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The United States of America: Counter-Terrorism Pre-9/11

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Since the attacks of 9/11, political, public, media and academic focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism has proliferated. According to Martha Crenshaw, '[t]he attacks of September 11 propelled terrorism from obscurity to prominence in the wider field of international relations and foreign and security policy', adding that '[s]cholars who had previously ignored terrorism now acknowledged it as a major national security concern'.¹ According to Andrew Silke, prior to 9/11, the study of terrorism was peripheral in academia, but '[s]ince the terrorist attacks of 9/11, interest in – and funding for – terrorism related research has increased enormously'.² Yet, he argues that there has been an over-emphasis on al Qaeda and a lack of historical research.³ In fact, when 9/11 occurred it became difficult for many to remember a time when it was someone other than a Muslim perpetrator. In addition to this, much literature, media attention and counter-terrorism since 9/11 has focused on international terrorism and foreign actors, sources and threats, as opposed to domestic ones. 9/11 not only served to determine the terms of terrorism and counter-terrorism, but also overwrote, if not erased, the collective and institutional memory of pre-9/11 terrorism. According to Robert Singh, 9/11 '... heralded a dangerous and unprecedented chapter in the 'American experiment'. 9/11 represented the end of what remained of America's post-1991 innocence about the severity of global threats'.⁴ Former Director of the CIA R. James Woolsey, argued that '[i]f the world did not change on September 11, 2001, at least most people's perception of it did'.⁵

In *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda*, Christopher Hewitt shows that this is not the first time that this has occurred. Describing the shock and surprise the media expressed following 9/11, as if it were without precedent in America, he cites *Newsweek's* response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh on April 19 1995, previously the largest attack on American soil, having killed 168 and injured approximately 680: 'This doesn't happen here It looked like Beirut. But the devastated building was deep in America's heartland, ending forever the illusion that here at home we are safe'.⁶ He also cites *Newsweek's* response to the first World Trade Center (WTC) attack by Ramzi

¹ M. Crenshaw, 'Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies', *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. A. K. Cronin and J M. Ludes, Washington: George Washington Press, 2004, p. 82.

² A. Silke, 'Research on Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism', *Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security*, eds. H. Chen, E. Reid, J. Sinai, A. Silke, and B. Ganor, New York: Springer, 2008, p. 47.

³ A. Silke, 'Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research', *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, eds. R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth, and J. Gunning, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 13-33.

⁴ R. Singh, 'Superpower response: The United States of America', *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and beyond*, eds. M. Buckley and R. Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003, p. 52.

⁵ R. J. Woolsey, 'Forward', *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, ed. Y. Alexander, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. v.

⁶ C. Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 12.

Yousef on 26 February 1993 (prior to Oklahoma and also within the period of ‘innocence’), which ‘rattled the country’s confidence, dispelling the snug illusion that Americans were immune, somehow, to the plague of terrorism’.⁷ Hewitt attributes this to historical ignorance, the ideological diversity of the terrorists, and their fragmented organizational forms.⁸

The tension, if not contradiction, between overdetermined representations of individual events and selective memory, historical amnesia or even ignorance, is not restricted to the media. The first World Trade Center attack had enough of an impact to associate the location with terrorism and lead then New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani to approve placing the Office of Emergency Management headquarters there, not considering the impact if it were to be targeted again. The first attack was remembered post-9/11 because of this dangerous mistake and the failure to recognize or act on the threat posed by al Qaeda to both the WTC and America itself. Yet, the link also served to emphasize the role of al Qaeda and threat of international/foreign terrorism and forget the Oklahoma City bombing and the longer history of terrorism involving domestic anti-government activists, such as Timothy McVeigh, and white supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan, both of which have experienced a revival and renewed attention following Obama’s and Trump’s elections. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, formed in the wake of 9/11, issued the report *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment*. The report warned of a resurgence in right-wing extremism and potential for violence in the context of Obama’s election and the economic downturn, similar to that seen with the anti-government militia movement and Oklahoma City bombing in the 1990s.⁹ Thus, not only challenging the view that all terrorism is Islamic and international, but also using historical examples and lessons learned from previous periods, such as not only the bombing, but warnings from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and others of the threat posed by anti-government militias threat prior to it.

As counter-terrorism is, by its very nature, a response to current, ongoing or future predicted threats, it must adapt to respond to new forms of terrorism and the changing nature of threats. These change based on the emergence of new movements and groups, ideologies, strategies and tactics in different contexts, as well as changes to terrorist strategies and tactics in response to new counter-terrorism measures themselves. Thus, while a focus on past manifestations, experiences and frameworks may be ill suited to the demands of counter-terrorism, one that focuses only on current threats risks presentism and missing the longer-term lessons of history. A historical examination of terrorism and counter-terrorism, such as this chapter presents, can help map and analyze changes, patterns, mistakes and failures over time (e.g. Giuliani’s decision and the government’s failure to address warnings about anti-government Militias pre-Oklahoma City and al Qaeda pre-9/11). This can help to address not only the lack of historical knowledge that Silke and Hewitt note, but highlight the problems

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division and FBI), *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment*, 7 April 2009. <https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf>. Accessed 18 April 2016; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘Homeland Security issues warning on right-wing extremist groups’, 15 April 2009. <http://www.homelandsecurity.com/2009/04/15/homeland-security-issues-warning-on-right-wing-extremist-groups>. Accessed 18 April 2016.

of and challenge contextually specific, reactive, presentist and ahistorical approaches, as well as politically or ideologically motivated counter-terrorism policy, and assumptions or stereotypes, often racialized, about the profile of the 'terrorist' and creation of 'suspect communities', such as that experienced by Muslims post-9/11.

This chapter examines the history of counter-terrorism and the terrorism and terrorist threats to which it responded in the United States pre-9/11. Part one will provide an overview of the different types of domestic and international terrorism and movements that have affected or targeted America historically and been the focus of counter-terrorism. Part two will examine the history of counter-terrorism in the United States, looking at different developments, policies and approaches, and examine the ways in which counter-terrorism has changed in response to both threats and attacks, political and ideological agendas and interests, pressure and criticism, as well as challenges, mistakes and failures.

Terrorism Pre-9/11

It is not only that knowledge and understanding of terrorism in or involving America in the pre-9/11 era is challenged by a collective amnesia or a reading of terrorism largely determined by 9/11, but there is a lack of consensus amongst experts when terrorism began and what or who may be included in a history of terrorism. This may, as we will explore later, be a product of how the state, security and law enforcement define and deal with threats based on factors such as political pressure, interests or expediency, high profile events, the changing nature, character or source of threats, the scope and remit of existing laws, and jurisdictional issues, as well as a lack of consensus on the definition. The U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, which was established in 1985, stated that 'terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define'.¹⁰ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did not formalize their definition of terrorism until 1986 as 'the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives', and there was no requirement that local law enforcement accept and abide by this definition.¹¹ It was only in 2001 that the State Department came up with its definition: 'the term "terrorism" means premediated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience' (U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f(d)).¹²

It is important to note that for a variety of reasons, historically not all terrorism has been dealt with through counter-terrorism policy and legislation, some has been dealt with through criminal law, and not all threats or attacks that are dealt with by counter-terrorism, are on the face of it, terrorism. Some may be cases of vandalism, robbery or harassment that are committed by groups designated as terrorist, based on labelling, their political intentions or wider repertoire of tactics. While other cases may be ones in which the state sees counter-terrorism policy and legislation as the most effective or expedient way to deal with of the actions of an individual or political group because it allows them to increase resources or legal powers.

¹⁰ Y. Alexander, 'United States', *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations*, ed. Y. Alexander, Dulles: Potomac, 2006, p. 13.

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 11-12; Hewitt p. 14.

¹² Alexander, p. 13.

Terrorism and terrorist groups that are covered by American counter-terrorism can be divided into two types based on the perpetrator and target: domestic and international. In the 1980s, the FBI made the distinction between domestic terrorism perpetrated by ‘a group or individual based and entirely operating within the United States or its territories without foreign direction’ and international terrorism acts are those that ‘occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum’.¹³ The CIA, with international jurisdiction, defined international terrorism as ‘terrorism conducted with the support of foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments’.¹⁴ Terrorism in and against the United States has come from both left and right-wing movements, has operated based on a variety of causes and identities, often overlapping, including racial-ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, revolutionary and single issue, and has been anti-state and oppositional, as well as state-sponsored and state or system-supportive.

