CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL CONFLICTS OVER CYPRUS

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to explain the intractability of the Cyprus conflict through an exploration of the connection between national narratives and claims to self-determination. In Cyprus nationalism was constituted differently for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. For the former, it was the struggle for Enosis (union with Greece) whereas the latter strove for Taksim (partition of the island). However, from the human rights perspective, both communities used the common term of self-determination. In a contradictory manner, the universal claim to self-determination has come to divide rather than unite Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Taking a cue from Edward Said, the thesis suggests, that the 'gravity of history inflects legal claims.' While critical legal studies have been much concerned with the rhetoric of human rights, this work sets out to analyze the emergence of discourses about self-determination in the context of key anti-colonial moments between 1878 and 1960. These are the repressed dimensions of British colonialism in Cyprus which hang heavily over the present but are often underestimated by current politicians, international negotiators and various interlocutors. The analysis suggests that each community saw the other as attempting to veto their right to self-determination. Thus, appeals to universal human rights, such as self-determination, far from advancing conflict resolution can be a factor that exacerbates conflict. The form in which anti-colonialism took place has influenced the actions and attitudes of the leaders and peoples of both communities in all generations. The selected anti-colonial moments are reconstructed through reference to archival material and academic works of history and politics.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People)

AON (Progressive Youth Organisation)

CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization)

EAM/ELAS (Communist movement in Greece)

EDES (Royalist Movement in Greece)

EKA (Cypriot Farmers Union)

EOKA (Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)

Evkaf (The Board of Pious Foundations)

KATAK (Cyprus Island Turkish Minority Institution)

KITEMB (Turkish Defence Union for Cyprus's Future)

KİP (Restitution of Cyprus Project)

KKK (Cyprus Communist Party)

KMTHP (Cyprus National Turkish People Party)

KOP (Cyprus Football Organisation)

KTFF (Cyprus Turkish Football Federation)

KTİBK (Association of Turkish Cypriot Workers Unions)

KTKF (Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations)

OHEN (Orthodox Church's Youth Movement)

PEK (Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus)

PEON (Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organisation)

PODG (Pan-Cyprian Organisation of Democratic Women)

TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation)

UN (United Nations)

UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus)

USA (United States of America)

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Acknowledgements

"Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn't trust the evidence of one's eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civilizatrice."
(Edward Said)

Introduction

This project sets out to investigate the role that universal human claims operate in the Cyprus conflict by focusing on the British Colonial period. Since the focus is on colonial period, the project is going to focus on the right to self-determination of peoples. It will argue that universality dissolves into a particularity and that far from offering a common discourse, the appeal to human rights can intensify conflict. The current division of the island between the Republic of Cyprus and the unrecognized "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"[1] cannot be understood without developing further insights on the root of the conflict and discourses that developed during the British Colonial period. Cyprus, like many other parts of the world, was embroiled in an intense anti-colonial struggle. However, the anti-colonial struggle also brought intense inter-communal strife that contested the narratives of emancipation. At the same period also the aspirational clauses of the United Nations promoting the principle of self-determination were to be forged into a legal doctrine. At this critical point, the Cyprus conflict raises an aspect of this emerging doctrine over the identity. Also, this project interrogates retrospectively on discourses from the British Colonial period and its reflections on the ongoing conflict.

Cyprus is an island in the eastern Mediterranean with a population of approximately 1.4 million and comprises an area of 9,251 square kilometres. It has a rich history having been part of the Byzantine, Lusignan, Venetian, Ottoman and British Empires. Cyprus became independent, as the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, In July 1974 the invasion of Cyprus by Greek military Junta-led groups announced right-wing Nicos Sampson as the President of Cyprus and shortly after announced Cyprus as a second Hellenic Republic in Eastern Mediterranean. Five days later, on 20th July 1974, Turkish troops engaged in a

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[1] Turkey is the only state that claims it recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. However, this is also questionable relationship that Turkish Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that "Turkey is the most important supporter of TRNC" nevertheless does not mention recognition. Also, neither Republic of Turkey's Grand National Assembly had a formal decision on the recognition of TRNC. "Relations with Turkey," accessed 22 March, 2016, mfa.gov.ct.tr/foreign-policy/relations-with-turkey/.

military operation on the Island and by August 18, 1974, had control of 37% of the island. Since then, repeated attempts to reunite the country have failed.

These failures in resolving the Cyprus conflict mostly happens because of a general understanding of the issue considered as finding out a way to overcome the division. However, the historical narratives and particularly the legacy of colonialism underpin the situation. This thesis offers an analysis of the constitution of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities that sought self-determination during the British colonial period with a common appeal for emancipation but with a different vision of what that would mean.

The intense struggle to end British rule in the 1950s pitted Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece (Enosis) against Turkish Cypriot demands for partition of the island between Greeks and the Turks (Taksim). However, as Kingsbury suggests "human rights does not establish which groups or territories are the units of self-determination for purposes of human rights enhancement[2]" It is the ambivalence that hangs over the Cyprus conflict.

The thesis will place the failed diplomatic efforts to the lack of understanding on colonial experience and reluctance of the international actors to critically engage with the colonialism. In particular, the project will argue that articulation of claims for self-determination was constructed in a bifurcated anti-colonialism. The colonial experience, it will suggest, is not an easy period of history to overcome and the postcolonial era retains its imprint.

Failure to address the Cyprus conflict lies in the way in which the parties and their interlocutors underestimated the impact of British colonialism in shaping the sense of identity on the Cypriot communities. This thesis aims to demonstrate how narratives about nationalism forged in human rights discourses, as a result, they have created widely diverging points of departure for the communities in terms of defining the future of Cyprus. To demonstrate it, the thesis largely relies on archival materials acquired from the National

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[2] Benedict Kingsbury, Reconstructing Self-determination: A Relational Approach, in Pekka Aikio and Martin Schenin (eds) *Operationalizing the Right of indigenous Peoples to Self-determination* (Turko: Institute for Human Rights Ab Akademi University, 2000), 23.

Archives in London and Milli Arşiv (National Archive) in the northern part of Cyprus. Also, newspapers, official correspondences of the colonial office, notes from the British Cabinet and the existing historical literature regarding the island's history helped to portray how rights' discourses have been shaped.

The articulation of the understanding of rights became particularly acute in the 1950s, as Greek Cypriots dominant narrative demanded self-determination in the form of *Enosis* (union with Greece). In contrast, Turkish Cypriots dominant narrative sought self-determination through *Taksim* (partition from the Greek Cypriot community).[3] Each community saw the other as attempting to veto their right to self-determination. As a result, this thesis argues that appeals to universal human rights, such as self-determination, far from advancing the cause of conflict resolution can be a factor that exacerbates conflict. Advancing right of self-determination, nationalism was reinforced in each community with a different point of departures in history. The way that the communities engaged with colonialism influenced (and still influences) the actions and attitudes of the leaders and the political elites from both communities.

By selectively focusing on moments within the British colonial period and the responses of Cypriot communities in these moments demonstrate the relationship between identity and its reflections to the human rights discourses, thus leading to the questioning of the universality of human rights. This is the critical point that requires introducing a multidisciplinary understanding of law, politics, and history.

