The quiet virtues of sadness: A meta-theoretical appreciation of its contribution to flourishing

New Ideas in Psychology

Authors

Tim Lomas

Dr. Tim Lomas, School of Psychology, University of East London, Arthur Edwards Building, Water Lane, London, E15 4LZ, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 8223 4465   Fax: +44 (0)20 8223 4937   Email: t.lomas@uel.ac.uk
Abstract

Critical emotion theorists have raised concerns that ‘normal’ human emotions like sadness are increasingly being pathologised as disorders. Counter efforts have thus been made to normalise such emotions, such as by highlighting their ubiquity and appropriacy. This paper goes slightly further by suggesting that sadness is not merely normal, but may have inherent value, and indeed be an integral component of a flourishing life. It offers a meta-theoretical review of literature on the potential ‘virtues’ of sadness. Three overarching themes are identified, each comprising four subthemes: (a) sadness as a mode of protection (including as a warning, as prompting disengagement, as a mode of conservation, and as enhanced accuracy); (b) sadness as an expression of care (including as a manifestation of love, of longing, of compassion, and eliciting care); and (c) sadness as a vehicle for flourishing (including as a moral sensibility, as engendering psychological development, as an aesthetic sensibility, and as integral to fulfilment). It is thus hoped that the paper can contribute to a more ‘positive’ cultural discourse around sadness, suggesting that, for the majority of people, experiences of sadness may serve an important and even desirable function in their lives.

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Depression has come to occupy an increasingly dominant place in the cultural landscape; for instance, the World Health Organization (2006) have made the much-cited assessment that unipolar depression is likely to be the second leading cause of global disability burden by 2020 (see e.g., Kessler et al., 2009). However, hand-in-hand with this prominence has come heightened critical scrutiny of the construct itself. For example, theorists such as Jerome Wakefield (1992, 2005) have argued that the psychiatric concept of depression has essentially ‘colonised’ a whole spectrum of dysphoric feelings; thus, as Horwitz and Wakefield (2007) argue in their influential book *The Loss of Sadness*, emotions that were previously regarded as natural and inherent dimensions of the human condition, from sadness to grief, have to an extent been re-framed as psychopathologies. So, while it is generally accepted that clinical levels of depression are indeed problematic and warranting of medical or psychotherapeutic help, there has been something of a countermovement in recent years aimed at normalising sub-clinical dysphoric states like sadness (Thieleman & Cacciatore, 2014). The current paper aims to contribute to this process, showing that sadness – used here as an overarching term for states of low mood that fall short (either in terms of intensity or duration) of warranting a clinical diagnosis of depression – is not only normal, but can be valuable in helping people live full and fulfilling lives. It will do so by exploring how sadness plays three important roles: (a) as a form of protection; (b) as linked to caring; and (c) as a vehicle for flourishing. However, before considering these three in turn, the first section will introduce the terrain by exploring the conceptual evolution of depression and sadness, as well as the significance of related terms such as melancholy.

**Outlining the Emotional Terrain**
Over the centuries, humanity has developed a rich and nuanced appreciation of the diverse mental afflictions that are today arguably swept up by the overarching term ‘depression.’ Even just limiting the focus to words used in the English language, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED; Oxford University Press [OUP], 2015) reveals a detailed lexicon, and moreover one which has evolved subtly over the years, with shifting patterns of usage.

**A Lexicon of Dysphoria**

Among the most prominent of the words relating to depression is melancholy, which entered English in the late 14th Century, derived etymologically from the Greek *melankholikos*. Its prominence is attributable to the influence of the physician Hippocrates (circa 460-370 BC), regarded as the ‘father’ of medicine (Davey, 2001). Hippocrates propounded the idea that melancholy – described in his *Aphorisms* as ‘fears and despondencies, if they last a long time’ – derived from an excess of black (*melas*) bile (*kholé*), reflecting the more general belief that illness was caused by an imbalance of the body’s four ‘humours’ (i.e., fluids). The concept remained current throughout the Middle Ages, for instance being depicted as a psychological ailment by the influential Persian scholar/physician Ibn-Sīnā (Avicenna; 980-1037) (Radden, 2002). The term was further popularised by Robert Burton (1621) in his influential *Anatomy of Melancholy*, a wide-ranging treatise which identified a spectrum of melancholic shades, including feeling ‘dull, sad, dour, lumpish, ill-disposed, solitary, any way moved or displeased,’ before reaching even greater cultural prominence through Freud’s (1914) *Mourning and Melancholia*, which identified its close association with grief.