While the focus on much discussion and strategy post-9/11, has been international and ‘Islamist’ terrorism, most literature on American counter-terrorism, places the origins of terrorism in and involving America with domestic terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s, and the perpetrators and period that played a role in the emergence of federal counter-terrorism. Most notably the 3rd era Ku Klux Klan in the 1950s and 1960s and New or Revolutionary Left of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While there are some examples from earlier, such as the post-Civil War 1st era Ku Klux Klan who opposed Black emancipation and reconstruction in the 1860s and early 1870s, the Molly Maguires, who targeted anti-Irish Catholic Scots, Ulster, Welsh and English Protestants in the 1870s,¹⁵ and anarchists such as Leon Czolgosz who killed President William McKinley in 1901, leading to the formation of the Secret Service protection detail, what is often left out of the story is the role of terrorism against the British in the American Revolution. Yet, as terrorism is largely identified and understood through its labelling and response by counter-terrorism and other state measures, it would be difficult to expect an American response to terrorism that occurred in its name, before it existed as a sovereign country. Yet, it is important to acknowledge because it was the first example, part of America’s celebrated founding mythology, and provided a source, influence and reference in future extreme-right terrorism, including the Minutemen of the 1960s, Patriots of the 1980s, Militias of the 1990s, and the Oklahoma City bombing itself which took place on the 220th anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, the first of the American Revolution.¹⁶ Moreover, it can be used to shine a light on the selective and at times hypocritical application of the term to delegitimize, demonize or hold to collective account certain social groups or political movements, but not others.

Because of issues defining terrorism, such as the lack of a single shared definition, the reluctance of law enforcement agencies to label acts where there is no individual or group claiming responsibility as ‘terrorism’, complex jurisdictional issues (which also impact record keeping), as well as wider problems with official statistics, data on terrorism in American history must be treated with critical caution. Hewitt attempted to

¹³ Ibid. p. 12.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 16.

¹⁶ Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), ‘Bombs, Bullets, Bodies: The Decade in Review’, *Intelligence Report*, Issue 97, Winter 2000, p. 21.

address these challenges and traced the history of domestic and foreign terrorism *in* America from the 1950s to 9/11. While the FBI makes a clear distinction between domestic and international terrorism, in which foreign operatives occupy the latter category, for Hewitt domestic terrorism, which is defined as terrorism *in* America, includes attacks within America by international operatives. They are placed under the ‘foreign’ sub-category of ‘domestic’ along with émigrés (e.g. Cuban) and Puerto Rican independence groups due to the fact that central to the modus operandi of the latter is the rejection of American possession of the territory and thus their designation as ‘American’.¹⁷ Al Qaeda would be an example of a group that would straddle both domestic (under foreign) and international, because they represent an international perpetrator and domestic targets, but more generally they would be placed in the international category due to their non-American origins, bases of operation and wider targets. Whereas Gus Martin places Cuban groups (Omega 7), Jewish-Zionist groups (Jewish Defense League/JDL) and Irish ones (e.g. Provisional IRA/PIRA) who were based in the U.S. with al Qaeda as ‘international’.¹⁸

Hewitt found that between 1954 and 2000, there were over 3,228 attacks and over 661 fatalities in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.¹⁹ According to Hewitt, during this period 31.2% of terrorist incidents and 51.6% of fatalities have been committed by ‘White Racist/Rightist’ perpetrators, including the Oklahoma City bombing. Following ‘White Racist/Rightist’, are the ‘Revolutionary Left’ with 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities, ‘Black Militants’ at 14.7% of incidents and 25.0% of fatalities, anti-abortion terrorists at 6.2% of incidents and 0.9% of fatalities, ‘Jewish Terrorists’ at 3.6% of incidents and 0.8% of fatalities, and ‘Other domestic/unknown’ at 2.8% incidents and 8.1% fatalities. Under ‘foreign’ terrorism, Hewitt has ‘Puerto Rican’ at 11.9% of incidents and 4.3% of fatalities, ‘Cuban émigrés’ at 5.2% of incidents and 1.5 of fatalities, ‘Other foreign’ at 2.1% of incidents and 4.1% of fatalities, and ‘Islamic’ the lowest at 1.1% of incidents and 1.7% of fatalities.²⁰

Hewitt argues that there have been nine waves of American domestic terrorism. Each wave was constituted through and defined or represented by a particular and dominant political movement, cause, ideology and perpetrator profile which emerged and mobilized in response (as defense or opposition) to developments, conflicts and other circumstances in a given context (e.g. desegregation and civil rights, Vietnam, abortion law), although many overlapped in the volatile 1960s and 1970s. Each wave, associated movements and attacks went into decline or ended due to a number of factors, including counter-terrorism and other forms of state intervention (e.g. legislation, arrests and killings) which, according to Gurr and Ross, destroy terrorists’ ‘coercive capabilities’. There is also movement dynamics (e.g. leadership battles and power struggles, splits and burnout) and public response (e.g. backlash) which affect their ‘political capabilities’,²¹ as well as changes to the context or social-political terrain that provided their *raison d’être* and conditions for mobilization.

¹⁷ Hewitt, p. 14.

¹⁸ G. Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, 5th Ed., London: Sage, 2016, pp. 363-364.

¹⁹ Hewitt, pp. 12-15.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 15.

²¹ M. Crenshaw, *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 197-198; J. I. Ross and T. R. Gurr, ‘Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study in Trends and Groups in Terrorism in Canada and the United States’, *Comparative Politics*, 21, 1989, pp. 405-426.

The first wave occurred between 1954 and 1969. It centred around white supremacist opposition to desegregation and civil rights in the South, and was dominated by the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party. During this period, which peaked in 1964, there were approximately 588 incidents, including bombings to shootings, assaults and intimidation, with sixty-five fatalities. The targets were largely black people, protestors, civil rights activists and places of worship.²² The most notorious cases included bombing of the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation Temple in Atlanta, Georgia on 12 October 1958, the assassination of NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers on 12 June, 1963, the 16th St. Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama which killed four young black girls on September 15th, 1963 and the June 1964 murders of civil rights workers James Earl Chaney, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner in Mississippi, the latter committed by Klansmen, who included amongst their ranks, law enforcement officials.²³ Another group in the 1960s was the more oppositional Minutemen who made attempted to assassinate Arkansas Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright, poison the UN and bomb the Hollywood Bowl during a speech by Martin Luther King, Jr.²⁴

The second wave occurred in the mid-1960s and involved those labelled Black Separatists, such as the Nation of Islam, Death Angels and the Mau Mau, and Black Nationalists, such as the Black Panthers, George Jackson Brigade and Black Liberation Army.²⁵ During this period, it is claimed there were approximately 475 incidents, 72% of which were shootings, and 400 people killed or injured.²⁶ In one of the biggest cases, the Black Panther Party was alleged to have been involved in a failed plot to bomb police stations, department stores and public buildings, as well as kill police officers in New York City in 1969. Thirteen members were brought to trial, but all were acquitted.²⁷

The third wave occurred in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s and centred around groups identified as part of the Revolutionary Left, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), New World Liberation Front, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), United Freedom Front (UFF) and The Weather Underground. The latter were involved in bombing military and business targets, as well as robberies, shootings and kidnappings, with approximately 500 incidents,²⁸ including the June 1974 bombing of the Gulf Oil Building in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.²⁹ In an example of different waves coming together, there was the May 19 Communist Organization (M19CO), including members of the BLA, Black Panthers, Republic of New Africa and Weather

²² Hewitt, pp. 16-17.

²³ C. Webb, *Rabble rousers: the American far right in the civil rights era*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010; A. Winter, 'American Terror: From Oklahoma City to 9/11 and After', *Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror*, eds. B. Brecher, M. Devenney and A. Winter, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, p. 165; A. Winter, 'White Terror and the Racialization of Violence', *Open Democracy*, 8 December 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/aaron-winter/white-terror-racism-and-racialization-of-violence>. Accessed 10 December 2015.

²⁴ J. Ridgeway, *Blood in the Face: The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi Skinheads, and the Rise of the New White Culture*, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1990, p. 63.

²⁵ Hewitt, p. 17; Martin, pp. 341-343.

²⁶ Hewitt, p. 17; Alexander, p. 17.

