu had made use, in *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu, 1984, 1988), of Kant’s text on the ‘Conflict of the Faculties’. The point of Yearbook II is to move on from the symbolic interactionist emphasis of Yearbook I to explore what might be the implications for the production of research of the ways in which historically the boundaries between disciplines have been constructed. My Introduction to Yearbook II represents the case-studies examined in the seminars – especially the historical production of social research by Mannheim in the immediate post-World War II period in the UK, and then the development of Cultural Studies by the New Left in the 1960s as a form of socio-political critique. The intention is that these two publications will stimulate the production of annual Yearbooks which will represent ongoing dialogue between research students and, through them, between academic discourses.

References


*Derek Robbins, July 2007*
Introduction:

For a socio-genetic understanding of trans-disciplinary research

Derek Robbins

A Social Theory group was formed in 1983 at the Center for Psychosocial Studies in Chicago. During the 1980s Moishe Postone, Edward LiPuma, and Craig Calhoun were involved in a series of readings and discussions of Bourdieu's work. These culminated in a conference in March-April, 1989, which Bourdieu attended. The outcome was Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993), which ended with Bourdieu's reflections on the comments of his critics, entitled “Concluding Remarks: for a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works”. In this article, Bourdieu makes two typical points. The first is to insist that his work should not be appropriated by what one might call ‘theoreticism’. He wrote:

“If you will allow me an image true to the spirit of my theory of practice (and thus of scientific practice), I blame most of my readers for having considered as theoretical treatises, meant solely to be read or commented upon, works that, like gymnastics handbooks, were intended for exercise, or even better, for being put into practice; that is, as books that put forth so many programs for work, observation, and experimentation. This way of conceiving scientific work (absolutely irreducible to the kind of pure ‘theoretical work’ that has come back into fashion this past decade in American social science and in all the countries still strongly dominated by it) was in perfect agreement with the conviction – which, from the very beginning, inspired my research strategies – that one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality, historically situated and dated, but only in order to construct it as an instance (cas de figure) in a finite universe of possible configurations.” (Calhoun et al. 1993, 271-2)

As stated here, the corrective to theoreticism is the recognition that research is essentially practical. Also, however, Bourdieu argued that his practical work derived from his social dispositions – from a fundamental anti-intellectualism:

“I think, without being able to prove it, that my propensity to anti-intellectualism, by progressively converting itself into a systematic will to bracket intellectual doxa – that is to say, the presuppositions that intellectuals accept as part of the background of their activity – was at the root of a series of more or less profound ruptures bound to shock, sometimes very profoundly, intellectuals.” (Calhoun et al., 1993, 269)

This Introduction joins together three seminar sessions which were designed to generate consideration of what should be the nature of the involvement of individual researchers within the collective, institutionalised context of a multidisciplinary School of a modern university. My contention is that Bourdieu first developed a notion of reflexivity as an extension of the sociology of knowledge. What started, however, as epistemological reflexivity gradually came to be articulated anthropologically or ontologically. The essence of collective activity had to be immersion in research practice which was fully conscious of its origins in pre- (or anti-) intellectual motivations. The first section explores this issue by reference to Le métier de sociologue, written in 1968 by Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron. The second section invites the use of Bourdieu’s sociology of students and student sub-culture as a possible perspective on the pre-intellectual origins of research
problems generated by PhD students. The third section suggests that consideration of
Lyotard’s introduction to Phenomenology might lead to a fuller understanding of the
ontological dimension of Bourdieu’s epistemology.

1.
Bourdieu was trained as a philosopher at the Ecole normale supérieure, Paris, from 1950-
1954. He gained a diplôme d’études supérieures with a translation of Leibniz’s critique of
Cartesian epistemology and a critical commentary. This suggests not only that Bourdieu was
trained in ‘continental’ rationalist philosophy – as opposed to training in the British
‘empirical’ tradition – but also that, within the ‘rationalist’ tradition, he was hostile to the
mind/body separation of Cartesian dualism and, instead, sympathetic to the emphasis of
engagement in Leibniz’s thinking Bourdieu began to plan research for a doctorate which
would have been a philosophical study, from a phenomenological perspective, of the
temporal dimensions of affective relations. It was to have been supervised by Georges
Canguilhem, who was both a philosopher and a qualified medical doctor, but, instead,
Bourdieu was conscripted to serve in the French army in Algeria in 1956 at the beginning of
the Algerian War of Independence. I think Bourdieu managed to be posted with an
intelligence division and, certainly, by 1958, he was already working as an assistant at the
University of Algiers – teaching Kant and Saussure. Whilst in Algeria, he began to explore
empirically the issues which he was originally to have considered in the framework of
speculative philosophy. He called his work: “Fieldwork in Philosophy”. In Algeria, therefore,
Bourdieu’s research problematic was an extension of his interest in the phenomenology of
affective relations – modifying American acculturation studies to seek to generate a
phenomenology of cultural adaptation from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ values, related to the
enforced migration from rural to urban areas.

Trained as a philosopher and with a philosophical problematic, Bourdieu’s attempt to carry
out empirical enquiry was largely self-taught. He learned research methods and statistical
analysis as he carried out his research. Both in practice and philosophically, Bourdieu was
disposed to think that social research should not operate with predefined ‘methodologies’
but should develop appropriate research methods in practice. Having undertaken research
in Algeria in 1958-1961, Bourdieu published three books – Sociologie de l’Algérie, (Bourdieu,
1958); Travail et travailleurs en Algérie, (Bourdieu, 1963); and Le déracinement, (Bourdieu,
1964). These were the products of different stages of the same research project. Sociologie
de l’Algérie attempted to offer ethnographic case-studies of the status quo ante of modern
Algerian society – analysing the social organisation of four tribes. Travail et travailleurs
attempted to measure cultural adaptation – providing one part of statistical information and
a second part containing interpretative analysis, whilst there were also numerous appendices
containing transcripts of interviews. Bourdieu wrote an introduction to the second part in
which he discussed the relationship between statistical and ethnographic analysis – between
quantitative and qualitative procedures.

On returning to mainland France, Bourdieu attended the research seminars of Lévi-Strauss
and this is reflected in the second edition of Sociologie de l’Algérie, published in 1961, in
which Bourdieu presented his accounts of tribal social organisation in terms of binary
oppositions, often expressed diagrammatically. He taught Philosophy at the University of
Lille and, at the same time (in about 1962) became secretary to a research group established
by Raymond Aron in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales – the Centre de
sociologie européenne. Working in a team of young researchers, and mainly in collaboration
with Jean-Claude Passeron, Bourdieu initiated a series of sociological research projects – on
students, on museums/art galleries, and on photography. The books which were the
outcomes of these projects used sophisticated techniques of quantitative analysis. Bourdieu
was trying to establish a sociological research centre whilst remaining aware of the fact that
the discourse of sociological explanation is only one culturally and historically contingent
framework to deploy in understanding social reality.

The publication of Les héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964) contributed to the disquiet
about French universities which reached a climax in the ‘May events’ of 1968. As a response
to the student unrest, the French government introduced higher education reform which
included the establishment of an ‘experimental’ university – Paris VIII at Vincennes. Several significant contemporaries – Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze – joined the new institution but, instead, Bourdieu chose to try to institutionalise the practice of research rather than become involved in attempts to modify the curriculum which would be taught in the new university.

The attempt to institutionalise sociological research practice rather than canonise sociological knowledge led Bourdieu to organise the production of handbooks for research students. Several handbooks were projected, but only the first – *Le métier de sociologue*, 1968, - with J.-C. Chamboredon and J.-C. Passeron - was actually published. It outlined the ‘epistemological preliminaries’ of sociological research. The text has a long introduction to a collection of passages extracted from the work of sociologists working within different ideological traditions. It attempted to demonstrate that the work of Durkheim, Weber, Marx and others was undertaken with a common methodological impulse – to understand social relations in terms of a discourse peculiarly appropriate to those relations – even though each had attempted to deduce different social theories from their findings.

The conclusion to the long introduction to *Le métier de sociologue* is sub-titled “Sociology of knowledge and epistemology”. Bourdieu et al. were anxious to emphasize that the ‘sociology of knowledge’ should remain instrumental and should not become a body of knowledge in itself. They were equally anxious to argue that although they were recommending the instrumentality of applying the sociology of knowledge to sociological production (what Bourdieu was later to call ‘reflexivity’), they were not advocating this procedure simply to strengthen the status of Sociology. They wrote:

“The sociology of sociological knowledge can provide the sociologist with the means of giving epistemological critique its full force and its specific form, when it is a matter of bringing to light the unconscious presuppositions and begged questions of a theoretical tradition, rather than of calling into question the principles of a constituted theory.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 69)

Bourdieu et al. adhered to the ‘historical epistemology’ of Gaston Bachelard which required that social historical research should analyse the social conditions of emergence of intellectual disciplines and of explanatory competition between them, such as, for instance, physics and biology or sociology and psychology. Reflexivity should question the grounds of existence of discipline discourses and should not be reduced to a methodological technique within discourses, designed to consolidate and legitimate them. *Le métier de sociologue* should be read alongside an article which Bourdieu and Passeron had published together a year before - “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967) – where they had tried to produce a social history of the French post-war period which would explain sociologically the competing movements in Philosophy and Sociology and simultaneously enable them to articulate the position which they were attempting strategically to establish. *Le métier de sociologue* was a manifesto which clarified their own position-taking.

The position which Bourdieu and Passeron tried to adopt was, therefore, unashamedly particular to the circumstances of France in the late 1960s. They argued against the ‘neopositivism’ of American sociological research on the grounds that it was philosophically flawed but also on the grounds that it had become excessively professionalised. They regarded their philosophical and social objections as inseparable:

“In contemporary French sociology, the attraction exerted by positivism is perhaps due not so much to the intrinsic seductions of this brief philosophy of scientific practice, or to the place occupied by sociology in a hypothetical evolutionary pattern valid for all sciences, but rather to a set of social and intellectual conditions.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 69-70).

Or, again:
“The professionalization of research, linked to the use of substantial grants, the growing number of research staff, and therefore the appearance of large research units, has led to a technical division of labour that owes its specificity to the ideology of the autonomy of operations which it has engendered.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 71).

In opposition, Bourdieu et al. tried to establish an anti-positivist philosophy of social science and to establish a social space within which this social science could be practised in such a way that it did not endorse the presuppositions of system-world sponsors or funding agencies. For them, it was necessary to construct an autonomous social space within which to practise reflexive research. Against positivism, they insisted that no research or social analysis can be presuppositionless:

“The code that the sociologist uses to decipher the behaviour of social subjects has been constituted through socially qualified learning-processes and always partakes of the cultural codes of the different groups to which he belongs. Of all the cultural presuppositions that the researcher is liable to involve in his interpretations, the one which operates most insidiously and most systematically is his class ethos, the principle which in turn organizes the acquisition of his other unconscious models. Because each social class derives the fundamental principles of its ideology of the functioning and evolution of society from a primary experience of social reality in which, among other things, determinisms are felt more or less directly, a sociologist who fails to perform the sociology of the relation to society that is characteristic of his own social class is likely to reintroduce into his scientific relation to the object the unconscious presuppositions of his own primary experience of the social, or, more subtly, the rationalizations that enable an intellectual to reinterpret his experience in accordance with a logic which always owes something to the position which he occupies within the intellectual field.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 72-3).

The necessary reflection on the presuppositions which condition the selection of research problems and research findings was not, for Bourdieu et al., the prelude to the isolation of epistemological purity:

“If, in order to reflect on himself reflecting, each sociologist has to resort to the sociology of sociological knowledge, he cannot hope to escape from relativization by a necessarily fictitious effort to tear himself completely away from all the determinations that define his social situation and to attain the ethereal standpoint of true knowledge where Mannheim situated his ‘free-floating intellectuals’.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 74)

On the contrary, the necessary reflection could only be achieved by immersion in the social processes which impinge on research practice:

“Every scientific community is a social microcosm, furnished with institutions for control, constraint, and training – academic authorities, juries, critical forums, research councils, co-option panels, etc. – which define the norms of professional competence and tend to inculcate the values that they express.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 74)

It is only by participating in such a community and by contributing to the communal self-definition of scientific values that academic researchers can resist the influence of the system world on scientific enquiry. In spite of their philosophical opposition to Durkheim’s positivism, it is significant that Bourdieu et al. end their conclusion with a quote from Durkheim which indicates that they acknowledged that they shared Durkheim’s commitment to the institutionalisation of social scientific practice precisely so as to make social research socially functional in securing social democratic participation against the intrusions of state intervention:

“In short, the scientific community has to provide itself with specific forms of social interchange, and, like Durkheim, one is entitled to see a symptom of its heteronomy
in the fact that, in France at least, and even today, it is too often responsive to the
non-scientific enticements of intellectual 'worldliness': 'We believe,' wrote Durkheim
at the end of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, 'that the time has come for sociology
to renounce worldly successes, so to speak, and to take on the character which befits
all science. Thus it will gain in dignity and authority what it will perhaps lose in
popularity.'" (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 77)

Bourdieu et al. attempt to argue that the institutionalisation of a discourse of sociological
research practice is not just a matter of consolidating a discourse and a particular scientific
terminology but also of establishing a community of researchers committed to the same
goals. The habitation of autonomous social space and the construction of a scientific
discourse were necessary concomitant actions to counteract the intrusion of state control in
determining social self-understanding. Although Bourdieu still at this stage recommended
the use of the sociology of knowledge to strengthen the practice of sociological research, in
the 1970s he was to develop a personal approach – which could be called 'post-structuralist'
– by which he sought to reintroduce his earlier phenomenological thinking so as to generate
a phenomenological critique of scientific discourses.

2. Although Bourdieu was quickly thought to be a 'sociologist of education' as a result of his
work on students and their studies in the early 1960s – particularly in anglo-saxon countries
after the publications of the translations of *Les héritiers* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964) and *La
Reproduction* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) into English in 1979 and 1977 respectively – in
important respects the research which led to these publications pursued further the
problems investigated in Algeria at the end of the 1950s. Firstly, Bourdieu had attempted to
analyse the process of cultural adaptation of Algerian tribespeople as they settled in Algiers,
modifying 'traditional' attitudes towards, for instance, time and work in an urban, 'modern'
environment. Secondly, Bourdieu had analysed the condition of the Algerian 'sub-
proletariat' and had contended that, in the colonial North African situation, Marxist analysis
was only useful deployed relatively rather than absolutely. In other words, Bourdieu argued
that social thought and behaviour are not socio-economically determined in an identically
universal manner. Rather, the extent to which they are 'conditioned' is a function of the
nature of the social condition. The life chances of socio-economically disadvantaged people
are more conditioned by their socio-economic condition than are the life chances of those
people who possess the capital which enables them to transcend their situations. There is a
spectrum of socio-economic determinism rather than an absolute formula.

Bourdieu chose to analyse the situation of students precisely because he thought that they
constituted a social sub-group which, as a result of the process of educational instruction,
was likely to be less 'conditioned' by class difference than most of the population. The
purpose of the investigation was to go beyond Marxist analysis to argue that 'class'
differentiation occurs even in a sub-group of the population where it might be thought to be
most explicitly eliminated. Bourdieu took the statistics of class and regional factors in
admission to French higher education at the time as a given – acknowledging that there were
obvious class discriminations, but he wanted to demonstrate that, additionally,
differentiations and distinctions are socially constructed after admission within a context
which might be thought to be relatively independent of class determination. *Les héritiers*
explores the mechanisms of cultural differentiation within higher education institutions –
analysing the effects of a range of factors such as domestic working conditions, part-time
working, and residential situation. He showed that universities are not the guardians of
autonomous knowledge content but that, for instance, the choices made by students –
whether, in the case of his sample, to study Sociology or Philosophy – are choices which
relate to their social trajectories generally. He also began to suggest what he developed
more strongly in *La Reproduction* and then, later, in *La Noblesse d’état* (Bourdieu, 1989) that
choices of institutions are self-fulfilling – that, in other words, there is a reciprocal
relationship between the status of universities in the hierarchical structure of universities
and the social trajectories of staff and students in those universities.
The contemporary relevance of Bourdieu’s research of the early 1960s needs close consideration, particularly in relation to the post-1992 marketisation of higher education institutions in the UK and to the effects of post-1997 government policies. Are we seeing written large the phenomenon which Bourdieu identified within existing French universities? Is the attempt to remove class discrimination and to widen access to higher education to accommodate 50% participation occurring alongside a masking of continuing forms of cultural discrimination within institutions and between institutions within the Higher Education system? How do these issues relate to our perceptions, as staff and students, of our situations and to our definitions of the kinds of research which we try to undertake?

3.

Bourdieu initiated a research seminar at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1969 at which he inaugurated a series of research projects which aimed to produce a sociological analysis of artistic and intellectual production during the French 3rd Republic (1871-1940). It was here that he undertook the research on Flaubert and Manet which generated articles on both and, finally, *Les Règles de l’art* (Bourdieu, 1992) – translated as *The Rules of Art* (Bourdieu, 1996). Equally, this research seminar generated the body of research on the intellectuals of the 3rd Republic published by Christophe Charle. Bourdieu subjected artistic and intellectual production to sociological analysis, using his concept of ‘field’ to mitigate crude Marxist analysis and to argue that ‘fields’ of production generate their own autonomous rules whilst the ‘fields’ themselves can be understood as the contingent products of historical, socio-economic changes. Bourdieu’s changing attitude towards Flaubert’s work is indicative of his own changing position in relation to sociology and art between 1969 and 1992. Initially, Bourdieu argued that Flaubert’s social observation – his proto-sociology – was diminished by his accession to the rules of literary production in transmitting his insights, whereas, by 1992, Bourdieu was celebrating the capacity of art to be socially critical – in contrast to the discourse of sociology which had become acquiescent in an unacceptable social system.

There were similar factors in the intellectual trajectories of Lyotard and Bourdieu. Both were influenced by Phenomenology and both were affected intellectually by their experiences in Algeria in the 1950s. Lyotard’s early introduction to Phenomenology (Lyotard, 1991, first published 1954)) was a brilliant short account of the key ideas of Phenomenology and of the influence of Husserl and of Merleau-Ponty on post-war French thought. On returning to mainland France, Lyotard wrote several books in which he developed his critique of Marx and Freud and moved towards a position which had affinities with the Nietzschean influences on Foucault and Deleuze. He carried out research in Paris which led to the production of a thesis on *Discours, Figure* (published in 1971) in which he argued that the power of artistic expression had been neutralised by attempts of criticism to subject art to rational analysis.

Lyotard became disposed to identify different kinds of narrative – one generating discursive science and the other expressive creativity. Although Bourdieu was prepared to acknowledge that scientific discourses are socially constructed, he also believed that this was true of literary or artistic forms of expression. Bourdieu’s solution, therefore, was to try to allow sociology to operate at a meta-level so as to create social analyses both of science and of creative expression. The key difference between Bourdieu and Lyotard, therefore, is that Lyotard’s differentiation between kinds of discursive and figurative expression tends to be dualistic, whereas Bourdieu tries to subject a spectrum of expressions to sociological analysis. By attempting to do this, of course, Lyotard would have argued that Bourdieu was colluding in a neutralisation of the potential influence of art.

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Chapter 1

Sexuality Narratives of Two Generations of ‘Modern’ Women in Turkey

Cigdem Esin

It was my first encounter with discussions of the connection between “being a feminist” and “sexuality” in the late 1980s when I was a younger woman at high school. One of my classmates, who was not reluctant to voice her belief in gender equality and used to be called a “feminist”, brought a book to the class. It was written by one of the feminist activists of the newly emerging feminist movement in Turkey. The book called “Woman Has No Name” was about the relationships of a woman including sexual ones. It created a scandal when it was first published, and was categorized as ‘naughty publication’ by the high censorship board of the time. The publications under this category used to be sold within a plastic cover in order to inhibit their offensive influences against the moral values of the society. My friend was labelled as a “loose” girl because of the book. However, she had created a question mark – at least- in my mind: A question mark on the connection between sexuality and gender equality. Having been brought up by a mother who was one of the teachers of “modern” Turkey, I had strongly believed in the equality of women and men in public life. However, I had not even thought about sexuality as an issue that could be raised in the public sphere before. Thinking of how the private part of our lives was political at the same time was beyond my imagination then. I had not realized that I was one of the candidates of the ‘emancipated but unliberated’ (Kandiyoti, 1997a) women of the Turkish modernisation/westernisation who was at the edge of a transformation in seeking for her identit(ies) as ‘modern’ woman.

When I started my PhD research, which aims to understand the complex and antagonistic discourses and practices interwoven in the domain of sexuality for well-educated young women in contemporary Turkey, I was aware of the necessity that my analysis should include the discourse of modernisation. Since our, women’s narratives of personal histories and identities have been relational to either dominant or counter narratives on the modernisation project of the Turkish Republic. However, the strong emphasis on being ‘modern’ in one of the respondents’, Zuhal’s interview made me think about contextualising the individual narratives of sexuality within Turkish modernisation.

Throughout the history of the modernisation project of the Turkish Republic, the identities of women have been constructed and reconstructed by nationalist-modernist discourses as subjects (or objects) of politics. Similar to nationalist and ethnic processes in other geographies, the control of women and women’s sexuality has been at the centre (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989). Women’s identities were constructed as the carriers of the culture, symbols of the national differences, and ‘mothers’ of the nation (an ‘official’ responsibility in nation-building processes).

Although many analyses were made, and many stories were told on the modernisation history of Turkey, there are still grey parts in this history for which researchers should listen to women’s unheard stories. These are the stories that will tell us the reconfiguration processes within the gender regime of modern Turkey. This paper presents my initial analysis in my attempt to trace these stories within the context of the Turkish modernisation. In the following section, I will briefly introduce some critical moments in the construction of the modernist discourses on gender and sexuality in modern Turkey. Shaped by the contemporary feminist analysis on the modernisation and gender in Turkey, this introduction aims to reveal the instances of discursive productions in shaping the regulations surrounding the sexuality of ‘modern’ women.
Emancipating Women: A Strategy of Modernisation Project

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern nation state, with his fellow founders instituted a series of reforms. These reforms were designed so as to make huge socio-political transformations towards creating a secular westernised modern society. Secularisation was put as the main principle of this transformative project. The notion of ‘secularism’ was crafted on the binary of ‘secularism versus religion’ in Kemal Ataturk’s modernisation model (Mardin, 1981). As Durakbas (2000:152-3) points out, the huge socio-cultural changes in the history of modernisation in Turkey were an effect of its attempt of secularisation, which was crafted so as to cut off its bonds with Islam and wipe out the influence of religion in all civil institutions. This transformation process was not limited to the religious parts of the society, but also aimed to institute a western type of ‘culture’.

Saktanber (2002) argues that in the process of building a new secular Turkish society, the aim was not only the establishment of a new political regime, but also the re-construction of a ‘subject constitution regime’ (2002:121). According to her, within the specific historical conditions of the process of making a Turkish nation, this regime is based in the regulation of the social life by secular principles. It required transformations so as to create rational, modern individuals.

De Lauretis (1987:2) defines gender as a social relation, which is constructed and re-constructed through the ‘technologies of gender’ as interwoven in the complex network of social technologies such as cinema, institutionalised discourses, power relations, and everyday practices. She argues that there is a gender system in each culture, which is constituted on the cultural conceptions of female and male genders. (1987:8) According to her, this gender system is a system of meanings correlating gender to its cultural contents. This system includes social values and hierarchies, and is always connected to political and economic factors in society. The modernist, secularist discourses of the modernisation/westernisation have created a gender regime with its unique characteristics. The idealisation of women’s emancipation has been the core of this transformation process. Therefore, understanding the construction of the gender regime within the modernisation/westernisation project is crucial in analysing how this gender system shape the stories of women in contemporary Turkey.

The modernisation/westernisation reforms of the Turkish Republic prioritised the women’s emancipation and construction of women as equal citizens of the nation. In its way towards modernisation, the early republican state under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk passed laws and implemented policies aimed at re-shaping women’s social and legal status as well as their position within the mixed gender relationships.

A series of reforms were made in order to constitute women as patriotic citizens of the new Turkish Republic (Sirman, 1989: 9). The new patriotic citizen (albeit female) had the role of educating the nation as well as fulfilling their traditional roles as mothers and wives. Professional women, especially those with teaching careers, became an important symbol of the Republican regime in its attempt to distance itself from the Islamic heritage of the Ottoman empire and to institute a secularised lifestyle.

The citizenship rights of women had a strategic importance in the modernisation process, which was constituted on westernisation. The legal equality of women was provided by the adoption of a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, which abolished polygamy, marriage by proxy, and gave equal rights to women and men in divorce and child custody matters. The enfranchisement of women was a two-stepped process; the right to vote were granted in 1931 and later the right to be elected was granted in 1934 with the change of the Turkish Constitution.
Kandiyoti (1988) argues that the women were essential part of the modernisation project as "actors or symbolic pawns". As Çağatay and Nuhoglu-Soysal (1993: 329-331) state, equal rights would support the mobilization of women in increasing their participation in the public sphere, and in providing their integration into the political and economic system in nation-state formation. However, the conditions and limits of this public participation were strategically defined on the basis of the public-private dichotomy. The boundaries of this dichotomy were drawn by the male state elite of the modernisation. As argued by Arat (1997:100) it was the state elite who decided on different levels of contribution of women from different classes to the modernisation process. While a group of elite women were encouraged to involve in public life as well-educated professionals, a large number of ‘other’ women were channelled to perform traditional gender roles in private life as western type housewives by bringing ‘order’ and ‘rationality’ to homemaking through girls’ institutions.

Education has been one of the sites of modernisation in the mobilization of women with professional identities in the public sphere. Actually, higher education of women in the first generation of the republican era has had long-term positive influences in the legitimation of women's presence in the public sphere. However, later work done by feminist researchers revealed that the modernist-nationalist discourse had one basic reason in supporting women's education: educating 'enlightened mothers' (Tekeli, 1990).

The mobilization of women as public figures (or actors of the nation-state building) meant neither an achievement of a full gender equality nor transformation of gender hierarchies in the private space of home and family. The gender regime of the modernisation project in Turkey did not aim to construct public identities for women who would also join the power mechanisms and create a possible threat to the male domination in the public sphere. In the private sphere, women were expected to perform their traditional domestic responsibilities in order to reproduce new generations of the nation and to educate the nation by western, rational ideals. The state elite did not only draw the boundaries of the public, but also of the private as Yuval-Davis (1991) argues.

Durakbasa (2000:147-8) argues that the female image created by the modernist discourse is shaped by the contradictory discourses on women’s identities. Turkish modernisation as a project has aimed to create a new femininity for women in Turkey. In the process of creating, modern, rational and scientific women, their participation into the public life through education and professional careers was the main objective of organisation made by the state. Compared to their traditional domestic counterparts, educated, professional women were given a higher status. However, as Durakbasa (2000: 143-145) argues, the public recognition of women did not challenge the gender hierarchies within the domestic sphere. On the contrary, it narrowed down the space for women at home as the claim of westernisation/rationalisation of the domestic sphere brought extra responsibilities to women about the home-economics, hygiene, and scientific child raising.

The reconfiguration of women’s identities did not only include positioning them as responsible ‘actors’ in modernizing the nation, but also as ‘symbols’ of the modernized/westernized Turkey. The new public image of Turkish women was the flag of nationalist-modernist ideology of modern Turkey (Kandiyoti, 2003: 276).

Kandiyoti (1997a: 71-72) argues that Turkish reforms, which had been planned and imposed from the top in the absence of a women’s movement, have been blind to the inequalities in sexuality or the definition of women’s roles in gender relations. This blindness has created a generation of “emancipated but unliberated” women in Turkey. There was a consensus in society that the modernisation reforms emancipated women. Not only professional elite women who were educated in westernised secular institutions of the modern state, but also housewives who knew their daughters would benefit from these reforms, accepted this notion of ‘emancipation.’ They were ‘emancipated’ daughters of the Republic with full faith in the reforms of the project of modernity, which upgraded their status to ‘modern’ women and ‘equal citizens’. However, they were still ‘unliberated' women being lack of their own political voice. For a long time, the ‘emancipated but unliberated’ women in Turkey would
not necessitate to question gender hierarchies, which were not transformed by the legal equalities they were ascribed.

Towards the Analysis of New Forms of Subjectivity in Modernisation

In her argument on the ‘missing dimensions in the study of Turkish modernity’ (1997b), Kandiyoti reminds us of the necessity of analysing the modernisation beyond two opposed narratives, which frame the studies of experience of modernisation in Turkey (p.113). On the one hand, the narrative of ‘modern’, which is originated from official Kemalist discourse equating modernisation with progress. On the other hand, the narrative of ‘tradition’, which presents the modernisation project as a “totalising and authoritarian project that marginalizes and even destroys the life-worlds of those purported to represent the traditional” (p.114). She continues to suggest that it is time to analyse complex social and cultural transformations created by the modernisation project which constructed new identities and new forms of subjectivities.

While aiming to create a homogenised union in society through eliminating the traditional characteristics of it by a series of socio-political reforms, the Turkish modernisation created a gender regime within its specific version of patriarchy. This regime based on the sexual modesty of women doubled the moral responsibilities of ‘modern’ women (Durakbasa, 2000: 148). In addition to the traditional notion of female modesty ‘that is, the traditional values of virginity before marriage, fidelity of the wife, and a particular public comportment and dress’ (ibid.), women became the respectable representatives of the nation state, which made them avoid their individuality and sexuality.