Some of the events that are explored within this work include Cyprus's transfer to Britain in 1878, the 1931 Uprising, 1950 Referendum for the unification of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis), discourses on the partition (Taksim), the foundation of nationalist organisations like Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and Turkish Defence Organisation (TMT) and the formulation of British policies to remain in Cyprus that finalizes with offering independence

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[3] It is important to underline that there was a significant time lapse between the foundation of the two opposing discourses. While the Greek Cypriots had been advocated Enosis since the late 19th century; Turkish Cypriots failed to introduce a political project for a long time. The idea of Taksim (partition) suggested by the British Administration in Cyprus in the mid-1950s. From this point of view, Greek nationalism was more consolidated than the Turkish nationalism.

as an exchange of sovereign bases in Cyprus. These events were exemplary instances that had particular weight in identity-formation processes of the Cypriot communities and also there are dimensions that worth to interrogate including proper application of the self-determination in Cyprus. The overall analysis depicts how the history of rights discourses and national self-determination plays a critical role in the formation of self-determination discourses and how those discourses conflict with one another in each respective community due to the forged nationalism in those discourses.

Appealing to international law is fundamental for both parties in Cyprus problem. In constructing the legal arguments, each side presents its inherently partial ethno-nationalist view with universal terms. As a result, the universalism of international law endows each national cause with a sense of exclusive legitimacy. In this way, international law ceases to operate as a means of conflict resolution but instead becomes a source which exacerbates the conflict. Each party interprets international law from a mono-communal perspective. This project claims that the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem also represents an inherent paradox of international law. In writing of the neighbouring Palestinian-Israeli Strawson puts it "each side has become cocooned within legal righteousness in which its legitimacy is unimpeachable while that of the other is compromised. This has nourished the existential character of the conflict. Consequently, war, occupation, and defiance of the international community are justified as the exercise of legal rights."[4] The similar dilemma is observed in Cyprus, as this thesis is an attempt to show how this dilemma unfolds.

In Cyprus the contours of the emerging doctrinal disputes about the definition of the "people" with the right to self-determination as well as conflicts over the form of self-determination are observed. While the Greek and Turkish political leaderships were using the same universal language to articulate two opposed visions. In a broad sense, the legal doctrine of self-determination crystalized in the anti-colonial struggles of the post Second World War era. Cyprus was part

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[4] John Strawson. *Partitioning Palestine*. (London and New York: Pluto Press: 2010), 1.

of that development.[5] The anti-colonial struggle became essentially the removal of the colonial regime for the territory concerned, irrespective of its pre-colonial history or how its inhabitants thought of their identity.

Methodological Framework

This project touches upon number of topics that is highly sensitive such as nationalism, identity, colonialism, power, and self-determination. As a result, it is important to underline from the beginning that this thesis is not a just a legal analysis on the human rights; but it aims to further our understanding on the notion of human rights over the factors like colonialism, nationalism, and identity. In the case of Cyprus those all led to the events during, that ended up creating an independent republic which was so fragile that it could be able to sustain its bi-communal constitutional order over the island only for three years. Considering, colonialists' justification of their imperial acts by claiming it as a duty of civilizing mission; this thesis tries to interrogate what is broken in the case of Cyprus and how colonialisms' so called high moral duty of civilising mission shifted when the geopolitical considerations and power games are in place.

This thesis covers the whole colonial period in Cyprus (1878-1960) and particularly focuses on the late colonial period (1950-1960). A selective approach used to portray some of the significant events during the colonial period. Particularly, the first chapter mainly draws the selective historical moments from the beginning of the British Colonialism in Cyprus (1878) to 1950 while the third and the fourth chapters focus on the last decade of the colonial period, considering that it covers an extended period, it is important to emphasize some of the scholars that influence this study. Overwhelmingly, Kızılyürek,[6] Drousiotis,[7] and Holland[8] were some of the most influential scholars over the period (1950-1960) that I focused more intensively. However, George

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[5] Brian Simpson. *Human Rights and the End of Empire.* (New York: Oxford University Press: 2001), p924 −1001.

[6] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

[7] Makarios Drousiotis, *Karanlık Yön: EOKA*. (Nicosia: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 2005).

[8] Robert Holland. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Hill[9], İlia Xypolia[10] and Anastasia Yiangou's[11] studies provide an immense impact on this study, particularly for the period between 1878 to 1950.

Another prominent work by Kızılyürek on the history of violence in Cyprus is one of the most detailed accounts of the violent incidents throughout the conflict in Cyprus.[12] Drousiotis and Varnava[13] analyse the history of EOKA, as both bring forward how rights discourses had been carried out during the colonial period mostly from the lenses of the Greek Cypriots. Indubitably, one of the most notable works on British colonialism in Cyprus is written by Robert Holland, which enriches this thesis on various dimensions, particularly his approach that helped develop a better understanding of the British colonial perception of Cyprus. Likewise, numerous other journal articles, including Storis[14] and Katsourides[15] were consulted as secondary sources to gain a better understanding of the Cypriot left in each community about anti-colonialism and the idea of Enosis. Another work by Katsourides[16] sheds light on the early history of the left and the Cyprus Communist Party, whereas Ktoris demonstrates diverging points regarding the Greek Cypriot left's relation to national identity and Enosis as a nationalist project.

However, from a theoretical point of view, the backbone of this thesis is Edward Said's conception of the *gravity of history*. Said indicates:

> Cults like post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism, Deconstruction, neo-pragmatism transport into the country of the blue, an astonishing sense of weightlessness with regard to the gravity of history and individual responsibility fritters away attention to public matters and public discourse. The result is a kind of

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[9] George Hill, *Kıbrıs Tarihi: Osmanlı ve İngiliz İdaresi Döenmi 1571 - 1948.* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016).

[10] Ilia Xypolia, *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus 1923 - 1939.* (London: Routledge, 2017).

[11] Anastasia Yiangou, *II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Kıbrıs: Doğu Akdeniz'de Siyaset ve Çatışma.* (Nicosia: Khora Yayınları. 2016).

[12] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi.* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 2016).

[13] Andrekos Varnava, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA (1955-1959).* (Nicosia: C. Epiphaniou Publications, 2004).

[14] Sotos Ktoris, AKEL and Turkish Cypriots 1941-1955. *Cyprus Review* 25, (2013): 15-38.

[15] Yiannos Katsourides, Communist Left and the National Question in Cyprus. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, (2014*)*: 474-501.

[16] Yiannos Katsourides, *Kıbrıs Komünist Partisi Tarihi: Sömürgecilik, Sınıf ve Kıbrıs Solu.* (Lefkoşa: Khora Yayınları, 2014).

> floundering about that is a most dispiriting witness, even as society
> as a whole drift without direction or coherence. Racism, poverty,
> ecological ravages, disease and an appallingly widespread
> ignorance: these are left to the media and the odd political candidate
> during an election campaign.[17]

Said's notion on the gravity of history can be enriched in the thesis by interpreting its significance over the universality claim of human rights and interrogating it through the lenses of national identity over the history of the Cyprus conflict. Said's view of imperialism and colonialism enable to situate the Cyprus problem and allowed a novel understanding on the role of the colonial narratives in the history of the island and its further reflections to legal demands. Furthermore, this critical engagement shows the gravity of history where the colonial responsibility is ignored about the conflict and adhered to the communities living in the island.

The emphasis on the gravity of history primarily unfolds when repressed dimensions of British colonialism in Cyprus that continues to influence the efforts for a resolution to the conflict, despite it being a factor much ignored by interlocutors and international experts on conflict resolution for Cyprus, is explored in detail. The thesis offers a fresh analysis of the Cyprus conflict by bringing together an understanding of the nationalist movements of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the context of the articulation of the right to self-determination. By linking identity, nationalism and human rights, this study suggests that universality is a claim that can be appealed to conflicting parties. Furthermore, this study provides a detailed interrogation of the political and legal background of the notion of self-determination by referring the relevant developments in the United Nations enriched with the International Court of Justice opinions on the matter.