²⁷ Alexander, p. 17.

²⁸ Hewitt, p. 17.

²⁹ Alexander, p. 17.

Underground. They were involved in prison breaks, including that of Assata Shakur and FALN leader William Morales, and an October 1981 Brinks robbery.³⁰

The fourth wave involved the Puerto Rican independence movement from 1969 to the late 1970s, following an earlier period of activity in the 1950s. The movement was active in both Puerto Rico and the mainland United States. During the first incarnation, in 1954, independencistas attempted to assassinate President Truman in Washington DC and wounded five members of the House of Representatives in a gun attack on the House.³¹ Groups included the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), Macheteros and Armed Forces of Popular Resistance.³² FALN targeted banks, corporations and symbols of U.S. capitalism and imperialism, and the Macheteros targeted U.S. soldiers and police. There were approximately 365 incidents, including bombings, shootings, robberies and rocket attacks, and eighteen people died.³³ In 1980, more than a dozen members of FALN members were convicted and imprisoned for terrorist related crimes.³⁴

The fifth wave involved Jewish Zionist groups, such as the JDL and splinter groups Jewish Armed Resistance, Thunder of Zion and Save Our Israel Soil. The JDL had been around since 1968 and was active into the 2000s, but the peak and period of this wave was between 1969 to 1989. The JDL bombed Soviet and Arab embassies and Arab-American organizations in and around New York City. There were 115 bombings, leaving five dead, as well as shootings and assaults.³⁵ In an intersection of two terrorist threats, linked by intergroup and international conflicts, JDL leader Meir Kahane was assassinated by an Egyptian terrorist in New York in 1990.³⁶

The sixth wave centred around anti-Castro Cuban émigrés and took place between 1968 and 1980.³⁷ Groups included Omega 7 Cuban Nationalist Movement, Cuban National Liberation Front, Alpha 66, El Ponder Cubano.³⁸ Many of which were supported, through training or funding, by the U.S. government and targets within the U.S. included Cuban exile community members, and there were 168 incidents and ten murders.³⁹ Omega 7 is said to have been responsible for 50 attacks on, the Venezuelan Consulate and Lincoln Center in New York, a Soviet ship in New Jersey and the Cuban Mission to the UN.⁴⁰

The seventh wave centred around anti-abortion terrorism, beginning following Roe vs. Wade in 1973 and experiencing revivals in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴¹ Perpetrators included groups that advocate or perpetuate violence such as the Missionaries of the Preborn, Pro-Life Action Network and the Army of God, websites such

³⁰ Martin, p. 345.

³¹ Ibid. p. 343.

³² Ibid. p. 344; Hewitt, p. 17; Alexander, p. 17.

³³ Hewitt, p. 17.

³⁴ Martin, p. 344.

³⁵ Hewitt, p. 18.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Alexander, p. 17; J. I. Ross, *Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach*. New York. Peter Lang, 2006, p. 154.

³⁹ Ross, p. 154; Hewitt, p. 18.

⁴⁰ Martin, p. 363.

⁴¹ Hewitt, p. 17; A. Winter, 'Anti-Abortion Extremism and Violence in the US', *Extremism in America*, ed. G. Michael, Gainesville: University Press Florida, 2013, p. 232.

as the Nuremburg Files and so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as James Kopp.⁴² Their tactics included murder, bombings, arson, acid and anthrax attacks, assault, intimidation and harassment. The first recorded incident was an arson attack on an Oregon clinic in March 1976.⁴³ 1984 saw a significant increase in attacks, with 25 bombings and arson attacks, and was named the ‘Year of Fear and Pain’ by the Pro-Life Action Network,⁴⁴ and 1994 saw the highest number of murders (four) and attempted murders (eight) for any year.⁴⁵

The eighth wave was represented by a revival of the extreme-right in the 1970s-1990s, including white separatists, neo-Nazis, anti-government patriots and militias. The period (‘5th era’) was initiated by former Klansman Louis Beam Jr. with the call to arms ‘Where ballots fail, bullets will prevail’ and paramilitarization of the Klan.⁴⁶ The most notorious groups were the Christian Identity affiliated Aryan Nations and The Order, the latter of which were responsibly for a wave of terror including the bombing of a synagogue in Boise, Idaho in March 1984,⁴⁷ and murder of radio DJ Alan Berg in Denver Colorado on 18 June 1984. The 1990s saw government (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms/ATF and FBI) sieges at the Ruby Ridge, Idaho home of anti-government activist Randy Weaver in August 1992, that left his wife, son, dog and two marshals dead, and at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas in February-April 1992, where 76 died. These informed Beam’s call for ‘Leaderless Resistance’ and emergence of the Militia movement.⁴⁸ There were approximately 60 right-wing plots during the decade, which peaked with the Oklahoma City bombing,⁴⁹ followed by the bombing of Centennial Park, Atlanta Olympics in 1996 by Eric Rudolph.

Although not constitutive of a wave, other movements and groups emerged during these periods. The 1980s saw the emergence of eco and animal rights activism, such as the Evan Meecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy, Animal Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, some of whom would continue into the 1990s.⁵⁰

The ninth and final wave involved Islamists, most notably al Qaeda. Within the United States, this wave began in the early to mid-1990s with the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, killing six and injuring 1042 (Hewitt 19). There were also al Qaeda attacks on American targets and allies abroad, including U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.⁵¹ These followed Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad against the U.S. and Saudi government, and bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri endorsing a fatwah calling on Muslims to kill Americans anywhere in 1996 and bin Laden’s second in command Mohammed Atef’s endorsement of a fatwah calling for jihad against the U.S. ‘Ulema Union of Afghanistan’ internationally in May 1998.⁵²

⁴² Winter 2013.

⁴³ Ibid. p. 232.

⁴⁴ F. Clarkson, ‘Anti-Abortion Extremists: ‘Patriots’ and racists converge’, *Intelligence Report*, Summer 1998. <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid+410>. Accessed 10 December 2015.

⁴⁵ National Abortion Federation (NAF), *Violence and Disruption Statistics*, 2008. http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/violence_statistics.pdf.

⁴⁶ Winter 2010, p. 157.

⁴⁷ Ridgeway, p. 93.

⁴⁸ Ridgeway, p. 87; Winter, 2010, p. 157; SPLC 2000, p. 29; C. Berlet and M. N. Lyons, *Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort*, London: The Guilford Press, 2000, p. 290.

⁴⁹ Alexander, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁰ Ibid.; Martin, pp. 346-347.

⁵¹ Hewitt, pp. 30-32.

⁵² Alexander, p. 15.

While the focus on and discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the U.S. starts in the 1950s and 1960s with domestic terrorism, international terrorism became a major concern for the United States following a series of events beginning in 1969 and continuing into the 1970s. America has the distinction of being the favoured target of international terrorism in the post-1960s 'modern' era of international terrorism.⁵³ According to the State Department, there were 1,617 attacks on American targets abroad between 1970 and 1989.⁵⁴ The most popular targets were diplomatic/political, military, corporate (financial, energy, chemical, communication, technology) and perpetrators included state-sponsored agents (e.g. Libya and Iran) and groups with a range of ideologies and causes, most notably Marxist (Red Army Faction), Islamist (Hezbollah), Palestinian Nationalist (Abu Nidal) and 'ideological mercenaries' (Japanese Red Army),⁵⁵ as well as others. Like with domestic terrorism, international terrorism and the particular movements and perpetrators that emerged were informed by developments social-political context (e.g. foreign policy, military actions, etc.) and went into decline based on both changes to that context, as well as counter-terrorism, movement dynamics and public response.