Similarly, Arat (1997:105) points out to the construction of a specific space for women within the Turkish modernisation, which would legitimise their presence in society as citizens. The boundaries of this space were constituted on the control of sexuality, faith in education and professionalism, and respect for the community over the individual. On a similar line, Kandiyoti (1998:278-284) argues that the modernisation process in Turkey included a refashioning of gender, which created a regulatory discourse on sexuality that attempts to institutionalise monogamous heterosexuality as the normative ideal.

Kandiyoti (1998) traces the concern with marital sexuality back to Ottoman society when new governmental technologies that redefined subjects as a ‘population’ had emerged (1998: 281). These redefinitions mandated new orientations and disciplines for both women and men resulted in the refashioning of gender, which created new images of femininity and masculinity. Although these new images symbolized the break from the tradition, they carried their own ambiguities and tensions. The break from the Ottoman tradition was expressed in relation to paternal roles of men. The new image of masculinity presents ‘modern man’ of the republican period as an ‘attentive spouse and engaged parent’ in contrast to the Ottoman figure of ‘remote, authoritarian, and foreboding’ father (1998: 281). On the other hand, the image of femininity based on a discourse of sexual purity that involved ‘a persistent anxiety over sexual morality’ (1998: 282) of women in relation to the discourse of family honour.

Modern women of the Turkish Republic had to have an “asexual” identity, which would enable them to go out and work in the public world of men in which social interaction used to be constituted over the absence of women. In a society, where femininity was unsuited with the public presence, veils were replaced by symbolic armours, of which significant components were discipline of femininity and sexual modesty. This symbolic armour involved the construction of a set of codes and practices by women in order to give the message of sexual unavailability by de-highlighting femininity.

Emergence of a Feminist Discourse: A Response to the Modernisation
The women whose identities have been under construction since the beginning of the modernisation project have responded to these processes by developing social and political strategies within and beyond the existing gender regime. Kandiyoti (1997b) argues that there have been differences in the experiences and responses of the modern women in Turkey that were created by the class differences between them (Kandiyoti, 1997b:127). The urban upper class women were able to manage the identity transformation and tensions they experienced in mixed-gender groups at education institutions and at the workplaces. However, they protected themselves from direct contact with the other public spaces such as streets, buses of which main inhabitant were still men. In doing so, they used the means that their class positions made available to them, such as private cars. On the other hand, urban lower middle class women, who had to share all public spaces with men while working out for income generation, managed their new identities through formulations that would protect them. The male and female workers’ keeping different timetables for tea breaks at the mixed-gender factory canteens was an example of these formulations.

Political resistance by the women came later by the emergence of the feminist movement in the second half of the 1980s. The women in Turkey had not had a significant political activism to question or transform their lives particularly in connection with the modernisation project in terms of “woman question” before the second wave feminist activism. First of all, because, ‘the productive role of power relations’ (Foucault, 1998:94) worked and created a ‘state feminism’, the discourse of which had identified itself with the official discourse of the Turkish Republic. The well-educated, professional modern women have been the main actors of state feminism to publicize their faith in the transformative reforms of the modernisation which upgrated their status to ‘modern’ women and ‘equal citizens’.

Major criticisms of the feminist movement have articulated the deconstruction of the gender system of the modernisation. This process has been constituted around the positions inhabited by the ‘state feminists’ or ‘daughters of the Republic’, who internalised the gender discourses of the modernisation. This deconstruction included both the questioning of female identities constructed by the modernisation project, and the position of the earlier ‘emancipated’ generation who voiced the dominant discourse of the modernisation project on women’s responsibilities and progress.

Feminist women distanced their political position from the one of the earlier generation of Republican women. Based on their analysis of the ‘educating the nation’ responsibility given to women in modernisation of the country, they have claimed that this process had created a notion of ‘saving the ‘other’ women of the country’ who could not benefited the opportunities of the republican era, therefore, could not be emancipated. It was this notion, which constituted a hierarchy between ‘emancipated’ and ‘un-emancipated’ women. The political position of the feminists based on the denial of being the ‘emancipated’ women who aimed to save ‘other’ women. In the construction of a new discourse, feminist activists would define themselves ‘we women’ instead of speaking for ‘other’ women (Altinay, 2002).

As Arat (1997:104) argues, this position indicates a very significant shift both in politics and the individual lives of women in Turkey since the late 1980s. This was a shift in the positions of women from being objects or pawns of modernisation towards being the subjects of feminist politics, who claimed subjecthood in their own lives.

The second wave feminist politics have led to to the emergence of new version of gender regime in modern Turkey. Having redeployed the ‘emancipation’ discourse of modernisation, this new gender regime is shaped around the possibility of ‘sexual’ identities for women. Politicising the private so as to deconstruct the power relations and gender hierarchies has been a core element within this version of the gender regime.

I do not have enough space within the scope of this paper for another section discussing the continuities and discontinuities between these two versions within the Turkish modernisation. However, it will not be too wrong to say that the feminist critique of the
modernisation project, and subsequently the feminist activism developed over the universal categories was the product of modernisation/westernisation in the Republican Turkey.

I would like to continue with the individual stories of Zuhal and Asli, a mother and a daughter whom I interviewed for my research. These two women represent two generations of the ‘modern and modest’ women in the modernisation history. I suggest that these narratives might guide us in the research of grey areas in the picture I summarised above.

**Untold Stories or Had They Been Told Before?**

What is specific with these two generations? The historical time in which they were born and socialised refers to historical moments of transformations in women’s lives in connection with the shifts in political discourses in Turkey. Asli represents the young women whose knowledge, ideas, and practices are being influenced by the ‘women’s liberation’ discourse of the feminist activism whereas Zuhal represents the earlier generation of urban women many of whom were mobilized in leftist political activism during the 1970s, and witnessed, if not participated in, the emergence of the second-wave feminist movement in Turkey.

**Zuhal, Second Generation of the Daughters of Republic**

“Zuhal: (...)My mom, I can say that was an intellectual housewife. She was never conservative. That’s what I observed during the time I lived with them. They had 7 children. I’m one of them, the third daughter…My father didn’t aim to leave an inheritance to us. Instead he wanted all of us to be educated well. Education was indisputable. Although I was the third daughter and accepted to the university in my third year, I was sent to courses when they had financial problems. Not only me, but all my sisters and brother were given the same opportunity. Daddy had only a cheap flat bought by dept when he died. I can say that he spent all his money for education. All of us are university graduates. (err) I’m proud of it. I’m a “Journalism and Broadcasting” graduate(…)

These are the first lines in Zuhal’s interview, a 44 year-old journalism graduate. It is a narrative which is constructed by a progressive woman of the Turkish modernisation. From her first description of her mother (the first social generation of the modernisation project) as an ‘intellectual housewife’ who was ‘never conservative’, Zuhal makes her position explicit. She presents her mother as the ideal mother in the modernisation discourse who is a western type housewife who will bring rationality to homemaking, and who is responsible to educate the nation. Similarly, her description of her father fits into the new image of masculinity constructed in modernisation discourse: A modern father who is an engaged parent unlike the ‘traditional’ model. Zuhal also refers to the binary opposition of modern-conservative/traditional, which is the core of the modernisation/westernisation discourse. Zuhal refers to this binary opposition at different points of her narrative in order to position herself and her family on the side of the modern/progressive. Her initial emphasis on the importance given to education in her family is one of the main components of her modern portrait she draws in this narrative.

**Presence in the Public Sphere**

“Zuhal: I (err) started working there. The chief of my department was a man who used to work during the day, and attend evening classes after work. H (err) was a very good friend of mine. We liked each other very much. We were friends for two years. I used to ask everything to him at the beginning (err) I might have
exaggerated. Since he was my senior. (err) There was a political atmosphere. There was an association of Highways officers. (err) He was a board member in that association. My family was quite open-minded. I became a member. We started to work together. We used to organize meetings together, participate into demos together. We had difficult days together. Throughout this activism, we understood that we were harmonious (err). However, we were friends for one year. (err) Our families became part of this relationship when we thought that we were serious and would marry…”

This is Zuhal’s narrative on her meeting with her current husband and the first phase in their relationship. The year was 1977. As she tells us, there was a political atmosphere when the political discourses of the opposition were multiplied by the emergence of the leftist movement. As she is the second generation of Republican daughters, there is a modification in the mobilization of women in the public sphere. The boundaries of the public sphere for women were not limited to education and working, but included political activism in those years. Her ‘open-minded’ (modern) family let her join a political organization. However, this ‘permission’ still represents the non-transformed gender hierarchies within the family. As a well-educated, professional urban woman in the public sphere, she still represents her family’s reputation which is under the control of her father who is the one to approve her public participation.

The other interesting point in this extract is Zuhal’s asexual or neutral tone while telling us about her relationship. Although her progressive position enables her to have a private relationship in public sphere, she prefers to keep her ‘symbolic armour’ made up of discipline of femininity and sexual modesty in her story. What she tells us about this relationship is not love or sexual attraction, but a ‘harmony’, which refers to a shared political position between her husband and herself. Here, she voices the dominant storyline of the leftist politics, which positions women as ‘sisters’ on the denial of their sexuality, and defines a relationship between two ‘comrades’ legitimate only in case of marriage.

In her story, Zuhal positions herself within the dominant discourse of modernisation, which constructs women as emancipated but unliberated from the patriarchal relations. The way in which she tells me about her relationship and marriage decision; her emphasis on the approval of the families clearly reveal her discursive position within the dominant storyline.

This position becomes stronger while she refers to sexual relationship. Her definition of their relationship as ‘being friends’ but not partners, meaning not having sex with him, until “…we thought that we were serious and would marry…” when families were involved in this relationship at a moment of marriage decision (when it is legitimatised), shows her position within the regulatory discourse on sexuality. This discourse constituted the conditions of a sexual relationship for a woman whose ‘sexual modesty’ is the main issue.

Asli, Second Generation of Feminist Politics

If Zuhal’s story is constructed on her references of ‘being modern’, her daughter Asli tells her story within the new discourse on woman’s sexuality created by the ‘emancipatory’ politics of feminist activism in Turkey. She represents a new generation for whom, the meaning of being political is not identified with only being ‘modern/progressive’ unlike her mother’s generation. Telling sexual stories, speaking out experiences of body and sexuality, deconstruction of gender identities of modernisation project are included in the sphere of politics in this historical moment. Although this new emphasis on the politics of the private and sexuality keeps its marginality within the dominant discourse of mainstream feminist politics which still works through the categories of modernisation, there is no doubt that it has impacts on the construction of new ‘technologies of gender’ (De Lauretis, 1987) which includes modified forms of social, political, and cultural configuration of gender as a relation
by the multiplied social and political discourses within the current phase in the Turkish modernisation.

Telling Sexual Stories

“Asli: I cheated on my partner and I slept with him, O (err)...How did it happen? I stopped him that night. Other friends had to wake up early the following morning. O wanted to wake me up to have breakfast together. I wanted to leave. He said, “You want to run away this atmosphere.” The next time we met, he was like a very old friend. As if nothing happened. I thought, “Oh my god! What a comfortable person you are!” We went to listen to them. It wasn’t planned. He sang somewhere with the ex-partner of a friend of mine. We went there. There was sleepover arrangement again. I thought I would never sleep with him. Ah! It never happened like that. Anyway, we had a chat. He never touched me. He had a huge bed. We were on the opposite edges of the bed. He organized our sharing of the bed. I would sleep with my girl friend, he would sleep with his boy friend if we liked to do so. He made an arrangement, and we found ourselves together again. In the middle of the night, he said, “You thought I jumped in you last time. I would like you to sleep here in order to prove that nothing will happen.” He has proved until 7am. It happened after 7am (smiling).”

Unlike her mother, Asli told me stories of sexual experience in her relationships. In this story, she positions herself outside the regulatory discourse on sexuality which presents monogamous, marital sexuality as a norm in which ‘sexual purity’ is the key to woman’s sexuality. Her agency is in there. She positions herself outside the dominant discourse on modern and/or modest women. In this story of her affair, she inhabits a position within the current gender regime in Turkey, which gives space for telling sexual stories. The way Asli tells her story also voices a counter narrative in which women are constructed as the subjects of sexuality who are active parts of the power games in sexuality.

Speaking about Sexual Experience

“Asli: I enjoy making love. I sometimes get orgasm (lowering her voice). However, at the penetration moment something happens to me, I pass into that bad mood. It’s a strange and very strong pain. Whenever I tell somebody, they say, “You’re not relaxed enough.” If I know myself, it’s not psychological but physical. But it has an impact on my psychology as well. There is a physical problem. A has understood my pain. He said, “we haven’t got to do it if you’re hurt.” The number of our intercourses is very limited. I’ve noted them on my agenda. We’ve had fifty times in five years. We haven’t been doing it regularly. Because it is easy to feel that I’ve got pain.”

This is an extract from Asli’s longer narrative of her experience of penetrative sex, which is dominated by her pain. It again represents a discontinuation from her mother’s narrative on sexual experience and emotions of body that she told by a neutral tone. On the other hand, it is similar to narratives of western young women on sexual experience (Martin, 2002). At this point, I would like to ask an experimental question. Might the western style of this narrative, which articulates a scientific discourse on body and sex be read as a modified form of a ‘sexual armour’, at least at discursive level? Is it a strategic use? Would speaking through a western genre create a space for this new generation of modernisation in Turkey to cross the boundaries of private and speak out sexual experience?
I will conclude with the narrative of Asli, who tells us her relationship with an imaginary daughter. I think this extract clearly maps out the connection between modernisation in Turkey—which is a project in progress—and discursive positions of her generation in the Turkish modernisation. There are discontinuities in their experiences and stories between these two and earlier generations, but this does not mean a break. The positions of both Zuhal and Asli are constructed by the discourses of the Turkish modernisation/westernisation although they represent different but interrelated phases in this project. That is what creates the continuities in their stories as Asli describes while making a distinction between the discursive and the real. As soon as she changes her position to a mother, she goes back to the dominant narrative on the regulation of women’s sexuality.

While Zuhal’s generation represents an early stage in the transition to westernisation, Asli’s generation is in a further stage of this transition, westernised in many ways; in telling their stories, and expressing power on the control of sexuality (as in this specific extract). However, it is necessary to take into account that the discourse of modernisation/westernisation project itself is still a work in progress. It includes many contradictions and ruptures some of which are shaped by the local characteristics of the modernisation experience. It is these blurred spaces that shape the positions of women from different generations; and within these spaces it is difficult to discuss clear-cut boundaries between generations.

References:


Chapter 2

“What do we see when we look at ourselves?” – Visual dissidence towards post(colonial) sex/gender organisations within post-apartheid South African culture

Henriette Gunkel

Southern Africa has recently witnessed an emerging visibility of discussion and proclamation of sexual identities. Along the question of cultural authenticity and that of gender equality, the subject of rights has been brought to the fore in local attempts to define the post-colonial nation states. While post-apartheid South Africa was the first country in the world that explicitly incorporated lesbian and gay rights within the Bill of Rights of the post-apartheid constitution, the surrounding countries chose to exclude lesbians and gay men from citizenship rights. During the Book Fair in Harare 1995 the Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, for example, gave an infamous speech in which he described lesbians and gay men “as worse than pigs and dogs”. But this was just the start. In 2000 he declared homosexuality “as an abomination, a rottenness of culture” imposed upon Africans by Britain’s “gay government”. Several politicians from different African countries followed Mugabe’s lead. Namibia’s minister of home affairs urged new police recruits in 2000 to “arrest on sight gays and lesbians and eliminate them from the face of Namibia” (Epprecht 5), while in 2006 Nigerian’s president Olusegun Obasanjo declares homosexuality as “un-Biblical, unnatural and definitely un-African” (Horn 7).

The public speeches that in a populist way proclaim the idea of homosexuality as un-African are also part of the discourses forming within South Africa itself. In fact the idea that homosexuality is un-African proliferates in public discourse and it is a shared opinion by a significant portion of the population (Gevisser; Van Zyl). Despite the constitution organized religious leaders, politicians and nationalist voices in South Africa continuously feed the homophobic discourse in the name of tradition and culture (Gevisser). To give the statements some weight they refer to a history of colonialism, yet – as I intend to show - a populist understanding of the colonial history in order to push through postcolonial nationalism. I argue that postcolonial homophobia is central to contemporary nationalisms and processes of postcolonial nation building.

The connection between colonialism/cultural imperialism and (homo)sexuality, however, is not new and it is not made exclusively on the African continent. In different historical periods homosexuality has been considered as un-American, un-Indian, un-Iraqi, etc (Sinfield; Meghani). And during apartheid homosexuality was read as un-Afrikaans by a range of cultural and religious organisations that feared wealthy Jewish and English men were corrupting Afrikaaner boys (Gevisser 31). In fact there is a long history of constituting homosexuality as something outside tradition and culture and thus outside the nation. Alan Sinfield, for example, discusses how homosexuality figured in American discourse during the Cold War. Sinfield argues that homosexuality was considered to undermine constructions of masculinity, femininity and family values of the American society; lesbians and gay men threatened the distinct and superior American (therefore similarly Western) morals and values. Sinfield concludes that the recognition of homosexuality as supposedly un-American is not directed towards queers but that homophobic discourse aimed to control and discipline the heterosexual majority of the population.

Following Sinfield’s analysis this article argues that postcolonial homophobia, as articulated in the populist notion of homosexuality as un-African, is not interested in historical and cultural forms of same-sex sexuality and intimacy on the African continent. In fact this
nationalist and rightwing discourse is not referring to older and culturally specific forms of same-sex intimacy. Instead (South) African forms of female intimacy and their underlying sex/gender organizations, which are dissenting colonial sex/gender regimes and Western cultures of sexual identities, are discursively disciplined and re-conceptualized. In fact, the historical and contemporary Westernization of sexuality and gender in (South) Africa requires a Western standard of homophobia which was introduced as an act of colonialism. By highlighting colonial discourses of race and sexuality the essay argues that homophobia became a Western act of colonialism and that postcolonial homophobia actually reintroduces the colonialist, racist discourse of sex/gender through postcolonial homosociality.

Against this background the article turns to cultural interventions and visual dissidence in discourses of sexualities within post-apartheid South Africa. And it is the "global" context of this discourse that makes its analysis and its resistance so interesting. By focusing on the work of black lesbian artist and activist Zanele Muholi this essay examines the dissent in racial, sexual and gender-related identity formations in contemporary South Africa. In her work Muholi documents some of the key issues within the black lesbian community in Johannesburg and by doing so resists heteronormativity as well as homonormativity in the country. The photographs reveal the dissenting position of the photographer who dismantles both the cause and the effect of postcolonial homophobia. The images point to Muholi’s dissidence towards postcolonial nationalism and its proclamation of a decolonized African heterosexual identity. I develop this argument by focussing on Muholi’s images Aftermath (2004) and Period (2003), which both reveal the tension between the post-apartheid constitution and post-apartheid homophobia, as well as Muholi’s Safe Sex II (2003).

This essay analyses Muholi’s images before it presents a discursive and scientific contextualization of Muholi’s work by highlighting historical and contemporary discourses of sexuality and race. The article explores the historical use of photography as a tool of constituting (colonial) discourses of whiteness and heteronormativity and points to the intricacy of postcolonial homophobia by highlighting its colonial heritage. By doing so the essay raises the question of what place should be given to deviance in the representation of already stigmatized dissident identities? Until today, Africa as a continent serves as a reference point in the negotiation of a European white identity. Postcolonial homophobia needs to be situated in this context. Mikki van Zyl, for example, points out that African leaders response to homosexuality is also a response to the racist images of African sexualities in Europe as being opposed to European/white conceptions of sexuality. The claim “homosexuality is un-African” hence cannot be understood outside dominant Western images of African sexuality that have their roots within the colonial project and needs to be seen as the expression of an internalized racism stemming from colonialism. By bringing the dissenting voices in postcolonial South Africa into a Western academic framework therefore allows us to rethink the white/Western gaze and orientation of queer studies.
I saw Muholi’s image *Aftermath* for the first time when I was visiting the Month of Photography exhibition *Is Everybody Comfortable?* at the Castle of Good Hope in Cape Town in 2005. Muholi’s *Aftermath* was outstanding in the effect it had on me (and other viewers), generating various, contradictory emotions. *Aftermath* shows the body of a black (lesbian) woman from just above the belly button down to the knees. The woman is only wearing pants from the label “jockey”, a signifier of lesbian identity. Her hands, at the centre of the picture, are grasped over her genitals. In the subtitle of the image Muholi states that “(m)any lesbians bear the scars of their difference, and those scars are often in places where they can’t be seen…”. Just underneath the hands on the right thigh a big, long scar makes this violation of the body visible. The scar almost covers the entire thigh and it takes the viewer’s attention away from the centre of the picture, the hands covering the genitals. The eyes, however, return to the hands immediately once the viewer realizes that the scar is already healed, thus illustrating Muholi’s comment on scars of difference that often ‘can’t be seen’. So it is in that moment that the gesture of the hands becomes central. The gesture does not imply shyness, possibly due to the woman’s nakedness in front of the camera. Instead the gesture functions as a form of protection where the hands also expresses a certain fragility and vulnerability. So while the scar on the thigh is already healed the gesture of the hands implies a more recent violation of the body. And it is this reference to the violated lesbian body that uncompromisingly creates a sense of accusal, of vulnerability, agency, intimacy, discomfort, pain and anger all at the same time.

The temporal order/composition of the scars, visible and invisible, in the image *Aftermath* can be seen as a metaphor for the historical and contemporary discourses of (neo)colonial sex/gender organizations. The first scar, the one that is visible on the thigh is healed but will nevertheless remain visible on the body: it will always mark the black body in the image. This scar therefore can be read as the signifier for the violation of the black body through colonial discourse that particularly targeted the black female body for European self-identification and gratification. Within the construction of the European Self particularly African women’s availability was taken for granted and was thus constituted as such, finding its expression in the act of rape. As Monti has pointed out the colonial invasion of the land was often equated with the conquest of the woman: “(t)he seduction and conquest of the...
African woman became a metaphor for the conquest of Africa itself. A powerful erotic symbolism linked a women’s femininity so strongly to the attraction of the land that they became one single idea, and to both were attributed the same irresistible, deadly charm.” (Nicholas Monti, quoted in Young 63).

The image *Aftermath*, however, is historically positioned in the post-apartheid context and refers to the violation of the lesbian body through rape. The image is therefore not only an analogy for the colonial history but also a metaphor for postcolonial homophobia. In fact, *Aftermath* reveals starkly the tension between the post-apartheid constitution and post-apartheid homophobia by linking the contemporary dimension of anti-lesbian violence to the post-apartheid era and the aftermath of the liberation movement as the very name “aftermath” may imply.

![Image of a sanitary pad, a knife, and a fork arranged on a plate.](image)

**Period (2004)**

*The same blood that defines us as women, is the same blood which we shed in the attacks against us, while some make a meal of their hatred of us as women, as lesbians.*

Similarly Muholi’s image *Period* deals with the issue of hate crime against lesbians. But unlike *Aftermath* in which the body is used as a signifier for a lesbian identity, it is here removed from the picture. *Period* shows a used sanitary pad on a plate framed by a knife on the right and a fork on the left. While the fork is in line with the pad, the knife is not as parallel, pointing rather away from the pad. It is the knife that seems to be the disturbing moment within the picture, the active part in it, the element that goes along the squiggled silver fork. It is a sharp knife, of those used to cut meat. It can be considered as threatening and thus useable in an attack. *Period* is a still life, a composition or arrangement of inanimate objects, each with possible symbolic significance. The image provokes what Walter Benjamin calls the visual ‘shock’. It is this picture within the exhibition that has been perceived as most disturbing and evoking disgust. Not because of the connotation to hate crime as indicated by Muholi’s strong subtext to the image but because of the connotation to women’s monthly period. The sanitary pad is a symbol for the period and thus for womanhood that girls enter with their first period. Womanhood is therefore closely linked to female sexuality as well as to women’s culture. Muholi makes the link between the period and the attack in form of hate crime that leaves the woman behind bleeding. She uses blood as a signifier for womanhood and female sexuality while this same womanhood and a specific form of sexuality, namely lesbian sexuality, is the target in the attack against her.
Muholi’s images in the exhibition all deal with issues of black women’s sexuality. Similar to the images *Aftermath* and *Period*, this work de-romanticizes sexual pleasure by pointing out practices and commodities that dissent normative perceptions of (hetero)sexuality. This is achieved by introducing strap-ons, breast-wrapping and dental dams, for example. By doing so Muholi’s images reflect on the different issues that are predominating the different lesbian communities in contemporary South Africa. In South Africa it has only been since the turn of the twenty first century that there is a growing visibility of lesbian sexuality and identity within the visual arts in general and photography in particular. One exception seems to be Jean Brundrit who started to focus on feminist and lesbian issues in her work from the 1990s onwards. Her work focuses mainly on the white lesbian community in Cape Town. She describes a particular comfort zone, a safe space that is often linked to the private sphere, which white lesbians to a certain extent inhabit. This becomes particularly visible in her series of photographs titled *Does Your Lifestyle Depress Your Mother?* (1999), which shows lesbian couples in the domestic space. In one photograph two women are lying in bed together while drinking their morning tea/coffee. They seem to be naked, covered by a big duvet. Another one shows two lesbians in a bathtub obviously enjoying themselves. Here again, the nakedness is only indicated. Intentionally, as Brundrit argues: “I wanted to show ‘real’ lesbians. By not showing anything hardcore, I’ve taken away the voyeuristic angle that might have otherwise been there for the viewer.”

What Muholi’s *Aftermath* precisely lacks and in fact dissents is this comfort zone. The majority of Muholi’s images instead raise issues such as HIV/Aids, gender dissidence, performativity and passing. The political message that underlines Muholi’s images is the most striking difference between her images and Brundrit’s, which seem to mirror the efforts of assimilation of the mainstream gay and lesbian community since the implementation of the sexual orientation clause within the constitution. In contrast Muholi’s work takes up the issues central in the work of predominantly black lesbian and gay organizations in Johannesburg over hate crime, gender and HIV/AIDS. In a way these different images by contemporary South African lesbian photographers demonstrate who has access to the rights inscribed into the constitution and who not. More importantly the images reveal starkly that South Africa is still culturally and politically constituted along the colonial lines and that the new constitution is in fact not an effect of a wider deconstruction of the sex/gender regime that underpinned apartheid.

Accordingly, the responses of the media to Muholi’s exhibition, which was first staged in Johannesburg in 2004, mainly reflected on the political dimension of the work and its impact on questions of lesbian and gay rights in the country. Gail Smith for example argued that Muholi’s “photographs are not artistically or technically brilliant - and some are downright disturbing, but the exhibition, and the response to it, show some movement towards addressing the staggering absence of ‘out and proud’ lesbians in South African society” (Smith 90). In her article “Is Anybody Comfortable?” Nonkululeko Godana similarly highlights how the political project is central to this exhibition by contextualizing the work, and *Aftermath* in particular, as a direct translation of Muholi’s activism into documentary photography. Godana states that Muholi has been documenting violence against lesbians over the last years in Gauteng townships and she informs the reader that *Aftermath* was taken two days after the woman in the image had been raped by a male “friend” aiming to show her that she is not a man (Godana 91). In the conversation with Godana, Muholi explains that the subject in the image “called me a couple of hours after the incident with no one to confide in. She already has a scar from a past incident, yet received new emotional scars from her rape” (Muholi in Godana 91).

The image *Aftermath*, however, does not only tell the story of victimization. It also tells the story of agency and dissidence. The subject in the photograph is raped two days before the image was taken but she is willing to speak out, to expose her body again in order to make a difference, in order to document this trauma. She is not willing to hide her sexual identity. Hence, this picture not only tells the story of the subject but also Muholi’s story as the

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photographer whom those women allow to take such intimate pictures, in moments in which they are in fact very vulnerable. Muholi knows the women she is visualizing and that she portrays. The women are her friends, her colleagues or women she meets within her work as an activist: “These are not only subjects, these are my people, this describes the person I am.” (Enraged by a Picture).

Muholi usually invites the audience who attends her exhibitions to write down comments and reactions to the images. She has also shown her images in the streets of Johannesburg and has made a short documentary about it, titled Enraged by a Picture, which was produced for “Out in Africa”, the Gay and Lesbian Film Festival in South Africa in 2005. Muholi included some of the responses to her work in the documentary. Some members of the audience are in distress, some overtly express homophobia, and some commentators even go further by expressing strong anger and directly threatening the artist: “you need a smack” and “you must be hung” while one paints a penis with big balls saying “I believe this is art, but then this would also be art”. However, there was also strong positive feedback that viewed the images as “eye-opening” and “mentally stimulating”, and that welcomed the space that could be opened through these kind of debates on sexuality: “...excellent. I think it’s about time people stopped being so ashamed about human sexuality. For centuries women have been ‘desexualized’ and, I just feel that people need to embrace their sexual identities.”