The critical legal theory substantively covers the how colonialists instrumentalize the law and how much role decolonialism had over the

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[17] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism,* (London: Vintage Books, 1994) 366-7.

international law.[18] Within this project, additional methodologic approach will be introduced that is Said's *contrapuntal reading*, which will be applied over law and legal narratives, to demonstrate how through the law imperialism can be re-invented. At this point, it is important to clarify an understanding of imperialism. In this project, imperialism is defined as; "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory."[19]

Considering that the international legal system heavily relied on European Enlightenment and colonialism than it is possible to claim that modern law, followed a specific intellectual understanding that inherited the imperialism at its heart. Peter Fitzpatrick, points out that the "advanced Occidental law can be despotic when it is exported to the rest of the world."[20] There are some points that we can draw from Fitzpatrick's remark on *'export of law'*. The remark on the export of law is fascinating because primarily, it indicates a competitive aspect of production that one territory can produce law abundant; as a result; it seeks a market outside of its territorial limits to exchange it either with money or with some other materials that are abundant in another territory. Furthermore, interpreting the law – a normative standard- as a meta that can be exported creates another representation that requires multiple parties to engage in a give and take relationship. So, the question of how suggested trade-like relationship (export of law) can result?

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[18] Antony Anghie, "The evolution of international law: Colonial and postcolonial realities", *Third world Quarterly* 27 (2007): 739-753.

[19] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism,* (London: Vintage Books, 1994) 8.

[20] Peter Fitzpatrick, *The mythology of modern law*, (London: Routledge, 2002) 107.

If the trade of law - a normative standard- requires a transaction any kind of tangible material product or money; then in real terms, it means exploitation of material resources of the importing territory. If the exchange means internalisation of the normative standards through the art of governance in distant territory than it means domination through law.

In either of the scenarios the point worth to interrogate further. Unquestionably, the law has a value. However, it is not possible to provide a material exchange value or a price tag on it. In the broader sense, the law can be considered as a crystallized form of social relations that carries historical, political, economic and social practices in the territories that it comes into being.[21] However, in some other territory that the law is imported, there can be peculiar conditions. As a result, a law that is imported from a foreign land can be obsolete as it may not have a corresponding value. To make turn law into a value at a distant territory, creation of required conditions might be necessary and this ought to be despotic because it requires relevant social, economic, political transformation. The imposition does not need to be brutal since violence is not necessarily just a brutal act. The important point is to understand that imperialism is all about techniques that are required to rule a distant territory.[22]

Also, another point that requires further interrogation is on the need to export law. Why there is a need to *export* law? If the answer is because the exported

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[21] Sururi Aktaş, "On The Minimum Conception Of Justice: The Minimum Principles of justice", *İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 12 (2021) :211.

[22] Andre Broome and Joel Quirk, "Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global benchmarking", *Review of International Studies* 41 (2015):819-841.

law is simply better than what is available; than it is possible to assume that the origin of law is more advanced so that it can produce it abundant amounts and better in quality. As that relationship takes place from West to East; it is possible to observe traces of imperialist understanding. If the export of law is confined within a territory and certain administrative structures are also enacted than from Said's definition "implanting of settlements on the distant territory" is colonialism.

Today, it is possible to agree that the former colonialist system is dismantled. There are number of United Nations resolutions, ICJ opinions, inter-state and international agreements that supports this view. Nevertheless, the dismantlement of colonialism does not mean that the colonialist/colonized mindset disappeared at the same time.[23]

Following the end of colonial order, the imperialist interpretation tends to offer its values through an abstract meaning of being universal. The new relationship is beyond the way how old-Empires operated.[24] Now, the export of law aims to create a universal value system that holds democracy, human rights and free market together. Most of the principles of the free market, such as profit maximisation were based on the corporate culture that used to operate such as the East Indian Company of the colonial period or like the today's corporations. Probably the only difference between former and today is that contemporary

[23] Hoffmann, Kasper (2021) Ethnogovernmentality: the colonial legacy of the nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict. Conflict Research Management (08 Jan 2021). Blog Entry.

[24] Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire,* Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2000)

corporations are vastly coupled with the human rights languages, despite there are still territories that ignore some of the fundamental standards and number of firms still enjoys their profit in the territories that exploitation of natural and human resources as an expense of wider concerns of human rights or sustainable developments are ignored. Endorsing the standards due to the needs of the better operation of the global market for profit brings us to the point of ruling from distance again. The normative framework does not represent a specific centre, neither it is limited with a specific nation-state but it is more of a boundless capitalist desire that prioritizes capital accumulation. Colonialist European Empires tried to justify this act by claiming that it is a moral objective, a civilising mission.[25] Today, capitalist corporations glorify profit maximisation and take the advantage of law as a tool to expand the value system of the free market economy at the cost of the climate. [26]

Today, the universalist point of departure treats the free market as an endless opportunity for profit and builds itself over the legal prescriptions. However, the universality of the profit maximisation lacks the elements of people at the local level and largely ignores the local voices. From this point of view, the universalist claims face challenges coming from the will of the people in distant territories. Sometimes the rulers and the ruled may agree on the universalist transformation on the market-friendly legal system but the local actors act

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[25] Watt, Carey A., and Michael Mann, eds. Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development. Anthem Press, 2011.

[26] Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, *Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020)

against *laissez-faire* capitalist policy choices, working classes stand against privatisation, ecologist raises their voice to the climate crisis and wide array of otherized groups goes beyond the divisive nationalism and able to respond truly universal sense. This paradoxical relationship between local and distant voices requires further interrogation of human rights in general.

Since contrapuntal reading has the element of gravity of history, in addition to the postmodern deconstruction of the critique, also the role of the author has to be contextualized within the degree of intentionality. At this point, Fitzpatrick also underlines that the "occidental law was a unitary, universal object"[27] that becomes the main justification of imperialism. Colonialist West assumed that the colonies were the areas without order and the colonial missions were primarily justified through a moral objective, bringing order to the land of savages.[28] It worth to revisit from this perspective of human rights as a tool to rehumanize the dehumanized.

Those points altogether portray the significance of multidisciplinary work on this topic that is being pursued throughout this project. To understand the role of colonialism over the self-determination demands in Cyprus, the history of the island and different interventions throughout the course of history has immense amount of impact over the Cyprus problem.

However, in a wider theoretical and methodological point of view, the gravity of history that has undeniable impact over representations of the will of the people

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[27] Fitzpatrick, *the mythology of modern*, 107.
[28] Fitzpatrick, *The mythology of modern,* 73.

needs to be understood to develop the sense of justice in general. Particularly, on the themes around the human rights, the gravity of history tends to be even much visible. As Samuel Moyn puts it:

> *A few short years ago, there was no such domain of historical inquiry (on human rights). Now it is ubiquitous. It has verged on absorbing past themes that once stood on their own or served other purposes, like the meaning of the eighteenth-century Atlantic revolutions or the nineteenth century campaigns against slavery. And it has sparked new and fascinating investigations into transformations of world governance, social movements, and international law.*[29]

What Moyn suggests on human rights, can also go further in other topics of law. Because it is not possible to separate other historical trends, development from the legal developments. From this point of view, history is not only crucial for law but primarily it helps us to understand the limitations of law. Many examples can be brought forward on this, but I will give two of them. First one is the Horwitz's 1977 book, The Transformation of American Law[30] that focuses 1780 to 1860, in which he emphasized the changing economy and emerging political views that is responsible for the substantial change in the common law doctrines. Those changes in general benefited trade elite and the industrial classes more in comparison to the farmers. Also, the changing ideologies with the rise of market capitalism affected those changes but certainly the significance of history and law is vividly portrayed.

Another example to demonstrate the relationship between law and history would be over the work of Douglas Hay.[31] Hay argues the crime and punishment, in which reminds later work of Michel Foucault on Birth of Prison, where he argues the history of crime and punishment in England can be seen as the system relies on barbarity while enlightenment and modern systems turned punishment into

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[29] Samuel Moyn, *Human Rights and The Uses of History,* (London: Verso 2014) : i.