The first event that brought international terrorism to American attention was the 1969 TWA high jacking and hostage taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, quickly followed by the 1970 highjacking of a TWA flight from Frankfurt and a Pan American flight from Amsterdam, and then the murders of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.⁵⁶ The 1969 TWA hijacking was also one of many in a peak year, and period. Between 1969 and 1972, almost half of all highjackings originated in the U.S., and in 1969, 37 out of 82.⁵⁷ The 1970s also saw a series of attacks on U/S. embassies and officials: Khartoum in 1973, Athens in 1974, Kuala Lumpur in 1975, Beirut in 1976 and Tehran in 1979.⁵⁸ The 1970s also saw the emergence of foreign nationalist groups active in the United States. Examples include the assassination of Turkish consulate officials by the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia in Los Angeles in 1973.⁵⁹ That same year, the PLO affiliated Black September killed an Israeli Air employee in Washington DC.⁶⁰ In 1976, Otpor high jacked TWA Flight 727 from New York to Paris in a campaign to gain Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. In 1978, they took over the West German Consulate in Chicago in an attempt to secure the release of a member held by the state in Cologne.⁶¹ The decade ended, and next stage in international terrorism (Rapoport's fourth 'religious' wave) and counter-terrorism began with the 1979 the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian Revolutionaries. They held the embassy and sixty hostages (although released some) for 444 days,⁶² in an attempt to have the U.S. hand over the Shah, who had been backed by the Americans and was in the country for medical treatment, for trial.

⁵³ P. Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Responses*. Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 45.

⁵⁴ Alexander, p. 21.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 22.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 26.

⁵⁷ Wilkinson, p. 162.

⁵⁸ P. Wilcox, 'United States', *Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, ed. Y. Alexander, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 51

⁵⁹ Alexander, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 17.

⁶² Ibid. p. 22.

Despite the activities of the anti-abortion movement and extreme-right during the 1980s, the decade would see a decline in overall domestic terrorism compared with the 1970s, but an increase in international attacks,⁶³ most notably by Arab and Muslim groups in the Middle East. Hezbollah was particularly active with attacks on U.S. bases and embassies, high jacking, hostage taking, kidnapping and murder during the 1980s. In April 1983, they launched an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut which killed forty-nine and injured 120. In October 1983, they attacked the U.S. Marine base and barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and later that year launched an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.⁶⁴ In September 1984, they bombed the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Berlin, and later that year, they kidnapped and murdered CIA station chief William Buckley in Beirut. This would be followed by further kidnappings and murders into the early 1990s, including that of Lieutenant Colonel William Richard Higgins USMC in 1991. In June 1985, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad hijacked TWA Flight 847 on route from Cairo to San Diego and, in October that year, the Palestinian Liberation Front hijacked the Achille Lauro and killed Leon Klinghoffer by throwing the Jewish-American wheelchair-bound pensioner overboard.⁶⁵ In 1986, the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, which was frequented by American soldiers, was attacked by Libyan sponsored terrorists in retaliation for American military intervention in Libya. The attack killed three, including two servicemen.⁶⁶ There was also the Libyan sponsored bombing of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie attack in 1988. It killed 270 people, mostly Americans.⁶⁷ In addition to this, there were examples of suspected state supported or perpetrated terrorism by Iran, most notably the 1989 pipe bomb attack on the car of the wife of Captain Will Rogers of the USS Vincennes, which shot down an Iranian plane the previous year (Alexander 19). The decade was not limited to Arab, Muslim or Middle East related terrorism. In 1985, the National Front bombed a nightclub in Greece injuring 69 Americans, and the car bombing of the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany by the Red Army Faction and French Direct Action, killing two and injuring fifteen.⁶⁸ There was also the attempted attack on an Air India plane in New York by Sikh terrorists and gun running in and through the United States by PIRA.⁶⁹

The 1990s saw an increase in international terrorism, attributed partially to the Gulf War and the emergence of al Qaeda. In 1990, there were thirty-two incidents and in 1991, between January and March, there were 104.⁷⁰ 1991 also saw calls for Jihad against the U.S.,⁷¹ and 1993 saw a threat to assassinate President Bush during a trip to Kuwait.⁷² In terms of al Qaeda, there was the first WTC attack in 1993, the same year as an ambush of U.S. soldiers in Somalia. These were followed by the 13 November 1995 car bombing of the U.S. run Saudi National Guard training Centre in Riyadh and the 26 June 1996 attack on Khobar Tower, Saudi Arabia where coalition forces were based, killing nineteen, and for which Iran and Hezbollah were eventually held responsible.⁷³ Then there were two bombings outside U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 23.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 21; Wilcox, p. 44.

⁶⁷ Alexander, p. 23.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 19.

⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 20 and 24.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 24.

⁷² Crenshaw 2011, p. 138.

⁷³ Ibid. pp. 145-148; Alexander, p. 24.

1998, killing 234, including twelve Americans, and wounding thousands, and the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbour, Yemen, killing seventeen and wounding thirty-nine American soldiers.⁷⁴ The period also saw attacks linked to Iraq and the Gulf War on U.S. embassies and consulates in Frankfurt, Berlin, Sydney, Dhaka, Mexico City, Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur, and on the U.S. military in Jeddah, Ankara and Izmir, U.S. businesses such as Ford, Coca-Cola and others.⁷⁵ Despite all this, and particularly the 1993 World Trade Center attack, belief that this was a closed case and the activities of the anti-government movement led to a focus on domestic terrorism, compounded by Oklahoma City in 1995. This is alleged to have led to missed opportunities to pursue and consolidate information about al Qaeda,⁷⁶ leading to the issue of counter-terrorism.

Counter-Terrorism Pre-9/11

Counter-terrorism serves a number of (sometimes overlapping) functions, including prevention, deterrence, control, retaliation, security, and symbolism, as well as addressing wider risks and consequences, and can be based on a number of competing and complimentary theories. It can address terrorist targets, such as security for political, military and private institutions, civil society populations and infrastructure, and target a wide variety of causal sources including political and socio-economic inequality, international conflict, ideology and psychology, or terrorist resources, such as financing, support, state sponsors and weapons. It can make use of a number of its own resources and powers to stop or limit terrorist capabilities, opportunities and impact, such as military, security, intelligence, diplomacy, foreign policy, foreign aid, peacekeeping, legislation, criminal law, police/law enforcement, emergency responders, international bodies, conventions and cooperation, and media. It can target perpetrators with everything from de-radicalization, repression, arrest, prosecution and sanctions to killing (during arrest attempts or as assassination) and military retaliation.⁷⁷ It can be proactive or reactive, preventative or retaliatory, and responds to threats, events, political agendas, as well as mistakes and failures. The record of counter-terrorism programs and strategies is mixed. Not only in terms of failure to stop an attack, but in terms of its wider social and political implications. While it is intended to prevent, control or stop terrorism and save lives, it can also have a negative impact on ‘suspect communities’, civil liberties, human rights and democracy where counter-terrorism and security is placed above consideration of these issues, and used to justify repressive policies and tactics, as well as aggressive military actions.

While the types and definition of terrorism, and what is included in the latter, can change as we have seen in the previous section, so does counter-terrorism. Alexander argues that while post-9/11 we have come to see terrorism as a national, federal issue and combatting it involving a relatively centralized, coherent approach, previously the U.S. did not see terrorism as a ‘major strategic challenge to the very survival of the Republic’ and ‘spoke with a bewildering variety of voices on the definition of terrorism’.⁷⁸ The tendency, according to Alexander, was to treat terrorism based on acts as individual incidents, ‘without political pattern or strategic dimension’.⁷⁹ While generally true, there were exceptions, most notably the political use of the FBI through

⁷⁴ Alexander, p. 24.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 20.

⁷⁷ Ross, p. 201-209; A. Silke, ‘The Psychology of Counter-terrorism: Critical Issues and Challenges’, *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*, ed. A. Silke. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 3-4; Wilkinson.

⁷⁸ Alexander, p. 11.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

their counterintelligence programme COINTELPRO in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to address a wide variety of so-called 'subversives', including the Ku Klux Klan and Black Panthers. The wider lack of consistency and coordination was the norm and partly a product of the lack of national centralized definition and approach.