Closely intertwined with melancholy over recent centuries, both conceptually and in prominence, is sorrow, which also entered English around the 14th Century, derived from the Old Norse *sorg*. This has a complicated relationship with melancholy; for instance, drawing on Hippocrates, Burton (1621) wrote that sorrow is both ‘mother and daughter of melancholy,’ and that these ‘tread in a ring...for sorrow is both cause and symptom of this
disease.’ One way of disentangling these two states is that melancholy tended to be used in a more overarching sense to depict a range of dysphorias, including those without any apparent cause, as well as the habitual disposition of a melancholic ‘personality’; in contrast, sorrow was more a lament in response to specific tragedy or misfortune, including in recognition of the universality of suffering (Pies, 2008). An influential example of the latter usage is found in the *Imitation of Christ* by the 14th Century Monk Thomas à Kempis (1418-1427), regarded as perhaps the most widely read Christian spiritual text after the bible (Espin & Nickoloff, 2007); in this, à Kempis speaks of the ‘proper sorrows of the soul,’ saying that this is the right and proper response to the ‘vale of tears’ that is earthly life, and that ‘we often engage in empty laughter when we should rightly weep.’

Beyond sorrow and melancholy, there is a rich vocabulary of conceptually similar terms which remain in current usage, albeit sometimes with new inflexions, as detailed in the OED. For instance, ‘care’ entered old English (from the Proto-Germanic *karō*) as an expression of concern, grief and lament, and it was not until the 16th Century that it took on the positive nuances it now carries (e.g., to have fondness for). Likewise, ‘pathos,’ taken in the 17th Century from Greek, was used to express pity and suffering, as was the adjective sorry (whose use in an apologetic sense did not occur until 1834). Other prominent terms include the adjective ‘woeful’ (14th Century, meaning afflicted with sorrow), the noun ‘chagrin’ (1650s, taken from French, meaning melancholy or anxiety), the adjective ‘lamentably’ (14th Century, from the Latin *lamentabilis*, meaning mournful and full of sorrow), the verb ‘condole,’ meaning to sorrow (15th Century, from the Latin *condolere*, to suffer with another), the noun ‘plaint’ (13th Century, from the Latin *planctus*, meaning lamentation or wailing), and the noun ‘misery’ (14th Century, from the Latin *miseria*, i.e., wretchedness), which took on connotations of great sorrow and distress from the 1530s onwards.
The Emergence of Depression

The term ‘depression’ first emerged in English in the late 14th Century from the Latin (via French) *depressionem*, the past participle stem of *deprimere*, meaning ‘to press down.’ Originally a term in astronomy, by the early 15th Century it took on meanings of dejection and ‘depression of spirits.’ Its usage as a clinical term is often dated to 1856, when the French psychiatrist Louis Delasiauve began using it in place of the word melancholy (Andrews, 2010). The latter term initially continued to be more prevalent, as evinced by Freud’s (1914) *Mourning and Melancholia*. However, through the work of clinicians such as Emil Kraepelin (e.g., 1899), who referred to different kinds of melancholia using the overarching label ‘depressive states,’ depression gradually became the nomenclature of choice for medical professionals. In 1952 the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) featured ‘depressive reaction,’ described as low mood and poor self-esteem triggered by loss. The term ‘major depressive disorder’ (MDD) then emerged in the 1970s as part of a drive to develop diagnostic criteria based on symptoms, and was incorporated into the DSM-III in 1980 (Andrews, 2010). MDD remains the dominant construct relating to depression in the latest fifth edition of the DSM (APA, 2013), albeit with updated considerations, such as the removal of the DSM-IV’s ‘bereavement exclusion’ (where clinicians were advised to refrain from diagnosing MDD in individuals within the first two months following the death of a loved one).

While the specific omission of the bereavement exclusion continues to be a matter of controversy, it also highlights a broader point about shifting and contested trends in terms of what constitutes depression, and indeed what constitutes a psychopathology more generally (Wakefield, 2013). (This point is made even more strikingly, in another context, by the fact that homosexuality was deemed a disorder until the publication of DSM-II in 1973 (Meyer, 2003).) As such, recent years have seen much debate around not only what constitutes a
clinically significant form of depression, but moreover about the ideal conceptualisation and nomenclature of all those forms of dysphoric low mood that fall short of this threshold. For instance, as scholars like Horowitz and Wakefield (2007) have pointed out, if these variants of low mood are still referred to using the term ‘depression,’ even if this is qualified as being ‘non-clinical,’ it nevertheless implies that such states are maladaptive and dysfunctional (given that depression is essentially used culturally as an illness label). While this debate includes consideration of the various terms highlighted above, such as melancholy and sorrow, much of it has recently centred on the concept of sadness (Freed & Mann, 2007).