[30] Morton J Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977).

[31] Douglas Hay and others, *Albion's fatal tree: Crime and society in eighteenth-century England* (Verso, London,1975).

imprisonement. He considered capital punishment as an element of barbarity and claimed that it reflected the social and political order of the period. From this point of understanding the transformation of the criminal law shows the significance of history as well as law's limitations. However, rather than arguing further, it is sufficient to underline that those two examples represent the significance of history and law.

In the case of Cyprus Problem during the British colonial era, at the heart of such chaotic conditions, the order is sustained through law. So, the trinity of law, history and politics becomes the core disciplines that is required to understand and interpret the situation in Cyprus and its continuing significance. At this point, the importance of engaging law critically becomes fundamental way to open up new discussions or better understand the problems.

In this project, to re-interpret the conflict in Cyprus, rather than clashing the legal claims of self-determination on Cyprus; I will try to situate the British Colonial history of Cyprus at the heart of those discussions to understand the trajectory of Cyprus problem. While prioritizing the gravity of history and engaging with contrapuntal reading of legal narratives; at the crossroads of law, history, and politics I will be expecting to better understand the way in which the conflict had shaped the island but also its people.

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter explains the political and legal foundations of British colonialism in Cyprus in a detailed manner. The shift of the governance system from the former Ottoman millet to British Colonial administration depicts the significance in the transformation of Cypriot communities within political affairs on the island. Also, the chapter explains the colonial administrative apparatuses and the way that it divided and ruled the communities based on ethnic and religious lines bolstering the polarisation between the communities on the political lines. According to the new conditions, both communities on the island reposition themselves within the context of the new ruler's understanding of governance. The chapter selectively focuses on three key developments from 1878 to 1950 that are to say: 1) annexation of

Cyprus by Britain with the first World War, 2) 1931 Plebiscite and 3) 1950 Referendum.

The second chapter focuses on the notion of the self-determination. This chapter will survey the historical, theoretical and legal aspects of the concept. Moreover, it will seek to place these debates in the context of the period. Also, a comprehensive analysis of nation and nationalisms is provided. By analysing the idea of nation and nationalism from various perspectives helps to articulate and understand the modern foundations of the self-determination and contemporary reflections over the national conflict situations. It will contrast differing political approaches to self-determination in particular the views of Wilson and Lenin. It will then turn a discussion of the interpretation of the self-determination during the period of the League of Nations and then in the UN system. By referring to the International Court of Justice's opinions on the self-determination the evolution of the interpretation of the notion portrayed. Several cases of self-determination will be discussed. Finally, the application of the self-determination in Cyprus analysed. Particularly, the principle of the of *uti possidetis* and the evolution of the concept into a territorial interpretation provided.

The third chapter analyses the last decade of the British colonialism on the island from the lenses of the Greek nationalism and the narratives on Enosis elaborated. The third chapter focuses on different aspects of Enosis nationalism in Cyprus. Initially, it explains the political climate following the Referendum for Enosis that was held by the Church of Cyprus and also it explains how Cypriot left's reactions to Enosis demand. Also, it carefully analyses how the British Colonial Administration engaged with the increasing Enosis demand. Following sections of the third chapter focuses on the EOKA insurgency in Cyprus. However, before engaging in the historical narratives of EOKA struggle, an introductory discussion on violence provided. Such critical engagement can enhance the understanding of why there is a violent reaction in the context of anti-colonial movements and its role how violence can be mainstreamed in colonial situations observed within the boundaries of the chapter. Finally, EOKA's role and particularly its political leader Makarios's efforts and

understanding of anti-colonialism being discussed. At the same time, starting from the Conference in London, several other military and diplomatic efforts had been covered. The discussions on the Future of Cyprus by the British Administration and the compromise on the foundation of independent republic narrated. This chapter also provides the regional developments to draw the relationship between local and international and the adverse outcome for the Greek Cypriots. Such a detailed account of the problematic relationship between the Greek Cypriot nationalists and the colonial administration demonstrates how Greek Cypriot identity was further shaped and how this influenced the discourses of the right of self-determination.

The fourth chapter focuses exclusively on the last decade of British Colonialism in Cyprus, from the perspective of the Turkish Cypriot community. Putting the Muslim identity into a secondary position transformed Turkish Cypriots in the mid-1940s. In 1948, Turkish Cypriots started to stand against Enosis, which had officially been in place for (at least) the last four decades.[32] From 1948 onwards, Turkish Cypriot elites became organized to influence the political discussions and decisions on the future of Cyprus. This chapter attempts to explain these points substantively. From the fear of being a minority under the subordination of Greek nationalists; the colonial policies and the impact of the international affairs together with the use of violence Turkish Cypriots upgraded to the equal founders following to the decolonisation. It is a fact that in a way shorter time, Turkish Cypriots able to accumulate significant political capital mostly because a powerful actor (Turkey) backed them. Also, their stance to stand with the colonialist played a substantial role in this. However, to better understand this evolution, attention must be directed towards the relationship between Turkey and the British colonial administration that is also explained in length. Also, in this chapter, the lack of concrete long-term strategy among the Turkish Cypriot elite pointed out. Also, in this chapter Turkish Cypriot communities denial of the self-determination and re-engagement to self-determination through Taksim

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[32] The first time Greek Cypriots raised the issue of Enosis in the Legislative Council was in 1904, which could be seen as the first official record of Enosis by the Greek Cypriot elected representatives.

discourse explained in detail. A detailed account is on TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı∕Turkish Defence Organisation) also provided.

The final chapter of this thesis offers a critical analysis of the narrative of self-determination in the history of the Cyprus conflict and its reflections today. In this chapter, the impact of specific moments over the collective memories of the communities provided to portray how Enosis and Taksim narratives are still hegemonic. The universality of human rights is acknowledged by all; however, the narratives of human rights can create situations where the objectives of legal arguments are unable to help resolve the conflict. On the contrary, they can further fuel the conflict by unilateral interpretations of the very same rights. The final chapter demonstrates the fundamental reasons why international law fails to resolve the Cyprus conflict.

An analysis of the history of legal narratives is significant as nationalist interpretations of events encode starkly different justifications of the legitimacy of the cause. In the case of Cyprus- one of the longest serving peace-keeping efforts- the underestimation of the gravity of history represents a fundamental problem in addressing the conflict. The United Nations, for example, tends to see the references to self-determination as unifying whereas as the thesis argues, each side has a different understanding of what is meant by the term. The appropriation of the universal language by two nationalist movements divides rather than unifies the two communities. As a result, two narratives forged through the engagement with British colonialism remains entrenched. Despite the colonial experience ended nearly six decades ago, weighs more heavily than many contemporary mediators realize. The analysis questions the UN's assumptions on human rights as a solution to conflicts. By demonstrating the ways that communities interpreted and linked certain events to the rights, and the divergences occurred among them in contrast to one another. The primary aim is to demonstrate how nationalist lenses can diverge the principle of universality in human rights. The final section focuses on two defining discourses (Taksim and Enosis) in Cyprus and how communities in Cyprus have been manifested the self-determination that goes beyond the formulations of the international legal expertise. By focusing on the different periods of

colonialism on the island, the main aim is to demonstrate the way communities formulated their rights, the factors leading to the articulation of human rights discourses and its influence on the boundaries of the universality of human rights, as well as their relationship with the colonialist.