As stated earlier, it was not until the 1980s that the FBI, acting as a domestic federal law enforcement agency within the Department of Justice (DoJ), created clear official operating definition of terrorism.⁸⁰ Other federal executive agencies developed their own definitions in line with their own mandates and jurisdictions, such as the CIA's definition which focused on the international.⁸¹ This lack of a federal, centralized approach, was a product of and exacerbated by the fact that in the U.S., terrorism has historically been defined and dealt with by state and federal law enforcement as a criminal matter, and in the U.S. federal system, individual states have the power to determine what is an offense under its criminal code. As such it has been defined, pursued, or not pursued, and dealt with differently between and within different states,⁸² as well as differences in how coordination and cooperation with federal authorities works. State laws addressing terrorism have appeared under nine headings: civil defense (interstate compacts and state emergency management plans), anti-terrorism provisions, destructive devices, terrorist threats, enhanced criminal penalties, victim compensation, street terrorism, ecological terrorism and taxes.⁸³

Another factor in the lack of coordination has been the lack of major national domestic event, such as 9/11, to bring these together or apply pressure. One impact of this lack of national priority and coordinated approach, and multitude of voices, are gaps in fragmented intelligence and approach. Although, the lack of centralization and resulting unevenness while allowing excesses in some areas and jurisdictions, can help to mitigate against these nationally. On this point, a concerted, centralized national priority, as was the case following 9/11, is not an inherently positive or constructive thing as it led to the invasion of Iraq, which was not involved, and Guantanamo Bay, as well as surveillance and profiling that targeted Muslims and threatened wider rights, civil liberties and trust. The other impact of this lack of coordinated focus and strategy was a somewhat reactive approach in which strategy and policy are developed in response to threats and events as opposed to being done with a pro-active, wider, long-term view in mind. Something that a history of counter-terrorism can provide an illustration of and lesson for.

While most histories of U.S. counter-terrorism begin in the late-1960s and 1970s with the emergence of international terrorism, or even later in the 1980s,⁸⁴ the domestic U.S. story starts in the mid-1950s and 1960s with the Ku Klux Klan, but can be located earlier in 1860s and 1870s when the Klan first emerged. The Klan, which formed in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865,⁸⁵ was dissolved in 1871 following efforts by the federal government, whose reconstruction efforts were being challenged. In 1870 a federal grand jury labelled the Klan

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 12.

⁸² Ibid. p. 11; Hewitt, p. 82.

⁸³ Alexander, p. 11.

⁸⁴ M. Crenshaw, 'Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies', *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. A. K. Cronin and J. M. Ludes, Washington: George Washington Press, 2004, p. 121.

⁸⁵ D. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux Klan 1865-1965*, Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, p. 8; Berlet and Lyons 2000, pp. 58-62.

a 'terrorist organization',⁸⁶ leading to hundreds of indictments and, in 1871, Congress passed the Third Enforcement Act or Ku Klux Klan Act of 1877, which suspended habeas corpus in order to by-pass the Posse Comitatus Act and allowed President Ulysses S. Grant the power to send federal troops to suppress armed combinations, night riding, harassment and other Klan violence.⁸⁷ This pattern would be repeated in response to the 3rd era Klan in the 1960s. In response to Klan opposition to the civil rights and violence, the FBI deployed its Internal Security Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which was created in 1956 to 'neutralize' an expanding list of subversives, starting with communists and moving to 'White Hate Groups', the 'New' or 'Revolutionary' Left and 'Black Extremist' organizations.⁸⁸

Widely viewed as extremists and terrorists today, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Klan had been defending laws and institutions such as segregation and white supremacy, and opposing threats to these (desegregation, civil rights and voting rights), and not only supported local and state law enforcement and elected officials, but received support from them and included such figures amongst their ranks. While laws about racism were being changed, Klan violence and the inability to address it, was seen to present a barrier to the safe implementation and enforcement of desegregation, civil rights and later voting rights, much as it had to reconstruction. Three cases around the time of the Civil Rights Act, not only increased pressure to pass the act, but led the Federal Government to take action. These included the assassination of Medger Evers and 16th St. Baptist Church bombing and the murders of Schwerner, Clancy and Goodman.⁸⁹ In 1964, under pressure from President Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the FBI launched the COINTELPRO 'White Hate Groups' programme, targeting the Klan.⁹⁰ In 1965, also under pressure from Johnson, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities conducted hearings into the *Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States* (1965-6), most notably

terrorism, and produced the report *The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement* (1967), which declared the organization 'un-American'.⁹¹

COINTELPRO would continue into the 1970s, but from 1969 the focus would turn from the white supremacist racist right to Black Power, with the FBI declaring the Black Panthers the most dangerous internal threat,⁹² as well as the revolutionary left. Within a year of the FBI's announcement, all senior leaders of the Black Panthers would be on trial, in prison, on the run or dead and by 1972, Huey P. Newton would announce the end of their

⁸⁶ A. Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995.

⁸⁷ Ridgeway, p. 34.

⁸⁸ B. de Graaf, *Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A comparative study*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 72; D. Cunningham, *There's Something Happening Here: The New Left, The Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Hewitt, pp. 97-98.

⁸⁹ D. Chalmers, *Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005; C. Webb, Counterblast: How the Atlanta temple bombing strengthened the civil rights cause. *Southern Spaces*, 2009. <http://southernspaces.org/2009/counterblast-how-atlanta-temple-bombing-strengthened-civil-rights-cause>. Accessed 10 December 2015; Winter, 2010, p. 165; Winter, 2015.

⁹⁰ Chalmers, 2005.

⁹¹ United States Government, *Activities Of Ku Klux Klan Organizations In The United States*, Hearings before the Committee On Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Ninth Congress, 19 October 1965-28 January 1966; *The Present-Day Ku Klux Klan Movement*, Hearings before the Committee On Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, 11 December, 1967.

⁹² Crenshaw 2011, p. 198.

‘militant self-defense program.’⁹³ In terms of the left, in his 1969 ‘Campus Unrest Speech’, President Nixon called student and anti-war demonstrations and occupations, as well as arson attacks by protestors, the ‘next to last step along the road to terrorism’.⁹⁴ In 1970, Nixon and FBI head J. Edgar Hoover focused on what was termed ‘revolutionary terrorism’, allegedly being perpetrated by ‘determined professionals’.⁹⁵ The government amended the Organized Crime Control Bill in order to label bombings of ‘buildings, vehicles, or other property of any federal assisted institution or organization’ a federal crime,⁹⁶ and re-established the DoJ’s Internal Security Division and Special Litigation Section, which had not been active since the discredited McCarthy era and pursued conspiracy investigations.⁹⁷ In June 1970, the Nixon administration extended intelligence activities through a presidential mandate, as opposed of attempting to pass new legislation that would require oversight and approval.⁹⁸ On 25 June, the President established a special Interagency Committee on Intelligence, led by Hoover. Its Huston Plan justified the extension of state authority to acquire evidence (e.g. electronic surveillance, mail checks, ‘surreptitious’ entry, underage campus informants and military undercover agents), and a DoJ unit was created to coordinate law enforcement and save and process all info about terrorist bombings.⁹⁹ Yet, between 1970 and 1972, The Pentagon Papers revealed the extent to which espionage by COINTELPRO, CIA and military was conducted on and gathered intelligence on Americans.¹⁰⁰ In 1974, the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) investigated COINTELPRO and, in 1975, declared it illegal and unconstitutional.¹⁰¹ In addition to this, there has been relative consensus that COINTELPRO was politically motivated and undemocratic, used to suppress, criminalize and delegitimize political protest and speech.¹⁰²

COINTELPRO was an example of the government expanding the definition of terrorism (possible without an official definition) and using counter-terrorism discourses and tactics to deal with social movements and political protests, particularly progressive ones, that challenged the state using counter-terrorism discourse and tactics. But while COINTELPRO focused on organized movements who threatened or engaged in violence, such tactics were not limited to these. In response to so-called ‘race ‘riots’ in the 1960s and 70s, the government set up the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which put out the 1976 *Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism*. The report referred to riots as ‘a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes’,¹⁰³ thereby linking more diffuse and constitutionally protected protest to organized terrorism and criminalizing it.

⁹³ Ibid. pp. 198-199.

⁹⁴ de Graaf, p. 73.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 78.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 79.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 87.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 83.

¹⁰² Alexander; de Graaf; Cunningham; C. Berlet and M. Lyons, ‘One Key to Litigating Against Government Prosecution of Dissidents: Understanding the Underlying Assumptions’, *Police Misconduct and Civil Rights Law Report*, Part 1: Vol. 5, # 13, January-February 1998, Part 2: Vol. 5, #14, March-April 1998; Cunningham; de Graaf.

¹⁰³ Alexander, p. 26.