**Normalising Sadness**

Sadness entered English in the early 14th Century carrying implications of seriousness, but soon took on connotations of sorrowfulness (OUP, 2015). Sadness today is seen as being characterised by many of the same features of depression, as outlined in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), from diminished interest in pleasure, to a lack of energy (Leventhal, 2008). Crucially though, scholars are beginning to counterpose sadness with depression, in that, whereas the latter is a psychiatric disorder, the former – which encompasses a range of dysphoric states of low mood – is a ‘normal’ emotion. This perspective is captured by Wolpert (1999, p.74) in his book on depression, entitled *Malignant Sadness*: ‘Depression I believe is sadness that has become pathological.’ Of course, there are a range of different views on how sadness (as a ‘normal’ emotion) differs from depression (as a ‘disorder’). Some clinicians view sadness as being qualitatively different from depression (Stiver & Miller, 1988); for instance, Freud (1914) argued that melancholia (i.e., depression) was accompanied by lowered self-regard and intense guilt feelings, symptoms which were absent in ‘normal grief’ (i.e., sadness) after a loss. Conversely, others view these as being on a spectrum, where sadness shades into depression by degrees; for instance, according to Wakefield’s (1992) model of mental disorder, sadness becomes depression (i.e., a pathology) when it cross a line into becoming
both harmful and dysfunctional (these each being necessary but not individually sufficient for warranting such a diagnosis). For example, sadness might be regarded as a normal ‘time-limited’ response to loss, but can be deemed a disorder at the point it becomes prolonged and disruptive (although the location of this point is an issue of debate, as highlighted above with the controversy around the removal of the bereavement exclusion) (Leventhal, 2008).

Thus, there is an emergent literature which seeks to disentangle sadness from depression, and to normalise the former as a ‘natural’ human emotion (rather than a disorder). Within this literature are a number of different perspectives. Perhaps most common are efforts to render it normal by emphasising its ubiquity and appropriacy, as in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999); in this, sadness is emphasised as a natural reaction to events such as loss, and is further normalised by stressing its universality. However, while such rationalisations may be helpful (e.g., in terms of fostering acceptance), they might still lend the impression of sadness as an invidious state, even if not a disordered one; after all, many phenomena might be considered ‘natural’ – from aggression to death – but this does mean that people would want these in their lives. As such, there are also attempts to identify the potential value of sadness, exploring its role in successful human functioning and even in psychological development and the attainment of flourishing. (Indeed, it has been suggested that much of the appeal of the recent Pixar production Inside Out, which won the 2016 Academy Award for best animated film, is because of the way it encouraged this type of re-evaluation of sadness (Moss, 2015).) In exploring the literature around sadness, it is possible to identify three broad, overlapping themes, three ways in which sadness is deemed to potentially play a beneficial role in human life: (a) as a form of protection; (b) as linked to caring; and (c) as a vehicle for flourishing. The paper will explore each of these themes in turn.

**Sadness as Protection**
The first main theme in the literature around the possible value of sadness highlights its role in protecting or safeguarding an individual. For instance, focusing primarily on sadness as a response to loss, Freed and Mann (2007) have identified three distinct models of sadness: a reunion model, in which sadness is an intrapsychic ‘punishment’ for becoming separated from phenomena that one loves (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004); a disengagement model, in which loss is responded to with a detachment coping style (Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000); and a caregiving model, in which sadness functions to elicit care (Barr, Green, & Hopkins, 2000). While the caregiving model will be discussed below in the context of the second main theme (sadness as connected to care), the reunion and disengagement models both reflect this first overarching theme of sadness as protection. This theme can be broken down into various subthemes, including sadness as, (a) a warning; (b) prompting disengagement; (c) a mode of conservation; and (d) as accuracy. These shall be considered in turn.

**Sadness as a Warning**

Much of the literature on the protective value of sadness is rooted in evolutionary biology, in which attempts are made to understand the potential adaptive value of the ‘down-regulation of positive affect systems’ (Gilbert, 2006, p.287). Such theories often take the symptoms of sadness or depression, such as loss of energy and withdrawal from social activity, as precisely the factors that may render sadness evolutionarily useful (albeit a process that can become dysfunctional, as in the case of clinical depression). One way this usefulness manifests is as a warning about a situation that may be evolutionarily costly or noxious in some way.