Overall, the thesis focuses specifically on the critical analysis of the self-determination discourses during the colonial period across Cypriot communities to provide fundamental reasons of underlying the failure of reconciliation. The rights discourses analysed within their historicity provide the genealogy of rights, which can also reveal a) reflections of nationalism over the contemporary human rights discourses in Cyprus, and b) the influence of the colonial experience of Cypriots regarding the failure of the political solution in Cyprus. The representations of events created in the media, the opinions of the elites, colonial policies, colonial violence, inter-communal strife, and grassroots responses demonstrated the elements that constructed the rights discourses and the legal narratives within which the parties position themselves. As a whole, this study offers an original understanding of the paradoxical situation of human rights discourses in the case of the national conflict in Cyprus.

There are certain limitations to this project. First, the linguistic barriers in understanding the original documents in Greek constituted the primary challenge for this study. Most of the material on the Greek Cypriot community collected from the secondary sources. Only a few notable works had been translated from Greek to Turkish or English. Another limitation was related to access to the archives. While the British Archives hold a significant amount of primary resources on the issue, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot archives were not as helpful as the British Archives. In the case of Greek Cypriot archives, the language barrier constitutes a limitation once more. Contrary to the Greek Cypriot Archives, the Turkish Cypriot National Archives do not present the problem of a language barrier; however, the archives were weak in content, and it was difficult the access to the materials.

Finally, this research only focuses on the colonial period. Although colonialism plays a significant role in the Cyprus Problem, various other aspects must be

studied to see the details of the conflict. Nevertheless, it was not possible in the length of this study. However, it is essential to focus on other significant moments in the island's history, mainly the period from 1960 – 1974, which includes incidents that occurred in December 1963 known as the Turkish Uprising among Greek Cypriots and Bloody Christmas by Turkish Cypriots. Also, the period from 1963 to 1974 deserves attention as Turkish Cypriots were not involved in the governing bodies of the Republic of Cyprus until the coup d'état staged by the Greek colonels, in which it can also be called Greek Invasion to Cyprus, that followed by the Turkish military intervention, which led to the division of the island and the occupation. The post-1974 period has a significant role in identity formation and in defining the limits of universal human rights discourses. Particularly, the period between 1974 to 2003 where the communities had nearly no contact at all. Further analysis of specific moments in post-colonial Cyprus, serving as reflections of identity over national conflicts would provide comprehensive and much tangible room to understand the problem.

Chapter 1 – British Colonialism in Cyprus 1878 – 1950

This chapter analyses three significant events. It is argued that the events examined have had an influence on Cypriot politics and how local communities continue to frame their national identities today. Firstly, it focuses on the arrival of the British rule in Cyprus in 1878 the time when the British rule replaced the Ottoman governance. During this transition, the social and political roles were transformed rapidly whilst the Ottoman *millet* system ended.[33] Ottoman millet system prevented social mobility, giving Muslims a superior position and the exclusive right to rule, while non-Muslims were not allowed to participate in governance.

However, the Orthodox Church acted as an intermediary in tax collection. The rights of non-Muslims were limited, and their economic activities were subject to additional taxes. The structure constituted one of the fundamental sources of the rising nationalism and the secessionist movements in the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, in Cyprus, the Orthodox Church accumulated new conditions for its political significance by blending religion and nationalism. The rise of nationalism and the problems associated with the millet system created fertile grounds for identity politics. The power of nationalism influenced other subjects within the Empire, both in Europe, the Middle East and Western Africa, resulting in a wave of nationalist struggles. Cyprus's colonisation by Britain started right at the beginning of this transformation.

In Cyprus, British Colonialism created a unique setting and acted as a catalyst during the era of nationalist politics. It is important to note that, the two communities in Cyprus had the asymmetrical level of national consciousness which will be argued in detail at a later stage.

The second event discussed in this chapter is the 1931 Uprising. It is argued that the 1931 Uprising needs to be taken as a significant rupture of solidifying

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[33] Cassia explains Ottoman Millet System and emphasize that the Church as a partner of the Turkish rulers, mediating between them and the peasantry. Paul S. Cassia, Religion, politics and ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkocratia (1571 - 1878). *European Journal of Sociology* 27, (1986) : 3-28.

nationalist sentiments on the island among the Greek Cypriots and as a constituent moment of the Greek Cypriots' militant movement for Enosis (Union with Greece).

The last event to be detailed in this chapter is the 1950 referendum for Enosis where differentiation of demands from the two communities covered. The aforementioned asymmetry well exploited by the colonialists and the Turkish Cypriot collaborators of colonialism caused the major divergences between the two communities. From the start to the end of British Colonial Administration, effective exploitation and manipulation of the identity problem in Cyprus. This brings unmanageable chaos and the notion of self-determination becomes both the source and the solution of the conflict.

1.1 The British Rule in Cyprus (1878 – 1914)

This first section of Chapter 1 provides the general framework of the Defensive Alliance signed between the Ottoman and British Empires providing a general socio-political setting for when the British arrived in Cyprus. It explains the structures that the British Administration in Cyprus erected most notable the legislative council. Also, the section narrates the reactions of the locals to the new setting in Cyprus and how the geostrategic developments like the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and Greek independence had influenced the communities.

1.1.1 The Defensive Alliance

A defensive alliance was formed between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 signed by Sir A.H. Layarn and the Grand Vizier of the Sultan, Saffet Pasha. According to the treaty, two signatory parties emphasized that "their two countries, have resolved upon the conclusion of a convention of defensive alliance with the object of defining for the future the territories in Asia".[34]

In principle, the alliance aimed to ensure British support for the potential Russian threat as an exchange offered certain strategic advantages for Britain

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[34] United Kingdom, The National Archives, FO 93/110/27B of (1878, June 4), Convention. Cyprus. [Also known as the Cyprus Convention].

in the region. The convention contains an annexe titled "British Occupation and Administration of Cyprus" and was ratified on 1st July 1878.[35] While the convention recognises Britain's occupation and administration of Cyprus, it also clarifies that legally Cyprus was under the British administration, simultaneously remaining under the Ottoman territory. That's why the Sultan added the following words to the treaty: "I ratify the present Treaty on condition that my sovereign rights shall in no way be affected thereby."[36] Through the convention, Britain recognised the continuation of the Ottoman system in legal, religious and educational matters. Also, according to the convention, the Board of the Pious Foundations (Evkaf) would be supervised jointly with the Muslim community on the island, and a delegate would be appointed by the colonial administration. Since Evkaf is main institution that established after Ottoman's conquer of Cyprus, it had a major role since it possessed land, property, funds, mosques, Islamic schools, and many other religious establishments. Finally, the convention stated that Britain would pay a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Empire, which amounted to £92.800 British Pounds.[37]

The Ottoman Empire secured its economic interests by demanding a tribute and asking to maintain its control over the property that belonged to the Evkaf. Also, by controlling the institutions linked to Evkaf—such as schools and mosques—the Ottoman Empire aimed at sustaining its social existence on the island. It was an important aspect to safeguard the societal existence of Muslims, as the British administration of Cyprus was conditional. The treaty mentions evacuation of Cyprus as follows: "if Russia restores Kars, and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war."[38]

Quickly after Britain acquired Cyprus, it introduced a new way of governance according to the demographic formation. Accordingly, the population of Cyprus recorded as 186,173 in 1881. In the Cyprus Blue Book, the population divided

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[35] İbid.

[36] United Kingdom, The National Archives, FO 93/110/27B *of* May 31, 1880, Memorandum as to Ratification of Anglo-Turkish Convention.