In order to understand why the reactions of Muholi’s work are so divided it is important to develop an understanding of the impact of colonialism and colonial discourses on post-colonial homophobia, particularly its underlying colonial constructions of sex/gender and race.
“Only Half The Picture” – the discursive and scientific contextualization of contemporary images

Safe Sex II (2003)

The responses to Muholi’s exhibition and the image Aftermath also reveal how race and gender operate in the construction of contemporary post-apartheid homophobia. One common response to Muholi’s exhibition is that her images of the black female body are either degrading for all (black) women or alternatively, are demeaning for the community, the nation or the race, as one of the respondents wrote in Muholi’s response book at the exhibition: “It is truly unacceptable for you to undermine our race’s especially black portraying nudity and sexual explicit content images as if they are the only one who are involved these inhuman activities. After all Black was African and proud of its roots and cultures until you inflicted pain and trash to our community. Get a life you people.” Another visitor similarly expressed her anger about the “nature” of the images: “(y)es, art is an African thing. However, when degrading of women’s (make that black woman) bodies, it is no longer a question of art and beauty but of discrimination – the nation cries.” The responses to Muholi’s exhibitions highlight the strong resentment of portraying the black body naked while provocatively dissenting normative constructions of gender and sexuality. The history of, for example, the fantasmatic projection of outsized genitals on to men and women of African descent led to the ambivalence and resentment towards public images that represent the black body’s relationship to sexual dissent.

Muholi, however, does not protect a collective body from misrepresentation but instead demonstrates that there is no homogenous body and sexuality. This becomes particularly visible in her image Safe Sex II shows a black woman’s naked body, either in the process of strapping on or taking off a dildo. The fact that the dildo is of white colour hints to the racialization of commodity culture in the country. According to artist and curator Gabi Ngcobo, Muholi, however, acknowledges the gaze and challenges its biased nature (Ngcobo 5). Ngcobo highlights the questions that Muholi poses in her work. One of Muholi’s work titles “What don’t you see when you look at me?” was further developed through Muholi’s question “What do we see when we look at ourselves?” (Ngcobo 5). With her work Muholi reclaims, to borrow Ngcobo’s words, “the (visual) culture that was historically denied” (Ngcobo 4). Pumla Dineo Gqola argues in her essay on Muholi’s images that “the work is less about making Black lesbians visible than it is about engaging with the regimes that have
used these women's hypervisibility as a way to violate them” (Gqola 84). According to Gqola, black lesbian bodies were never invisible in society, but were in fact “highly visible manifestations of the undesirable” (Gqola 83) expressed, for example, through hate crimes such as visible in the image *Aftermath*. Very similar to Ngcobo, Gqola is not only interested in the question of what Muholi makes visible but in fact how she makes it visible.

Despite their differences, the position of the two scholars, Ngcobo and Gqola, and the position of the respondents in the exhibition space, they all raise the question of representation and its historical relevance/implication within the (South) African context. I use the term “representation” within a classic cultural studies framework by referring to Stuart Hall’s representation theory. According to Hall representation is “the production of meaning through language” (Hall 16). Representation is hence always mediated and in fact connects language to culture: “Representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It does involve the use of language, of signs and images which stand for or represent things” (Hall 15). The responses to Muholi’s exhibition are concerned with the representation of the black female body and so raise questions about who is representing whom, under which conditions, and with which purpose? Linked to this is the question of who has the right to look? And despite their differences the positive and negative responses to Muholi’s images encourage the viewer to think about (historical and cultural) representations of black women’s bodies, particularly in relation to sexuality.

**Gender, Sexuality and Race: Colonial Politics of Representation and Photography**

And in fact, in the (South) African context in particular, the use of photography as a tool to challenge representations of the body and sexuality is a loaded one and remains controversial for various reasons. In Europe photography has been historically used as a tool to demonstrate that the cause of “deviant” sexual behaviour was found in the (degenerated) body. Photography was used historically to produce knowledge/power of sexuality through the surveillance of the body as Tessa Boffin and Jean Fraser argue: “The writings of sexologists such as Krafft-Ebbing and Havelock Ellis established the ‘medical model’ of homosexuality, and the eye of authority was now focused through the medium of photography on the ‘homosexual body’.” (Boffin and Fraser 15). L.R. Broster’s et al. medical study, for example, *The Adrenal Cortex and Intersexuality* shows how sexual “deviance” was located in the physiological elements of the subject. The authors use images of so-called “physical hermaphrodites” to underline their argument that sexual “perversions” are inscribed into the (“abnormal”) body. These images reveal the significance of photography as being an important tool to give “scientific evidence” that “deviant” sexual behaviour must be found in the physiological elements of the body. So-called physical anomalies are captured by the camera’s gaze on the naked subject and are then situated within a medical research that links the (degenerated) body to sexual difference. Sexual “deviants” are thus objectified and constituted as the sexual Other from a norm that is defined in opposition to the subject position of the so-called pervert. The specification of the pervert within the development of medicine is hence important since it enables the specification, and the surveillance and control through discourse, of the entire population/race. Sex is therefore historically dependent on sexuality – and vice versa. As Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park argue, the moment the genitalia became a synonym for “nature”, heterosexuality became normative.

In 19th century medical discourses of non-normative bodies the objectification of the gender-ambiguous body, as visible in the hermaphroditic or intersex subject, was not the only marker of difference used to control the population body and the individual body. Racial and sexual discourses intersected in a historically specific way within the episteme of colonial knowledge that produced an anatomy of pathological bodies. Again the intersecting elements of sexuality and gender within scientific racism are displayed in a whole range of
images that shows the European gaze on the naked or semi-naked African black body. Leni Riefenstahl’s study of the Nuba people of Sudan is one prominent example. The female figure specifically became a predominant subject in colonial photography, the photographic lens often trained on women’s breasts and buttocks, as visible in popular images of Sarah Baartman for example. Throughout colonialism and to a certain extent in contemporary discourse, black women were systematically denied control over their bodies.

In order to understand processes of colonialism and its relationship to the history of sexuality it is therefore crucial to understand colonialism and sexuality as apparatus – a heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive elements – that is not fixed and is in fact contested daily. Following Foucault’s argument Somerville points out that in early 20th century discourses of sexuality and colonialism constituted each other to surround the emerging bodies of homosexuality (Somerville). In the course of European expansion into other parts of the world the body became the focus of new technologies of power that targeted the individual body as well as the population as a whole. This technology witnessed the birth of sexuality, as well as racism, aiming to differentiate bodies and groups within the bio-mass of the population in order to regulate them. Racial and sexual discourses intersected within the episteme of colonial knowledge that produced pathological bodies through anatomy. In fact travel narratives and a medical discourse of anatomies not only function as colonialist discourses but also urge colonialism into being. Anatomy provides the map connecting race, gender and sexuality (Stoler).

At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the focus shifted from anatomical markers of biological differences to psychological discourses of “abnormal” sexual object choice as identified in interracial and homosexual relationships, as evident for example within the biopolitics of apartheid South Africa. While the aim of the apartheid government was to entrench racial discrimination through law it simultaneously introduced laws that regulated the apparatus of race through sexuality by linking sexuality directly to race. Sexuality, within the apartheid project, was the biopolitical interface between the individual body and the population body and for this reason it became the main target of power.

From the beginning the apartheid regime focussed on sexuality as a regulatory factor of the race regime. This focus is highlighted by a series of acts it introduced over the first ten years; in 1949 it introduced the *Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act, No.55*, in 1950 the *Immorality Act* and in 1957 the *Sexual Offences Act*. Kopano Ratele discusses the sexualization of apartheid and argues that the apartheid government’s interest was in “intimacy and subjectivity and the private life of race”, thus in the micro-politics that regulate the individual body (Ratele 29). The main focus of the laws was to prevent marriages between “Europeans” and “non-Europeans”. The apartheid government was concerned about the white race only; it was not interested in the other racially constructed communities. Interracial heterosexuality is thus perceived as threatening the power of whiteness “because it breaks the legitimation of whiteness with reference to the white body”, as Richard Dyer argues (Dyer 25). According to Dyer the concept of race is always linked to heterosexuality. Heterosexuality is seen as securing the reproduction of racialized bodies – as race itself is always about bodies.

The importance of the sex, gender, race nexus for the apartheid regime became visible in 1968 when the apartheid government tightened the already existing laws to sexual “deviance” and for the first time “deviant” female sexuality. While lesbian sex remained unrecognized by the law, the use of dildos – as portrayed in Muholi’s *Safe Sex II* - became the subject of criminalization. In order to understand the fear or rather (moral) panic generated by the dildo one needs to look back to the 19th century discourse of sexuality that discursively produced the link between gender, sex and sexuality and that tied the penetrative subject to masculinity. The erect penis serves as the signifier for penetrating male dominance over women. However, as Karin Jurschick argues, the phallus loses its power if it becomes separated from the male body, is commercially available and strapped-on the women’s body for female pleasure and satisfaction. So while the dildo is used in heterosexual sexual acts, when women solely use it the dildo becomes a threat to male dominance. In this process of
re-appropriating gender attributes the relevance of gender categories is transgressed and questioned. The phallus, as a signifier for male dominance, loses its power the moment it is recognised to be a cultural construct and thus able to be played upon; as Jurschick asks what is the meaning of the phallus if anyone can have one?

It is the penetrative use of a dildo that shows the shift from the monstrous body to the monstrous use of the body - a monstrosity that all women were potentially capable of, whether they are heterosexual or homosexual, at least according to the apartheid government. In fact the central concern was white women’s sexuality and linked to this white femininity. The discourse of female sexual perversion thus returns once again back to the linkage between heterosexuality, femininity and reproduction and hence to the white women’s responsibility to reproduce the white race. A normalizing discourse of female sexuality that concentrates on reproduction acts as a means to secure male control and thus the gender regime within society. A sexuality that is in line with reproduction does not only reflect women’s ability to give birth but her “willingness to perform that labor” (Traub 163).

This means that this heteronormative approach to reproduction does not only aim to (re)produce the species, the race, etc. but also a gender regime built on male dominance. This is an important argument and serves as a crucial historical reference point for the understanding of contemporary claims such as homosexuality is un-African. It once again reveals that the notion of homosexuality as un-African is not so much targeting lesbians and gay men in the region (although they remain the targets of hate speech and physical violence). The interest/focus of this claim is in the securing of normative femininity - as represented through normative heterosexuality and its political institution, the family. Mugabe, for example, gave the speech in which he declared homosexuals as “worse than pigs and dogs”, during “Heroes Day” the Zimbabwean memorial day of the freedom fighters who died in the Liberation War. He added that “animals do not copulate with mates of the same sex but turn to the opposite sex in order to procreate” (in Aarmo 262). Mugabe has chosen to stimulate discourses of sexuality on a day that stands as a national symbol of liberation and decolonization for the whole of Zimbabwe. While he celebrates the heroes of the past he simultaneously focuses on procreation and an idealization of motherhood and culture. For Mugabe homosexuality is not a suitable signifier for a decolonized nation-state in which sexual subjectivities are produced and reproduced in the name of culture and tradition. Sexuality is thus used as a national/cultural identity-building project that leads to the homogenization and naturalization of culture. Nationalist narratives like this constitute national myths of identity, national imaginaries of the Self and the community that provide cultural material for the subject to constitute a personal sense of gender and sexuality. As a consequence, nationalism defines cultural and social boundaries within a community and excludes those who do not fit the moral values from the community of the majority (Aarmo 266).

In fact nationalism is dependent on a gender binary that is constituted through sexuality. The role of women in post-colonial Zimbabwe, as well as in post-apartheid South Africa, has shifted – and in this process has been reduced - from the position of the “comrade” within the liberation struggle to the identity of the mother. Motherhood defines women’s roles in relation to their community and the national collective and in doing so removes them from the public into the private sphere. In this speech Mugabe thus uses/introduces a discourse on homosexuality in order to restore the gender regime that was troubled throughout colonialism - at least in relation to the black majority - and within the liberation movement with reference to culture and tradition.

Conclusion
In the image Safe Sex II Muholi once again shows not only her dissent towards a colonial reading of race as a concept that constitutes sex/gender organisations but also towards the re-introduction of sex/gender organisations through postcolonial nationalism. As this article has argued nationalism – either in (South) Africa or Europe – is always linked to heterosexuality and its political institution, the family and is therefore always a gendered process. Through her work Muholi resists the fact that postcolonial South Africa is still
constituted, in cultural and political terms, along the colonial lines and its sex/gender organization by separating masculinity from maleness and men. By doing so Muholi gives way to acknowledging older and culturally specific forms of same-sex cultures that were rather constituted within discourses of intimacy and kinship than through discourses of citizenship. This means that Muholi dissents a reading of same-sex intimacy in South African history and culture within the European frame (that is homosexuality versus heterosexuality) and by doing so questions globalized identity formations.

This obviously means that the biopolitical procedures of homophobia in post-apartheid South Africa concern more than just South African lesbian and gay communities. An analysis of postcolonial homophobia needs to be also incorporated in Western theory and politics, such as within queer theory, gender studies, critical race theory and in research of global capitalism. This also means that the issues that have been raised in this article cannot be positioned as the ‘exotic margin’ of Western interest. Instead these issues needs to be understood as a challenge for Western discourses, particularly discourses of sexuality, which tend to constitute themselves as a reference point of modernity - a modernity that has done so much damage to conceptions of sexual cultures and gender organisations in South Africa.

References


Chapter 3

Realising Turkey’s potential within the European Information Society Project¹

Aygen S. KURT

Information society (IS) and its technologies play an integral part in the European research policies and its Framework Programmes (FP). For most of the European Union's (EU) perspectives and regulations affect the policy formulations in Turkey as an accession country, the European Information Society strategy allows Turkey to adjust its policies and realise its own potential within an information society prospect.

Turkey’s adventure on the route to EU membership involves adoption of and adaptation to the European ‘ways’ and ‘strategies’ in various political and economic areas. However, whether this journey has a happy ending or not, we need to figure out Turkey’s research, innovation and science and technology (S & T) capabilities as fundamental bases for enhancing its economic growth not only in relation to Europe but to the global information and communication technology (ICT) markets. For this reason, although integration of an acceding country to a supra-national network (the EU) may be considered to be linked to several political questions; our main intention is to investigate Turkey’s status in the European information society, thereby excluding the debate on political integration as the core of analysis.

This paper is part of an on-going PhD research titled, “The Turkish ICT Sector and the European Information Society: Innovation for Integration?”, but it is also about the European IS polices in general, and Turkey’s recent situation within such political context in particular. A review of the previous work on the information society theory will allow us to set up the theoretical scene before giving a general picture of the notion of the IS in European policies focusing on the last decade (1994-2005) and Turkey’s response at state level. However, although adjustments are made at state level in Turkey, the producers, traders and operators of the information society technologies should be taken into account as one of the main players in linking Turkey to the European information society. For this reason, our focus will also include a few insights derived from the empirical findings about how a number of ICT producers and experts² interviewed in Turkey during October 2004-January 2005 interpret the European and Turkish IS policies and their future in relation to integrating into the European networks.

Encountering with the notion(s) of information society

Even though there are different perspectives in the current information society theory (e.g. Bell 1973, Lyon 1988, Heap et.al 1995, Dutton 1996, Castells 2000; Mackay et al 2002, May 2002, Webster 2002), the whole argument appears to stem from the technological innovations that allowed convergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs) since the 1970s and the increasing usage of ICTs that have enabled major changes in the ways society and economy are structured. In relation to the theoretical perspectives, the Information Society in European politics has shown that technological developments and

¹ An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented at the UEL Post Graduate Conference, 25-26 May 2006, Contexts, Fields, Positions: Situating Cultural Research; as part of the Panel on "Turkish media and information society in the European Context: Approaches in Analysis"

² In total, 27 high level managers from ICT firms and 14 experts were interviewed.
convergence which allow ICTs operate at the core of all economic activity are taken into account seriously (Ducatet et al., 2000).

Confrontation with the information society, as a concept and a political product has become unavoidable. The term first appeared in a study mapping information sectors of the US economy in 1960s (Machlup, 1962) and its usage in the policy agendas of national governments and international organisations have increased within the last two decades. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has characterised the role of national governments in the global information society as a catalyst for the development of ICTs, and secondly as becoming more active users of ICT-based services (Iversen et al., 1998). The concept of information society has been used interchangeably with numerous notions that are highly related but different from each other. As listed in Box 1, such notions seem to have flexible and unclear borders, and are often used persuasively.

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<th>BOX. 1. Different but closely related notions of the Information Age</th>
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<td>Information society</td>
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<td>Post-industrial society</td>
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<td>Informational economy</td>
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<td>Knowledge-economy</td>
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<td>Digital society</td>
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<td>Network society</td>
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<td>Post-modern society</td>
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<td>Wired / Internet society</td>
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<td>Surveillance society</td>
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Initial attempts in understanding the changing structure of the information sectors of the economy resulted from a number of increases in informational jobs, and a broad usage of ICTs in work place. As early as late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea of the information society (IS) gained wider acceptance in the post-industrialism debate with Alan Touraine’s *La Societe Post-industrielle* (1969) in France, Bell’s *The Coming of Post-industrial society* (1973) and Alvin Toffler’s *the Third Wave* (1980) in the US.

The IS concept, rooted in the postindustrialism literature, considers an emerging society as the end of the industrial era and the new arrival of a service and leisure economy (e.g. Bell, 1973). This new society is celebrated, because the technologies enabling the IS were considered as cures of our societal and economic problems. Therefore, initial IS policies in the agendas of several advanced countries and international organisations aimed to establish strong infrastructures that would carry information with the highest speed possible.

We need to note that the specific purposes of this paper allow us to exclude any deliberate discussions about the theoretical and philosophical analysis of the existence of the IS, nor does it intend to cover any discourse analysis of the IS policy texts. Happily, comprehensive work documenting the theories of information society exists (Webster, 2002; 2004). James Martin states that the emergence of the IS theory is said to be ‘either as a social forecast or as a model of social possibilities, and that these have somehow been translated into views of reality and perceptions of actual societies’ (1995: 11). On the other hand, Webster’s (2002) taxonomy of the theories of information society comes to the conclusion that social
scientists have, to differing extents, demonstrated a technological determinism when dealing with the impact of ICTs in society.

Admittedly, the speed developments in ICTs have transformed economic transactions and communications worldwide. Some evidence in 1990s indicates that the escalating power of ICT usage has created a ‘technological revolution’ in the sense that the ICT market and industry structures have changed enormously due to a cluster of technological innovations (Freeman et al, 1991). While several works on the role of ICTs in our societies and the work place have gained attention in literature; the characteristics of information and knowledge and how ICTs can be used to improve efficiency in business studies provided major areas for attention, too (e.g. Head, 2003). However, among others, Lyon situated the information society idea in a recycled version of postindustrialism, and suggested that ‘it should be more than just focusing on social adaptation to IT, rather how IT may be designed to suit people’ (1988:8). For such reasons, there has been an alternative line of argument focusing on the ‘social’ side of the information society and the society’s role in shaping the ICT developments (e.g. Wyatt et al, 2002).

Among the thinkers who emphasise the systemic change by suggesting the concept of an information society on the one hand, and ones who explain the present society contending the continuities of the past on the other; Castells’ (2000) argument of a ‘network society’ appears to stress the fundamental changes due to technological innovations since 1970s and the union of capitalism with the ‘informational mode of production’. In this way, the notion of network society seems to stand in the middle of two strands and attempts to comprehend structural changes in the society declaring a new society which has been enabled by ICTs with the priority of establishment of networks for information flow (Castells, 2000). Establishment of such networks and integration of scientific and technological knowledge in Europe have been at the core of European research collaboration programmes since 1980s accelerating with the First Framework Programme in 1984. Why and how has the notion of IS found a significant place in the EU’s strategic policies that are related to economic growth and industrial progress? How has the EU treated the concept of IS? The following section reviews the European IS policies briefly.

**The European ‘rhetorical’ Information Society project**

The information society and its technologies have been in the core of European research policy since 1980s. The EU support programmes for ICTs officially starts with the ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for Research in Information Technology) in 1983 followed by the first Community Framework Programme in 1984. The Framework Programmes have been the key instruments for EU to support innovation and S & T related pre-competitive research. These Programmes meant two things: ‘the EU’s involvement in scientific and technological matters which made serious commitment to “Europeanize” the production of advanced knowledge; and enshrining the pursuit of competitiveness, which has become a major raison d’être of the Union’ (Borrás, 2003: 1).

The key initial IS plans at European level were mainly market-driven initiatives promoting the competitive position of the ICT sector in Europe. Formation of the European Single Market and the IS policy agendas embraced the market as the driving force behind technological innovation. It could be noted that the EU’s IS policies had major technological and political motivations. First, speed developments in high-technologies, particularly in ICTs, shortened the life cycles of various products and service applications in the ICT industry. This was caused mainly by the opportunities and possibilities available for technological convergences and also the increase of innovative capacity of organisations, regions and countries with the influence of a general trend in realising the importance of research and development (R & D) in advanced economies. With such a technology-driven approach in its agenda, the infamous Bangemann Report prepared for the European Council (European Commission, 1994) was envisaging the development of an IS Europe-wide and warning the European policymakers,
industrialists and governments not to be sole respondents and passive users of the coming IS, but masters of the IS by meeting the challenges it will bring:

All revolutions generate uncertainty, discontinuity and opportunity. Today’s no exception. How we respond, how we turn current opportunities into real benefits will depend on how quickly we can enter the European information society. [...] The race is on at global level and those countries which adapt themselves sooner rather than later will set the technological standards for other countries to follow. [...] Given its history, we can be sure that Europe will take the opportunity. It will create the information society (European Commission, 1994: 4-5).

The race, it seems, – for Europe- was obviously about tackling with the strategies of not being excluded from the so-called ‘globalised, informational and networked economy’ (Castells, 2000) at a time when the Al Gore-Clinton Administration in the US had already declared their ambition to build the information superhighway by investing in the global information infrastructure. On the other hand, Japan’s presence in the global ICT markets (particularly in semi-conductor industry) started to become stronger in early 1990s and the Japanese government’s plans to set up a national IS since 1970s continued to take a significant place in their innovation policy.

The Bangemann Report treated technology as an exogenous factor affecting the changes in society. Although the report’s technologically determinist approach was accused of undermining the impact of societal forces on the ways that ICTs are developed (de Miranda and Kristiansen, 2000; Goodwin and Spittle, 2002); perhaps, this was a clear reflection of how innovation and technological developments took over regulatory policies. Actually, the report had a profound impact on the formation of European IS Action Plans and ICT research programmes late 1990s. Europe’s “immediate” action in producing IS policies was also an attempt to realise the tension between regulation and innovation. Until then, technological innovation led the ways which regulations and policies were formulated. Now it was time to politically construct the paths in which ICTs, their applications, access, usage, and public acceptance strategies would be located. It is essential to realise that since mid-1990s, this political activity at European level –"building the European IS"- has never underestimated the role of technology in economic competence. It has rather been the power struggle policy makers wanted to win by “shaping” the environment where an IS would be “created”, but not evolve. On the other hand, it can be agreed that the European IS policies in 1990s, including the Bangemann’s suggestions, had been “pushed” by the technology already present in the market. For this reason, the European IS policies in 1990s embarked a market-driven approach which later in the beginning of the new century turned towards a more demand-driven shape. For instance in a few years after the Bangemann Report was released, the Commission itself challenged the technologically determinist approach, and issued a report emphasising the significance and power of the societal forces in shaping the ways ICT are developed (European Commission, 1997). The EU’s strategy included first, a regulatory framework envisaging the legal matters related to the rapid convergence of technologies and the protection of individual rights in the IS, and secondly, the start of e-Europe Action Plans3, which later were spread to the inclusion of candidate countries through the e-Europe+ Action Plan. These plans were setting the strategic goals and what needs to be done in a specific time for building the European Information Society.

The new millennium welcomed the European IS strategy with a well-determined goal for Europe to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010’4.

Issued at the European Council’s March 2000 Lisbon Summit, the Lisbon Strategy has become the most momentous reference point to measure science, technology and

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3 The first e-Europe Action Plan2002 was launched in 1999 followed by the e-Europe Action Plan 2005 launched in 2002.

innovation activities of the EU member states and candidate countries. As part of the Lisbon Strategy, Information Society Technologies (IST) Research was the single largest priority in the European 6th Framework Programme as in its predecessor, with a €3.6bn figure, accounting 30% of all thematic programmes. EC states that the main reason for this is because ICTs have an integral contribution to overall economic performance and they offer great amount of benefits to society at large (European Commission, 2005).

In 2004, a group of high-level industrialists led by W. Kok evaluated the extent that the EU has achieved in relation to the Lisbon Strategy. Kok’s report stated that Europe’s lack of political commitment to operate the Lisbon Goal is threatening the targets need to be met (European Commission, 2004):

External events have not helped achieving the objectives but the European Union and its member states; have clearly itself contributed to slow progress by filing to act on much of the Lisbon Strategy with sufficient urgency. This disappointing delivery is due to an over-loaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities. However, a key issue has been the lack of determined political action.

The new EC Presidency under Barosso reviewed the IS policy as soon as he came to power.

I welcome the Kok Report. It provides a realistic, but worrying, assessment of progress. It shows that we must act now to make up for lost time (European Council, 2004, original emphasis).

As a result, the Directorate General - Information Society was expanded to include media (which was formerly under education and culture). This had natural reasons linked to the developments in communications and media technologies. The technological convergence of ICTs and media has brought the convergence of markets in these areas and the DG Information Society and Media was formed with the aim of supporting the development and use of ICTs for the benefits of all European citizens. Due to the speed emergence of converged technologies and markets, a single Information Space, i2010, has been established as the key part of the Commission’s renewed IS policy. i2010 is a new strategic plan, which succeeds the former eEurope Action Plans, for an open and competitive digital economy. With the new programme, EC also creates a single space for policy convergence in order to revise the IS regulations in areas like supply of content and the operation of networks.

In general, the European IS policies can be seen as a framework in which concepts including market economy, S&T, innovation, networking and ICT revolution play a major part. Above and beyond that, the same framework is a component of the European innovation policies at a larger scale and is a result of economic and technological challenges from the US and Japan, technological convergences and scientific advancements since 1970s, and Europe’s aim to become a leader in the global markets. When Garnham (1997) situated the European IS policies in a ‘rhetoric’ at late 1990s, he saw the same decade as the successor of previous failures the European Community made especially when the European market was still dominated by the European telecom monopolies during 1980s. Still, it is possible to suggest that the ‘rhetorical’ side of the project continues to overlook the policy realm, because the IS project itself attempts to create a polity venue where a consensus building process among member and candidate states could be run for the purpose of reaching a common goal (the Lisbon goal, envisaged by the EC) that the future of Europe lies in ICTs. It also seems to be a dominant political and ideological choice combined with the “push” power of the existing (and developing) technologies in the market. However, it should be noted that when IS has become a political and ideological goal for advanced economies (perhaps also with the help of agendas set by international organisations), the developing and underdeveloped countries are motivated to establish political strategies to “construct” an IS for the sake of “catching-up” and take part in the global networks as quickly as possible. The celebrated digital revolution, though, created a digital divide which has widened the information gap between those who were striving to catch-up and “transfer” the required technologies as quickly as
possible and those who were “producing” and innovating such technologies and increasing their power in building the information infrastructure of the world. In this picture, questioning the ways of which ICTs are “embedded” in political frameworks of the underdeveloped countries has become desirable (e.g. Wilson III, 1998; Audenhove et al., 1999; Sahay and Avgerou, 2002).

As mentioned before, this ongoing study considers Turkey’s position in relation to the IS policy and ICT markets as evolving due to its accession process into the EU. However, as a developing country which has to consider international binding policies like the EU criteria, Turkey’s direct adoption processes of the European IS strategy needs to be questioned by taking into account Turkey’s own capabilities and advantages within the European context. It is possible to observe that there is a tendency towards technology acceptance and increasing ICT usage in Turkey; however, in order to become a “player in the game” by not only accessing but also having a decisive role in IS networks in Europe, and in order not to depend upon the technology producers (in advanced economies); Turkey should invest in technology production and change its reputation for being a sole ‘market’ for technology consumption. The next section briefly reviews how Turkey has responded to the IS policy developed in the EU and what the main IS strategies have been at state level.

**Turkey’s perspective in building an information society**

Turkey’s reflection in this picture is directly influenced by the accession procedures to the EU and its tendency towards market economy ideology. Whether we believe in it or not, globalisation of trade have brought binding policies in relation to the global organisation of economic activities. We can even agree that this have resulted in more disadvantageous conditions for the developing and underdeveloped parts of the world, whilst at the same time favouring the corporate multinational big companies based in advanced countries. Accessing the European ICT market and taking part in European networks appear to be significant (and powerful) channels for Turkey to reach global markets.

Turkey’s recent attempts to “build” an IS and set-up a “national” science, technology and research policy framework are mostly shaped by the binding policies of the EU and mainstream ideologies centred on neo-liberal market economy. Turkey has applied to join the EU and the Europeanization process is taking place in numerous policy areas. For instance, its integration process into the European (ICT) markets has been strengthened by joining the Customs Union in 1996.