This idea is central to Eisenberger and Lieberman’s (2004) ‘reunion’ model of loss, mentioned above. Eisenberger and Lieberman refer to the distress that one feels when separated from that which one loves – usually a person, but could also be a place or even an object – as ‘social pain.’ They note that the feelings that arise from such estrangement are described with language that parallels that of physical pain (e.g., broken heart). Thus, in their
model, sadness functions as a psychological punishment for estrangement, thereby motivating people to seek a reunion. Somewhat similarly, Hagen (1999) raises the idea that postpartum depression may function as a ‘perinatal psychic pain’ that signals to new mothers ‘that they are suffering or have suffered a fitness cost’ as a result of the birth (p.325). Exploring this empirically, Hagen and Barrett (2007) argue that this pain serves as a warning to mothers that something is amiss in their current situation – whether in terms of herself, the baby, her partner, or her circumstances more broadly – and needs redressing. Sometimes such redress may not be possible though, which is where the second protective function of sadness fits in.

**Sadness as Disengagement**

In some cases of sadness, the redress that one seeks (e.g., reunion) may be overly costly or even impossible; in such an event, sadness may function to encourage withdrawal from the ‘goal.’ This is the premise of the ‘disengagement model’ noted above, in which detachment is a coping response to loss or separation (Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000). This idea was initially elucidated in Klinger’s (1975) incentive-disengagement theory, in which depression was seen not as a pathology, but as a ‘normal, adaptive part of disengaging oneself’ from an incentive or goal that one has perceived as unattainable (p.21). More recently, Nesse (2000) outlined the possible adaptive value of sadness (and even depression), where symptoms such as low energy, while subjectively unpleasant for the person, help regulate ‘patterns of investment,’ e.g., stalling the pursuit of goals that ‘will likely result in danger, loss, bodily damage, or wasted effort’ (p.14).

Of course, in making the case for the utility of sadness, one must be sensitive to the conditions under which it may manifest as a more problematic form of clinically-significant depression; for instance, while disengagement from an unattainable goal may be adaptive, if this becomes generalised into a more global stance (e.g., believing that all worthwhile goals are unattainable), this may lead to more severe depressive issues, as per Abramson, Seligman,
and Teasdale’s (1978) model of ‘learned helplessness’ (see Mikulincer (2013) for a recent overview of work in this area). However, more time-limited and specific types of disengagement prompted by sadness may well serve an adaptive function.

**Sadness as Conservation**

Related to the idea of sadness prompting disengagement is the notion that sadness might help conserve resources when one is vulnerable, by restricting one’s sphere of engagement. There is an interesting potential here parallel with Fredrickson’s (2001) ‘broaden-and-build’ theory of positive emotions, in which positive affect is regarded as broadening people’s experiential and perceptual horizons, thus enabling the person to build capacities and resources (e.g., social networks). Conversely then, negative affect may help ‘narrow-and-defend’ the person during times of vulnerability. This idea was floated by Engel and Schmale (1972), who spoke of ‘conservation-withdrawal’ in the context of despair behaviours among infant monkeys who had become separated from attachment figures. Likewise, in humans, Thierry, Steru, Chermat, and Simon (1984) suggested a possible adaptive value to depression as a form of ‘hibernation,’ a ‘searching-waiting strategy’ in which resources are preserved while more optimal opportunities for engagement in the world become apparent.

More recently, in the context of work-related burnout, Hobfoll and Shirom’s (2000) ‘conservation of resources’ model holds that burnout and subsequent potential depression may result from long-term depletion of one’s energetic resources, serving to preserve what resources do remain. Again, as with disengagement, there are risks of longer term depressive issues if such withdrawals are prolonged; Hobfoll and Shirom argue that initial resource loss can lead to further ‘loss spirals’ (subsequent loss of remaining resources) and worsening depression (see Hakanen and Schaufeli (2012) for empirical validation). However, also as with disengagement, time-limited withdrawal to conserve resources may serve a useful immediate restorative function (Nesse, 2000).
Sadness as Accuracy

Finally, one further way in which sadness might play a protective role is through enhancing people’s perceptual and evaluative accuracy. It is often suggested that depression can alter people’s judgement, e.g., making them less sensitive to reward possibilities (Paulus & Yu, 2012). However, others have argued that sadness may actually be reflective of a degree of sober realism that can be relatively lacking in more positive moods, leading to an improved sense of judgement. For instance, using mood induction protocols, Forgas, Goldenberg, and Unkelbach (2009) found that a sad mood was associated with enhanced ability to remember everyday scenes, while Storbeck and Clore (2005) similarly observed that people in low moods are less liable to experience false memory effects (compared to those in positive moods or those whose mood was not manipulated).