International terrorism became a major concern for the US beginning in 1969, with the 1969 TWA high jacking and hostage taking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 1970 TWA and Pan Am hijackings and Munich Olympics in 1972.¹⁰⁴ These events led to the establishment of three bodies: 1. President Nixon established a cabinet level committee to coordinate counter-terrorism; 2. The State Department, Interagency Group on Terrorism; and 3. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.¹⁰⁵ The State Department became the lead national agency for dealing with terrorism.¹⁰⁶ In 1971, The Organization of American States, to which the U.S. is a member, became the first regional international organization to respond formally to terrorism, including kidnappings, with the 1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance.¹⁰⁷ Following Munich, the U.S. put forward a draft UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, leading to concerns from the developing or so-called 'Third' World that this would be used to deny legitimacy to anti-colonial movements and national liberation struggles. This was reflected in the 1972 resolution.¹⁰⁸

In response to the number of hijackings, in 1972 Director of Aviation Security Lieutenant-General Benjamin Davis proposed legislation that when passed in 1973, made boarding gate security measures mandatory.¹⁰⁹ That year, U.S. hijack attempts fell from 31 to three, and searches led to 3500 lbs of explosives, 2000 guns and 23000 knives.¹¹⁰ Research by Enders, Sandler and Cauley in 1990, found that while metal detectors had a significant long term impact, there was a displacement effect onto other tactics, such as kidnapping and assassinations.¹¹¹ Despite the success of metal detectors and international agreements for their introduction, over the years, we would cases such as Lockerbie in 1988 and 9/11, which showed that different points of origin have less safeguards in place, new security avoidance technology could be developed and U.S. airport security was not updated, if not also degraded. In 1976, there would also begin an attempt to fortify US Embassies which, while reducing attacks, also had a displacement effect, with an increase in assassinations.¹¹² In addition to security, the U.S. would sign agreements with other countries, such as the Memorandum of Understanding with Cuba that would provide for the return of hijacked aircrafts and extradition of prosecution of perpetrators.¹¹³

There were also pieces of anti-terror legislation passed by Congress during the 1970s, including the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Section 303), which focused on state supported terrorism which had become a central issue, calling for cutting off of U.S. support for 'any government which aids or abets terrorism, by providing sanctuary from prosecution, to any group or individual

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ M. Crenshaw, *Terrorism and International Cooperation*, New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1989, p. 27.

¹⁰⁸ A. Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p. 166.

¹⁰⁹ Wilkinson, p. 163.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ A. Silke, 'Retaliating Against Terrorism', *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences*, ed. A. Silke, Chichester: Wiley, 2003, pp. 216 and 219.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 219.

¹¹³ Crenshaw 1989, p. 29.

which has committed an act of international terrorism'.¹¹⁴ In October 1977, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, introduced the bill: An Act to Combat International Terrorism. Amongst other issues, its definition of terrorism linked it to the international context, crimes under existing international conventions, states and international organizations as targets, and exempted military operations from being labelled terrorism.¹¹⁵ Following from the focus on state supported terrorism in the 1976 Act, in 1979, Congress developed a black list of countries supporting terrorism, including Libya, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and, added later as developments in the international arena occurred, Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan and Iran.¹¹⁶ The 1979 Iranian hostage crisis highlighted the lack of a coherent American policy. While admirable for not using force, President Carter blocked Iranian assets, sought UN sanctions and used the International Court of Justice, without success, then launched a failed rescue mission in April 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, and aborted second mission, Operation Credible Sport, and then returned to negotiations. This failure eventually led to the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and, with other attacks on embassies, a focus on embassy and personnel security.¹¹⁷ It also played a pivotal role in the 1980 election campaign where Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan and in the more aggressive militaristic in tone, rhetoric and policy of the Reagan era. The fact that the hostages were released the day of Reagan's inauguration, led to him getting credit over Carter's negotiations was indicative of this shift. 1979 did though see the introduction of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.¹¹⁸

The 1980s saw a continuing focus on international terrorism and the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Base in Beirut led to the formation of two new commissions and the development of a new approach to combatting international terrorism. The first was the Department of Defense's (DoD) Long Commission, which called for the replacement of the reactive approach to terrorism, in favour of a proactive one, and for treating international terrorism as a form of warfare.¹¹⁹ The DoD defined international terrorism as 'unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization Considered criminal under local law or acts which violate the law of Armed Conflict', and the Beirut attack as being 'tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terrorism'.¹²⁰ This link was reasserted in June 1984 when U.S. representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated that '[t]errorism is a form of war against a society and all who embody it'.¹²¹ This link to war made international terrorism a top security concern for America, and set the stage for its eventual consolidation of the war discourse and approach in the post-9/11 war on terror.

In terms of security, this was the focus of the second post-Beirut development. CIA Director Bobby Inman was appointed to head a new commission focused on security for U.S. embassies, bases and personnel abroad. This included structural improvements to increase security at facilities and personnel protection, as well as the appointment of an Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism within the DoD to oversee this.¹²² This was also

¹¹⁴ Alexander, p. 26.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 14.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 26.

¹¹⁷ Wilcox, p. 44 and 52.

¹¹⁸ Crenshaw 1989, p. 63.

¹¹⁹ Alexander, p. 27.

¹²⁰ Ibid. p. 12.

¹²¹ Ibid. p. 12.

¹²² Ibid. p. 27.

partly in response to a series of kidnappings Americans by Hezbollah. This development also led to elements in the National Security Council to embark on Iran-Contra, bringing the administration and efforts into disrepute.¹²³ Support for the right-wing rebel Contras in Nicaragua as well as UNITA in Angola in the 1980s,¹²⁴ while labelling left wing groups and governments ‘terrorists’, also led to charges of American hypocrisy on the issue of terrorism. Another case that demonstrated American inconsistency, if not selectiveness, in its response to terrorism, was the 1984 case of PIRA member Joe Docherty who the U.S. refused to extradite to Britain following a court decision. It led to a 1985 Extradition Treaty, passed in 1986 when Reagan, in response to U.K. support for the bombing of Libya that year.¹²⁵

In response to terrorist attacks and international-focused counter-terrorism mandate, the period also saw a number of other developments, including the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Anti-terrorism Act of 1984, which would see aspects of its proposed definition of terrorism in the 1986 FBI definition discussed earlier.¹²⁶ The year also saw a series of specific acts: The Act of Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts (98th Congress, 2nd Session, HR 5612) and 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism (98-533), which established a counterterrorism rewards programme, administered by the Diplomatic Security Service,¹²⁷ as well as the Prohibition Against the Training and Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984.¹²⁸

Despite the linking of international terrorism to war, Congress had a narrower focus in relation to specific crimes: Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Crimes Against Aviation and Crimes Against Taking of Hostages.¹²⁹ In addition to this and the fact that the 1977 An Act to Combat International Terrorism exempted military operations from being labelled terrorism, authorization for military operations were not sought as the challenge was still identified officially as a criminal and not military matter.¹³⁰ This gap between rhetoric and policy would continue throughout the decade, and the rhetoric would become increasingly dramatic as the cold war stepped up.

On 4 February 1985, Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz stated that ‘[t]errorism poses a direct threat not only to Western strategic interests but to the very moral principles that undergird Western democratic society’.¹³¹ He claimed that the ‘enemies of the West are united’ and called for democracies to be ‘united in a common defence against terrorism’, similar to George W. Bush’s post-9/11 call for a coalition of the willing in the war on terror. Yet, the U.S. still had not developed a unified official definition for the term ‘terrorism’ in relation to conflict.¹³² It was only, as stated earlier, in 2001 that the State Department came up with a definition of terrorism in U.S. Code title 22, section 2656f(d)).¹³³

¹²³ Wilkinson, p. 35.

¹²⁴ W. Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987, p. 296.

¹²⁵ Guelke, pp. 167-168.

¹²⁶ Alexander, p. 14.

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 27.

¹²⁸ Y. Alexander and M. Kroft, *Evolution of Counterterrorism Policy Volume 1*, Westport: Praeger, 2008, p. 60.

¹²⁹ Alexander, p. 15.

¹³⁰ Ibid. pp. 14-15.