Turkey’s involvement in global and European organisations is not a recent issue. It is a founding member of various global institutions, including OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the United Nations (UN), and World Trade Organisation (WTO). At European level, it is the founding member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975, and became a member of the Council of Europe in 1950, one year after its establishment. In S & T related organisations, it is a founding member of the European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research (COST) since 1971, and according to an EU-funded research done in 2003 (Stein, 2004), Turkey is a member of nearly 100 European S & T organisations including EUREKA and the European Science Foundation. Recently, it has taken part in the latest EC 6th Framework Programme project funding schemes. In this respect, questioning Turkey’s integration and establishment of networks with the European Research Area and the European Information Society is possible, but how?

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1 Own elaboration of a data set collected for (Stein, 2004). The data collection phase for the EC-funded SEGERA project ([www.segera.ruk.dk](http://www.segera.ruk.dk)) included mapping of nearly 400 S&T related organisations in Europe. For each organisation, data were comprised of listings of members from the EU, non-EU and associate states.
Turkey ranks 48 among 115 countries in 2005 with no score attributed to it in the Networked Readiness Index (NRI) prepared by the World Economic Forum. The NRI illustrates the degree of readiness of a nation to participate in and benefit from ICT developments. In 2002-03 Turkey ranked 57 with a score of 3.57 and in 2004-05 ranked 52 (out of 104 countries) with a score of -0.14. The picture demonstrates that although Turkey’s rank relative to the countries increases, the score for the country’s readiness to take part in an information society does not show a promising increase. As the World Economic Forum explains, the NRI is composed of three component indexes which assess: (a) environment for ICT offered by a country or community; (b) readiness of the community’s key stakeholders (individuals, business and governments); and (c) usage of ICT among these stakeholders.

Moreover, relative to the EU-25, Turkey falls behind in ICT expenditures in 2004 (EIS, 2004) and according to the same European Innovation Scoreboard in 2005, its status has changed from catching-up to falling-behind between 2004 and 2005 (EIS, 2005). Compared to former six candidate countries and the EU-15 average in 2003, Turkey still lags behind in ICT applications, production and investment (European Commission, 2003). But the same report suggests that among other candidates, Turkey is the fastest catching-up country in technology and innovation:

Turkey is the only country with specialised governmental and non-governmental agencies with a track record of managing funding and assistance to enterprises for innovation (European Commission, 2003: xx).

We can realise that the picture does not solely tell us that as a developing country in the accession process, Turkey’s investments in ICTs and ICT research are inefficient. When we look into the telecoms and information technologies sub-sectors separately, in 2004, the Turkish telecoms sector’s share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 3.3%, which is quite close to the OECD average of 3.2%; however it was quite distant from the OECD average of 2.9% in IT being 0.8% of the GDP (SPO, 2006). The Turkish ICT market’s status in the European and global ICT markets demonstrates a promising growth tendency, although the domestic market is not huge in relative sense (Çağlayan and Bener, 2006: 41).

The table below summarises the key milestones in Turkish IS policy as part of the national IS policy. The e-Turkey Project, which is called as the e-Transformation Turkey Project now, was the initial step in adjusting the government’s IS policy to the EU’s e-Europe Action Plans which was declared in Feira in 2000. The e-Transformation Project, operated by the Information Society Department of the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO), could be considered as the first official attempt in determining a national IS strategy in Turkey as former political attempts did not create a promising goal to sustain an IS prospect for Turkey as this project. E-Transformation Turkey’s main objectives are to provide the necessary conditions for the citizens to gain access to higher quality and faster public services through Internet; revise the ICT policies with regard to the EU’s strategies and prepare an Action Plan in the light of the e-Europe+, an Action Plan including the candidate countries.

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7 The former 15 member states plus the recent 10 members joined to the EU in May 2004.

8 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia.

9 [http://www.bilgitoplumu.gov.tr/eng/default.asp](http://www.bilgitoplumu.gov.tr/eng/default.asp) [last accessed on 02 April 2007]
Table 1. Turkish Government's selected IS-related policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy Document or Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Declaration of a national S &amp; T policy: Establishment of a national innovation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>TUENA – Turkish National Information Infrastructure Master Plan for 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Turkey obtains candidacy status in Helsinki Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Turkey is invited to join eEurope+ Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td><em>eTurkey Action Plan</em> declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>e-Transformation Turkey Project (continues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Liberalisation of the Turkish Telecom market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acceleration of the Turkish IS policy during 1990s was not a coincidence at a time when the convergence of technologies in ICTs has begun to increase throughout the world with a greater emphasis on innovation, know-how creation and R&D. The spread of Internet after the first half of 1990s in Turkey have speeded up an on-line societal life and e-business transactions as it had naturally happened elsewhere.

**Information Society policy in Turkey and Europe: selected empirical findings**

Turkey's strategy in general appears to be the adoption of the Lisbon Goal in all senses as part of the EU accession process. In a way, the aim of becoming the most competitive knowledge economy of the globe (for Europe) is itself an integration process for all European countries at S&T related fields and mainly research and innovation, since this is significantly related to the enlargement and regional integration prospects of the EU. Thus, Turkey's synchronised policies make sense. However, one major problem in the EU's course of policy-making and implementation of IS policies is the different institutional set-ups and cultures that exist in member states and the differing ways of responding to the EU's directives at nation state level. As a supranational entity, EU's directives and their calls for coordinated policy programmes at national levels seem not to be working yet as the Kok Report highlighted (European Commission, 2004).

One of the foremost problems in Turkey is its lack of continuous political commitment and the digital and economic divide between the highly industrialised parts and the rural regions of the country. Still, it has an opportunity in highly qualified human resources allowing to develop in the middle term strong ICT services and an R&D sector (Skulimowski, 2006). The empirical field work of this research revealed that there is high level of politicisation in management of S&T and its institutions. For instance, in 1998 the TUENA project (Turkish National Information Infrastructure Master Plan) started with great ambitions as a scenario building tool for the future of a Turkish IS by 2010; but as soon as the new government elected in 2002, the project lost its attention and interest within the political realm. The
sample of firms interviewed in this research stated that they need to see an IS policy superior to all political parties to be implemented without any distraction by power holders.

Another problem is the transmission of the European IS policies into the Turkish context. Turkey’s plans about aligning the e-Europe Action plans in 1990s did not include a systematic approach. The process of adopting the European regulatory framework without much questioning was highly criticised. It even looked like that the IS policy in Turkey meant a ‘meaningless and an aimless’ activity just for the sake of showing off an image of an e-Turkey (Respondent # 2).

The Turkish IS society policies are a direct, insipid and plain translation of the European IS policies. How should they be? We need to embed their [Europe] philosophy into our thinking, and think what can be done on behalf of a competitive Turkey. On the European side there is an implicit conservatism, a secret protectionism’ (Respondent # 7)

It is clearly stated above that taking the European IS policies and the EU’s Action Plans as guidelines is not the real problem. The main dilemma is whether Turkey should take everything as given or whether it should attempt to grasp the relevant policies behind the conditions and realise how to benefit from the European IS policies. Naturally, it is our main concern here to propose that Turkey should find its own way; however, on the route to taking part in the European IS; following the European regulations and applying them to the national context also sound meaningful.

The majority of the interviewees suggested that the Turkish State’s R&D support programmes are favouring big and powerful firms in the market. Therefore, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), although provided with opportunities like state initiatives and tax exemptions in industrial incubators; they also suffer from politicisation of the support mechanisms. This seems to be because of the inefficiency in the flow of information about project calls, training seminars and policy updates through state channels. Firms interviewed do not have time to read all comprehensive information. For that reason, most of them are not aware of relevant European funding schemes like EUREKA and COST. However, FP6 is more popular. This is perhaps there is more attention in publicising the FP6 in the National Scientific and Technical Research Council’s (TÜB TAK) and universities’ agendas. Interestingly, only six out of 27 firms applied for European funding in this research.

Although the figures we covered earlier in this paper suggest that there is low investment in ICT production in Turkey (EIS, 2004); the “snapshot” of the ICT sector in this research told us that there is a great ambition for domestic technology production. All of the selected participants in this research were success stories in the specific ICT product areas they were operating. As in the words of one respondent (# 5), concentrating on technology production within the borders of the nation and increasing the competitive capacity of the sector were at the core of a successful ‘national’ ICT sector integrated into the European and global ICT markets:

Let us produce technology! We do not have time and energy to deal with the EU’s issues and EU’s policies. We must produce our own technology! That is the solution!’ (Respondent # 5)

Integration into the European IS project and the European collaborative funding applications does not only mean a policy flow from the EU to Turkey. It is important to see whether there is a tendency towards ‘networking’ with European comparators, i.e. do the firms use the existing funding opportunities? In what ways do they attempt to collaborate and communicate within the sector, with the nation state, with the EU and with their comparators in Europe?

One of the experts warned the situation in Turkey, suggesting that the ICT sector was not
able to create its own communication channels although several platforms, such as sectoral NGOs (non-governmental organisations) existed. He used an interesting analogy:

Networks?.... NOT-works! (R&D consultant, Expert # 2).

It was observed during the Field Work that the majority of the firms in this research had or found their own channels to communicate and network with Europe. The state’s, namely TÜB TAK’s communication and informing tools were found complex. On the other hand, the sector’s own collaborative works happened through first informal networking; and second, through formal and procedural funding applications at European level. However, partnership searching in Europe did not seem to fit with their ways of business-making. First of all, they did not want to spare time for project applications as the nature of the EU funding needed to be understood well which was costly for them in terms of time and human resources. One software firm which had been highly successful in the EU project applications suggested that:

Our firms go to Europe, apply for FP6 for money. Stop there! You should go to the EU for networking. Lisbon Goal is fine, but, be careful! In order to create a competitive Europe, EU aims to put customers and industrialists together. We should understand this very well (Respondent # 12).

Although the FP6 was popular, it was found that the number of applications were very low among the firms in this research. However, according to TÜB TAK’s figures, among all other themes, the thematic areas of Information Society Technologies (IST) showed the highest number of project applications from Turkey in the EU’s FP6: nearly 20% of the 2947 applications came from the IST area (TÜB TAK, 2006). Conversely, if we look at the success rate in the total number of funding applications; only 15.4% of the applicants were able to take part in projects (ibid). So, where could the above figures have come from? The same indicators suggested that, nearly half of all applications to the EU’s FP6 (54%) were received from the universities; whereas only 17% of the applicants were SMEs (TÜB TAK, 2006).

The initial empirical results showed that a high demand in time and human resources, financial capital, language barriers and lack of knowledge in business making in the European style and with the European culture (as they claimed) were the problems firms had encountered in project application processes. Therefore, national funding sources were preferred more.

Do all these matter?

Instead of concluding, it is better to start asking the question– is there a potential in the Turkish ICT sector compared to Europe, then? Is the Turkish course of action in IS-building promising for the future development of the country? It appears that technology and R&D are not very old concepts for the Turkish ICT sector; however, indigenous technology production and the development of domestic technology production capabilities take a significant place in the agendas of the firms interviewed in this research; because, they see this process an essential factor for the enhancement of innovation-based economic growth in Turkey.

The S & T integration at European level motivates the member states, candidate countries and other associate countries to produce a technological product and an innovative idea together; to share research prospects and ‘understand’ the ways which each part makes business. However, the direct policy flow from a supranational institution needs to be questioned and adapted to the national context by ‘realising’ one’s own needs and potential. The selected companies from the Turkish ICT sector seemed to have their varying views on collaboration with Europe; however, through networking and partnership projects will they only find the opportunity to encounter with their European comparators and to learn from each other. Since innovation and knowledge production is an interactive process (Lundvall,
1992), it is valuable to ask what the ICT sector as a sub-system in Turkey can do in terms of creating opportunities to integrate Turkey with the European Information Society. We guess, that has been our starting point which needs to be dealt in more detail.

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Chapter 4

Conceptualising feminism in Africa: is it merely politics of naming?

Patricia K. Litho

This chapter discusses the concept of feminism in Africa and seeks to explain how feminism functions within the African context including how viable it is. It questions whether African feminism is merely politics of naming or there is more to it. It then explores what the tenets of the African feminism discourse entails, highlights areas of commonality and difference with dominant feminist discourses and ends with its implications for understanding ICTs and the empowerment of women in Africa.

Defining African feminism: the contestations

…the power of naming is two fold: … [first is the] quality [of power] and the value… of that which is named- [second is that] it … denies reality and value to that which is never named, never uttered. That which has no word or concepts is rendered mute and invisible … [and] powerless to inform or transform … our understanding” (Du Bois 1983: 108).

While these words were used to critique the claim for neutrality in social sciences and describe the position of women in knowledge production by Du Bois (1983), it captures the essence of this thesis. It highlights the concerns of African feminists and activists. African women are concerned with the power and right to name their own location and set their own agenda. It could therefore be said that African feminisms are concerned with issues of power, agency and subjectivity within feminism itself and in society, which are also evident in the empowerment discourse (Arndt 2002). But is there such a thing as African feminism? What does it constitute and what is so African about African feminism that is not in other feminisms? I have often been asked these questions and sometimes it is hard to give a clear answer as to whether African feminism exists or not, because of the complexities surrounding the idea of feminism in Africa. To say no to the existence of African feminism would be denying the fact that the women's ideology against all forms of oppression do exist in Africa and yet to answer yes would seem contradictory because some women in Africa would rather be called activists and not feminists. What could be said however is that ideas that could be labelled feminist exist in Africa and so do feminists and I am not shy to admit that I am one of them because sticking with the terminology used by other women plays the political role of increasing African women's participation in the production of the wider body of knowledge about their own experiences to the global picture (Oyewumi 2003 and Johnson-Odim 1991). However as an African woman, I continually have to deal with challenges on how I define feminism, what it is constituted of and what “legitimate feminist foci and goals” ought to be (Johnson-Odim 1991). My definitions are often expected to comply with dominant perceptions of what feminism should be. These standards and/or expectations of what a feminist should be “functions like a filter through” which my position as a feminist is judged. At several conferences for instance, I have been accused of not being a feminist because of my argument that women and men need to work together to ensure gender equality and that women themselves sometimes play the role of oppressor not just to men but also to fellow women. As an African woman, I feel that the application of such standards fail to recognise and appreciate who I am and views my difference as a flaw. This view seems to reinforce a form of dependence on Western standards and paradigms that Afrocentric ideology (see Asante 1988) advocates against.

A review of literature offers no explicit definition of feminism but what is clear is that feminism is essentially concerned with the liberation of women and is;
“... committed to work individually and collectively ... to end all forms of oppression [against women based on sex differences and to work towards] uncover[ing] and understand[ing] what causes and sustains oppression in all its forms” (Maguire 1987:79).

The term ‘feminist’ is therefore used to refer to a female displaying a “range of behaviour indicating ... agency and self determination” Oyewumi (2003:1). According to Oyewumi personal, cultural, political self determination and organising in groups (brought about by age group socialisation into regiments and/or through rites of passage ceremonies) has been a long term value of traditional African societies and not something taught to African by the West as often assumed but this relatively privileged position of some African women was abridged by slavery, colonisation and globalisation which has made the African people dependant on the West economically, politically and to some extent culturally.

African feminism on the other hand could be defined as a theoretical model that shares common concerns with other feminisms; however its point of departure from mainstream feminisms is based on “issues of agency, subjectivity and power – the power to name oneself, one’s location and one’s struggle” (Arndt 2002:13). This agency is located in Africa’s historical realities of marginalisation caused by slavery, colonialism, racism, globalisation, and poverty (Oyewumi 2005 and Adeleye-Fayemi 2000). By implication therefore African feminism is “… anti-imperialist, socialist-oriented and aware of social injustices on a society... ” (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000:6).

Like other Third World feminisms, African feminisms calls for the consideration of its varied cultures, ethnicity, language and religion because these added dimensions have a bearing on the different ways women experience their lives as women and constructs a “different context in which Third World women’s struggles must be understood” (Johnson-Odim 1991:314). The key argument here is that Western feminisms cannot meaningfully represent other women because different women have different value systems, challenges and needs (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Mohanty, Russo & Torres 1991 and Mikell 1997). Similar critiques are shared by other alternative feminist discourses including; ‘womanism’ (Walker 1983), ‘Africana womanism’ (Hudson-Weems 1993), ‘Motherism’ (Acholonu 1995), ‘Stiwanism’ (Ogundipe 1994), ‘negofeminism’ (Nnaemeka 1995), ‘femalism’ and ‘Black feminism’ (Kohrs-Amissah 2002). Theorising African feminism is therefore no easy task, first because it is a work still in progress and secondly because of the sheer size of the continent and the complexity of issues that the different regions in the continent face. This makes it difficult to have a single African feminist thought. The concept of African feminism may therefore “raise more questions than give answers” (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002:316).

Before proceeding with this discussion, there is a need to define two key words used in this discussion; that is African and Western. Africa is used to refer to the Uganda context. I am aware that other African women share similar experiences of oppression but this thesis will not be able to deal with a wider scope because of the vastness and diversity of Africa. The diversity in Africa implies that women’s experience of oppression are different and therefore understanding of women’s empowerment may significantly vary because of ethnic, religious, economic, political and historical differences. While Western (or dominant) is used to refer to feminist discourses from Western Europe and North America.

What constitutes African Feminism?

Evidence from the literature indicates six key tenets of African feminism including; its location in the continent’s historical and cultural experiences of oppression, the genesis of feminism in Africa, the politics of naming, the production of knowledge, advocates for
cooperation between women and men to achieve women’s emancipation and upholds motherhood.

To begin with, it is important to acknowledge that there are some common themes between African and Western feminism and an attempt to redefine what is African in feminism usually has Western ideas resurfacing. According to Adeleye-Fayemi (2000) this is borne out of Africa’s Colonial history and globalisation. Common themes between the two kinds of feminism includes the rejection of gender oppression and inequality as well as consider patriarchal power as a deliberate structure to subjugate women, including the view that women experience the world differently and their view point may be different from that of men. The commonalities imply that all feminist could be relevant to each other especially when working towards broader and inter-connected issues like the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as stated in the Uganda CEDAW Report (GoU 1999).

As indicated earlier, Africa’s history has shaped the experiences of women and their relationship with the West. Additionally, feminism in Africa challenges institutionalised racism evident in global structures like the World Bank, United Nations and development agencies that sometimes undermines the continent’s development processes (Mama 1995). The two forms of feminisms are grounded in different contexts, experiences and realities, implying that the term ‘feminism’ carries different meanings for women in Africa and those in the West and else where in the World and this needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the experiences of oppression by women from the different worlds (Mwale 2002 and Alleyne 1998).

It could be said that those involved in women’s rights struggles in Africa are of two minds; the first is that they are feminists and the second is that they are not feminists but activists (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Tamale 2003 and Ardt 2002). According to Adeleye-Fayemi (2004), the more dominant group prefers the ‘gender activist’ label because they feel that ‘gender’ is a safer word because it is accommodated by men unlike the term ‘feminist’ that they find threatening to the status quo because of its association to ‘power over’ and the negative stereotypes attached to Western feminisms for instance; “men haters, divorcees, uncompromising, extremists, atheists, hypocrites, imperialists and lesbian among other names” (Oyewumi 2003, Mohanty et al 1999 and Asante 1988). Adeleye-Fayemi further explains that the fear of using the term ‘feminist’ is heightened by the fact that patriarchy in Africa uses “a system of rewards and punishment depending on whether one conforms or deviates” (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004:17).

Women professing to be feminists and others advocating for the rights of others, do so at great risk. An example for instance is the brutal treatment faced by those fighting for gay and lesbian rights in Uganda. These women face challenges not just because same sex relationships is culturally forbidden in Uganda but also because homophobia is encouraged through governments laws of the penal code that legally outlaws homosexuality. Additionally, some of the press encourages homophobia by providing space for anti-homosexuality messages and campaigns. In August 2006 for instance, the Red Pepper newspaper published names of 45 gay men and carried several stories which encouraged the public to harass gay people. In its 8th September 2006 issue, the Red Pepper run an article titled “Kampala’s notorious lesbians unearthed”. Besides listing names of lesbians women, it called out to the public to name and shame these kinds of women and encouraged more people to “send more name to us, [including] the occupation of the lesbians within your neighbourhood…[so that] we can shame them”. The Red Pepper said they were committed to exposing all the lesbians in the city so as to “rid our motherland of the deadly vice”. After these articles were published, most of the people whose names were mentioned were attacked in their homes by local residents, some lost their jobs, were disowned by their families, their homes searched by state agents and even arrested by police. Some women have even been raped by men so as to “teach them a lesson” (Mukasa 2006:1).

Despite these challenges, the ‘feminist’ minority like Dr. Sylvia Tamale, argue that the term feminist is a better label because it carries a harder “political punch” that the term activist
lacks. According to Tamale (2003), the use of the 'activist' label has left the women's movement in Uganda weak and can only be remedied if women's rights activists are "... elated ... and drunk on [women's] cause ... objectives ... mission ...[and] obligations". Tamale further discourages gender activism because it has had the unfortunate tendency to lead to lack of enthusiasm, "comfortable complacency, dangerous diplomacy and even importance" (Tamale 2003:1). Exceptions like Tamale are generally considered radical and often criticised for promoting ‘foreign ideas’ that may erode African values.

Tamale also advocates for the rights of gay people. During the revision of Uganda’s Domestic Relations Bill (DRB) for instance, Tamale pointed to the hypocrisy of government and feminists in Uganda for their double standards when it came to dealing with human rights yet in the same breath are intolerant to issues of same sex relationships, which she argues are also human rights that deserve to be recognised (Tamale 2003). Tamale’s advocacy outraged many Ugandans and caused President Museveni to force the withdrawal of the DRB in 2002. In a letter to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the president confessed he had ordered the Ministry of Gender to withdraw the DRB because "... the Bill was rather shallow and cannot address issues of the Ugandan society". The President further warned all Ugandans against "... copying western ways of life which have caused ... the stampede for self destruction ..." (Kawamara-Mishambi 2003).

African feminists also argue against the notion that the struggle for women’s rights in Africa started with liberation and anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s and that the ideas of feminism reached Africa via Western Feminism. According to Mohanty, Russo and Torres (1991), this seems to ignore resistance to male domination by women in Africa and other Third World countries since the 1800s although not necessarily called feminism. In 1899 for instance, Qasim Amin, an Egyptian jurist wrote a book on Women’s Liberation (Tahrir al-Mar’a). The book criticised some of the practices prevalent in his society at the time such as polygamy, the veil, and segregation of women. Prior to this book the women’s press in Egypt was already voicing such concerns since its very first issue in 1892 and were producing their own magazine, the L’Egyptienne by the 1920s (Mama 1995).

In addition, the African form of communication has mostly been oral and therefore little documentary evidence exists on the actual period women’s activism started. For instance, through folk tales told to me by my grandparents, I have grown up knowing that centuries ago Warrior Queens and women soldiers existed. There are several other stories about unmarried powerful women who resisted arranged marriages and in protest eloped or lead celibate lives. Evidence from Uganda and other countries like Nigeria (see Adeleye-Fayemi 2000); indicate that the institution of witchcraft has also been used to resist patriarchal practices like polygamy or wife battering. In other cases, older women protested unfair treatment by stripping and marching naked. Amongst the Japadhola from Eastern Uganda where I come from, it is a taboo to see the nakedness of your mother or grandmother. The mere threat of such acts acted as a deterrent to male oppressors. I therefore see witchcraft and stripping naked as examples of how African women have resisted patriarchy despite arguments that African women have accepted to be battered and depersonalised (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000).

Although one of the areas considered to be vehicles of oppressing women is religion, it is also an area where women have exercised power in Africa. There are several cases of powerful priestesses today and in the past within African traditional religion. However through the introduction of Islam and Christianity to Africa, women’s oppression deepened because these religions promoted the exclusion of women from work outside the home. Prior to this period, African women were involved in activities based outside the home like agricultural production and trading. These elements are still evident in rural areas of several African communities including Buwama and Nabweru in Uganda, were women till the land, look after the home, make crafts and are involved in trading. According to Mama (1995), Islam undermined women and depersonalised them through veiling, while Christianity emphasised women’s obligation to their husbands. These new religious expectations on women added to African women’s existing roles instead increased women's burden. Women's exclusion from public and wage waged employment is therefore part of the colonial legacy that African
feminist have to deal with now. Christianity and Islam can however be credited for introducing African women to education that has served as a source of empowerment for some women (Mama 1995).

Mbire-Barungi (1999), further argues that although the duality of roles is common, the degree of the burden distinguishes women from the South from those in the North. In Africa men are dependent on the women for their daily existence and women sometimes use this as a source of power to get the men to do exactly as they wish (Mbire-Barungi 1999 and Mama 1995). During the focus group discussion with women in Uganda for instance, it was revealed that their typical day involved domestic chores like cooking, laundry, taking care of the children and agricultural labour as indicated in table 3.1 below that illustrates Mr. and Mrs. Mukasa daily schedule. It shows that a woman in Uganda does almost 15 hours of work as opposed to her male counter part who does 5 to 6 hours less. Although this data is not representative of all women and men in Uganda, it gives a rough idea of what happens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Women's activities</th>
<th>Men's activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>Wake up &amp; morning prayer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06:00-0700</td>
<td>Sweeps house</td>
<td>Morning prayers and goes farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepares breakfast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepares children for school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cleans utensils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milks cow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sell milk to buyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tither cows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:00-09:00</td>
<td>Goes to the garden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00-12:00</td>
<td>Returns from garden</td>
<td>Returns from garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepares lunch</td>
<td>Rests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washes clothes</td>
<td>Has a drink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00-13:00</td>
<td>Eats lunch</td>
<td>Eats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-16:00</td>
<td>Rests</td>
<td>Visits friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make crafts</td>
<td>Goes to community meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Listens to radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-18:00</td>
<td>Collects firewood</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Checks livestock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fetches water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ps: women usually socialise during this time</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00-21:00</td>
<td>Cleans up</td>
<td>Returns home to check on livestock and family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepares dinner (May get help from children if they back from school)</td>
<td>Listens to radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure children have had a bath</td>
<td>Goes out for drink with friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eats dinner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepares for bed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00-00:00</td>
<td>Gets up to warm husbands food</td>
<td>Returns home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Get him water to have a bath</td>
<td>Eats dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Go back to bed</td>
<td>Bed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During struggles for liberation in Africa, women’s political participation was evident through women’s wings that included women from both rural and urban areas for instance in Kenya’s Mau Mau rebellion, Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) and Mozambique’s FRELIMO guerrilla force amongst other liberation struggles in Africa (Mwale 2002 and Mama 1995). In Uganda, women started with the formation of the Banakazadde be Egwanga (mothers of the nation) to protest the deportation of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Mutesa II in 1955.
These women also struggled against property restrictions and women's right to vote. It was however common for women to work towards the common independence goal as opposed to organising to deal with gender relations specifically. Despite this, after independence, the new states sidelined women (Ardnt 2002). The common scenario after independence was instead seeing women as politicians' wives quietly standing besides their husbands. Most of these women had been specially groomed in girls' schools established by colonialists to prepare wives for 'western-educated-African men' (see Ahikire 2005).

It is therefore worth noting that even before the struggles for independence, patriarchal practices existed in Africa and women used several strategies to resist it including; "... using the institution of motherhood, access to political power [and] religious authority... [amongst others]", just that Africa's contacts with the West added another dimension of oppression to Africa, were women had to bear a bigger burden including losing their previous positions of power and leadership (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000:6 and Johnson-Odim 1991). African feminism therefore questions the degree to which women can benefit from their political participation. As discussed in chapter 2, participation according to several empowerment scholars is one of the indicators of women’s empowerment; however women's experience in the liberation struggles and in development projects today indicates that participation in political processes does not always lead to women's empowerment. Feminist activism in Africa is therefore concerned with issues like revisiting constitutions, women’s relationships with the state, their civic rights and citizenship (Oyewumi 2003 and Adeleye-Feyemi 2000).

Despite this post independence betrayal by men, women in Africa still feel that without collaboration with men, attaining women’s empowerment could face challenges. According to Etienne and Leacock (1980 in Johnson-Odim 1991), African women continue to seek such egalitarian relations because it was the African way of life in pre-colonial Africa and although patriarchy existed, the view is that it has been made worse by cultural and economic imperialism that continues to oppress both women and men in Africa. Women also need men not just to fulfil their biological role of motherhood but also to work towards institutional power structures that oppress African people. This is important because African women believe that for meaningful change to take place there is need to collaborate with their men. African women feel that the continued resistance to women's liberation is because men have been eliminated from processes that could have changed their negative attitudes. This backlash is because of the fact that while women are ‘conscientised’, men are left with the same way of thinking and yet there is a need for the men to understand why women have to be addressed as a special group. Besides men are not just beneficiaries of patriarchy but also “products of patriarchal socialisation” (Ardnt 2002:73).

For this reason therefore, not just men should be viewed as oppressors but women too can be oppressors or partners in oppression or have the potential to become oppressors. For instance, cases were mothers-in-law oppress their daughters- in- law or even cases of matrilineal societies in Africa were women have power over men. Some of the matrilineal societies include; the Mang’anja of Malawi, the Akan of Ghana, Ngoni of Tanzania and the Akamba of Kenya who even have women to women marriages, also practiced in Uganda (Mutiso 2004). In these cases the women yield more power than men, the children belong to the woman and the man is expected to settle in the wives ancestral home upon marriage (Mwale 2002). Additionally, there are other institutional forms of oppression that are not necessarily related to people’s sex or gender but race and class. African women and men therefore need to work together to challenge these institutionalised forms of oppression. To African feminists therefore, feminists need not be in opposition to men and women need not neglect their biological roles because motherhood is a strength and seen as having a special manifestation in Africa (Ogundipe-Leslie 1985).