Sadness may also improve judgement: Forgas and East (2008) found that induced sadness was associated with increased scepticism, leading to a greater ability to detect deception. Similarly, examining the impact of mood on judgements among criminal investigators, Ask and Granhag (2007) found that a sad mood made participants less likely to commit the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ as they were more sensitive to both situational and witness variables (whereas angry participants just relied on perception of witness variables). Thus, as Bodenhausen, Gabriel, and Lineberger (2000, p.320) put it, compared to happy moods, sad moods are ‘characterised by more extensive, detail-oriented information processing strategies.’ This comment aligns with the notion of sadness offering a form of protection, in this case through helping people navigate their social world with greater accuracy and better (e.g., more perceptive and realistic) judgment.

Sadness as Caring

The second key theme in the literature around the value and meaning of sadness focuses on its intimate relationship with caring and love. Such notions of course do feature in the models
included above; both models of loss already discussed – reunion (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004) and disengagement (Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000) – emphasise that the strongest forms of loss concern people that one loves and cares for. However, other literature around sadness frames its link with love and caring somewhat differently; rather than positioning sadness as a response to a loss of love, it is presented instead as an expression of love. For instance, discussing parental bereavement, Thieleman and Cacciatore (2014, p.6) argue that grief serves as a ‘way to maintain a connection to a beloved deceased child.’ From this perspective, sadness and joy are both manifestations of love, and indeed two sides of the same coin: love in the presence of its ‘object’ manifests as joy, and in its absence manifests as sadness. This notion plays out across a number of subthemes, including sadness as a form of (a) love; (b) longing; (c) compassion; and (d) eliciting care. These will be discussed in turn.

**Sadness as Love**

The idea that sadness may be an expression of love, while perhaps recognised implicitly in clinical contexts, has been given its clearest articulation in other realms, particularly literature and philosophy. In these fields, it has been suggested that love is fundamentally dialectical, involving a complex ‘co-valenced’ blend of light and dark elements (Lomas & Ivtzan, 2015). As expressed by C.S. Lewis (1971) in *The Four Loves*, ‘To love at all is to be vulnerable. Love anything and your heart will be wrung and possibly broken.’ To love is to open oneself to a spectrum of troubling feelings, from anxiety and fear over its potential loss, to grief and despair over its actual departure (Spitzberg & Cupach, 1998). However, the key point is that this potential dysphoria, from anxiety to sadness, is seen not as an aberration or dysfunction of love, but the very condition of it, the ‘price tag’ one must pay in order to be in love. This is because, as Levinas (1987, p.88) puts it, love requires a person to place his or her fate and happiness in the hands of an ‘other,’ whose reciprocal love cannot be willed and whose
actions cannot be controlled; it is this ‘insurmountable duality of beings’ that creates ‘the pathos of love.’

Moreover, this sense of the dialectical nature of love is emphasised by the recognition that its positive and negative aspects are arguably co-creating: the more intense one’s love for a person, the greater the peril that one is exposed to (e.g., the grief one would suffer if the relationship was lost against one’s will). Indeed, anthropological work by Lutz (1995) shows that this kind of dialectical appreciation is encoded conceptually and linguistically in some cultures; for instance, the Ifaluk tribe use the same word – fago – to encompass love, sadness and compassion, thereby encapsulating the precious fragility of love (see de Silva (2012) for recent additional commentary). Thus, as Bauman (2013, p.6) memorably phrases it, ‘to love means opening up to that most sublime of all human conditions, one in which fear blends with joy into an alloy that no longer allows its ingredients to separate.’

Sadness as Longing

A particular form of sadness as an expression of love is the concept of longing. This is a complex state, in which feelings of sorrow at being separated from someone or something that one loves are intermingled with an almost tantalisingly pleasant yearning to be reunited. The co-valenced nature of longing is highlighted by Holm, Greaker, and Strömberg (2002, p.608), who define it as ‘a blend of the primary emotions of happiness and sadness.’ The object of longing does not need to be a person, but could be a place, another time, or even a state of mind (such as a spiritual experience); as McGraw (2000, p.33), puts it, longing is an ‘intense wish to remove the physical or mental distance which separates the self from anyone or anything deemed desirable.’ For instance, in a phenomenological study of the spiritual experiences of adolescents suffering from muscular dystrophy, Pehler and Craft-Rosenberg (2009) found that participants’ spirituality centred around intense longing for connection with others and with a sense of the sacred.
What is particularly intriguing about longing is that, for all that it encompasses sadness, it is highly valued in many cultures (Wierzbicka, 1999). Many languages have words which roughly translate as longing, including saudade in Portuguese, toska (тоска) in Russian, hiraeth in Welsh, and sehnsucht in German. For instance, Feldman (2001, p.51) describes saudade lovingly as ‘an emotional state suffused with a melancholic sweetness that fills the souls with longing, desire and memory.’ As this definition illustrates, such states are held in high regard, including as emblematic of a national ‘character’ or a sign of a refined sensibility, and thus are not only valued but even sought and cultivated.