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 13.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

Following the 1985 hijackings of TWA and the Achille Lauro, Reagan made his now famous statement that ‘America will never make concessions to terrorists’,¹³⁴ and established the U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, appointing Vice President Bush as Chair. In its December 1985 report, it recommended greater coordination of agencies, a role on the National Security Council and the establishment of a consolidated intelligence center,¹³⁵ and establishment of the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) Counterterrorist Center (CTC) bringing together different tasks spread out throughout the CIA and intelligence community, as well as operations officers, analysts, reports officers, technical experts and other specialists in a ‘one-stop’ shop.¹³⁶ In their February 1986 report, they set out U.S. policy on negotiating with terrorists, contrasting clearly with that of the Carter administration’s attempts in Iran and affirming Reagan’s speech, ‘The United States has a clear policy of no concessions to terrorists as the best way to protect the greatest number of people’.¹³⁷ They also concluded that ‘judicious employment of military force’, might serve as an effective deterrent, but warned of the implications of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.¹³⁸ The criminal approach was reasserted with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which made it a federal crime for terrorists to threaten, detain, seize injure or kill an American citizen outside the U.S. borders. This allowed American law enforcement authorities to conduct investigations outside the U.S. and led to legal attaches being stationed in U.S. embassies.¹³⁹ There was also increased funding, over \$2.4 billion, for embassy security in 1986, but research has shown that this had no deterrent effect.¹⁴⁰ At the same time, military retaliation was also used, most notably the U.S. bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi ‘Operation El Dorado Canyon’ following the 1986 Berlin Disco bombing linked to Libya, which killed 37, including Muammar Gaddafi’s adopted daughter.¹⁴¹ According to Enders, Sandler and Cauley, military retaliation in the form of El Dorado Canyon, while popular with Americans, it led to negative responses from the international community, including allies, and was not a significant deterrent, leading to a short-term increase in terrorism targeting the US and some of its allies.¹⁴² Military retaliation was only used two more times prior to 9/11, in response to the assassination attempt on President Bush in 1993 and attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.¹⁴³ The 1988 Lockerbie case, which ended the decade, while in Scottish, as opposed to U.S. jurisdiction, led to American sanctions and Federal Aviation Administration work to improve security.¹⁴⁴

While the focus of counter-terrorism in the 1980s was primarily on international terrorism, there were developments domestically, mostly focused on the extreme-right and centred around Christian Identity affiliated groups such as Aryan Nations and The Order. In addition to charges against The Order for their crimes, in April 1987, a federal grand jury in Fort Smith, Arkansas, brought seditious conspiracy charges against senior leaders of Aryan Nations and ten surviving members of The Order. The charges included conspiracy to overthrow the

¹³⁴ Alexander and Kroft, p. 61.

¹³⁵ Alexander, pp. 27-28.

¹³⁶ P. Pillar, ‘Intelligence’, *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. A. K. Cronin and J M. Ludes. Washington: George Washington Press, 2004, p. 121.

¹³⁷ Alexander, p. 28.

¹³⁸ Crenshaw 2011, p. 138.

¹³⁹ Alexander, p. 28.

¹⁴⁰ Silke 2003, p. 219.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 217; Alexander, p. 21.

¹⁴² Silke 2003, pp. 217-218.

¹⁴³ T. Hoyt, ‘Military Force’, *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. A. K. Cronin and J M. Ludes, Washington: George Washington Press, 2004, p. 164.

¹⁴⁴ Alexander, p. 29.

federal government, assassinate an FBI agent and a federal judge, bomb federal buildings, utility pipelines, and electrical transmission lines, poison water supplies, and sabotage railroads. Yet, in April 1988, the accused were acquitted of all charges.¹⁴⁵

Despite the focus on international terrorism in the 1980s under Reagan, and terrorist threats and attacks occurring the wake of the Gulf War, including the first WTC attack and threat against Bush in 1993, which led to cruise missile strikes against Iraqi intelligence agencies in Baghdad,¹⁴⁶ initially the Clinton administration did not see terrorism as a major national security issue, nor part of foreign policy planning.¹⁴⁷ According to David Tucker, former Foreign Service officer, U.S. policy on terrorism was in a 'strategic vacuum' post-Reagan and post-cold war.¹⁴⁸ Clinton inherited an existing counter-terrorism policy based on four principles: 1. No concessions to terrorist demands; 2. Imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against state sponsors; 3. Enforcement of rule of law to bring terrorists to trial; 4. Multilateral cooperation.¹⁴⁹ For Reagan, it had been central to the cold war and to Bush, the post-war 'clash of civilizations', but Clinton did not have a coherent focused framework for international terrorism, however flawed and ideological these were.¹⁵⁰ According to Martha Crenshaw, the Clinton administration rejected the 'clash of civilizations' approach and saw terrorism as part of a grouping of 'modern' global problems, including organized crime, disease epidemics and environmental disasters as a feature of the globalized world.¹⁵¹ Domestic terrorism did become an increasing focus though, albeit inconsistently.¹⁵² This was primarily in response to right-wing anti-abortion and anti-government groups, with 60 right-wing plots and major events such as the Oklahoma City bombing during the decade. There were also 60 actual attacks by the right and wider movements, killing 182 and injuring over 1932. Yet, this was actually the continuation of a long-term decline overall that began in the 1980s, attributed to the FBI working with other law enforcement agencies, including the discredited COINTELPRO, more prosecutions and a loss of revolutionary fervour seen in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁵³

The first major piece of legislation passed under Clinton was the Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 which prosecuted any protest that impeded clinic access, to deal with harassment and threatening behaviour, as well as protect the legal right to abortion.¹⁵⁴ That same year, the Attorney General Janet Reno established the Task Force on Violence Against Abortion Providers to investigate whether there was a conspiracy to commit

¹⁴⁵ Associated Press, '13 White Supremacists Acquitted of all Charges', *Seattle Times*, 7 April 1988, p. A1; A. Winter, 'The Order', *Religion and Violence: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict*, Vol. 2, ed. J. I. Ross, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2011, pp. 542-546.

¹⁴⁶ Crenshaw 2011, pp. 138 and 143-145; Hoyt, p. 164.

¹⁴⁷ Crenshaw 2004, p. 81; Crenshaw 2011, p. 173.

¹⁴⁸ Crenshaw 2004, p. 81.

¹⁴⁹ Crenshaw 2011, p. 138.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Crenshaw 2011, p. 173.

¹⁵² G. Michael 'Homeland Defense Initiative and US Counter-Terrorism Policy', *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, 1996-2002*, eds. R. Picquet and F. Shanty, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, p. 55.

¹⁵³ Alexander, pp. 19-20.

¹⁵⁴ Hewitt, pp. 87 and 125.

acts of violence against abortion and reproductive health providers.¹⁵⁵ At the same time, the extreme-right, and more specifically anti-government, activism and threats had been on the rise, but the response was mixed. In response, in 1995, the SPLC's Morris Dees issued a warning letter to Attorney General Janet Reno urging her to 'alert all federal law enforcement authorities to the growing danger posed by the unauthorized militias that have sprung up in at least eighteen states'.¹⁵⁶ Only nine days prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, Kenneth Stern, former director of the National Organization against Terrorism and representative of the American Jewish Committee, issued the report *Militias: A Growing Danger*.¹⁵⁷ Yet, there was no response. It is likely that the experience of Ruby Ridge and Waco, and their role in the mobilization of the anti-government movement, led to greater caution or fear on the part of federal authorities.

The Oklahoma City bombing was not only on an anniversary of the American Revolution, but that of the final day of the Waco siege. In fact, McVeigh referred to his attack as a 'retaliatory strike' for Ruby Ridge and Waco, and targeted a federal building housing the ATF. The response to the bombing included the establishment of an FBI counter-terrorism taskforce in the Pacific Northwest,¹⁵⁸ and five Senate sub-committee hearings held between May and November 1995. The hearings included: *Combating Domestic Terrorism*, *The Militia Movement in the United States*, *The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America*, *The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID.* and *The Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians*.¹⁵⁹ The latter two of which represented an acknowledgement of the link between the two sieges and anti-government activism and terrorism.

In response to Oklahoma City, and delayed response to the 1993 WTC attack, Clinton issue Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, which came into force in June 1995 and focused on both domestic and international terrorism. PDD 39 made 'terrorism a top national security priority', designated terrorist attacks both a criminal act *and* a national security threat, and justified the use of force.¹⁶⁰ It also made the FBI the lead government agency for terrorism investigation and prevention and led to the

¹⁵⁵ Winter 2013, p. 236; United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 'National Task Force on Violence against Health Care Providers: Report on Federal Efforts to Prevent and Prosecute Clinic Violence 1998–2000', 2000. <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/faceweb.php>. Accessed 10 December 2015.

¹⁵⁶ M. Dees with J. Corcoran, *Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat*, New York: Harper Collins, 1996, pp. 104-105.