Motherhood to several African women provides a sense of protection and companionship which they do not expect from their husbands unlike their Western sisters. This belief is evident in a common saying amongst the Japadhola that ‘Achandere pa dhako makunywol’, literally translated as; I am suffering like a women who has not given birth to children. This saying highlights the vital power that motherhood gives several women and having no child is viewed as a possible source of suffering. A child is seen as a source of comfort, so several
women in Africa embrace their reproductive role because they see it as a positive element (Oyewumi 2003 and Ogundipe-Leslie 1994). Although motherhood is connected to sexuality, African scholars hardly cover this issue. According to Mama, it could be a deliberate move by African women to avoid an area that has been a “historical legacy of racist fascination with African sexuality” (Mama 1995:14). This has resulted into an ongoing prejudice of African sexuality. Most of what is emphasised are the problematic aspects of African sexuality like genital mutilation and epidemics like HIV/AIDS.

Another area were African women experience institutional oppression and/or ‘power over’ from fellow women is evident in the difficulties they face in an effort to participate in “defining feminism and setting a feminist agenda” (Johnson-Odim 1991:323). According to Mama (1995), since the 1970s, educated African women have demanded that their voices be heard because they;

were no longer content with merely being objects of studies, whose situation was used to test and verify theories conceptualised elsewhere by women scholars whose concerns and preoccupations often differed from their own (Mama 1995:3).

Some of the steps African women undertook to increase their autonomy involved the establishment of women specific institutions like the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) and CODESRIA’s gender analysis seminars. Additionally, country specific institutions were launched. In Uganda for instance, women’s desks were established in several government sectors and through affirmative action, policies were created to increase the representation of women in parliament to at least 30% and female students were awarded an extra 1.5 point to boost their entry to tertiary institutions (Nabachwa 2004 and GoU 1999).

Through donor support, women in Uganda have been able to set up women specific organisations like the Uganda Media Women's Association (UMWA) and a women's studies department was established at Makerere University in Uganda. These institutions have however been hard to sustain because of financial difficulties and donor dependence has once again undermined the independence of these women organisations since the funds come with strings attached. Sometimes specific issues are funded and for survival these organisations have to change their focus. According to Johnson-Odim (1999), the limited resource that African women have has limited how much they can publish thus leaving the defining of African feminisms to those with more access to resources. This also means that African women have to publish in the West and by so doing have to comply with criteria that may sometimes relegate their views.

Oyewumi (2003) further argues for a need to construct knowledge about African women by African women themselves, in their own terms and based on their own beliefs and needs. African women challenge the notion that one mode of feminism can be privileged above others and that knowledge production should be based on the experiences of women in Africa (Oyewumi 2003). African feminists are concerned with the way dominant feminists discourses has represented them; in the words of Oyeronke Oyewumi (2003:27) and Olufemi Taiwo (2003:45) the “misrepresentation” of African women. African women criticise Western perspectives for looking at women as a homogeneous group and yet gender is experienced differently. An example is the representation of the African women in Western Feminist discourse solely as powerless victims who are unable to define their own needs (Okome 2003). However, as discussed earlier in this chapter and else where in this thesis, some women in Africa are in position of power and may sometimes be oppressors not just of fellow women but of men tool. Taiwo also illustrates this visor generalisation using the work of Kate Crehan (1983) on women in North Western Zambia that assumes that African women are the same. As indicated in the following quote, Crehan was in only one area of Africa for 18 months but uses this data as a basis to generalise African women’s experience;

| The research was carried out between 1997 and 1989 during which time I lived for 18 months in one small Kaonde Community in North Western Zambia. The main research method used was participant observation. Although the paper is in one |
sense specific and particular, the underlying processes described are similar to those found in many rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. (Crehan 1983:52).

This same pattern is evident in an article by Meeker and Meekers that describes the Kaguru women's family relations, household power structures and educational opportunities. While they try to indicate that the rural Kaguru woman is different, they still go ahead to use her experience to represent experiences in rural African societies;

Obtaining information from women themselves is essential for the formulation of policies and programs that are relevant to the needs of rural African women ...while the situation of women in other societies may be different, many of the issues addressed by Kaguru women are relevant for other rural African societies (Meeker and Meekers 1997:36)

According to Sexton this ought to be avoided because “generalising can be misleading, inadequate ... failing to take into account the astonishing variations among women. [it is therefore worth noting that] women have not one but many voices ...” (Sexton 1982 in Reinharz 1992: 4). Feminist scholarship must therefore create room for the inclusion of Afrocentric perspectives, acknowledge the position of African women in relation to her Western counter parts and be specific in identifying socio-cultural barriers to women’s empowerment and re-evaluate how they conceive women’s empowerment in Africa.

Additionally, African feminists argue that for long they have been spoken for either by their men or men from the West and if by women, it has always been by women from the West who misrepresent them. As a result, the content available on African women reflects foreign values and experiences which they use as a yardstick to judge Africa (Oyewumi 2003). According to Mwale (2002), this reflects priviledges of a few women over other women and how they use this as a position of power “to force upon ‘other’ women their own idiosyncrasies, terms and definitions [in other words] what they mean for themselves and others” (Mwale 2002:133). The issue for African women here is therefore not the origin of the term feminism per se but how feminist discourse engages Africa and its people. There is therefore a need to include African women’s experiences as authentic knowledge but also to go a step further to consider women’s position in relation to men as opposed to looking at women in isolation.

African women challenge the way their contribution to knowledge has been categorised under courses liken race, development and postcolonial theory. For instance, feminisms within the West have been classified based on historical debates over the definitions and constructions of gender. The different categorisation of feminisms has been based on the degree of tolerance in the way different scholars have dealt with gender inequality issues and women’s oppression. Some of the common strands include; Liberal, Radical and socialist feminisms amongst others (These categories could also be found amongst African feminists). The categorisation of feminisms is sometimes based on chronological historic occurrence or waves. They include; feminism awakening (1790-1848), Feminisms first wave (1848-1920, feminism retreat (1920-1960, feminism second wave (1960-1982) and feminism third wave (from 1982) (see Adeleye Fayemi 2004, Brayton 1997, Maguire 1987, Black 1989, Humm 1989 and Stamp 1989). According to Cott (1987), the wave categorisation is flawed because it ignores resistance to male domination between the 1920s and 1960s and other struggles against patriarchy which are located outside Western realities for instance that by ‘women of color’. This isolation leaves their work at the risk of not being read and as such their concerns are not being considered. This demonstrates that unequal power relations still exist within feminist scholarship (see Tamale 2000, Mama 1995, and Mohanty et al 1991). I was actually quite surprised to find that even recent key feminist texts like Maggie Humm’s (1992) “ Feminisms: a reader”, which mentions different genres of feminisms including Asian, Black, women of colour and lesbian feminisms, is silent on African feminisms. Although Black women share commonalities, in Humm’s book like several others, Black women are used to refer to Black women in Britain, other parts of Europe and the United States, meaning the African women are still left out. Additionally, African women disassociate themselves from other Black Anglo-American women like Alice...
Walker, and Cleonora Hudson Weems who speak on behalf of all Black women without really being informed about the situation in Africa. According to Ardnt (2002) African women demand a re-examination of feminist discourse because it depicts a mindset that considers other races inferior and bestows privilege on a few. This is evident in the "coloring of feminist discourse to "black, white and brown" as opposed to African women who speak geographically (Arndt 2002: 11).

According to Charles (1992) this limiting space under which African, Black and Third World women are allowed to speak depicts racism and imperialism. So they find it necessary to present their concerns within the very school of thought they oppose to ensure their voices are heard, that is taking the insider/outsider position (Collins 1990). Azziz further explains that this kind of representation continually presents Third World women as "victims" and not "agents" of their own cause as they would wish (Azziz 1992: 292). Part of the concerns of African feminism is therefore ensuring that women’s diversity is reflected in feminist discourses. African women therefore lobby against politics of universalism, cultural controls and misrepresentation. According to Mama (1995), if scholarship is indigenously grounded, the conclusions are often different and more profound than that done by those from outside that context. Mama makes reference to scholars like Foucault who have developed their theory based on an in-depth understanding of their societies.

African feminist are therefore trying to create new identities for themselves by questioning the relevance of models of thought and institutions which are of no value to the continent. The contestation with current models of feminism is that they have been created outside African experiences and realities and therefore serve to make African women invisible and disposable. However feminism is still unpopular in Africa and although some achievements have been attained in the public, in the private women suffer silently. In my case for instance, doing this PhD has confirmed to those around me my position as a feminist and as a result I have faced challenges even from my own family. Several times I have been accused of being blinded by Western ideas that do not apply to Uganda. I have also been accused of being too aggressive. As an African woman, I am expected to exude gentler characteristics like being caring, non-assertive and submissive, which to most African men implies accepting a position of inferiority to men and not challenging their 'authority'. Additionally, during interviews for this study, I was accused by some men of being "one of those urban based educated women who just want to confuse women in the villages". This happened on at least two different occasions. One of the men who made this comment was a husband to one of the women I interviewed and the other a government official at one of the sub counties I visited. Other women in Uganda involved in similar activities have to deal with unsupportive or even abusive partners in private, hostility from the state and even the media that ridicules activists and/or feminist as "frustrated women who want to mess up other people's homes" (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Oyewumi 2003 and Tamale 2003).

It therefore ought to be understood that African feminisms in all its multiplicity, is concerned with issues of who defines their issues, because for long what has been defined as acceptable has mostly been defined by men, women are treated as second rate citizens, women’s labour is not remunerated, her rights are subject to validation and her daughters share the same fate because she is socialised to sustain these oppressive structures. Rewards are given for compliance and punishment for rebellion (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000, Johnson-Odin 1991 and Mohanty et al 1991).

Feminism in Uganda: challenges and contradictions
There are two basic faces to feminism in Uganda. The popular group made up of ordinary women and the intellectual group considered more individualistic and are involved in setting up most of the women NGOs. This group also includes women within academia. The women’s movement in Uganda has been influenced by international events like the United Nations (UN) International Conferences on women in Mexico City in 1975, the 1976 Wellesley conference on women and development, Copenhagen 1980 (Mohanty 1991: 75) and the third UN conference on women in Nairobi in 1985 which attracted a lot of third world and
African women. More recently is the fourth world conference on women held in Beijing, China, 1995.

The popular group, considered less threatening is a product of liberation movements during which women fought along side men for their country's liberation. These groups of women are mostly illiterate but intelligent enough to take advantage of ongoing debates to improve their status. It is amongst this group that you find small scale traders based in mainly rural areas. Small and agro based trading is ingrained in the traditional African societies' matriarchal system where women enjoyed some rights, although this was within a clearly defined space, the household and community management (Uchendu 1993 in Toure et al 2003 and Mbire-Barungi 1999).

The intellectual group faces more challenges because they are viewed as promoting western ideologies, acquired through western education and exposure to international debates on women's rights. It is this group that has for many years challenged oppressive cultural practices like polygamy, forced marriages, female genital mutilation (FGM), widow inheritance and domestic violence and property rights amongst other issues. This group is also recognised for exporting debates on rights of women in Africa beyond African borders through international conference that they speak at and papers that they write.

Although this group has had great impact in terms of advocating for changes away from oppressive cultural and legislative practices they are looked at as practicing "intellectual-profit-seeking feminism" (Toure et al 2003:2) and 'careerism' (Tamale 2003:4) which creates a monopoly by a few elite women and weakens women's collective movement and continuity. Most academic women have set up organisations commonly known as MONGOs; an acronym for "my own NGO". The MONGOs have had the sad effect of disadvantaging other women particularly rural women since a level of discrimination is practiced. As explained by one of the CEEWA beneficiaries in Buwama, for other women to channel their handcrafts for exports through these women NGOs they need to know someone within the organisation;

The previous CEEWA officer used to link us with NAWOU¹ and they would buy our crafts but since she left, NAWOU does not seem to know or even remember us. I went to NAWOU recently but they refused my crafts. It really hurts, other women’s crafts were being accepted because they have friends or relatives working at the organisation but mine was rejected” (focus group discussion, Buwama 2005)

Clearly there is an absence of the rural face to the women’s movement in Uganda. The movement seems to rotate around Kampala (the capital city of Uganda). Women in Kampala continually talk on behalf of others and this limits the effectiveness of the women’s movement.

Continuity is also limited because younger women are isolated from the feminist processes since there MONGO practice promotes founder member syndromes. Although younger women are blamed for taking a lukewarm approach to women’s issues, the founder member syndrome has meant that older women cling onto power and are not grooming younger women to take over (Tamale 2003). A closely related problem is the gap between theory and practice. Women in academia and the active practitioners work separately. According to Tamale, the failed relation between theory and praxis has contributed to a "half baked and truncated feminism". Tamale further argues that these two groups need to work together because while theory leads to informed activism, it is also informed by practice, otherwise Uganda feminism will continue operating in “obscurantism” (Tamale 2003:4).

One of the greatest challenges to women’s movement in Uganda is the fact that women’s rights and human rights in general are shrouded in uncertainty and to a large extend depend on the politics of the day. Politicians are aware of this and use it to buy off women. In Uganda for instance, President Museveni claims to have made the women’s movement

¹ National Association of Women of Uganda
what is today and so women should allow him to be “...the driver of the vehicle of the women’s movement...” and expects women to forever be grateful to him (Tamale 2003 and Kabuchu 2005). This situation has seen several women activists bought off by offering them leadership positions and once they take up these positions they stop lobbying for women issues and instead work towards pleasing the appointing authorities. This “grateful sycophancy” syndrome is evident in Uganda’s 2001 presidential elections when a group of women claimed to speak for other women, constituted themselves into an organisation known as Women’s Movement for the Return of Kaguta (WORK) (Goetz 2003:121). WORK run advertisements to support the incumbent on the grounds that he had elevated the status of women in society. Women also fail to successful influence issues pertinent to them in parliament because of their small numbers, just about 18% of the parliament and yet to win in policy making is not just about voting on issues but about numbers (Matembe 1997).

According to Tamale, political leaders like Museveni find it easy to hijack women’s achievements and get all the credit because women themselves have failed to claim their gains. This makes critics question whether indeed there is a women’s movement in Uganda. According to Ahikire (2005) however, the question is not whether there is women’s movement in Uganda but rather about the lack of leadership to show direction for the over grown movement. She argues that the movement is “…visible but lacks the power as a collective” (Ahikire 2005:5). Women activists in Uganda have also failed to sustain their benefits because they work in a fragmented and adhoc manner and only “come [together] in response to specific issues and don’t sustain the pressure even on those specific ones ... it is a crisis approach rather than a sustained continuous social movement” (Tamale 2003: 9). Ahikire further critics Uganda activists for failing to plan for resistance and failure and assuming that all their ideas to change the status quo will be embraced by the same men they seek to challenge. She points out the example of the Domestic Relations Bill (DRB) that seems stagnant because the women’s coalition had no fall back plan but assumed the bill would automatically be passed (Ahikire 2005: 7). The DRB proposes equal rights for both men and women and proposes the consolidation of all laws relating to marriage, separation and divorce (GoU 2000). Further challenges are evident in the several proposals being advanced by men to scrap sex-quotas and the policy of affirmative action.

The culture of donor driven NGOs, has also overtaken the women’s struggle. This is looked at as leading to the advancement of mainly other people’s agenda as opposed to what is truly relevant for women in Uganda. Some critics attribute the defeatist approach that several women NGOs use to donor dependency. In a bid to get more funding proposals are written in a way that depicts women especially those in rural areas as ignorant suffering victims who can not stand up for their own rights (Tamale 2003). This is coupled with governments increasing obsession to control NGOs. For instance, NGOs in Uganda have to get their licence renewed annually and on the board that approves these licences are security operatives (Tamale 2003).

A recent resistance to showing the play “Vagina Monologues” in Uganda is a clear demonstration that the women’s movement still faces challenges rooted in cultural orientation from not just men as individuals but also men use their advantageous position as the majority in policy making to undermine women’s efforts. Whereas the play is an adult play seeking to highlight sexual violence, it was stopped on the account of immorality. It is a show of double standards by government because pornographic material is allowed on the streets where even under age children have access. Clearly, “…the interests of men prevailed”. While pornography, depicting women as sexual objects is for men’s pleasure, the “V-Monologues are not” because they offer women an alternative out of sexual oppression (Ahikire 2005:13).

Although efforts to address the gender equality gap in Uganda became more pronounced after the 1995 Beijing conference, government efforts to include women in social and political processes became evident in about 1986. A Ministry in charge of women issues was established in 1988. This Ministry that started as the Ministry of Women in development has had several institutional and name changes and is now known as the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. This Ministry is underfunded, has a skeleton staff and has
changed its approach to gender mainstreaming which has reduced its visibility as a ministry concerned with women's issues (Nabachwa 2004). The changes in the ministry's name and mandate are indicative of Uganda's move towards a gender mainstreaming way of operation, which in my opinion diminishes the need to focus on women's specific needs.

Although gender mainstreaming is considered a more holistic and inclusive approach for dealing with gender inequality, it has the unfortunate result of further discriminating women and has made government less accountable to women. Gender mainstreaming seems to be looked at as if gender issues are cross cutting and so women issues remain a political rhetorical and policy document appendages devoid of real commitment to improve the unequal position of women and men (Ahikire 2005 and Tamale 2003). According to Rathgeber and Adera (2000), “gender-neutral” policies tend to favour men, as they usually have more resources and better education than women. This has been clearly demonstrated in the Uganda experience where just 2 women out of a 25 member task force directly took part in the formulation and drafting of the national ICT policy. These processes did not even involve the Ministry responsible for women. As a matter of fact the 1997 National Gender Policy emphasises the need to gender mainstream in planning processes and levels of national development.

Implications for the study: using the standpoint of African women

The methodological implications of the issues raised here is that the analysis must be grounded in Uganda women's understanding of their own experience with ICTs. It ought to be understood that feminist research, “in all its varieties” challenges the “positivist notions of objectivity and truth” that they believe are men's ways of defining reality and excludes women's perspectives. Feminist research therefore differs from traditional research for three reasons; (i) it seeks to remove the power imbalance between research and subject; (ii) it is politically motivated in that it seeks to change social inequality; and (iii) it begins with the standpoints and experiences of women (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002:315).

This study also recognises that just like there are several feminisms, there are also several ways feminist research can be conducted. This study therefore employs Standpoint feminism which is of the view that “knowledge can be produced from … women's unequal gendered social relationships …” (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002:171). Standpoint feminism’s basic principle is to place women’s experiences as central. An African feminist standpoint therefore goes further to advocate that if knowledge on African women's experiences is to be produced, it should be by African women scholars because they understand their values better. It is also a resistance to their continued marginalisation in the production of knowledge (Oyewumi 2003). Feminist theories will therefore be the overarching theory informing this thesis.

Based on the standpoint feminisms principle for a research that “is on, by and for women” (Stanley and Wise 1983: 17), this study on African women, has been done by an African women, for African women and based on the African feminists epistemologies and ontology. However, it must be noted that, as a literate African women, I am a construct of the Western systems of knowing and therefore some of the arguments I present reflect this orientation. To start with, the very use of the English language, in addition to having undertaken this PhD in a European University means my work is heavily influenced by the Western academic and social value system. The output of this work, like other papers I have written based on this project will ‘unfortunately’ be in English, meaning that most of the rural women, whose experiences and insights into technology change and rural communities I use used to produce my work, will be denied access. As a strategy however, it is hoped that some of my findings will be disseminated through a channel more accessible to them in terms of language and infrastructure.

Based on standpoint principles this study consciously focused on women living in rural Uganda because these women are a marginalised group who have been rendered invisible through processes that have silenced their voices. Worse still, even when rural women are targeted, their real needs are usually ignored by projects that are developed on assumptions of what is thought to be suitable for these rural women as opposed to asking them what
they actually need. Positioning rural women as authorities of their own experiences has ensured that they are partners in the production of knowledge about their lived experiences and should hopefully lead to their visibility.

This chapter has argued that only by appreciating the context within which an experience is encountered and patterns of social relationships that influence people's lived realities can we begin to work towards meaningful change. A critical review of the way in which new technologies have been promoted in Uganda is therefore necessary. Most of the studies on new communication technologies in Uganda seem to ignore the fact that social factors like gender relations and power dynamics shape technological and social change. The fact that technology and society are 'mutually constitutive' means that technology transfer to Africa will not necessarily lead to women's empowerment as anticipated but may in fact reinforce already existing male dominance and negative social practices like domestic violence.

Bibliography


Chapter 5

Situated outlooks on discourses of Europeanised cosmopolitanism: all-inclusive or exclusive?

*Ulrike M. Vieten*

This article discusses some perceptions of the *Other* within contemporary concepts of cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany while looking at the writings of the political theorist Chantal Mouffe and the sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Both authors are advocating regional allegiance rather than cosmopolitan loyalty as the timely political response to the global transition of nation-states in Europe. It is argued that this paradigm is linked to the transnational ideological project of *Europeanisation* keeping territorial ideas of social solidarity in place. To help to understand this ideological twist, firstly, modern representation of *Otherness* are going to be discussed outlining implications of a critical discourse regarding contemporary racialised boundaries. Before turning to Mouffe and Habermas, the notions of difference and Otherness are analytically specified as these different layers shed light on the perplexity crossing the borders and boundaries of our contemporary plural societies.

Introduction : A brief anchoring of cosmopolitanism in European history

Historically, cosmopolitanism as a philosophical ideal evolved prior to concepts of nationalism and the nation-state in Europe though not prior to the metropolitan polis (Athens). If we break down the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ we come across the perception of ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’ introducing two dimensions: On the one hand it suggests a privileged belonging to a particular political community (polis) and the imagination of its extension to world scale (cosmos), on the other.

Cheneval (2002) suggests that cosmopolitanism is rooted in the philosophy of modernity proposing the individual’s emancipation from absolutism through supposedly universally defined though particularly shaped interests. As he argues, the idea of cosmopolitan law is embedded in Kantian and *contractual* philosophical considerations (2002: 47).

In his famous essay ‘Perpetual Peace’ (1795), Kant promoted the utopia of a world wide peace, understood as an absence of eternal war. His vision presumed that states are organized internally according to “republican” principles, when they are organized externally in a voluntary league for the sake of keeping peace, and when they respect the human rights not only of their citizens but also foreigners.’ (Kleingeld and Brown, website)

Importantly, Kant published his essay in a contemporaneous European context of French revolutionary upheaval and the international reception of Hobbes’ Leviathan. In difference to Hobbes proposing ‘a kind of fortress state that can overwhelm both internal and external enemies’ (Williams 2003: 219), Kant’s statement can be read as an effort to find a more peaceful and harmonious alternative beyond an authoritarian state guaranteeing international political stability. In the 20th century, Kant’s idea of a contractually based model of cosmopolitanism i.e. inspired post war transnational governance institutions such as the ‘League of Nations’ (1917) and most importantly, the codification of an
nascent form of cosmopolitan rights, known as the United Nations Declaration of Human Right, in 1948. In the aftermath of war and the Holocaust as crime against humanity (Chandler 2002), the will to protect the individual as the universal human rather than as the national citizen against internal and external genocides was the driving force to establish transnational institutions of law.

The renaissance of discourses on cosmopolitanism since the early 1990s underlines a cyclic interests and theoretical need to revisit the legitimacy of political community boundaries and the hope for a more peaceful and just integration of different nations and people all over the world. Consequently, cosmopolitan concerns have to address and to rethink any collective link between individual strangers belonging to particular and universal communities. The position of the self as an individual Other, but also in relation to potentially collective Others has to be interrogated when looking at actually existing national communities and the promise of an imagined cosmopolitan formation.

Having said that cosmopolitanism in principle is meant to engage with the question of the relation to the Other, this relation does not only depend on having a world and experiences in common, but is also guided by an ethics that commands responsibility for the Stranger as stranger. The identification with or the rejection of the stranger as an alien determines the perspective of alternative visions of solidarity, justice and world community.

In the multicultural world of today, group particularity and global universalism appear as antagonistic twins. Conceptually, cosmopolitanism has addressed the problem of universalism in political and philosophical terms, but it is burdened by the Eurocentric character of the discourse of universalism. Accordingly, contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism have to be ascertained in terms of their visionary models of an all-inclusive social solidarity.

While thinking of the cosmopolitan do we deny her embedding in specific 'imagined communities'? Does it make a difference whether the Other is territorially, spatially or spiritually identified? Who is the Other, anyway?

In the following, I am going to discuss some perceptions of the Other within contemporary concepts of cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany while looking, in particular, at the writings of the theorist Chantal Mouffe, born in Belgium and who is working in the UK and some of the writings by the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas. I am focusing on their contributions to a broader discourse on cosmopolitanism as both authors refer to modified symbolic political boundaries in Europe from different ideological though related angles.

As far as the traditional notion of international politics is concerned we are confronted with rather minor differences between both academics. Both are advocating regional allegiance rather than cosmopolitan loyalty as the timely political response to the global transition of nation-states in Europe. I argue that this re-territorializing paradigm is linked to the transnational ideological project of Europeanisation keeping territorial ideas of social solidarity in place. Although both authors assume a profoundly critical position towards US unilateralism and are rooted ideologically in Marxism, and as far as Habermas is concerned in Critical Theory, neither Mouffe nor Habermas dare to conceptualise cosmopolitanism as an ideological challenge to world capitalism.

To help to understand this ideological twist, firstly, I will discuss briefly modernist representations of Otherness and outline the implications of contemporary racialised boundaries. Secondly, I will distinguish the notions of difference and Otherness. Those different layers shed light on the perplexity crossing the borders and boundaries of our contemporary plural societies. Finally, I will analyse more closely some specific texts by Mouffe and Habermas in order to detect in what ways they construct Otherness in their approaches to cosmopolitan society and their analytical response to the US-American war on terror and the factual rise of terrorist threats and suicide bombings.
The problem of representation: the burden of racialised boundaries

The image of the cosmopolitan from the late 19th and during the 20th century signified the transnational agent undermining, or even threatening the spatial logic of the nationalised nation-state, defined territorially. In the 21st century, we have to assume that a delusion of particular nation and state borders decodes the notion of 'the cosmopolitan'. Symbolical representations of the Other are contingent and therefore, its racialised content has to be reviewed. Figures of the Other have to be interpreted as situated articulations of various modernisation processes.

We come across representations of the modern Other when looking at sociological and cultural (studies) writings on modernisation. Both, the stranger and the hybrid could be identified as dynamic cultural representations of the Other engendered by particular modern western and secular Christian national societies in the 19th and 20th century. Simmel’s stranger, for example, and Bhabha’s hybrid can be identified as urban images. Both representations introduce approaches to the phenomenon of migration and mobility. In contrast, the notion of the stateless could be addressed as the non-territorial position beyond the modern cultural boundary signifier of the stranger and the hybrid, inscribed and constructed as a non belonging to nation states in legal terms.

Both, the stranger and the hybrid do not transcend the phenomenon of a territorially bounded political community though they clearly mark a critical turning point in its reading. We can think of a stranger obtaining a particular national citizenship, and similarly, of the cultural hybrid who possesses regular legal citizen rights proofing his/her formal inclusion. Traditionally, the stateless (in Arendt’s approach) transgresses this legally secure position and signifies at the same time the essential importance of its presumption.

At the end of 2005, 20.8 million refugees, asylum seekers and Others of concern to the UNHCR were officially counted. As the numbers of illegalised people are steadily rising the tension of legal and symbolic boundaries has become a more complex and politicised issue. While referring to Agamben (1997), Yuval-Davis (2005) advances the argument of ‘bare life’ by saying that it is the non-legal status of ‘people on the move’, i.e. those without documents that leaves persons outside of institutional state protection in our contemporary world.

Recent research on digitalised surveillance techniques, for example, stress the strict border/ boundary logic of the European Union. Broeders (2007: 76) claims ‘Exclusion means separating the “ins” from the “outs”, the “deserving” from the “undeserving”.’

This statement gives a sound example in what ways othering of difference operates ideologically in a contemporary context. Hence, it is the discursive turning point that matters where Otherness as a collective signifier of uncanny and dangerous abnormality is put outside of ‘our’ enclosed civil order. The majority of refugees, internally displaced and stateless persons remains largely in camps in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. It is the camp that evokes the notion of a guarded and controlled place. Leaving them there, means leaving them outside.

As state borders and political boundaries are blurring (Bauböck and Rundall 1998), we have to address critically an increasing dialectic phenomenon of othering difference in a post-democratic European Union: on the one hand, authoritarian, legal measures are targeting a younger generation of minoritised orthodox faith groupings. On the other, EU anti-discrimination directives promise to target racism and social exclusion. This twist in legal measures and boundary construction has to be analysed further. What I am suggesting is the theoretical differentiation between ‘difference’ as the accepted plural mix of secular individuals and ‘alterity’ as the signifier of collective Otherness that is

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2 Bhabha 1990; 1994
3 http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html
beyond the hegemonic notion of deliberation. This Otherness is inscribed historically in different nation state practices and conceptualisations of ‘the political’. As far as the contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism are concerned we are witnessing a paradigmatic change in processing symbolic boundaries.