**Sadness as Compassion**

Closely related to the idea of sadness as a manifestation of love is the connection between sadness and compassion. Compassion has been defined by Neff (2003, p.224) as ‘being open to and moved by the suffering of others, so that one desires to ease their suffering.’ Models of compassion (e.g., Ozawa-de Silva et al., 2012) construct it as a potent combination of empathy (‘an emotional reaction in an observer to the affective state of another individual’; Blair, 2005, p.699) and sympathy (‘sorrow or concern for another’s welfare’; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p.92), plus motivation and behaviour (i.e., acting to reduce their suffering).

Thus, in some instances of sadness, it may have arisen in response to the sadness or suffering of another person. Thus, this link with compassion further presents sadness as a manifestation of care, and so helps re-appraise it as something to be valued.

For instance, many religious traditions not only valorise compassion, but suggest it is among the highest qualities a person can aspire to. In Christianity, St. Paul (Corinthians, 13:13) wrote, ‘So faith, hope, love [agape] abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love’; building on this, St. Thomas Aquinas presents compassion – frequently used interchangeably with its synonym mercy – as the ‘interior effect’ of agape (Barad, 2007, p.11), and writes that mercy ‘takes precedence of other virtues’ (Aquinas, 1273, II-II, q.31,
Similarly, Buddhism is often described as a ‘religion of compassion’ (Price, 2010, p.53). In this context, sadness arising as compassion could be regarded as a sign of moral sensitivity and worth, a point that will be returned to below in the final section on ‘sadness as flourishing.’ Before this though, mirroring the idea of sadness as compassion is the reciprocal idea that sadness elicits care in return.

**Sadness as Eliciting Care**

The counterpart to the section above – sadness as a compassionate response to suffering – is that one’s own sadness can in turn elicit a compassionate response from others. Sadness has long been recognised as a ‘care-eliciting’ behaviour (Henderson, 1974, p.172), and likewise as a ‘signalling’ phenomenon, alerting caregivers to distress (Barr, 1990). Thus, Barr et al.’s (2000) ‘caregiving model’ of sadness holds that it serves a number of important interpersonal functions, including inducing compassion and empathy, prompting loved ones to respond to the person’s needs and/or to return to them (if they are absent). Such care-eliciting is arguably most prominent in childhood, and particularly infancy, where sadness – and other expressions of distress, such as crying (Lockwood, Millings, Hepper, & Rowe, 2013) – play key roles in regulating adult attention (Lummaa, Vuorisalo, Barr, & Lehtonen, 1998).

It has been argued that depression in adults can likewise be a plea for help or resources, as per Hagen’s (1999) ‘perinatal psychic pain’ model above. However, reactions to people with depression are often negative (Coyne et al., 1987); as such, Klerman (1974) argues that while milder dysphorias like sadness may be adaptive (in eliciting care), ‘the adult depressive episode represents an attempt at adaptation that has failed’ (p143). Nevertheless, it remains a common position that sadness can be effective at eliciting care, as found for example in terms of nurses’ affective responsiveness to patients (Sheldon et al., 2009).

Sadness may likewise elicit other prosocial responses; Sinaceur, Kopelman, Vasiljevic, and Haag (2015) report that in negotiation scenarios, participants conceded more to someone
expressing sadness (relative to other emotions), as it evoked the participants’ other-focused empathic concern.

**Sadness as Flourishing**

In the sections above, at points the idea has been raised that sadness may not only be useful, but might actually be precious and indicative of psychological development and refinement. This includes the religious notion that compassion (which may often manifest as sadness) is one of the highest qualities to which a person can aspire (Aquinas, 1273), or the way in which longing is highly valued in numerous cultures as a sought-after sensibility (Feldman, 2001). This final section examines these ideas more fully, exploring the underappreciated notion that sadness may actually be an important component of ‘flourishing’ (Keyes, 2002), integral to living a full and fulfilling life. This notion can be explored in terms of four main areas: (a) sadness as a moral sensibility; (b) sadness as engendering psychological development; (c) sadness as an aesthetic sensibility; and (d) sadness as integral to fulfilment. This final section will explore these in turn.