[37] United Kingdom, The National Archives, FO 93/110/27B of June 4 1878, *Convention. Cyprus. [Also known as the Cyprus Convention].*

[38] George Hill, *A History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Province the British Colony, 1571 1948*. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1952) 300-3.

as Mahometans, Greek Church and other religionists including Roman Catholic, Maronite, Gregorian, the Church of England, protestant, Presbyterian, Wesleyan Methodist, Baptist, Plymouth brethren, Lutheran, Unitarian, free-thinker, Jews, Gypsies and Copts.[39] According to the statistics Mahometans were 45,458 people, Greek Church members were 137,631, and the other religions were 3,084 people residing in 6 districts consisted of Nicosia, Larnaca, Limassol, Famagusta, Paphos and Kyrenia.

The privileges attributed to the Orthodox Church in Cyprus was consistent with other Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[40] However, the Orthodox Church's status changed once Britain took over the administration in Cyprus.[41] Losing certain granted rights for the Cypriot elites let them reconsider new ways of continuing their political significance.

From the day that Britain arrived in Cyprus, Cypriot communities experienced a transformation in that aspect. and had to adjust themselves to the new British rule. Muslim Cypriots assumed that the agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Britain would be in the benefit of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, to sustain loyalty to the Ottoman Empire; it meant being loyal to Britain as well. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots convinced that Britain would respect the Hellenic Unity and the idea of national restoration. Also, for the Greeks, their memories from the slaughter of the Orthodox Bishops in 1821 was still fresh.[42] As a result, the end of Ottoman Rule would be considered as a positive development. The new political framework can be observed from the beginning of the British Colonial period.

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[39] United Kingdom, Colonial Office, *The Cyprus Blue Book 1887-1888*, (Nicosia: Government Printing Office: 1878) Retrieved from Ψηφιακή Πλατφόρμα Κυπριακής Βιβλιοθήκης: http://www.cyprusdigitallibrary.org.cy/items/show/58.
[40] The Ottoman Empire offered privileges for the Orthodox community to sustain the division between Catholics and Orthodox. Privileges for Orthodox ended after the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, also known as Tanzimat Firman İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*, 3. Edition, (Ankara: Cadit Neşriyat, 2008).
[41] The rising waves of nationalism and the success of the Greek nationalist movement influenced Orthodox Cypriots in Cyprus. Therefore, when the Ottoman Empire leased Cyprus to Britain, they tried to ensure its presence only by relying on the Muslim subjects of the Empire.
[42] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi*. (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017): 20.

1.1.2. The First Responses to British Colonialism

When the first British troops arrived, no resistance observed from the native population. Mainly because they were unaware of what was going on. The only people who left the island after British arrival were the Ottoman civil servants and the only recorded friction to the new administration was the refusal of city councils of Famagusta and Limassol to cooperate.[43] The last Ottoman Governor of Cyprus, Besim Pasha, handed over Cyprus without any objections. Hill (2016) claims that when the Ottoman flag was replaced by the British flag, natives saluted with applause and shouts of "Long Live Victoria!"[44] Wolseley declared, upon his arrival in Cyprus as the first British Governor of Cyprus, Britain's willingness to support agriculture and trade for the development of the island.

Additionally, he promised freedom, justice and security for the natives.[45] Among the Greek Cypriot political elite, the British arrival in Cyprus was considered as a positive development, expecting Britain to take necessary steps to unify Cyprus with Greece like the other Greek islands in the Ionian Sea.[46]

The change of administration had a significant impact over the existing socio-political setting. First of all, equality in the eyes of the law meant the abolishment of privileged positions, including the Ethnarchy; acquired by the Greek Orthodox Church leader since the Ottoman's conquest. The abolition of the Ethnarchy status of the Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus represented a clear rupture from feudal power relations to a new colonial conditions.

However, the impact of the Church did not disappeared. On the contrary, the representatives of the Orthodox community became elected officials in the Legislative Council. The loss of the privileges created resentment towards the decision on Ethnarchy, distanced Orthodox Cypriots from the British rule in

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[43] Hill, "*A History of Cyprus*", 245.
[44] Ibid, 247.
[45] Ibid, 248.
[46] When Britain took over the rule in Cyprus, the Orthodox Archbishop welcomed the new Governor of Cyprus however Katsiaounis (Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour society and politics in Cypus during the second half of the nineteenth century*. (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996).) rejects this, claiming such narrative is a myth.

Cyprus.[47] On the other hand, this brought a new political narrative for the Greek Cypriots.

British records were showing the presence of a desire on Enosis among the Orthodox population. Samani refers to a letter, written on 1st August 1878 to the British Foreign Secretary Salisbury by Henry Layard, the Consul General of Britain in Istanbul, inviting Salisbury to increase the population of the island in favour of the Muslims instead of the Greeks. Layard argues that such a policy would reduce the threat of Enosis demanded by the Greeks Cypriots.[48]

On the other hand, Colonial Administration brought together a legal code offering the natives certain legal rights; including representation.[49] Legislative Council was a critical avenue to trace the political developments but also to see colonial policies of divide and rule.

1.1.2.1 Legislative Council

The Legislative Council was one of the most important institutions during the British Rule in Cyprus to understand political affairs; nevertheless, it was also considered mainly as a "toy parliament"[50]. The first legislative council was established in 1878 and had an advisory role. The first Legislative Council was appointed by the Governor and comprised of three officials from each Cypriot community, which were the Muslim, Orthodox and Latin communities. Accordingly, each member of this Council could serve for two years.[51] By the end of two years, Greek Cypriots were pressurising the governor for a fair representation of the communities.[52] Adjustments were made by introducing six appointed government officials and twelve elected members consisting of nine from Orthodox Community and three from the Muslim Community.[53] Accordingly, the island was divided into three electoral districts, whereas 6,122

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[47] Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the modern: The cultures of nationalism in Cyprus*. (London: IB Tauris,2004) 27-8.

[48] Meltem Onurkan Samani, "Kıbrıs'ta Bir Sömürge Kurumu: Kavanın Meclisi," (PhD dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2007), 36.

[49] Government of Cyprus, The Cyprus Civil List, 1903.

[50] Xypolia, *British Imperialism and,* 122.

[51] Samani, *Kıbrıs'ta Bir Sömürge*,, 86.

[52] Ibid, p. 88.

[53] In 1925, another change occurred in representation. While Greek Cypriot members increased to 12 and government officials increased to 9, no change was made to the number of Muslim members. Legislative Council members reached a total of 24. (Cyprus Civil List, 6)

Mahometan and 24,952 Non-Mahometan registered electors were defined.[54] The creation of the Legislative Council disrupted the traditional relationships of the communities. For Greek Cypriots, it created an alternative source of legitimacy to the Church hierarchy, whereas Muslim Cypriots found themselves as a minority element with limited representation.

As Samani[55] explains, in the first two decades of the Legislative Council, Cypriot representatives were mostly priests, landlords and pawnbrokers. Starting from the 20th century, the religious identity of Orthodox subjects tended to change, and national identity became much more decisive in politics across Greek Cypriots. At the same time, Muslim Cypriots attempted to find a strategy to prevent being subordinated. Nevertheless, the Muslim community remained a loyal subject of the empire while the Greek Cypriots effectively facilitated the legislative council to promote nationalist aspirations.

It is worth to remind here that the political projects of the communities were asymmetrical on various aspects. Greek nationalist project had moral advancement as the empires were eroding. While the Muslim community believed in the conditions set in the Defensive Alliance of 1878 and chose to wait until Cyprus would be handed over back to the Ottoman Empire.   It is possible to consider those initial positions as the source of the conflicting expectations that eventually modern Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities were forged.[56] As they struggled to fulfil their desires, the intensity of disagreement grew.

In 1903, the issue of Enosis was approved for the first time in the Legislative Council discussion, and gradually became one of the 'hot' topics, until the Government of Cyprus banned the Legislative Council following the 1931 Uprising. Although the colonial government of Cyprus reported Enosis as a desire by a minority within the Greek Cypriot community.[57]

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[54] Cyprus Civil List, 1903, 6.
[55] Samani, *Kıbrısta Sömürge,* 88.
[56] Eleni Bouleti. Early Years of British Administration in Cyprus, *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 4, (2015), 72
[57] Bouleti, *Early Years of British*, 76.