**Contemporary cosmopolitan outlooks on political community and the ‘Other’**

The claim of cosmopolitan openness towards Otherness has to be situated in a particular historical context as the territorial paradigm of nation state borders and symbolic boundaries is shifting and transgressing to differently organised ideological systems. It is debatable indeed, how and to what extent contemporary visions of cosmopolitanism re-conceptualise ‘imagined communities’ to larger regional patriotic systems rather than abandon territorially fixed allegiance.

Further, it is important to differentiate the meaning of Otherness and difference in order to approach a more complex understanding of contemporary boundary construction in discourses on cosmopolitanism.

As an ambiguous term Otherness was used by Hegel and has been also taken up by Lacan and other thinkers. Depending on the academic field it can describe the psychological dynamic of the individual self/other or when referring to political theory and sociology it signifies hierarchical power relations (colonization, racializing of certain people).

According to Iris Marion Young (2002), discourse constitutes a system of knowledge which ‘conveys the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates’ (2002: 685) and ‘the social norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and proposed solutions’ (ibid).

Andrew Linklater (1998), Daniele Archibugi (1998) and David Held (2002) suggest the term ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ intending to cut down the modern paradigm of an exclusive sovereignty discourse. They argue towards the possibility of the co-existence of two political identities, e.g. citizen of the world and citizen of the particular community. Ideally, this would lead to a situation where territorially and nationally defined exclusive political identity loses its hegemony and ‘higher levels of universality and diversity’ (Linklater, 1998: 116) will be achieved at the expense of classical state sovereignty.

However, these liberal concepts of cosmopolitan democracy argue multi- and bilaterally on the background of the status quo of an assumed cohesion of national society and nation-state. Contradictory group interests, in particular, class, gender and ethnic differences within any ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) are ignored or underestimated.

Historically, certain groups, underwent othering processes (Jews, Armenians, Arabs, Sinti and Roma, Turks, Muslims, Black people, Irish Travellers, disabled people, gay men and lesbians). Sarcastically, we could even argue that the post modern notion of plurality contains what we cherish as the outcome of different stages of historical exclusionary practices, ethnic cleansings and the Holocaust in Continental Europe. More optimistically, we could say it is also connected with the struggle of minorities to gain rights within the Enlightenment promise of equality and participation. Nonetheless, we have to take into account that the ideology of modernity is ‘progress’; but there are analytically two dimensions to situated inclusion.

While referring to Levinas, Cheyney Ryan (2002) suggests that behind plurality is ‘difference’, symbolizing a ‘threat against totality from the inside’ (2002: 15). The second challenge to totality is produced or structured by the excluded ‘Other’ as an outside threat. Ryan discusses the critical potential of these two components as a ‘threat’ to totality. The first couple ‘Master /Slave’ suggest the ethical understanding that the ‘liberation of the slave will ‘save’ the master as well. ‘Liberation suggest ‘becoming equal’. However, if we have a look at the second couple, ‘the Civilised/ the Savage’; there is a different story to tell. Here, the savage ‘progresses’ with his/ her domestication.
Progress of ‘civilization’ is identified with expansion, such as conquering, removing, ‘liberating’ the savage nation’ (ibid).

Ryan (2002: 18) argues

the challenge is not one of multiplying voices but opening ears: the notion of ‘opening’ suggests why this form of postmodernism is associated with becoming more ‘hospitable’ – opening oneself and one’s own to ‘the stranger at the door.

Accordingly, the multiplying of ‘the self’ as the condensation of the Western secular ‘we’ does not recognize the location of the Other as someone beyond a particular knowledge horizon. It is here, where critical theory in an Adornian and Horkheimerian reading, should start to challenge attempts to re-establish hegemonic binary in academic discourses on cosmopolitanism.

In the last section of my article, I will examine more closely, how Mouffe and Habermas talk about cosmopolitan attitudes and political cosmopolitanism. I am interested, in particular, how the inclusion of the Other as historically othered signifier, remains salient in their concepts and whether they actually transcend the binary of the ‘Occident/ Orient’, ‘secularism/ religion’, ‘enemy/ friend’ scheme.

\[\text{\footnotesize * Said (1991, 1993) challenged the binary of Occident and Orient deconstructing ‘Orientalism’ as rooted in Western images and fantasies of the Muslim/ Islam Other. Said’s efforts raised consciousness about the prejudiced negativism accompanying the notion of the Muslim Other as a central ideological bias underscoring complex cultural expressions in Western discourses. Bhabha (1996) critically assessed Said’s criticism while hinting at the problematic issue that Said adopts the polar perspective and does not displace it.}\]
Two (continental) European voices: Chantal Mouffe and Jürgen Habermas

In difference to political perspectives opting for a consensual integration of people into society and nation states, Chantal Mouffe argues that attempts to construct an ‘us’ without a corresponding ‘them’ will essentially fail the political sphere as the ‘condition of constituting an “us” is the demarcation of a “them”’ (2003, paper ZKM).

In 2004, Mouffe published an essay on cosmopolitanism. The title, ‘The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ echoes one of Carl Schmitt’s statements. According to Schmitt ‘The world is no political unit but a political pluriverse.’

Schmitt was Attorney General (Kronjurist) of the Third Reich supporting its legal establishment in the early years of its regime. When he was introducing the term ‘multiverse’ he used a much older phrase suggested by Max Scheler in 1915, closely connected to his cultural racist idea of ‘Europäität’ (1915: 280). The term ‘pluriverse’ had been actually introduced by the William James in his book ‘Pluralistic Universe’, in 1909.

Mouffe refers constantly to the anti-Semitic legal theorists Carl Schmitt since the 1990s. Manemann (2002: 208) cites Mouffe while pointing at a problematic Schmitt reception of post-Marxists in the Anglo-American context. In general, the renaissance of Schmitt’s terms and his approach to ‘the political’ is primarily linked to a re-emergence of the ‘New Right’ in various European countries as well as in the United States (ibid).

Mouffe (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; 1999a; 1999b) clearly represents a left perspective and sets herself apart from the logic of ‘the enemy’ theorem while suggesting the term ‘adversary’ (1999a: 4). Nevertheless, Mouffe’s selective reading of Schmitt’s terminology and writings is most dangerous as it underestimates the racist implications of an ‘anti-liberal’ led political discourse. In her reception of Schmitt’s work, Mouffe seems to neglect Schmitt’s ideological connection to the Third Reich leadership, which lasted officially until 1936. Whereas Mouffe continues to refer to Schmitt, in her earlier writings from the 1990s, she also discussed more contradictory aspects of political inclusion at the matrix of a cultural boundary dilemma.

Back in 1993, Mouffe referred to Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller. In difference to Schmitt, who was rooted in völkisch Catholic values, Kelsen and Heller represent Austro-Jewish and German Jewish traditions of social democratic legal-political thinking at that time.

Though Mouffe mentions Hermann Heller as a scholar criticizing Schmitt’s biased perspective on the preconditions of political community she does not mention that Heller yet in 1928 stressed that Schmitt completely neglected the contradictory inner dynamics of creating and maintaining political units (Ladwig 2003: 60). The then debates in the Weimar Republic on social divisions, class antagonism in particular, were conducted in controversial ways similar to today’s political discourse. The life stories of those three men are part of the German history of the bureaucratically and legally operating ‘willing’ supporter of National Socialism and its/ his enemies.

Heller was forced out of his professorship in Cologne as a consequence of the anti-Semitic ‘Gesetz zur Herstellung des Berufsbeamtentums’ (law to re-establish the

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1 see also for details Mouffe 2005.
3 Another British academic, Paul Hirst, wrote about Schmitt in the journal Telos in 1987. From a radical critic perspective Neocleous (1996) from Brunel University/London challenges Schmitt’s enemy/ friend paradigm.
4 After 1945 Schmitt was held in prison for a while. The charge sounded ‘intellectual groundwork for planning a pre-emptive war (Angriffs krieg). The reports about his inquiry introduce a rather arrogant, self-confident character that was not willing to take responsibility for his part of guilt. Quite the opposite, he responded with religious phrases and as Quritsch (2000) underlines his so-called ‘Großraumschrift’ might be interpreted wrongly by the Nazi’s, but his own Anti-Semitic statements could only be regarded as political hatred (2000: 125).
5 Mouffe (1993b: 128, 129)
6 For further details see for example, Kranitz 1982; Horneffer (1926)
profession of public servants) that was approved by Schmitt. Heller escaped the gas chambers, but died of a heart attack in his Spanish exile in 1936. Kelsen was forced to flee Nazi-German Reich, too, but attained exile in the United States. He left his intellectual legacy to those Socialists and Social Democrats, who, upon returning from exile or concentration camps, engaged in rebuilding post-Nazi-Germany based on a social compromise between different class interests. The post World War II West German Sozialstaatsprinzip\(^{11}\) (welfare state principle) encompassing the idea of the social welfare state and social democracy in Germany has to be understood, accordingly, as an effect of historical legacies of nationally rooted hybrid cosmopolitans. In Mouffe’s writing in 1999 those scholars are not cited anymore. It matters that those actual cosmopolitans who worked on social compromise are silenced post mortem.

I will now turn to other difficult aspects of Mouffe’s approach in typifying otherness and cosmopolitans. In her critical perspective on current cosmopolitanism, the typical cosmopolitan is identified with liberalism and connected to ‘pseudo-universalism’ (Mouffe, 2004: 72). Those who represent the group of cosmopolitans are labelled as those who do have an interest in global civil society and are powerful enough as ‘business and financial elites’ (ibid) to motivate states to act on their behalf. Mouffe criticizes this elite and individualist cosmopolitanism as the ‘globalisation of the Western model’ (2004: 74).

Her sceptical approach to cosmopolitan democracy intends to deconstruct its non-political and anti-democratic implications. In opposition to a mainstream discourse, she identifies the new forms of terrorism as linked to an antagonistic conflict encompassing globalisation and the new world order. Hence, she views terrorists as actors of a political conflict that reaches world scale rather than as individual fanatics. And, these terrorists are not an ‘Other’ to cosmopolitanism as introduced by a mainstream media discourse; rather they embody cosmopolitanism coming from its shadow world. Hence, Mouffe is at odds with perspectives that declare violent terrorist action simply as ‘pathological’ or as an ‘expression of irrational forces’ (ibid). Despite this reflective perspective on the political causes of world wide terrorism, Mouffe’s strategic turn to traditional international politics is rather disappointing. We learn from Mouffe’s writings that she regrets the disappearance of the bi-polar world order. But what does she mean when suggesting a multi-polar world order as constituted by a different ‘number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles’ (Mouffe, 2004: 74)?

Traditionally, international politics views territorially and geographical regions as political units. Nation states are addressed as sovereigns and communities often imagined as automatically overlapping, culturally and politically. To follow this world view implies that intersected social divisions and for that reason, contradictory cultural and social relations cross cutting geographical and political lines all around the world simply do not exist. As Nira Yuval-Davis (2005) notes critically, Mouffe ‘does not distinguish between social and spatial locations, or between cultural identities and political value systems’ (2005, website). And further, she does not take on board the structural changes happening to the symbolic boundaries and matters of belonging relevant to any kind of politically bordered imagined community.\(^{12}\) Further, Mouffe widely neglects the patchwork of multi-layered and complex arrangements of social divisions engendering transnational links and also cosmopolitan habits that subscribe to a less glamorous image of cosmopolitanism (Werbner 1999). Here, Mouffe adheres to a perspective that reduces regional communities to single units and also underestimates the capacities of working class cosmopolitans and the transnational networks they built along marginalizing hegemony.

It is also remarkable that Mouffe’s proposal mirrors multilateral perspectives either mourning the fall of the second (Soviet) bloc or suggesting that new regional blocs (such

\(^{11}\) For details, Schiek 2001 : Rn. 19
\(^{12}\) On 31.01.2007, the British police discovered plans of a terrorist cell to highjack and captivate a Muslim soldier, who previously served in Iraq, in Birmingham. Despite the fact that both, the suspected terrorists and their victim are Muslims, the media focused on the increasing public risk coming from the Muslim community in Britain.
as the European Union, the African Union) should become balancing military powers. As argued elsewhere (Yuval-Davis et. el. 2006) political and social analysis has to comprehend that the 'modern' state division of domestic and foreign affairs is rather obsolete. Accordingly, the pragmatic concept to balance imperial power by multi-polar regions misses the vernacular state of the cosmopolitan social that yet arrived.

Next, I will turn to Habermas's approach on cosmopolitanism and his proposal of 'constitutional patriotism' in a ‘postnational’ Europe.

Prominently, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida issued a statement in 2003, condemning the US led military action in Iraq and expressing solidarity with the public protest against the war in Europe.¹³

In 2004, Habermas celebrated the ‘birth’ of a genuine European public space (2004: 44) when looking at the huge public protest against the Iraq war. Habermas is in favour of a written constitution for the European Union that might unite European forces to develop their own foreign policy.

As he demands ‘Europe has to bring its influence to bear regarding international relations but within the framework of the UNO. This is necessary to balance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States.’¹⁴

In resonance with David Held, Habermas is concerned with social justice, deliberative democracy and individual autonomy (freedom) surrounding a growing legitimacy deficit inherent to ‘de jure’ territorial statehood and ‘de facto’ transgressing and shifting boundaries of diverse political communities. Habermas (1998b: 88) talks about a ‘cosmopolitan compulsive solidarity’ (kosmopolitische Zwangssolidarisierung) connecting single states via their civil societies and political public spheres. These civil orientations should engender the insight of global players to cooperate with respect to their mutually shared interests. Inherent to this kind of global solidarity might be a thinner idea of belonging than exercised in nation states by now (1998b: 89).

Habermas, who grounds his overall arguments in Kantian philosophy is confronted with those critics who challenge a 'Western-centric model of civilized development' (Walker 2005: 4)¹⁶. However, it should be acknowledged that the ideological construction of the 'Western model' ignores different nation-state responses to democracy and nation building processes. In fact, Habermas proposes a very Germanic interpretation of the 'European national state' (1996: 286) arguing that it was the 'cultural interpretation of political membership rights' (ibid) that pushed a more 'abstract level of social integration' (ibid).

Despite Habermas's assumption that ‘Democratic self-determination’ (2001a: 64) is depending on the willingness of 'subjects' to culturally integrate into one nation, the purpose of a democratic state, the emergence of nations and outcomes of nationalism have to be differentiated more carefully. As Fine and Smith (2003: 480) argue

(d)espite its name, German National Socialism is best conceived not as an extreme form of nationalism but as a movement opposed to the parochialism and nationalist politics in the name of global ambitions, opposed to the unity of the German nation in the name of race-thinking that posited race divisions within the German nation and race links beyond the German nation, and

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¹³ Habermas 2004b
¹⁴ Europa muss sein Gewicht auf internationaler Ebene und im Rahmen der UNO in die Waagschale werfen, um den hegemonialen Unilateralismus der Vereinigten Staaten auszubalancieren’ (2004: 45)
¹⁵ See for example, footnote 22; here Habermas directly refers to Held’s writing (Habermas 2001: 70).
¹⁶ According to Ritter (2003) deliberative democracy in its normative theoretical substance demands that those who are affected by a political decision should have an equal say in its decision making. Thus, when talking about increasing deficits in democratic legitimacy a fundamental revision of political decision making processes seems to be appropriate to catch up with global transformation issues.
¹⁷ See for details ch. 7 in 'The inclusion of the Other' (1998a).
¹⁸ Walker (2005: 5) suggests a middle way, 'a via media between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism'. This, however, sounds like a circular logic as it does not resolve the principally political reading of hegemonic values, intersected social divisions and contradictory interests.
opposed to the institutions and structures of the German nation-state in the name of a parallel movement based on the leader principle.

Looking at new modes of belonging (1998b: 116, 2001a: 75), ‘individualization and the emergence of ‘cosmopolitan identities’ (1998b: 116, 2001a: 76) in Europe, Habermas calls this state of affairs ‘The Postnational Constellation’. The term ‘postnational’ points towards Habermas’ attempt to equate ‘nation’ and ‘nation state’.19 As Will Kymlicka and Christine Straehle (1999) spell out the hegemonic agenda of the ‘nation-state’ should rather be identified as that of a ‘nationalizing state’ (1999: 70). Given the historical power of the state to ‘nationalize’ its sovereignty in homogenizing terms, the de-nationalizing discourse assumes a reverse move of ‘national belonging’. But nevertheless this discourse generalizes again its hegemonic perception. Also, it poses wider problems regarding Habermas’ perspective on cosmopolitanism and the notion of the ‘Other’: taking for granted the overlap of territorial (spatial) and cultural (social) allegiance as far as the notion of a one nation state narrows down cosmopolitan solidarity to traditionally territorialized and bordered community purposes embedded in problematic Eurocentric legacies.

As suggested above, an ethnically constructed nation state membership frames the contemporary reading of law as well; thus the idealization of a European constitution that excludes Others in line with unchallenged elite interests has to be regarded as the fetishism of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (1985, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). In this sense, Habermas optimistic perspective of democratic methods for achieving a lawful order have to be confronted with the reality of social exclusion and the digital transnational instruments that move the border control outside/inside society and state. Nonetheless, Habermas suggests that recognizing difference could create ‘common identity’. However, he refers to difference, he is not talking about the Other.20

Concluding remarks

To argue for multi-polar blocs does not challenge the formation of regional governance with its tendency of maintaining and constructing racialised boundaries.

Chantal Mouffe, who vehemently criticises ‘liberal’ democracy theorists, follows a similarly sounding logic of territorial and cultural identity cohesion, actually not that different to Held and others. All of them give credit to a traditional idea of international pragmatic world politics (Realpolitik). But, even Realpolitik does attain a different meaning depending on classed, gendered or racialised positions within given societies, legally defined interests and dissimilar nation-state legacies.

The boundary construction of ‘we and them’ or in the 2007 ‘s researcher’ s speech ‘the Ins’ and ‘the Outs’, is actively constructed in the political realm and intersected with international legacies of racism and exclusion. Alternatively, the utopian potential of cosmopolitanism has to be understood as an ancient vision of sustaining bonds with humanity transgressing border and boundary of hegemonic inclusion. It clearly contains anti-capitalistic and even anarchistic spirits. Being conflated with up to date pragmatic international politic strategies it actually looses its critical appeal.

Mouffe’s proposal advocates strong regional and geographical coherent blocs to balance unilateral US power and Habermas ideal of a peaceful and multi-vocal communication space is primarily connected to the new regional regime of the European Union. In a way,

19 For a detailed discussion of this problematic equation, see for example Yuval-Davis (1997; 2002). Though Habermas himself emphasizes that “Theory-formation must avoid the ‘territorial trap’ (2001: 70) his own understanding of the nation-state as national community is embedded in an implicit and explicit Germanic philosophy tradition.
20 Likewise the tolerance of difference – the mutual recognition of the Other in his difference – could engender a common identity.
Mouffe’s ‘foreign’ politics argument complements Habermas’ s domestic, legal and social argument.

In Europe, we had a religiously arguing and colonially driven conquista in 1492. The contemporary debate seems to be framed by a late modern version of a secular European ‘re-conquista’ proposing ‘cosmopolitan democratic civilisation, global human rights and multicultural equality’ as an emancipatory narrative to global poverty and injustice. Guess, the Other does want to define liberation and belonging on her own terms.

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21 We could also adopt an interpretation of this late modernity project as rooted in secular Protestantism. According to Walzer (1980: 191) “ The theory of modernization appears in an earlier form as Weber’s ‘rationalization’ – a process culminating in a ‘rational-legal’ society”. 


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Concluding discussion

**Derek Robbins (DR), Cigdem Esin (CE), Aygen S. Kurt (ASK), Patricia K. Litho (PKL) and Ulrike Vieten (UV)**

This chapter attempts to reflect an ongoing conversation amongst the contributors about their contributions. The papers were discussed when given, but this chapter constitutes a virtual ‘Table Ronde’ conducted by e-mail after the submission of papers for this collection. There is an initial, editorial provocation which is followed by responses which are either related directly to this provocation or, cumulatively, to other comments as they were circulated. They are reproduced in sequence as submitted. They amount to a collective reflection rather than to any conclusion.

**DR:**

As you know, I try to hold rigorously to a materialist view of social science production. That is to say that I think social scientific findings are the products of the particular social, economic, and political conditions within which they are generated. They do not automatically possess ideal or transcendental validity. They do not have any universal relevance that can be said to be intrinsic. They have the capacity to become universalized, but universalization is dependent on their field of reception of findings which may bestow relevance to new situations beyond the specific conditions of production. This process of bestowing relevance is also material and it therefore implies an encounter between the socio-economic conditions of production and reception of research. My materialist view of social science knowledge production emphasizes subjectivity in as much as the selves which generate research problems and findings are themselves the products of specific socio-economic, political or cultural conditions. My view also emphasizes objectivity because it acknowledges that the definitions of situations by selves takes place by reference to previously objectivated subjectivities, embodied in institutions and instituted intellectual discourses.

It follows from this statement that the intention of Yearbook I is to explore the subjective dimension of research production, and of Yearbook II to explore the objective dimension. These are not, however, distinct or separate. they are complementary and are in a continuously dialectical relationship.

In relation to Yearbook I, this leads me to pose the following introductory question:

**As it happens, all five of you have grown up and been educated outside the UK. Can you comment on the ways in which your social background led you to undertake your current research? What are the implications of doing that research in a UK institution and within a UK intellectual and institutional tradition? How does your research reflect your social trajectory and in what ways do you expect its completion to affect that trajectory?**

**UV:**

I will kick off this joint reflection with what I call ‘the limbo of thinking in-between’.

In the following I try to reflect on my ‘rooting and shifting’ in terms of social and intellectual backgrounds. Also, I would like to talk a bit about the challenge to write an English PhD thesis as a ‘non native’ speaker and the struggles and complexities involved in my ambitious trajectory to translate highly culturalised epistemic concepts (hybrid, i.e. Jewish-German Continental European social theory) into class-ifying language (English).

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1 This phrase is used by Nira (Yuval-Davis) my spiritual study guidance since I entered the British academic scene.
The latter, also has to take into account that UEL is a ‘new or modern University’ delivering concrete spaces in support of critical and innovative thinking on the one hand, but also restricting disciplinary cross-over due to its own institutional constrains (anxiety about ‘the clash’ of different academic disciplines; university rankings). I start with some considerations regarding my social background and my disciplinary journeys that brought me to this place.

Studying Social Science at a ‘Reform’ University (new university) in the North West of the then FRG in the 80s meant free choice of subjects in our discipline and also my personal freedom to organise politically and culturally in the local alternative sub-culture (anarchist movement). Yet back in Germany’s early 80s, it was certain that the idea to study ‘sociology’ hoping for a proper academic or professional position was simply naive. In fact someone at a job centre told me to study ‘Sinology’; booming China was yet in sight. My working class parents did not impose any pressure on me to go for a more ‘reasonable’ profession, and as a consequence their lack of guidance gave me this relative freedom to go for my own future, whatever it would hold in store. Though this was somehow difficult to take with 19 and did not become easier in my twenties, it marked my own social situation much more detached from the dominating cultural and normative system (career, consume, compromise). I suppose this is somehow different to middle classed raised and equipped students, who might get a more realistic idea what academia is about, perhaps ‘father’s’ networks and a certain kind of ‘cultural capital’ to organise sufficient support. Otherwise, it was me, the singular, who crossed this classed boundary of higher education making my family very proud (though they did and do not fully understand what I am saying, even if I talk German).

Next, I will jump to the stage where I wrote my first MA dissertation, actually dealing with the main topics I am still engaging with though, of course, in a different way: I did research on the transition period between early and late German Enlightenment, focusing on the role of gender, or let’s say a particular notion of femininity. As a feminist I was interested to understand how history, the complicity of elite knowledge and agents influenced the way ‘the German woman’ was institutionalised to support embryonic and bourgeois nationalism and how the failure of the 1848 revolution and its post-political apathy turned out. Does this ring a bell? No wander, I am working on discourses on cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany, nowadays. But, in 1989 no one really seemed interested in my approach to the German nation state building. To make a long story short: After getting my degree, I had to cope with the social margins inventing my self again and again in different jobs. Moving on to another discipline in the early 90s – this time Law – I gathered even more critical insight how the German constitution, law in general, but European Union Law in particular, matched with my reservations about Germany’s long lasting shadow of ethnic-cultural and totalitarian history.

Having studied two academic disciplines in Germany so far I was fairly familiar with canonical differences when I arrived at UEL. I do mention this, because this knowledge prepared me to take a more ‘critical’ perspective on the power of disciplines and their somehow methodological ‘absolutisms’.

All in all, studying for my own ‘Enlightenment’ became a general pattern of life to me. There is this cliché of the ‘eternal student; it’s me. I can write this with an ironical twist, because it reflects struggle and will power not to surrender and, of course, encouraged me even with 40-something to do a PhD, though definitely not by chance in the UK.

Simply to share: anyone older than 35 will not get any kind of student- or fellowship, not even talking about a research position in the academic market in Germany. In this regard, Britain and UEL became a ‘refuge’ for my dissident voice. After finishing my MA in Gender & Ethnic Studies at the University of Greenwich in 2003, it was the studentship of the then School of Cultural, Media and Innovation Studies that enabled me to stay and continue with my research. Funny thing that I started in a Cultural Studies department; my third encounter with a specific academic discipline; my second encounter with studying in a British context. UEL as a rather marginalized academic place offered to me the inspiring intellectual space I was looking for and I had missed for years: international students and likewise international
colleagues engaged predominantly very open minded with my contributions. Since I embarked with my Studies at Greenwich it became a thrilling experience to communicate with Others in a second language and to realize that someone understood what I was talking about, finally.

Also we, ‘non native’ speakers from places all over the world, related to each other easily. Probably, this hesitant moment before you start to talk opens up another moment of communication; it slows down the rhythm and sound of the tongue; it simply happens and it happens to all of us. In this regard, we contribute actively to the transformation of the ‘lingua franca’ in British academic institutions as our hybrid speech echoes ‘the world’ in a nutshell; ‘producing’ research in English while mediating the mixture of our individual social, cultural and national heritages. It is very fascinating to me though that this ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ is a rather troubling thing for those, who have to train us in the ‘right way’ of articulation, presentation and conveying British research. Standardisation is the response, but that is and should not our question.

Finally, I am rather sceptical about my personal ‘career’ options: It is not really a ‘career aspiring’ habit to argue that ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ is used as an ideological container to create European belonging. And further, that this Europeanisation has less to do with cosmopolitanism, but with an attempt to bind together otherwise fractured post-democratic civil societies of various EU nation states. In fact, some EU frameworks are funding European academic research groups to do this at this very moment, exactly. Thus, I suppose in a way I moved on, but I am still where I started: stubbornly keeping myself to find out why and at what stage (certain) academics are bought in by political systems...

CE:
I totally agree with Derek about the ‘subjective’ conditions of research production in various levels. My own research is constructed by these ‘subjective’ conditions.

My current research has not only been an attempt to pose an academic question, but also an attempt to understand my individual experience of being a well-educated woman in ‘modern’ Turkey. The contours of this experience were drawn within the socio-political landscape of the country where I grew up.

I am a very good product of the Turkish modernisation project. I was educated in a secular western education system to participate into the public life as a career woman; and raised by one of the ‘daughters of the Republic’ to be a ‘modern and modest’ woman. However, I am not a perfect product as I have been having problems with (particularly) the gender regime of the project for a long time. My positions of feminist researcher and feminist woman in addition to multiple others have been crafted by my own contradictions in this process. As feminist philosopher Maria Lugones says, I have been a traveller between different worlds of mine. My aim to understand the network of discourses and polymorphous power relations surrounding the sexuality of women in Turkey in my PhD research was shaped by a conversation between my multiple positions.

The education system of Turkish modernisation could not make a perfect ‘modern and modest’ woman out of me, but equipped me with the skills necessary to trace and understand the ruptures and contradiction of the modernisation process where I located my research. I believe that it is these ruptures and contradictions what gives the Turkish context its unique characteristics. For me, without understanding the complexity of this context, a research with women in Turkey will be stuck in the dualistic surface of the question. Neither women’s lives nor their stories are constituted in the binary of modern vs. tradition in this context. Being an insider in the socio-cultural fabric of contemporary Turkey has been my advantage in understanding its multiple and intersecting layers. However, I am also an outsider in that fabric. My educational journey in sociology and gender studies introduced me to new worlds in academy and politics which gradually made me an ‘outsider’. My continuous travel between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positions enhances my analytical skills as
a researcher. I think it is this travel that enables me to trace my research question in the
grey areas of a ‘familiar’ context.

I am doing a feminist research. My position as a feminist is constituted within that ‘familiar’
context. This position is a ‘westernised’ one, but still different from ‘western’ feminism. My
PhD and social experience in a ‘western’ culture in the UK has made this difference clearer. I
think the contexts of our feminisms create this difference. Maybe we ask similar questions
to women, about women, but we contextualise and analyse them in different ways.