**Sadness as a Moral Sensibility**

As explored above, sadness may occur as a manifestation of compassion. Such compassion could simply be viewed as an expression of love, particularly if only directed towards people with whom one is personally close; indeed, from an evolutionary perspective, it could even just be seen as an act of self-interest (e.g., safeguarding one’s progeny)(Workman & Reader, 2014). However, compassion may also be regarded as reflective of a moral sensibility, especially if directed towards people with whom one has no particular personal connection (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012). This idea is reflected in the way that people who are thought to have attained high levels of psychological development – e.g., those deemed to have reached ‘self-actualisation,’ according to Maslow’s (1972) terminology – are frequently defined in part by high levels of compassion. An exemplar in this regard is perhaps the
Buddha, who made compassion central to his teachings, to the extent that H.H. the Dalai Lama has described Buddhism as a ‘religion of compassion’ (Price, 2010, p.53). Integral to this sense of compassion is a feeling of sadness at the ubiquity of suffering; for instance, Shenk (2006) has argued that Abraham Lincoln was driven by sorrow at the troubles of the world, and that this fuelled his personal sense of meaning and mission.

However, this link between sadness and morality is not just the province of epochal figures such as The Buddha or Lincoln. There is a rich emergent literature on the emotional basis of morality, i.e., that moral judgments are driven by affective reactions such as anger and sadness (see Haidt, 2003, for a review). For example, Decety et al. (2012) analysed neurophysiological and behavioural reactions to harm-related scenarios that were either accidental or intentionally-caused, finding that morally salient scenarios evoked stronger empathic sadness (including enhanced activity in affective neurocircuitry such as the amygdala); they concluded that negative affect ‘alerts the individual to the moral salience of a situation by bringing discomfort and thus can serve as an antecedent to moral judgment’ (p.209). Similar findings have likewise been obtained by Szekely and Miu (2015) and Hardman (2015).

**Sadness as Engendering Development**

Connected to the notion that sadness (as a manifestation of compassion) can be indicative of a moral sensibility is the idea that sadness can engender psychological development. In Buddhism, for instance, compassion is not simply regarded as a fixed trait, but as a quality that can be cultivated, for example through practices such as loving-kindness meditation (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008). In doing so, people are regarded as developing psychologically and spiritually; one theory in this regard is that concern for others helps people ‘transcend’ their ‘ego’ (i.e., cease to be pre-occupied with their narrow self-
identity), thus lessening their egoistic self-concern (which is regarded in Buddhist psychology as the origin of suffering) (Wilber, 2000).

Away from compassion, sadness has been seen to promote psychological growth in other ways. There is an emergent literature, for instance, on Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (1996) concept of posttraumatic growth (PTG), defined as ‘positive change that occurs as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life crises’ (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p.1). With PTG, people may experience positive changes in their life following trauma (even while still suffering distress), including: increased personal strength, enhanced relationships (e.g., closer and more appreciative), altered life philosophy (e.g., finding meaning in the trauma), changed priorities (e.g., greater appreciation of life), and enhanced spirituality. PTG has been explored in the context of grief, such as following bereavement (Neimeyer, Prigerson, & Davies, 2002). Studies here show that, even in the midst of sorrow, people may find that their grief has changed their life in ways that can be valued, such as deepening their sense of spirituality and/or religiosity (de Castella & Simmonds, 2013). The transformative power of sadness is not limited to emotionally-charged phenomena such as PTG; for instance, Saffrey, Summerville, and Roese (2008) found that regret is often valued by people (over other negative emotions) as a beneficial learning opportunity.

**Sadness as an Aesthetic Sensibility**

In addition to sadness potentially reflecting a moral sensibility, it has also been explored as a form of aesthetic sensitivity and refinement (Thoolen, Ridder, Bensing, Gorter, & Rutten, 2009). This notion has a long and distinguished pedigree, and has been particularly associated with Romantic art and philosophy, as exemplified by poets like John Keats (Brady & Haapala, 2003). Indeed, this type of melancholic aesthetic has proved culturally powerful at times, as seen by the dramatic – and indeed sometimes tragic – impact of the publication of Goethe’s *Young Werther* in 1774 (Thorson & Öberg, 2003). Likewise, Woolfolk (2002, p.23)
discusses how a melancholic aesthetic came to be revered in Japan as indicative of a refined character, particularly during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), describing this as having the sensitivity to be ‘touched or moved by the world… inextricably intertwined with a capacity to experience the sadness and pathos that emanates from the transitory nature of things.’