The Government of Cyprus repeatedly reminded Britain's official stance on Enosis: Her Majesty's Government recognising the owner of the island as the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and the desires to transfer Cyprus to Greece of having no meaning.[58] Those statements tended to relief Muslim Cypriots' concerns; however, the conditions were about to change when the bells of World War I started to ring.

Approaching World War I, the Legislative Council was turning into an obsolete institution, mostly because the Government of Cyprus preferred to minimise its role on the island's affairs. Secondly, the rising nationalist sentiments made communities consider alternative strategies for politics. Greek Cypriots gradually re-organized and distanced themselves from colonial institutions. On the other hand, the Muslim community leadership, which used to be based mostly on personal interests, evolved into a monopoly of certain elites that the colonial administration in Cyprus effectively supported.

1.2. Cyprus after World War I (1918 – 1931)

This section covers fundamental aspects of the impacts of the First World War over Cyprus. First World War was important over Cypriot politics as the incident led to a significant shift in terms of the island's governance. Until 1914 the island was administered by the British Empire under a lease agreement; but with the beginning of the First World War, Cyprus was annexed to British Empire, as the island was legally owned by an 'enemy'. Britain declared the island's annexation in early November 1914.[59] Simultaneously, Britain tried to convince Greece by offering control of Cyprus in exchange for support on the allied side to rescue Serbia.[60] However, King Constantine of Greece rejected the offer.[61] The developments in the early days of the First World War led Greek Cypriots to expect eventual annexation of Cyprus to Greece. At the same time, the

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[58] Hill, A History of Cyprus, 493.
[59] United Kingdom, The National Archives, FO 141/511/1 on November 5, 1914,*Annexation of Cyprus to British Dominions*.
[60] Lord Curzon claimed that the proposal was not legitimate as the conversation took place without the knowledge of the British Cabinet. (Hill, A History of Cyprus, 121)
[61] Heinz A. Richter, *Çağdaş Kıbrıs'ın Kısa Tarihi 1878 - 2009.* (Nicosia: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 2011):32.

Muslim community's concerns arose as the possibility of Enosis seemed more possible than ever.

This section analysis three fundamental dynamics that condensed the nationalist narratives. The first part showcases Britain's plans for the future of Cyprus. In this part, the differing positions of Cypriot communities will be introduced as well as the views of Lord Curzon on the future of Cyprus. In the second part, the reflections of geopolitical developments will be covered. Following the First World War, the Ottoman Empire signed Sevres Agreement which led to the national liberation fight for the independence of Turkey. Independence War concluded with the Lausanne Agreement in 1923 bringing the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. The Lausanne Treaty is particularly important because Turkey officially recognized Cyprus as a British territory. In this part, the reflections of the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic over the Muslim Cypriot community in Cyprus is explained. In the third part of this section; the causes of the 1931 Uprising and its wider impacts of the British Colonial policies in Cyprus will be detailed. Those three dynamics influenced the way that the communities responded to the notion of self-determination.

1.2.1 British Plans Regarding the Future of Cyprus

Following World War I (WW1) Paris Peace Conference came to the major political developments for the World. Wilsonian ideas were on the rise and the idea of self-determination was becoming a key notion for the areas that formerly ruled by the Empires that lost the war. Cyprus was already annexed to Britain since the beginning of the WW1; however, for the Greek Cypriot community it was the time to convince Britain for Enosis. Greek Cypriots saw the Paris Peace Conference as an opportunity to lobby the British delegation for their nationalist aspirations. Their demand was based on the fact that Cyprus was offered to Greece by Lord Grey in 1915. A letter signed by the Archbishop of Cyprus and Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council on 5 March 1919 stressed the majority position of Greek Cypriots and their kinship with Greece. For this

reason, they claimed that Cyprus's 'reunion' with the Kingdom of Greece was the irrevocable wish of Greek Cypriots.[62]

The nationalist desire of Greek Cypriots was interpreted as the restoration of historical justice. In the letter, the Archbishop of Cyprus stated that:

> *It is our duty to state that in case these high principles are not applied to Cyprus, such an omission will cause the greatest dissatisfaction, sorrow and disappointment to the Church and the people of Cyprus.*[63]

Not only were the Cypriots living in Cyprus putting pressure in favour of Enosis, but also the Greek Cypriot diaspora. A letter sent from the Hellenic Brotherhood of the Cypriots in Egypt favouring the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The Hellenic Brotherhood underlined that "under the Government of which the Cypriot people having been politically indoctrinated during the last forty years, have now become fully mature for the national restoration."[64]

However, Britain was no longer supporting the idea of Enosis; hence was no longer interested in the offer. At the Paris Peace Conference, Lord Curzon's secret memorandum titled "The Future of Cyprus" (3 January 1919) validated Britain's position. Also, his views were supported by an annexe that contains a document titled 'Joint Note by the Naval and General Staffs on the Strategic Value of Cyprus'.

Lord Curzon's memorandum shows the official British position on Cyprus following the end of World War I.[65] Curzon's argument frames the conditions of that time, particularly the developments after the revelation of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. According to this Skyes-Picot Agreement, "his majesty's government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government."[66] Curzon noted that Britain must be ready to declare that "Greece is the one Mediterranean State to whom Cyprus has

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[62] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 608/33/16, from 1919. *The Future of Cyprus*, 416.
[63] Ibid.
[64] FO 608/33/16, 386.
[65] Ibid.
[66] "The World War I Document Archieve" Sykes-Picot Agreement: accessed 1 November 2021 https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement

never belonged."[67] Curzon's memorandum also opposes Lord Balfour's cabinet paper that announced the "surrender of Cyprus as a possibility at the Peace Conference."[68] While Curzon details the reasons to control Cyprus about Britain's trade links with the East, he also refers to the geopolitical balances over different scenarios. However, among those scenarios, the security of the Suez Canal can be seen as the most critical dimension. Curzon explicitly opposed the ceding of Cyprus to Greece on the basis that such a strategic location must remain in a stable country. Considering Curzon's memorandum as a whole, the geostrategic and economic interests of Britain do not allow for the unification of Cyprus with Greece, or any other kind of alternative. Following the WW1, Britain's decisiveness to remain in Cyprus and not to respond to the demands for Enosis was clear.

Curzon's solution to the nationalist thirst of Greek Cypriots was to demonstrate "exemplary British governance and reasonable taxation." For Milner "there is a decided majority of Greeks or at any rate Greek-speaking people – for whom I have serious doubts about their alleged Greek origins."

Furthermore, Milner said:

> *There is much less reason for giving Cyprus to Greece than for giving Malta to Italy or Gibraltar to Spain. There is a much weaker case than there was for giving Heligoland to Germany –and even Heligoland – that very unfortunate precedent – was not given for nothing[69]*

What these remarks, at the official level, revealed was that the Greek Cypriots' desire was not seen as legitimate.