¹⁵⁷ K. Stern, *A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 13.

¹⁵⁸ B. Morlin, 'FBI Forms Task Force on Terrorism Incidents in Region Spawn Three-State Group', *Spokesman Review*, 20 December 1998, p. B1.

¹⁵⁹ United States Government, *Combating Domestic Terrorism*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 3 May 1995; *The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID.*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 15 June 1995; *Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians*, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Congress, 19 July - 1 August 1995; *The Militia Movement in the United States*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 6 September – 19 October 1995; *Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 2 November 1995.

¹⁶⁰ Michael, p. 55; Alexander.

establishment of the FBI Counter-Terrorism Centre, which focused on three areas: domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and countermeasures.¹⁶¹ The FBI would also see their counter-terrorism budget increase from 78 to 609 million and a staff increase of 224%, from 550 in 1993 and 1669 in 2000.¹⁶² PDD 39 also made FEMA the lead authority for consequence management and create the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).¹⁶³

The Oklahoma City bombing also provided Congress with the impetus to pass the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a version of which had been proposed following the 1993 WTC attack, but was opposed on grounds that it could pose a threat to civil liberties and negatively impact Arab and Irish communities.¹⁶⁴ The 1996 Act earmarked one billion for federal counter-terrorism and new initiatives would be introduced, such as chemical tagging of explosive material, a crackdown on financing, streamlining of execution and removal procedures for foreign terrorists, procedures to make it easier to withhold aid to countries that support terrorism, an increase in penalties for conspiracy, allowing victims to sue state sponsors of terrorism, and expanding the use of funds from the Victims of Crime Act for victims of terrorism.¹⁶⁵

At the same time as the Oklahoma bombing, in 1995 Clinton and the U.S. Attorneys established local task forces to coordinate law enforcement efforts to deal with abortion clinic violence.¹⁶⁶ Following the October 1998 murder of Dr Bernard Slepian, Attorney General Reno established the National Task Force on Violence Against Health Care Providers, which would issue their *Report on Federal Efforts to Prevent and Prosecute Clinic Violence 1998-2000* at the end of the decade.¹⁶⁷

Other developments at this time included the more internationally focused Executive Order 1015 in 1996, which established a Commission on Aviation Safety and Security led by Vice President Al Gore. In its 1997 report, the Commission warned of threats to air travel, including Operation Bojinka, a failed plot to bomb 12 American flights.¹⁶⁸ There was also the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996: Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY97, which provided for training of first responders in WMD incidents, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. This was followed by a joint report on crisis management submitted to congress by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and FBI.¹⁶⁹ 1996 also saw the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton Act (focusing on Cuba), requiring the U.S. to sanction foreign companies that engage with these countries.¹⁷⁰

Following the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, Clinton launched cruise missile attacks at a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was believed to be producing nerve gas, and sanctions against Sudan, as well as attacking bin Laden's base in Afghanistan. The attack on Sudan and

¹⁶¹ Michael, p. 55.

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 55-56.

¹⁶³ Ibid. p. 55.

¹⁶⁴ D. Cole and J. Dempsey, *Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security*, New York: The New Press, 2002, p. 113.

¹⁶⁵ Alexander, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶⁶ Winter 2013, p. 236; United States Department of Justice, 2000.

¹⁶⁷ United States Department of Justice, 2000.

¹⁶⁸ Alexander, p. 29.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 30.

¹⁷⁰ Wilcox, p. 37.

particularly on an unsubstantiated target that destroyed medical supplies, led to a backlash against the U.S.¹⁷¹ They also indicted bin Laden and Mohammed Aref in absentia,¹⁷² tightened economic and diplomatic sanctions on Afghanistan and placed pressure on Pakistan to end its support for the Taliban.¹⁷³ In addition to this, there was also a renewed focus on embassy security.¹⁷⁴ 1998 also saw PDD 62 and the establishment of the Office of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator was placed within the National Security Council, reporting to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and dealt with infrastructure, counterterrorism, WMDs, preparedness and consequence management.¹⁷⁵

In 1999, there was fear of both millenarian movements and millennial violence and al Qaeda. Fear of the former, and memories of Ruby Ridge, Waco and Oklahoma, led to the FBI's Project Megiddo. Its report, released in 1999, analysed the potential for extremist activity by white supremacists, militias, Christian Identity, Black Hebrew Israelites, apocalyptic cults and others around the millennium, and warned law enforcement.¹⁷⁶ Yet, none of the predicted threats or attacks occurred. Fear of al Qaeda led to extra security measures, including the FBI suspending all tours of its headquarters in Washington DC, the closure of selected diplomatic posts, and sanctions against the Taliban.¹⁷⁷ A 1999 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction recommended a shift from threat assessment and prevention to response and combatting terrorism, and the creation of an Office for Combatting Terrorism be created, with increased training for response (Alexander 31).

In preparation for the challenges of the next century, in 1999, the Twenty-first Century Commission led by former Senators Warren B Rudman and Gary Hart was established. In their 2000 report, they predicted a nuclear, chemical and/or biological WMD attack in the next 25 years and called for the creation of a cabinet level agency to take responsibility for defending the United States against attack. They also recommended that the National Guard be changed to form a 'Homeland Security Agency' with U.S. based troops.¹⁷⁸ 1999 also saw the formation of the National Commission on Terrorism. It was chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer, who would later go on to be posted in post-invasion Iraq. The Commission issued the report 'Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism' in 2000. It argued that international terrorism posed a dangerous and complex threat and that the U.S. needs to make greater effort to counter it, and, in an assertion of the proactive-preventative model, put prevention (including intelligence gathering) as the first priority, but called for the U.S. to prepare for a WMD attack. It also called for states that support terrorism to be targeted, private sources of financial and logistical support to be subjected to U.S. and international law, and the President and Congress to review, reform and fund counter-terrorism in order to ensure that all programmes and activities are

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 45; Crenshaw 2011, pp. 148-154 and 174.

¹⁷² Alexander, p. 30.

¹⁷³ Crenshaw 2011, p. 174.

¹⁷⁴ Wilcox, p. 52.

¹⁷⁵ Alexander, p. 30; Michael, p. 56.

¹⁷⁶ FBI, 'Project Megiddo', *Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future*, ed. J. Kaplan, London: Cass, 2000, pp. 27-52.

¹⁷⁷ Alexander, p. 31.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

part of a comprehensive plan.¹⁷⁹ In 2000, the U.S. Government Interagency of Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) was formed to coordinate federal, state and local agencies in response to WMD threats.¹⁸⁰

The October 2000 al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen led to the end of using the Suez Canal and the state department issuing warnings to U.S. civilians from traveling in certain regions, a high alert in the Middle East and the end of joint exercises with Jordan in Bahrain.¹⁸¹ Despite this and calls for greater coordination, the 14 December 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressay of Algerian Armed Islamic Group who was found with explosives in his car allegedly for a New year's attack on LAX while crossing the border at Washington State, FAA warnings about hijackers in July 2001, FBI concern about flight school students and the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui arrested in Minnesota in August 2001, and CIA reports to the FBI about al Qaeda members in the U.S.,¹⁸² America was not prepared for 9/11. These failures were raised in media reports and 9/11 commission hearings The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

This brings the history of U.S. counter-terrorism to the end of the pre-9/11 period. In addition to showing that, far from a clear and consistent historical narrative and strategy as the history of counter-terrorism is that of responses and reactions, changes and adaptations, different political interests and initiatives, selective applications, caution and overreach, successes and failures, cut off dates are problematic. For Singh, 9/11 not only represented an end of innocence and heralded in an unprecedented chapter, but 'confirmed the many prior warnings that the question of mainland terror was one of when, not whether, it would occur'.¹⁸³ So as much as 9/11 appears to have changed the terms of discussion, debate and policy, it was a paradigm shift that was produced by a failure to recognize the signs of a threat that led up to the event that 'changed everything', as well as some selective forgetting of the past. Hopefully this overview can aid in our understanding and analysis of counter-terrorism past, present and future, highlight the continuities and discontinuities, contextualize it and challenge uncritical support and expectations.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 31-32.

¹⁸⁰ Michael, p. 57.

¹⁸¹ Alexander, p. 32.

¹⁸² Alexander, p. 21.

¹⁸³ Singh, p. 52.