More recently, empirical attention has been drawn to the question of why people choose to engage with art that is sad, as attested to by the on-going popularity of melancholic songs (Schellenberg & von Scheve, 2012). For instance, Wassiliwizky, Wagner, Jacobsen, and Menninghaus (2015) investigated the phenomenon of art-elicited chills – shivers down the spine produced by endorphin bursts combined with a galvanic skin response (Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002) – which they found arose from being ‘moved,’ a complex emotional state in which sadness is almost experienced as being pleasurable. Indeed, sad music can often invoke positive feelings (see Sachs, Damasio, and Habibi (2015) for a recent review), doing so through processes including regulating negative emotions (e.g., ‘catharsis’), retrieving valued memories, and inducing feelings of connectedness (Taruffi & Koelsch, 2014). Similar analyses have likewise been conducted with sad literature (Oliver, 1993) and films (Hanich, Wagner, Shah, Jacobsen, & Menninghaus, 2014).

**Sadness as Integral to Fulfilment**

The notion that people might actually seek out states of sadness (e.g., ‘being moved’) through art leads to the final sub-theme here, the possibility that sadness may be an intrinsic part of a fulfilling life. The rationale here is that flourishing – an overarching term encompassing various aspects of positive functioning, from hedonic pleasure to ‘eudaimonic’ meaning (Huppert & So, 2013) – does not just mean having positive emotions, but experiencing a whole spectrum of human feelings (Lomas & Ivttzan, 2015). There are various arguments in support of this contention. From an existentialist perspective, it has been argued that one has not lived fully unless one has experienced both the highs and lows of life (Wong, 2012).
Indeed, from a dialectical philosophical perspective, it is only by experiencing lows that highs have any substance and meaning, since happiness depends logically upon the existence and experience of sadness (just as ‘up’ does not make sense without ‘down’).

Thus, flourishing itself can be seen as involving an ‘inevitable dialectics between positive and negative aspects of living’ (Ryff & Singer, 2003, p.272). In this respect, flourishing – encompassing a spectrum of feelings, from sadness to joy – might be regarded as a ‘meta-emotion’ (Oliver, 1993). As Koopman (2015) elucidates, even if one’s primary (i.e., most immediate) emotion is ostensibly negative (e.g., sadness), it is nevertheless possible to have positive meta-emotions regarding this (e.g., appreciation). This is the type of process that is occurring, Koopman suggests, when a person is greatly moved by a piece of art, or similarly in other ostensibly sad experiences, like acts of remembrance, e.g., visiting war memorials (Winter, 2015). In such experiences, sadness, far from being undesirable, let alone a disorder, is seen as entirely appropriate, valuable, and an important part of being human.

**Conclusion**

This paper adds to an emergent literature which seeks to normalise states of low mood – referred to here using the overarching term sadness – that fall short of clinical levels of depression. It does so by not only emphasising sadness as common and universal, but by suggesting that sadness may actually be useful and valuable, contributing towards a full and flourishing life. In exploring the relevant literature, three main ‘virtues’ of sadness were identified, each of which were further broken down into four ‘subtypes.’

First, the paper suggested that sadness can function as conferring forms of protection upon a person, including: (a) as a warning (mental pain alerting one to harmful situations); (b) prompting disengagement (detaching oneself from unattainable goals); (c) as a mode of conservation (saving resources when vulnerable or depleted); and (d) as accuracy (increasing
the efficacy of one’s perception and judgement). Secondly, it was suggested that sadness can be an expression of care, including as a manifestation of: (a) love (sadness being the way that love manifests if its object is absent); (b) longing (when sadness intermingles with pleasure in a desire for (re)union); (c) compassion (sadness arising out of concern for the suffering of others); and (d) eliciting care (sadness evoking compassionate responses in other people).

Finally, the paper explored the possibility of sadness being integral to flourishing, including as: (a) a moral sensibility (a sign of sensitivity); (b) engendering psychological development (through shifting one’s locus of concern outwards to other people); (c) an aesthetic sensibility (a coveted sense of aesthetic appreciation); and (d) integral to fulfilment (a necessary component of living a full life).

In setting out these potential virtues of sadness, the paper has acknowledged that these can potentially become maladaptive, for instance if prolonged or harnessed in a dysfunctional way (Wakefield, 1992). In such instances, sadness has the potential to develop into more problematic forms of clinical depression (Leventhal, 2008). However, while being alert to these risks, it might still be argued that, for the majority of people, their experiences of sadness are not merely mild forms of disorder, but rather are serving an important and even desirable function in their lives. Moreover, with analyses such as this, the larger hope is that cultural discourses around sadness may begin to change, and it may even be possible to foster more positive ‘meta-emotions’ (Oliver, 1993) in relation to sadness. That is, even if people’s primary subjective experience is dysphoric, they may yet be able to situate this negative affect within a larger context of appreciation, and come to not only accept their feelings of sadness, but even perhaps to value them.
References


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