Ulrike’s story about her disciplinary journey has reminded me of mine:

Neither sociology nor gender studies were promising disciplines for a successful academic
or non-academic career in Turkey in the early 1990s. They are still not if you do not come
from an academic family. Everyone who knew me surprised when I chose sociology for my
BA. Even my aunt, who was one of a few female university graduates of music education in
the late 1940s, said that I should have chosen an administrative science discipline to secure
my future. I still have difficulty to explain what sociology means when I meet someone while
visiting my mother who lives in the south of Turkey. Sometimes they ask, ‘Is it a profession?’
In their eyes, university is an institution that gives degree to qualify graduates for a
profession. Most of them do not understand why I am still a ‘student’ in my thirties if I do
not have a position in a university. I am an ‘alien’…

Gender studies have a long history of marginalisation within social sciences. Being an MA
student in gender studies in Turkey was an extra marginal experience for me. I seriously
struggled in the highly hierarchical and elitist structure of the program where I was a
student. I was indirectly accused of not having a ‘good-enough’ academic perspective. I
worked in a woman’s organisation throughout my MA study. I was really excited at the
beginning: theory and practice together: a feminist ideal. It was a very challenging
experience in another version of hierarchy. Was not feminism about transforming all those
hierarchies? When I asked this question, I was accused of being ‘too’ academic to work there.
This time it was direct.

Obviously it was not my challenging academic experience, but my passion for being a
researcher led me to work in a research project, and apply for a PhD. But, the same
experience was one of the reasons that brought me to a different academic system. My
modernist part told me to choose Europe, the ultimate dream of modern Turkey. There were
practical reasons regarding the academic boundaries and funding system in Turkey. Who
would be interested in my relatively marginal proposal about discourses on sexuality? Maybe
the cultural studies departments in one or two private university where I could not afford.
Doing a PhD means the necessity of funding. The PhD funding is not a common practice in
Turkish academic system since the state universities are still free. If you do not have a
teaching assistant position in a university, you need to support yourself (alternatively your
family can support you, which was impossible in my case). Yes, a PhD degree is definitely a
class issue. Applying for a PhD fund abroad was the best possible option for me. My second
language English has made my choice in Europe quick and easy: the UK.

I would like to say a lot on doing my PhD as a ‘non-native’ in English language, in Ulrike’s
words ‘class-ifying’ English, but to keep it short, I am going to say that it has been an
experience of re-construction for my self in another context where I am the ‘outsider’. 
Nevertheless, this experience has also been contributing to the analysis of my self-position.
Because telling stories in another language about/by women from my mother tongue
inherently means telling these ‘familiar’ stories to an ‘un-familiar’ audience. This necessitates
re-shaping my style and position in presenting my work. It has not been an easy and simple
experience for me. However, I am glad that I have been through this process, which has
given me the space to think more carefully and reflect upon several ethical and analytical
issues throughout my research. I believe that it enhanced my awareness on the boundaries
of my ‘researcher’ position.
Being more attentive to the (often) unheard stories of women like myself in Turkey was one of the objectives of my PhD research. Am I able to do that? At the final stage of my PhD, I still have questions in my mind. I hope to multiply them by sharing my points with more people in the further phases of my research journey. But, I am still an ‘alien’…

PKL:
Location of the self and my role as a researcher:

This research is part of my individual and political commitment to changing the oppressed status of women in society, especially women in Africa. Like most feminists, my methodological approach is a reflection of my activism translated to research. This is partly based on the realisation that for one to change a situation, one needs a deeper understanding of it and research seemed the best option of furthering my understanding on the relationship between ICTs and women’s empowerment. This strategy is based on a realisation that theoretical or praxis triumphs do not necessarily change much, however the two together yield better results.

I consciously use the standpoint of African feminists as an overarching lens for understanding ICTs for women’s empowerment because the knowledge of African women has been marginalised and most studies on Africa are done from a western perspective by either men or women from the North who have used other values systems and beliefs to represent knowledge of African women. Besides opposing all form of oppression against women, like other strands of feminisms, African feminisms embraces collaborating with African men to achieve their goals of gender equality, emancipation and empowerment. They believe that only by working with their men can structures of oppression be transformed because women’s situation is relational and other factors impacting on their current status like gender relations have to be considered holistically for better understanding of women’s situation and eventual achievement of women’s emancipation.

Undertaking a PhD therefore furthers my previous activism on gender inequality issues as well as ensuring that the voices of African women are visible in the production of knowledge about themselves. Previously I have worked on a professional and voluntarily basis in the areas of broadcast journalism and development communications. I have always been interested in ensuring that a platform is provided for women to air their views about their oppressive situation in the private and public spaces.

As a strategy I have been trying to and will continue to disseminate my finding as widely as possible through contribution to journals, paper presentation at conferences and actively participate in women activism in Uganda. In addition, I am a member of some women organisation in Uganda that work towards the betterment of women. These include; The Uganda Media Women’s Association, where I serve as a board member, Uganda Women’s Network where I was once a board member and the Centre for the Economic Empowerment of Women of which I am a member of and as well as the Uganda Women’s Network.

As a an African feminist researcher in a European university, like Patricia Collin Hill (1990), I take an insider-outsider position to critique some western epistemologies despite the irony of doing so within a European university. I believe that this gives me the benefit of accessing part of the audience I seek to address in addition to enabling me make use of best practices from the western way of looking at things. This is based on a belief that systems need each other. For instance, the use of the English language gives me access to a larger audience. I should also point out that I am a construct of the British system, as a result of British colonialism in Uganda, English as Uganda’s official language is one of the remnants of British colonialism and as a result I have been educated in English and although to the British my English may not sound right, I consider it my first language, I write and think in English and hardly literate in my own indigenous language, Japadhola. In addition, having this study done under cultural studies is a better strategy as opposed to being located within women studies, or shelved under an Africa studies section. I believe that only my being present within a context that I challenge can I significantly contribute to the debate and influence the key audiences for this discussion.
I believe that as an African woman, concerned with gender inequality issues, I am better placed to understand the values and needs of rural women in Uganda because I stem from the same environment. Based on a value system I understand, I can present a better case for changing the situation of women in rural Uganda and to explain policy and development practice in Uganda. I digress from the usual practice where researchers try to study contexts they are unfamiliar with because this has the unfortunate result of giving results based on values or cultures different from those of the people studied.

In trying to understand and document how women in rural Uganda experienced information and communication technologies (ICTs), I give due recognition to their contribution to the socio-economic development of their communities and the country. In Uganda, women in rural communities are mostly peasant farmers and contribute more to the country’s agricultural labour force and yet they are continually alienated from development processes including ICT advances that their urban counterparts seem to have exploited for personal and economic.

My role as a researcher is to network those interested and involved in ICTs for development (ICT4D) in Uganda. Through this research process, I have endeavoured to provide an intellectual framework for understanding the social, economic and political situation of the women as described by them. I therefore hope that the findings from this study will stimulate change within feminist scholarship, policy making sector and development practice. I attempt to offer a better understanding of how empowerment projects that target women in rural communities can be implemented for more meaningful results. I recommend recognition of the fact that the use and adoption of ICTs is dependent on specific contexts and power relations. This recommendation is made against the recognition of the current practice that seems to assume that the benefits offered by ICTs will automatically benefit rural women. Through this research I have realised that although ICTs have been identified as a potential catalyst for development, women, especially those in rural areas are not benefitting much from it because of their restricted social contexts. Even though rural women have been deliberately targeted by some development projects, they still remain the last to benefit from the remunerations of development initiatives because rural areas, where most of the women reside are poorly served in terms of basic needs and telecommunications infrastructure that would have supported ICT access and use.

In addition, studies on women’s empowerment and ICTs are mostly commissioned by donor agencies. The reports are therefore written in such a way that appeals to donor interests and are aimed specifically at getting more funding. In most cases, these studies have failed to be critical of development models that offer a hegemonic mode of operation like working towards the Millennium Development Goals amongst other generic frameworks (Heeks 2005). These studies have hardly addressed the complex issues surrounding the interplay between power structures, gender, social-cultural context and technological adoption; instead they have offered prescription on how things should be done, which fails to take into account these complexities (Heeks 1999).

This study goes a step further to address the scholarly concern of African feminists on the authenticity of knowledge acquisition and production about women in Africa. African women have continually expressed a need for diversity in knowledge. The argument is that the indigenous and specific experiences of women in Africa have been silenced. African feminists argue that knowledge available is mainly constructed using a single perspective; a western perspective. Dominant discourses therefore need to be more receptive to other perspectives.

**ASK:**

My subjective orientation in my research, within the ‘objectivated’ subjectivities (in Derek’s terms) is embedded in the institutional and intellectual settings in Turkey. As part of the 1970s-born generation in my country, I suppose I am stuck between the leftist movements of the 1960s and the generation of 1980s which has ‘deliberately’ been directed towards de-
politicalisation by mass media, consumerism and the political actors. Throughout this
challenging picture, coming from a highly secular and middle class family, the culture of
‘institutionalism’ and ‘statism’ has been rigorously entrenched in my thinking via the
modernist education in a highly-developed city.

With a mixed background of science, maths, art and philosophy at high school and having
had the opportunity of receiving secondary and higher education in English (and German as
a second foreign language), my dedication to understand the “real” picture of a politically
chaotic society led me to take a Political Science and Public Administration degree set in
1960s in a highly prestigious university. The university was established on an American
campus model in late 1950s with the funds from the Marshall Plan of the US, but had a
reputation of its pioneering and modernist (in Cigdem’s terms) ideals concerning the country
as a free and independent state from any global institutions and their binding rules.

The problematic issue of the “totality of sciences” was one of the first key concepts I had
encountered with in my first year of the degree. Thomas Kuhn’s ‘scientific paradigms’ and
P.K. Feyerabend’s anarchic attempt to focus on the non-universality of sciences should have
had an impact on my present day’s “context-based” and subjective approach to
understanding any social scientific issue. However, the same problem has highlighted
another critical concern in my scientific orientation: isolation within the social science
disciplines. Since we should all locate ourselves in the social sciences, particularly in the
British system through the RAE and grant application procedures, the over-reliance on
subjectivity and the mixture of several disciplines, which we usually tend to call “multi-
disciplinarity”, created a more problematic area to tackle for me. I will come back to this
shortly when I mention studying innovation at UEL.

My political science background was cultivated with a balanced approach between pure
social and political theory, and economics and practice-based courses on contemporary
politics and administrative/parliamentary characteristics of different political regimes at
national and European levels. However, my main interest in science and technology policy
appeared when a new concept (for 1980s), national systems of innovation (NSI), was used in
economics and research policy literature increasingly in 1990s and also in the OECD’s and
EU’s policy documents, at a time when the role of nation-state was stated to be diminishing
in a globalising economy. Supposedly an institutionalist, I rather like to believe in the “true
and just” administration of political institutions, be they formal or informal institutions like
norms, regulations, government agencies, universities; should serve for the common good
(in Communitarians’ terms) than diminishing the state’s role. For such reasons, NSI has
demonstrated a promising analytical framework for me to question the Turkish state’s role
in joining the EU, global markets, and multilateral agreements.

My MSc degree in the same university, which was run by economists, sociologists and
engineers, had the interdisciplinary approach with an aim of understanding the current
developments in science and technology in relation to social change, sociology of knowledge
and science, philosophy of technology, Information Age and how developing countries can
catch-up by investing in innovation. Following on to that establishment, my masters’ study
focused on the concept of technology foresight as a method of providing governments, firms
and organisations a systematic policy tool for selecting the priority areas for investment in
the immense diversity of science and technology. The main scope was about the UK’s
Technology Foresight Programme and its main achievements; why and how foresight was
chosen as a scenario building technique, and the main characteristics of the foresight

The main motivation behind my current PhD study is my concern with supranational
institutions like the IMF, WB, particularly the EU and Turkey’s direct adoption of these
institutions’ regulations and the ways which such organisations enforce their regulations
onto under-developed countries. The other side of the problem comes from the notion of
information society and its technologies. If there is a so-called information society; what is

\(^2\) Middle East Technical University in Ankara, [http://www.metu.edu.tr](http://www.metu.edu.tr)
actually that we are all forced to live in? Could it be an ideological and political project? Why innovation, science, technology and research funding is important? What is the Turkish state doing about that? I was acquainted with the idea that EU’s information society, ICTs and media regulations would -perhaps naturally- affect Turkey severely in some cases. Thus, it was unavoidably necessary for me to ask what the advantages and disadvantages of such EU policies on Turkey would be. Were there actually any mismatches? These were my starting points.

Why UEL?
I came across with the UEL’s Innovation Studies Department (of which roots could be seen in late 1970s) via the department’s membership in a Europe-wide network of nearly 16 university MA programmes3 from the Science, Technology and Society Studies area (STS). UEL’s expertise was stated as ‘the Information Society in Europe’. It seemed to be the perfect match for my interest.

Studying in a highly multidisciplinary Innovation Studies field is difficult both in Britain and Turkey with regard to locating one’s self within the social sciences. Whilst Innovation Studies is combined with Sociology at the moment here at UEL, and although there are common issues between the innovation studies and cultural studies, politics, communication studies and political economy of media; colleagues from other fields still ask ‘what is innovation studies?’ when I say I do my PhD there. It is possible to realise that studying innovation perhaps used to be a niche area in Europe, but now it has extended to numerous areas in social sciences with an emphasis that innovation is not solely a technological process but also a social process. The general picture at UEL seems to demonstrate that Innovation Studies might be shrinking in size, however, a new MA Programme in Innovation Studies is on its way to be launched and colleagues in the department have continued to collaborate with their European peers in the Europe-wide network of STS studies through meetings, thesis supervision and as external examiners. Second, although it might not be pronounced loudly, innovation studies is pervasive in many areas in other disciplines in our School: media and new technologies, gender and ICTs, technology and body, innovation policy in the UK government’s agendas, institutional innovation, innovation and urban regeneration, cultural innovation are only few of many examples we can give. Recently, innovation-related issues have been quite explicitly experienced in the British Sociological Association’s (BSA) Conference organised at UEL. The main theme of the event was ‘Social Connections: Identities, Technologies, Relationships’. These examples might show us that having a multidisciplinary framework in one’s approach to social sciences could be advantageous in terms of the flexibility of crossing boundaries and learning from other academic disciplines. On the other hand, since Innovation Studies is a growing area in Turkey, I find it very difficult to explain people what and why I am doing in my PhD. Besides, Cigdem’s well advised statements about doing a PhD and how it is perceived in Turkey are valid for me, too.

Ulrike’s claim about our contribution to the British academic system through our backgrounds set in different contexts, in (embedded) research cultures and experiences sounds agreeable. However, to what extent the British academe is “nourished” or transformed due to those contributions, and in what ways it might respond to the input it gathers from all over the world through the social, cultural and academic capital could be questioned. The know-how of an optimum doctoral study and a learning process within the British academic system will be transferred to other systems in other countries when we have the chance to pass our knowledge to others who may not have the same opportunity to experience education in a British university. Still, we may have a concern here: In modern universities like UEL, where I suppose the “research culture” is a significant arena for the institutionalisation process, the standardisation of the PhD as an outcome (with reference to Ulrike) can be hooked up to that process itself. That is to say, in principle, the system expects us, as PhD students, to contribute and develop that research culture while we may expect the system to behave in a standard way for everyone and create a suitable environment motivating us to contribute to the system. With reference to the innovation

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3 ESST- European Inter-university Association on Society, Science and Technology. [http://www.esst.uio.no/](http://www.esst.uio.no/) [last accessed on 2 July 2007]
system jargon, I would agree that our School at UEL is at a stage of “learning by doing”, by interacting and by forgetting, and is still in the process of institutionalising (in a formal way).

My other concern is my assumption about the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon research experience in the developing world’s research discourse. It is obvious that the packaged knowledge in the form of education, training and consultancy is one of the key successes of British universities contributing to the so-called knowledge economy. As customers and trainees of this packaged knowledge system, I wonder if we all have become similar products who will carry the flag around; or perhaps the system itself has taught us to analyse it critically; and that’s the catching point of the British academic environment which numerous developing countries may lack in. In that sense, I celebrate Patricia’s attempt to challenge the Western approach in understanding African women, which aims to include male power in transforming females’ lives for the better. I guess my attitude toward informing policy by attracting attention to explicitly unspoken major issues in the Turkish political realm have a similar course of action. Conclusively, it would be difficult to deny the fact that the experience of learning how to do research in Britain and particularly at UEL, has improved my critical understanding of my own context as an “outsider” both at UEL and in Turkey.

References

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**Appendix I**

**List of pre-2005 entrants to the School, and their research topics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Research Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Rahim N</td>
<td>A study of newspapers' roles in intergroup conflict resolution in Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed A</td>
<td>Aliens and Locals: Maids in Contemporary Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen S</td>
<td>Women's peace campaigning before Greenham: Politics &amp; Culture 1950-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anan GJ</td>
<td>Managing change in the church: an investigation into the reorganisation of the Church of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armstrong J</td>
<td>Contemporary independent feminist web media: A dialogical analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bramall R</td>
<td>Cultural amnesia' and 'amnesic' narrative: examining accounts of memory loss in contemporary culture, 1981-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowdhury S</td>
<td>Government - NGO Collaboration : an Effective Strategy for Poverty Focussed Development in Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crome YI</td>
<td>Child abuse: what impacts on the health visitor's ability to work in a primary preventive way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross K</td>
<td>Training the eye of the photographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwardes M</td>
<td>The genesis of grammar: a study of the sources of structure in language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elfer P</td>
<td>5000 hours. Organising for intimacy in the care of babies and children under three attending full-time nursery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esin C</td>
<td>Construction of sexuality in the narratives of well-educated young women in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faingulerntnt A</td>
<td>The 'Journey Film' genre in European Cinema - a Modern Odyssey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garofalo G</td>
<td>Political Economy of Prostitution in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman K F</td>
<td>To understand the policy process in child welfare and protection, and whether it confirms the process envisaged by policymakers or reveals a different process and if so, the implications for future policy processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gracia-Luque R</td>
<td>Access, gender and empowerment in multimedia education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunkel H</td>
<td>The cultural politics of female same-sex intimacy in post-apartheid South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey C</td>
<td>Towards a cartography of the video game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes C</td>
<td>Predictive factors of sexually abusive behaviour in children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson V</td>
<td>An evaluation of the importance of interprofessional collaboration in the implementation of Section 4 of the 1983 Mental Health Act within London hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikoniadou E</td>
<td>Digital architecture : an acoustic space of movement and effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johansen M</td>
<td>The dust of the departed and the fame of the struggling &quot;hero&quot;: the life and cultural location of Charles Goss (1864-1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones H</td>
<td>A study of intensive outpatient psychotherapy with sexually abused children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasapi E</td>
<td>Humorous advertising and audience cultural differences: A cross-cultural comparison study of British and Greek humorous television advertisements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt A</td>
<td>The Turkish ICT Sector and the European Information Society: Innovation for Integration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litho P</td>
<td>Information and communication technologies and the empowerment of rural women in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manion H K</td>
<td>Voices of the unheard: perceptions on the success of holistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouriki E</td>
<td>Women's rituals among the Hadzabe hunter-gathers of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moustaki-Smilansky E</td>
<td>&quot;Inner Residence Projected&quot; a psychodynamic approach to studying shared inner-outer spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassari J</td>
<td>Narratives of exile and identity: experiences of Turkish &amp; Greek Cypriot refugees in Cyprus &amp; London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigianni C</td>
<td>Rethinking 'queer': A film-philosophy project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orrelle, E</td>
<td>The Evolution of Social Complexity in the Southern Levant 5500-3000BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardo M</td>
<td>Family policies and gender equality in England and Germany; the fathers' perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcher B</td>
<td>The limits of British multiculturalism and the terms of legitimate cultural citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcher D</td>
<td>Meet the Family: Understanding adopted children and their grandparents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pizzey S J T</td>
<td>The work of &quot;guardians ad litem&quot; in care proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portonova S</td>
<td>Autopo(i)eitcs – audiovisual stratifications and the active space of video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson M M R</td>
<td>Possible links between experience in the first year of life and subsequent emotional and cognitive development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales S</td>
<td>Open adoption: controversy, conflict &amp; contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shibli A</td>
<td>Different Roles and conditions of Coverage for Western and Arab Media during the &quot;War on Terror&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somun L</td>
<td>Feminisms within a post-socialist Muslim context: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor H</td>
<td>The view from here: Cypriot refugees and the meaning of home in the metropolitan context of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas D</td>
<td>Who do you think you are? Identity, Identification and Narcissistic Phantasy in the Psychic Structures of the Central Characters in the Prose Fiction of Kazuo Ishiguro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Told M</td>
<td>A gender perspective on transnationalism of the Sri lankan diaspora communities in Germany - influence on the ethnic-nationalist conflict and peace-building in Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafford J</td>
<td>Virtual Agency of Nano-Bodies: Molecular Ethics, Affective Individuations, and Living Dust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieten U</td>
<td>Situating Cosmopolitanisms: A feminist discourse of the Other in contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams A</td>
<td>Priests in the making or priests already? Life stories of candidates for ordination in the Church of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeh D</td>
<td>Performances of identity as forms of resistance in the cultural practices of Chinese artists in Britain from the 1930s to the present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II

The Conflict of the Faculties

Derek Robbins

Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties* was published in 1798. It was divided into three parts, dealing with the conflict between the ‘lower’ or philosophical faculty and the three ‘higher’ faculties of theology, law, and medicine. These three parts had been written separately in response to different situations but Kant decided to bring them together into one text. This was one of the last books Kant published. He was 74 years old and died six years later. As you know from the synopsis of this presentation, I want to bring Kant’s text into relation with the thought of Bourdieu and some of his French contemporaries, before raising some questions about ‘situating cultural research’ in universities in England in the present.

Before looking at Kant’s text, I want to make some introductory comments about the context of Kant’s production – firstly in relation to the political situation in Prussia in the 18th century; secondly in relation to the traditional structure of the curriculum before Kant; and, thirdly, in relation to the formulation of Kant’s thought in his three Critiques of the 1780s.

First of all, the politics: It was only during Kant’s lifetime that the balance of power shifted significantly away from the Holy Roman Empire towards the State of Prussia. In his *The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Ringer, 1969), Ringer offered a social history of the rise of a class of academic intellectuals in the new Prussia in the 18th Century and throughout the 19th Century. Ringer contends that

“Politically, it is the gradual transformation of an essentially feudal state into a heavily bureaucratic monarchy which favors the development of a strong and self-conscious mandarin elite.” (Ringer, 1969, 7)

In order to counteract the power of the nobility, the reforming monarch sponsors the education of bourgeois state officials. Although he retains the loyalty of these educated officials by paying their salaries as civil servants, they begin to aspire to significance which is more than that of a class of state functionaries. As Ringer puts it:

“They demand to be recognized as a sort of spiritual nobility, to be raised above the class of their origins by their learning. They think of themselves as broadly cultured men, and their ideal of personal cultivation affects their whole conception of learning.” (Ringer, 1969, 9).

According to Ringer, this elevation of the function of bourgeois academics took two forms. There was a legalistic orientation which attempted to prescribe constitutional arrangements which would safeguard the new relations between the monarchy and the people, but there was also a more ‘cultural’ orientation which wanted to argue that, in the absence of any remaining belief in the divine right of kings, the rational, administrative framework of the state lacked any sense of vital purpose. The state should not operate as an administrative machine but should sponsor a cultural or spiritual vision. Taking these two orientations together, the incipient mandarin elite were seeking to ensure that higher education would supply both the state functionaries and the state cultural visionaries. During Kant’s last years, the work of some of his younger contemporaries exemplified these trends, on the one hand, for instance, Fichte’s *The Science of Rights* of 1796, and, on the other, Schelling’s *System of transcendental Idealism* of 1800. I shall come back to the implications of the work of these two ‘post-Kantians’ later but, for the moment, I am only concerned to point out that, formally, the bourgeois academics of the 1790s wanted to insist upon a regulated state and also the protection of intellectual freedom which would secure an affective raison d’être for
that state. As Ringer puts it again, it clearly followed from the aspirations of the new class of intellectuals that

"...government must give material aid to the elite and that it must do so without demanding an immediate practical return. The whole argument may actually be considered an extension of the notion that learning means spiritual 'cultivation'."

(Ringer, 1969, 11).

Ringer was attempting to trace the origins of the German crisis of 1933 in the development of liberal idealism in German thought during the 19th century, but I want to return now specifically to my second background point – to discuss the situation in which Kant found himself in the second half of the 18th century, and, in particular, to Kant’s position in relation to the university curriculum of his time.

The classification of university knowledge was already fixed in the medieval period by the 13th century, under the dominant influence of Bologna, Paris and Oxford, well before any universities had been founded in what is now Germany. There was a distinction in the structure of learning between those disciplines – the 'liberal arts' - which were regarded as 'propaedeutic' or preparatory, and the three properly superior disciplines – primarily 'sacred knowledge', that is to say biblical exegesis and Theology; Law; and Medicine.

Conventionally, the preparatory 'liberal arts' were divided into the 'trivium' which were the arts of words and signs (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics) and the 'quadrivium' which were the arts of things and numbers (arithmetic, music, astronomy, and geometry). It is important to remember that in none of these cases were the studies in any sense empirical or, in our terms, 'scientific'. The assumptions were all scholastic. The emphasis of instruction in the superior disciplines was on the exegesis of consecrated texts, whether in theology, law or medicine, whilst instruction in the liberal arts was based on classical texts such as, for geometry, the axioms of Euclid. In places, particularly in Paris in the 13th century, the faculty of arts became transformed into a faculty of philosophy, but this only meant that the study of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics and Ethics supplanted the study of his Organon, or treatises of Logic and the transformation did not alter the subordination of these studies to the three superior disciplines.

About a dozen universities were established in Germany between 1378 and 1500, all the creation either of princes of small states or of the ecclesiastical authorities of the Holy Roman Empire. The University of Königsberg, where Kant taught, was founded in 1544 in Prussia but this was before Prussia became absorbed into Brandenburg-Prussia at the end of the 17th Century. Königsberg was a Baltic port which had been a significant member of the Hanseatic League. It was fiercely bourgeois and independent and only succumbed to the authority of Brandenburg after it was invaded by the 'Great Elector' in 1674. At this time, it was much larger than Berlin. The ethos of the university was correspondingly independent. The newly established Prussian state had established two powerful new universities which were directly under its control – the University of Halle, founded in 1693, and the University of Göttingen, founded in 1733. Halle trained the civil servants and bureaucrats of the Prussian state whilst Göttingen introduced curriculum reforms, teaching new subjects such as dance, design and modern languages as well as modern disciplines such as history, geography and physics, attracting the nobility from all over Germany to its courses. By contrast, therefore, Kant began to teach at a university which was traditionally inclined to resist the characteristics of Halle and Göttingen by retaining bourgeois independence from state control. The other point to remember about the organisation of knowledge in the 18th Century was that most innovatory thinking in science and philosophy occurred in the context of learned societies. The Berlin Academy of Sciences was founded in 1700 in imitation of the British Royal Society, founded in 1662, and the French Académie des Sciences, founded in 1666.

My third background point relates specifically to the development of Kant’s own thinking in relation to the political and curricular contexts which I have outlined. Kant matriculated at the University of Königsberg in 1740. Only five years before, Frederick William 1st had issued a decree which insisted that all students should choose to pursue studies in one of the three
faculties – theology, law, and medicine - with a view to becoming state functionaries as priests, lawyers, or doctors. The decree had stated categorically that ‘the pretext that they wish to apply themselves only to philosophy or a part thereof is under no circumstances to be accepted; but each shall declare himself for one of the higher faculties, and make it his business to derive at least some profit from these.’ (Quoted in Cassirer, *Kant’s Life and Thought*, 1981, 20-1). Kant appears to have paid no attention to this decree, dabbling in the instruction offered in the higher faculties whilst involving him thoroughly in the philosophy and humanities learning of the lower faculty. This led to all of his early publications which were concerned with physics and discussion of the philosophy of physics based on his reading, in particular, of Descartes and Leibniz. His first publication of 1747, for instance, was entitled: *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*. The hallmark of Kant’s thinking was already apparent in that first publication. He was less concerned to evaluate opposing explanatory systems of the external world than to analyse the conceptual basis of opposing systematisations. At one point he actually made it clear that he was not opposing Leibniz’s objective explanations, “not actually the facts themselves, but the *modus cognoscendi* (the form of knowing)” (Quoted in Cassirer, 1981, 27).

After this first publication, Kant became a private tutor for seven or nine years. It is known that he gave his first lecture at the University of Königsberg in the autumn of 1755, and it is clear that his appointment was to teach in the lower faculty. In the early years he lectured on logic, mathematics, metaphysics, physical geography, ethics, mechanics, and theoretical physics. In other words, Kant’s teaching did not impinge upon or subvert the existing hierarchy of the faculties. This was changed as a result of the influence of the non-university institution which I have mentioned – the Berlin Academy of Sciences. For the year 1763, it announced a competition for a prize, inviting the submission of essays in response to the question: ‘Are the metaphysical sciences amenable to the same certainty as the mathematical?’. Kant did not win the prize but his entry was published as *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for a Demonstration of God’s Existence*. You can see, therefore, that Kant was philosophizing not so as to offer the traditional preparatory training of the lower faculty for the higher faculties but, instead, so as to differentiate philosophy from Theology and to argue that there are limits to the exercise of reason in defending theological beliefs. He was not questioning the validity of biblical exegesis and Christian understanding based on revelation, but he was determined to challenge the way in which reason was deployed to defend religious belief in the kind of rational theology that was dominant at the time. This was the beginning of the project which led to the famous publications which, together, are known as Kant’s critical philosophy. The first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was published in 1781. The *Critique of Practical Reason*, published in 1788, began life as part of the work of revision of the first *Critique*, the second edition of which was published in 1787. The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* was published in 1790. I don’t want to get bogged down in the complexity of Kant’s thought, but I do need to make a few simple points. The essence of Kant’s philosophy can be said to be that he achieved a reconciliation between the tradition of British empiricism and ‘continental’ rationalism, insisting that experience is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge but that, equally, knowledge is not exclusively derived from experience. This was the overriding form of his thinking – the desire to insist on the *a priori* determination of experience – but the three *Critiques* elaborated this form in three different spheres.

Crudely interpreted, Kant argued that there are *a priori* principles which govern our understanding of nature and, equally, *a priori* principles governing our inclinations to act in certain ways and not others, as well as *a priori* principles governing those things which give us pleasure or displeasure. In these three areas, therefore, which came to become institutionalised as the philosophical sub-areas of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, we can establish *a priori* the boundaries of what we can know, do or feel rather than deduce these things from empirical observation of beliefs, morals or tastes. The paradox of this endeavour, or, if you prefer, the fallacy, was to attempt to define rationally the characteristics of *a priori* reason. The history of philosophy since Kant – in so-called post-Kantianism, neo-Kantianism or even in Hegelian idealism - has been the history of attempts to sustain the status of the Kantian *a priori* in governing experience whilst, in a kind of
obverse paradox, trying to derive its characteristics empirically, either by a form of subjectivism or by either psychological, historical or dialectical analyses.

There are some grounds for supposing that Kant was himself moving away from an emphasis of a prioristic pure reason in relation to speculative metaphysics towards an emphasis of the free exercise of judgment in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics, even though the judgment still was thought to operate in accordance with a priori rules. Kant published his *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* in 1798. At first sight, this might seem to suggest from the title that Kant was proposing to analyse man pragmatically on the basis of what man culturally has made of man rather than scientifically on the basis of man’s biological characteristics, and there is, I think, this tendency in late Kant, but it is doubtful, nevertheless, whether he relinquished his insistence on human a priori rationality. I hope I have said enough now to situate Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties*, also published in 1798.

Kant had dedicated many of his earlier works to Frederick II – Frederick the Great. In *What is Enlightenment*, published in 1784, Kant had discussed Frederick’s motto which was: “Argue as much as you will, about what you will, but obey”. Frederick the Great, in other words, licensed freedom of speech and thought as long as it remained within the bounds of obedience to the state. Kant had followed Frederick’s prescription and had developed his own modus operandi.

Although Lutheranism was the Prussian state religion, Kant had avoided censorship under Frederick the Great by making a distinction between the personal and official exercise of reason. However, Frederick the Great died in 1788. He was succeeded by his nephew, Frederick William II who was religiously orthodox and mystically inclined and, in the same year, a new Minister of Justice was appointed, replacing the person to whom Kant had dedicated the *Critique of Pure Reason*. A new Censorship Edict was enacted and enforced by a Censorship Commission. It seems as if the editions of the three *Critiques* of the late 1780s escaped censure. However, Kant wrote *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* in 1793. It was in four parts. The censor of philosophy judged that the first part fell under his jurisdiction and approved it for publication, but he considered that the second part fell under the jurisdiction of the censor for biblical theology who refused to approve it. The full text was approved by the philosophy faculty of the University of Jena, but its publication aroused hostility towards Kant and, in 1795, the Censorship Commission issued an order to the senate of the University of Königsberg, forbidding any professor to lecture on Kant’s philosophy of religion. This is the context in which, before 1794, Kant wrote *The Conflict of the Philosophical Faculty with the Theology Faculty* and the political situation explains why he thought it important subsequently to join this article with comparable pieces on the conflicts with the faculties of Law and Medicine. We have to remember, of course, that this was all happening in the decade immediately after the French Revolution of 1789 and at a time in which, in the UK, William Pitt suspended the Habeas Corpus Act as a result of his fear of pro-revolutionary activists. This morning, I want simply to look at aspects of the text of this essay as it was published in 1798 as the first part of *The Conflict of the Faculties*.

In the Preface to *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant reproduced for the first time the letter he had received from the Censorship Commission on the publication of *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*. It accused Kant of acting irresponsibly against his duty ‘as a teacher of youth’ and it required him to give an account of himself. Kant also reproduced his reply. He invented a distinction between his role ‘as a teacher of youth’ and his role as a ‘teacher of the people’. In relation to the former, he insisted that he had never mixed philosophical instruction with any evaluation of Christianity. He had never been guilty of any transgression of disciplines and had, therefore, never denied the legitimacy of what was taught within the confines of theology. As Kant put it:

“… since I have always censured and warned against the mistake of straying beyond the limits of the science at hand or mixing one science with another, this is the last fault I could be reproached with.” (Kant, 1992, 13)
However, Kant made a different kind of argument in relation to his role as a ‘teacher of the people’ – in his writings rather than in his academic teaching. Whilst teachers of youth are obliged to transmit dogmatically the autonomous dispositions of their disciplines, whether in philosophy or theology, nevertheless it is the function of the university to encourage debate between faculties so that modified dogma can then be transmitted. As he put this in the last paragraph of his Introduction to The Conflict of the Faculties:

“It is absolutely essential that the learned community of the university also contain a faculty that is independent of the government’s command with regard to its teachings; one that, having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For without a faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government’s own detriment); …” (Kant, 1992, 27, 29)

I don't have time this morning to go into detail about Kant's full discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology, law and medicine in The Conflict of the Faculties. I would recommend that you read it – particularly the first part – On the Relation of the Faculties – of The Philosophy Faculty versus the Theology Faculty. It is time, instead, for me to take stock of my general argument. I have tried to show that Kant taught within a system in which a new nation state saw the primary purpose of the university as being to deliver trained and obedient state functionaries. He taught in the lower faculty which, since medieval origins, was thought to be subservient to the dominant faculties and where instruction was thought only to be preparatory to the dogmatic instruction which took place in these higher faculties. Within the lower faculty, Kant developed a philosophy of knowledge which emphasized the *a priori* structural determinants of all forms of knowledge. In other words, he developed a position which was not just one amongst other possible philosophical positions but one which argued that the essential raison d’être of philosophy was to explore the limits of all forms of knowledge and their claims to truth. The importance of The Conflict of the Faculties was that, in it, Kant sought to institutionalise the *a priorism* of his critical philosophy. The philosophy faculty was to embody proactive consideration of the grounds of knowledge of everything communicated in the university and, as such, was to challenge the authoritarianism of the prescribed curriculum sponsored by the state.

You might be forgiven for thinking that my account so far has been tacitly or tendentiously leading towards the recommendation of a return to Kant. I shall certainly argue that the situation in which we are all researching and teaching is suffering from central state intrusion in a way which is analogous with the enlightened despotism of Frederick the Great but, somewhat sadly, there is no possibility of a simple reversion to the Kantian strategy of critical subversion. I want now to examine briefly some of the complications inherent in the Kantian legacy so as then to generate some discussion about our current dilemma. The complications mainly arise from the distorting effects of Napoleon's domestic and imperial policies. Within France, there were no universities in the 19th century until 1896. The 22 universities which had previously existed before 1789 were abolished by the Revolution. Instead, Napoleon instituted specialised écoles to offer professional and technical training and the old universities were fragmented into independent faculties. Professors and teaching staff were state appointments and servants of the state. This only began to change after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 by which time the positivism of Comte was intellectually dominant. In the Third Republic, from 1871, an attempt was made to borrow from the ideology of the German universities to establish institutions of higher education which would inculcate positivist values and methods in the service of a socially inclusive republic. Durkheim's establishment of social science went alongside a commitment to a conception of the social function of the university in securing social solidarity or cohesion. Napoleon's military aggression had an unintended opposite effect on the development of German universities. In the settlement of the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, Prussia lost the territory which contained the University of Halle. Plans were immediately made to establish a new university in Berlin and there was sophisticated debate about what should be the
nature and function of the new institution. Those most involved in the debate were a younger generation of post-Kantian philosophers, notably Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, von Humboldt and Hegel. These transformed the Kantian notion of a critical faculty within the university. The post-Kantians undermined Kant’s commitment to rationality and emphasized, instead, the primacy of identity, either of the self or of the state, discovered through historical and cultural research. Their influence contributed to the consolidation of an ideology of a liberal university which, as a total institution, performed the critical function for society which Kant had only envisaged for philosophy within the institution. It was this ethos which dominated throughout the 19th Century in Prussia and generated German historical and cultural scholarship. At the end of the 19th Century, it generated the alternative, hermeneutic, philosophy of social science which we associate with Dilthey, Simmel and Weber.

These alternative ideologies of universities are described in section 9 of Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition. He distinguished between what we might call the French and German ideologies. The French ideology, he claims, was state-controlled because it sought to bring into being a participative society, whereas the German ideology sought to develop individuals independently of, even against, state regulation. Two aspects of Lyotard’s description of the French ideology resonate with our situation in the UK currently. Lyotard writes that, according to the French ideology,

“All peoples have a right to science. ... the right to science must be reconquered. It is understandable that this narrative would be directed more toward a politics of primary education, rather than of universities and high schools.” (Lyotard, 1984, 31)

Lyotard goes on to show that the apparent state-centredness of Napoleon’s reforms was not incompatible with the legacy of French Revolutionary thought:

“... even if imperial politics designated the institutions of higher education as a breeding ground for the officers of the State and secondarily, for the managers of civil society, it did so because the nation as a whole was supposed to win its freedom through the spread of new domains of knowledge to the population, a process to be effected through agencies and professions within which those cadres would fulfill their functions. ... The State resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct control over the training of the ‘people’, under the name of the ‘nation’, in order to point them down the path of progress.” (Lyotard, 1984, 31-2)

By contrast with the French ideology, Lyotard cites Schleiermacher to show that the essence of the German ideology was to think that

“The great function to be fulfilled by the universities is to ‘lay open the whole body of learning and expound both the principles and the foundations of all knowledge’ (Lyotard, 1984, 33).

Lyotard indicates how readily a post-Kantian critical philosophy became conceptually and institutionally allied with Hegelian idealism. Lyotard writes:

“Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather meta-narration. Hegel’s Encyclopedia (1817-27) attempts to realize this project of totalization, which was already present in Fichte and Schelling in the form of the idea of the system.” (Lyotard, 1984, 33-4)

As I’m sure most of you know, the point of Lyotard’s representation of these two opposing ideologies – which he calls ‘narratives of legitimation’ - is to argue that, as meta-narratives, both are untenable. Irrespective of the ebbing and flowing of fashion in modernist or postmodernist thinking, I think Lyotard’s The postmodern condition is a great book which
still deserves very close attention. Rather than engage fully with his solution to the problem he identifies, however, I want to use his diagnosis of the problem a little more before focusing on the solution, as advanced by Bourdieu, which I would prefer to recommend.

I want to take four points from Lyotard. The first is simply to note that Lyotard was trained as a philosopher who, as early as 1954, had written a short introduction to Phenomenology, and that he acknowledges in his Introduction to *The Postmodern Condition*, which was written as a report on knowledge to the Council of Universities of the Quebec government, that “It remains to be said that the author of the report is a philosopher, not an expert.” (Lyotard, 1984, xxv). The second point to take is that announced by Lyotard in the first sentence of the book:

“Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.” (Lyotard, 1984, 3)

The manifestation of this hypothetical perception is thought to be the influence of computerization on knowledge. Learning is in the process of becoming, as he puts it, ‘translated into quantitites of information’ (Lyotard, 1984, 4). This commodification of knowledge means that:

“The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (*Bildung*) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so.” (Lyotard, 1984, 4)

In other words, the cornerstone of the German ideology has collapsed and with it the whole structure of the liberal ideology of universities.

The third point I want to take from Lyotard is that he deduced that the commodification of learning would have another important consequence:

“For the mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege that nation-states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution of learning. The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated ....” (Lyotard, 1984, 5)

In other words, the cornerstone of the French ideology has also collapsed and with it the whole notion of state-regulated higher education.

My final point from Lyotard is to quote his description of the situation which necessarily arises from the collapse of these traditional forms of knowledge legitimation. For Lyotard, the problem lies not in the kinds of legitimation adopted but in the notion of legitimation itself. Although Lyotard does not make any reference to the conflict of the faculties, the consequence of Lyotard’s diagnosis must be that no conflict is possible because we no longer have any conception of arbitration or discrimination or inter-faculty knowledge judgement. In what could be a description of our current situation, Lyotard writes:

“The classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are thus called into question – disciplines disappear, overlappings occur at the borders between sciences, and from these new territories are born. The speculative hierarchy of learning gives way to an immanent and, as it were, ‘flat’ network of areas of inquiry, the respective frontiers of which are in constant flux. The old ‘faculties’ splinter into institutes and foundations of all kinds, and the universities lose their function of speculative legitimation. Stripped of the responsibility for research (which was stifled by the speculative narrative), they limit themselves to the transmission of what is judged to be established knowledge, and through didactics they guarantee the replication of teachers rather than the production of researchers.” (Lyotard, 1984, 39)
Before you get too depressed by this account which, for me, was extraordinarily prescient, I want to move to my preferred solution whilst also taking a glancing swipe at some other inadequate solutions.

Lyotard derived much of his knowledge of the development of the German ideology from a text, which he cites in footnote 108 of The Postmodern condition. This was a collection of translations of German idealist articles on the university which was published in 1979 – the same year as La condition postmoderne – as Philosophies de l’université. L’idéalisme allemand et la question de l’université. The collection was edited by philosophers associated with the Collège de Philosophie which was a development largely sponsored by Derrida which was committed to retaining the centrality of philosophical training in French education. One of the editors, incidentally, was Luc Ferry who subsequently became Minister of Education in the Raffarin government not too long ago. Most of the selected articles which had first been written at the beginning of the 19th Century in connection with the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 were translations into French of a similar collection which had been published in Germany in 1956 as Die Idee der deutschen Universität. My point is that in both countries, reference back was made to the German liberal idealist ideology of the university to seek to establish a philosophical basis for proposing university reform, in the case of Germany at the point of reconstruction after the Second World War, and, in the case of France, in the period after the May events of 1968. I haven’t got time to look in detail at Habermas’s response but only to give a brief sketch. In the 1950s, he did his doctoral research on Schelling – one of the post-Kantian idealist philosophers. His inaugural lecture as Professor of Social Philosophy at Frankfurt, given in 1965, began with a critique of Schelling (published as the appendix to Knowledge and Human Interests, 1971) but it is clear from a lecture which he gave just two years later (published as “The University in a Democracy – Democratization of the University” as chapter 1 of Toward a Rational Society, 1971) that he regarded it as being the social function of the university to counteract the tendency of new institutions of higher learning to become exclusively technological or commercial and primarily agents of economic regeneration. In other work of the same period, Habermas explored philosophically the relations between the positivist and hermeneutic traditions in the social sciences (in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, first published in 1970) and, historically, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published in 1962, at no time did he relinquish the discourse of philosophy or the social space within which that discourse might be offered. Similarly, Foucault’s critique of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view, which Foucault presented as his second doctoral thesis in 1961 alongside his translation of Kant’s text, published in 1964, was a philosophical critique in which he concluded by recommending the superior relevance of Nietzschean philosophy. Habermas’s critique of Foucault, published in 1985 in his The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity is a critique which actually sustains the legitimacy of the autonomous discourse within which they both confronted each other.

By contrast, Bourdieu argued that the philosophical perspective was a part of the problem. Philosophical discussion about universities tacitly sustained the liberal notion of the centrality of philosophy to the function of universities. In a famous passage, Bourdieu attacked the way in which many of his contemporaries were generating new pseudo-sciences to disguise the way in which they were actually operating still philosophically rather than scientifically. He called this the “-ology effect” and singled out for criticism the use of ‘archaeology, grammatology and semiology’, clearly therefore condemning Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes, and he commented retrospectively:

“I think that just at that time what was necessary was to question the status of philosopher and all its prestige so as to carry out a true conversion into science” (Bourdieu, 1990, 6)

As early as 1967, Bourdieu and Passeron produced an article entitled “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” in which they argued that the dominant Lévi-Straussian structuralist social anthropology of the time was the culmination of a movement which had wrongly reinserted humanistic values into the practice of positivist social science. For Bourdieu, the human dimension of science
has to be accommodated by understanding the social conditions of its generic construction rather than by attempting to modify the defining characteristics of its operation. In 1975, Bourdieu wrote the article on which his book entitled *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* was based. Here again, Bourdieu argued that the fallacy of Heidegger’s thinking was that it presented itself as ‘pure’ philosophy whilst in fact it incorporated elements of contemporary fascist thinking. The way to counteract Heidegger’s philosophy was to expose the extent to which it was an impure product of the social conditions in which it was generated. Bourdieu’s *Pascalian Meditations* of the early 1990s was his most developed critique of institutionalised philosophy.

In effect, Bourdieu proposed that sociological analysis should fulfill the function originally proposed for philosophy by Kant. It is significant that Bourdieu consistently opposed philosophical idealism whilst, throughout his work, there were echoes of both Leibniz and Kant. In a paper of 1989, published in English in 1992 as “Thinking about Limits”, it is clear that Bourdieu thought that sociology could be used to oppose state intellectual intervention in the same way as Kant had proposed for philosophy – by defining the boundaries of legitimate concern of competing disciplines - as opposed to the way envisaged by the post-Kantian tradition which was to encourage imperialist philosophy rather than philosophy as a device for intellectual arbitration. This was the framework of Bourdieu’s programme of research from the early 1960s onwards. *The Inheritors* of 1964 was based on an analysis of the social conditions causing students in French universities to choose between the study of Sociology and Philosophy. It was, therefore, a sociological analysis of the conflict between the two faculties, as perceived by the students. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* of 1970 attempted to provide a conceptual framework for systematically analysing the conditions of production in universities of different curriculum content. It offered a framework for understanding sociologically the conflict between faculties at the level of transmission rather than at the level of student reception.

However, Bourdieu was not engaged in a process which would simply elevate sociology as a meta-analytical discourse in place of philosophy. At first, in 1968, he edited, with others, *The Craft of Sociology*, in which he argued that sociological research also necessitated a sociological reflexion on the social grounds of its own existence. This has often been interpreted as just a recommendation for securing the scientificty of social science as an autonomous discourse, but, at the same time, Bourdieu began to deploy sociological analysis to clarify the boundaries between disciplines in French universities. He carried out a sociological analysis of the production of knowledge in Parisian universities on the eve of the May events of 1968. During the 1970s he refined his conceptual framework. We all inherit social and intellectual dispositions, which he called our habitus. These subjective dispositions are articulated as we position our lives and our thinking in relation to objective social and intellectual structures which have been constructed historically. Our own position-taking constantly modifies the objective structures with which we inter-act reciprocally. He argued, for instance, that in 1962, socially privileged students could afford to take the risk of studying the new subject of sociology whereas socially underprivileged students sought to buy into the security of the established discipline of philosophy.

However, importantly, the consequence of these actions was that the status of these disciplines themselves would change so that gradually the study of sociology would become as secure as the study of philosophy. The structure of disciplines, therefore, is not absolute but constantly contingent, dependent amongst other things on the attitudes of those studying them. Bourdieu first articulated this most clearly in *Distinction*, published in 1979 with the sub-title which has a deliberate relation to the work of Kant: ‘a social critique of judgment’. This was a work, published in the same year as Lyotard’s *La condition postmoderne*, in which Bourdieu acknowledged that our tastes – of wine, beer, golf, rugby, soccer, etc. - are not autonomous tastes with intrinsic absolute values, but, instead, acquisitions which function for us in our social position-taking. Like Lyotard, in other words, Bourdieu recognized that tastes and, equally, knowledge, have lost their ‘Bildung’ capacity, their capacity to influence or modify personal character. They have become commodities which have value in exchange and which we deploy for our social advantage. The important thing is to understand the competitive process of position-taking – the drive towards ‘distinction’ – rather than to try to formulate value judgments about tastes which are only
pawns in the social game. Bourdieu confronted Kant head-on in a ‘postscript’ entitled: “Towards a ‘vulgar’ critique of ‘pure’ critiques”. As we have seen, Kant was disposed to believe in an a priori faculty of judgment. Tacitly following the analyses of Kant made by Lucien Goldmann, Bourdieu argued that Kant’s a priori was the product of his bourgeois class position. The origins of Kant’s willingness to identify universal criteria of beauty and to despise the cultural tastes of the vulgar had to be understood sociologically. In the same postscript, Bourdieu attacked Derrida’s philosophical critique of Kant. Bourdieu’s position was not anti-Kantian so much as a sociological extension of Kantianism which would enable the social judgment of ‘low’ cultural activities to be taken as seriously as the judgment of canonical ‘high’ culture.

It was a short move for Bourdieu from Distinction to consideration of the kinds of issues raised by Lyotard in La condition postmoderne. In writing Homo Academicus in 1984, Bourdieu’s analysis was resolutely sociological. He revisited the sociology of knowledge analysis of Parisian universities which he had undertaken in 1968 and interpreted his findings in the light of the kind of reciprocal relationship between structure and agency which he had worked out in relation to taste in Distinction. In trying to demonstrate sociologically the way in which the conflicts between faculties correspond with the relative ‘cultural capital’ which these faculties possess in relation to intrinsic intellectual status or extrinsic social, economic, or political power, Bourdieu was also deeply conscious that his analysis had to be reflexive. If he was to avoid the charge of elevating sociological analysis to the level of detached philosophical scrutiny after the manner of Kant and to avoid the charge that he was simply replacing bourgeois philosophy with bourgeois sociology, Bourdieu knew that he had to acknowledge that his own analytical perspective was situated within the game that he was analysing.

I don’t have time to assess in detail Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus. Again, I simply urge you to read this text and, particularly, to read the preface which he wrote for the English translation when it was published in 1988. I can only extract a few comments in order to lead into my own concluding recommendations in this paper. Bourdieu’s first chapter discusses the methodological difficulties encountered in seeking to be reflexive about the situation in which we are engaged in research. He writes first of all:

“There is no object that does not imply a viewpoint, even if it is an object produced with the intention of abolishing one’s viewpoint (that is, one’s bias), the intention of overcoming the partial perspective that is associated with holding a position within the space being studied.” (Bourdieu, 1988, 6)

Not only do we need to reflect on our own viewpoint irrespective of the object of our research enquiry, we also, according to Bourdieu, derive benefits from subjecting to scrutiny the system of classification of our research within the university environment. Bourdieu continued:

“... we can only avoid claiming that the truth of the university field is one or other of the more or less rationalized representations which are engendered in the struggle for classification, and especially the semi-scholarly representations which scholarly circles give of themselves, if we include in our study the process of classification effected by the researcher, and the relationship between that and the classificatory attributions indulged in by the agents (and by the researcher himself, once he is not directly involved in research).” (Bourdieu, 1988, 11-12)

One of the constant emphases of Bourdieu’s position was that we should take care not to allow the existing structure of knowledge organisation within the university to define the parameters of research which is about a wider social reality of which the university itself is only a part. Given that universities hold a defined position and status within society at any time, Bourdieu is saying, in other words, that all researchers need to analyse sociologically those particular conditions so as to ensure that their research is not simply self-fulfillingly reaffirming the perspective of the institution within which it is undertaken. It was the second chapter of Homo Academicus which was entitled “The Conflict of the Faculties” and
which was headed by a quotation from Kant's text. Here Bourdieu outlined in great empirical detail the consequences of his attempt to sociologise Kant's inclination to conceptually define the limits of the knowledges offered within universities, particularly those which communicated knowledge in accordance with the dictates of state authority. Rather than pursue this further, however, I want instead to point out the next stage of the logic of Bourdieu's position. He carried out research on the relative status of all the 84 grandes écoles in France, analysing the relationships between the social origins of students, admission policies, curriculum content, and assessment procedures. This work was published in 1989 as *La noblesse d’état*, and published in English in 1996 as *The State Nobility*. Whereas *Homo Academicus* encouraged the reflexive analysis of the conflict between faculties within one institution, *La noblesse d’état* extended this to encourage the analysis of the differentiations between institutions and the consequent gradations of access to political power and economic opportunity.

I want to conclude by extracting some points from my discussion in relation to the situation currently in the UK and by suggesting some orientations which you should try to keep in mind during this conference when considering ‘Contexts, Fields, Positions: Situating Cultural Research’. This conference offers a great opportunity for a kind of collective reflexivity. It brings together research students from a range of universities – mainly UK, but not exclusively – who are undertaking research within the framework of a range of disciplines, perhaps Cultural Studies, Anthropology, Sociology in particular. Without wanting to become too polemical, I am suggesting that UK higher education is currently in a state of ideological confusion. Until the late 1960s, the situation was still quite clear. The dominant ideology of British universities was what, following Lyotard, I have been characterising as the German ideology. The expansion proposed by the Robbins Report of 1963 which led to the establishment of the new universities of the late 1960s was an expansion which only cautiously extended the proportion of the population which might be offered the social advantages to be derived from a liberal university education. The establishment of the polytechnics at the end of the 1960s did not at first alter that ideological domination because the ‘binary’ division was thought to legitimate a co-existence between the German and French ideologies, whereby the universities fulfilled liberal functions and the polytechnics fulfilled vocational functions. From the outset, most of the polytechnics refused to accept that role differentiation and, after the abolition of the binary division in the early 1990s, the so-called market of universities euphemised a clash of ideologies where the older universities have continued to be associated with the cultivation of superior minds and preparation for superior careers whilst the new universities struggle to avoid relegation to teaching institutions even though the supposed differentiations of quality of provision are normally spurious. Building on Mrs. Thatcher’s attempt to make all universities economically productive and accountable, the post-1997 Labour governments have attempted, as Lyotard could have predicted, to introduce increasing state-controlled regulation whilst retaining the language of choice but, in doing so, have failed to take any steps to challenge the perceived hierarchy of universities between which choice is supposedly exercised. Again, as Lyotard could have predicted, the strategy of regulation was at first preoccupied with primary and secondary education but, as you will all know, it is beginning now to encroach on real freedom of choice in research by tightly regulating research training and, incipiently, determining which universities should be authorised to support research students. As Lyotard could further have predicted, this state regulation is introduced in the interest of increasing the economic competitiveness of the UK whilst simultaneously encouraging a selected minority of universities to become multinational corporations trading commodified knowledge internationally. The collapse of the state legitimation narrative co-exists with the increased exercise of state control over knowledge production.

The solution to this predicament which I prefer is derived from Bourdieu. I contend that all the forces are currently conspiring to encourage you all, as research students, to close your eyes to the ways in which your research activities are conceptually or institutionally framed. If the Arts and Humanities Research Council funds research scholarships within the framework of a map of learning which is still dominated by the conventional demarcations of the humanities of liberal institutions, most students in most UK universities are structurally excluded from the competition and are deprived of the power to modify that structure of
knowledge as a result of their research. In a situation of relative impotence, most students are forced to opt to operate within the knowledge demarcation legitimated by their institution and hope that the guarantee offered by their institution’s status will secure general recognition. I am suggesting that there is a danger that this will tend to acquiesce in perpetuating a hierarchy of research practices which, in turn, will tend to acquiesce in a dysfunctional alienation of academic research from the real social and cultural problems of the country or the world. I would, therefore, like to encourage you to be reflexive on three levels, the personal, the disciplinary, and the institutional. First of all, ask yourselves what it was in the reciprocity between your inherited dispositions and your encounter with social structures which led you to articulate the particular problem which you are now researching. Secondly, what are the social historical conditions of existence of the intellectual field within which you have chosen to situate your enquiry. How are your research problems conditioned by the discourse within which they are conceptualised? Is it possible to carry out the ‘same’ research in the field of sociology, psychology, anthropology, or Cultural Studies, for instance? Thirdly, the social historical conditions of existence of disciplines relate closely to the social historical conditions of existence of institutions. As we have seen, the ideologies of French and German universities are historically different and, as I have suggested, the ideologies of British institutions are now very confused. Ask yourselves how far the study of the ‘same’ cultural phenomenon is the ‘same’ when it is undertaken at the university of Durham or Middlesex or Strasbourg, or Leipzig, or Ibadan or Princeton, for instance.

I have only one last point. As Bourdieu insisted, I have to acknowledge that my perspective on your situation is a product of my own situation as it has developed in the course of my career, first of all as a research student at Cambridge and then, since 1969, as a lecturer at this institution. I have to register this reflexively and so do you. The book which is due out shortly to which Ben has referred, entitled On Bourdieu, Education and Society (Robbins, 2006), attempts to provide the information which will enable you to analyse sociologically the relevance both of Bourdieu’s thinking and of my interpretation of his thinking. I hope you will look at this book when it comes out. After that, it is up to you to reflect on your own situations and to manipulate the conflict of the faculties to your own ends so as to participate proactively in an equitable society.

References