 Muslim Cypriots were supportive of Britain's stance. Opposing to the Greek Cypriot population they also lobbied to preserve the status quo. They were demanding that the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference maintained their presence on the island. One of the members of the Legislative Council, Irfan Nadir, argued that 60.000 Muslim Cypriots were concerned about the potential unification of Cyprus with Greece. Characterising this possibility

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[67] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 608/33/16 from 1919.
[68] Ibid.
[69] United Kingdom, National archives, FO 608/33/16 from 1919, *Letter from Lord Milner to Sir G. Fiddes,* 363.

as an *appalling disaster.* Nadir also underlined that such a scenario would signify "deliberate persecution and forced emigration."[70] By referring to the devastating outcomes in the case in Crete, he urged Britain to stay for the safety and security of the Muslim Population. Finally, Nadir also mentioned the loyalty of the Muslim community to the British Crown since the arrival of the British rule in Cyprus. As Muslim Cypriots feared a scenario in which they would live under Greek domination, Nadir tried to highlight Muslim Cypriots' sympathy for the British Government:

> *The Mohammedan population beg to express their unbounded gratitude and unflinching attachment to the British Empire and solicit the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference to maintain intact the status quo and they denounce the Greek Demand as contrary to the principles proclaimed by the Allies. Cyprus is already enjoying a regime of Justice and Liberty.* [71]

The Cypriot Muslims understood the Ottoman Empire lost the war. As a result, the return of Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire was not a viable option anymore. This brought a considerable level of concern in the island's Muslim community. They realized that the only way to sustain their significance is to play the role of vanguard of the British Empire's interests in the island.

1.2.2. Geopolitical Developments

The end of the First World War was complete desperation for the Muslim Cypriots; one reason being the rise of the notion of national self-determination among the countries that once ruled by the Empires. However, Muslim Cypriots did not have a unified political goal for themselves. The national emancipation idea was not visible to the Muslim community. Neither there were any remarks from the Muslim Cypriot political elite on a modern project of state-building. It is possible to claim that they did not see themselves as a constituent element for a political project that involves self-determination at the time.

Muslim Cypriot community believed that they were the continuation of the Ottoman legacy in Cyprus. As a result, they were loyal to the British administration. From 1878 to 1914, collaboration with the British was considered as the preservation of the Ottoman sovereignty in Cyprus. However,

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[70] FO 608/33/16 from 1919, *Letter from Lord Milner to Sir G. Fiddes* p.400.
[71] Ibid, 403.

the annexation was a major game-changer. That's why, Hill explains that Turkish minority immediately responded to the annexation with a positive stance, adding only one condition that the island's sovereignty should continue to remain under British and under no circumstance it will be annexed to Greece."[72]

In the meantime, new social dynamics were emerging among the Muslim Cypriots. One of those was the influence of the developments that were happening in Anatolia. For example, a number of Turkish nationalists known as *Jeune Turks* of that time escaped from the rule of the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire Abdulhamit II and came to Cyprus; starting to propagate for Turkish nationalism. The influence of *Jeune Turks* found a considerable response among the Muslim community. Muslim Community who perceived themselves as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire before, adjusted themselves with the new political dynamic through a new identity. Their reaction on the possibility of Enosis eventually fuelled Turkish nationalist sensitivity as well.

The Muslim community in Cyprus internalized the feelings of the nationalist reaction to the occupation of Istanbul and Anatolia and articulated their reaction within the narrative of Turkish nationalism. Their reaction to Greek nationalism became legitimate grounds of counter-nationalism. As the Turkish War of Independence had started and the Greeks were defeated in Anatolia, the despair turned into a triumph. The joy from the success of Turkish nationalist project against foreign occupation became a solid point of departure for national pride and a new beginning for the collective identity in Cyprus too.

The developments in Turkey, closely watched by the Muslim Cypriots and they started to imagine themselves as part of the Turkish nation. The existential crisis of the Muslim community was also over with the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. Kızılyürek claims that Turkey and Mustafa Kemal played a decisive role over the internalisation of the ethnic Turkish identity across the Muslim Cypriots.[73]

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[72] Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, p521.
[73] Kizilyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında,* 221.

For the Muslim Cypriot community, a new era started with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The nationalist politics had started and Turkish identity overcame the religious Muslim identity. The period from the WW1 to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey led to the creation of modern Turkish Cypriot identity. The new nationalist political line had two main issues: The first one was a threat, that was the Enosis demand among the Greek Cypriots. The second one was a strength that is anti-Enosis sentiment and the passion for motherland Turkey and Kemalist nationalism. The combined effect of the two issues played a major role in defining the options for the future of Cyprus.

By the end of the 1920s British Colonial Administration also observed the developments. A report in 1928 mentions the emergence of a new group in the Turkish Cypriot community who supports the implementation of the Kemalist reforms in Cyprus. The report also explains the division between the old and the new groups in the Muslim community, underlining that communal solidarity is not prevalent anymore. Additionally, the possibility of an emergence of a new political elite who may vote together with the Greek Cypriots.[74]

The opposing relationship between the Turkish and Greek nationalisms had a unique setting in the case of Cyprus. Because, the source of their nationalist projects, that is to say, their motherlands, started to establish a new relationship as two neighbours. However, the Cypriot communities did not concede their polarisation to a new understanding. The way that the Greek Cypriots articulated their future relied on the discourse of Enosis. Hill reminds that following the defeat against Turks in Anatolia, the Enosis sentiments' tone was lowered[75] but towards 1927 the demand for Enosis was once again starting to become popular. According to Hill, it was primarily Governor Sir Ronald Storrs' weakness against the Greek nationalism which caused popularisation of the demand for Enosis.[76] Considering the standpoints of Muslim Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as a whole, it is possible to claim that both communities tried to articulate their "future." In this frame, interpretation of the future involves not

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[74] Kizilyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında*, 219.
[75] Hill, *History of Cyprus,* 461.
[76] Ibid, 463.

only individual concerns but also collective existence. Existential concerns constitute the integrity of nationhood. Greek Cypriots' desire to unite Cyprus with Greece or Muslim Cypriots' interpretation of Enosis as an appalling disaster are clear examples of the lack of imagination for a common future across the communities.

However, there were areas of collaboration in socio-economic relations. On one hand, the idea of the nation was emerging and becoming an important part of political life. Also, class relations were getting more political. The period following to the First World War led to several developments creating different dynamics.

Cases of Turkish Cypriot families selling their daughters to people coming from Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries[77] is a good example to understand how desperate the economic conditions were. Even though most of the peasants and industrial workers were living in poverty, labourers in towns started to form unions. The formation of new institutions brought new dimensions to political life and discussions in the public sphere. The unionisation demonstrated the desire of people who were in the workforce to become active political subjects and make their voices heard, even if only on occupational problems. Also, political parties supporting workers were established, and publications were defending the rights of workers in Cyprus were distributed. The emerging working class created an alternative form of popular politics that went beyond nationalism and ethnic divisions.

An ideological alliance among the workers in Cyprus is visible in this period. Despite it being the 1920s when Cypriot labour movements were nascent,[78] Cypriots were acquainted with communist ideas upon the publication of *Neos Anthropos* (New Man). It was the first communist publication in Cyprus issued in January 1925. One of the most critical dimensions of *Neos Anthropos* was its anti-Enosis stance, which underlined the urgency for the independence of

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[77] Neriman Cahit, *Araplara Satılan Kızlarımız*. (Nicosia: Ajans Yayıncılık, 2011)
[78] Mihailis Mihailidis, "Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Sınıfı ve Kıbrıs İşçi Hareketi 1920-1963", *Kıbrıs, Dün ve Bugün.* ed. Masis Kürkçügil (İstanbul: İthaki, 2003), 301.

Cyprus.[79] The ideas emanating from *Neos Anthropos* formed the fundamental ideological grounds of labour unions of the time. They led to the creation of the first left-wing party in 1926, the Communist Party of Cyprus / Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου (ΚΚΚ).

KKK stated its goal as an independent Cyprus in the Socialist Balkan Federation, defending their position against Enosis as follows:

> *...with regard to the national question of Cyprus, that is union with Greece, which has been long regarded the major claim of the bourgeoisie, we remain partially indifferent because they are united with the British capitalists against our movement and the struggle of the workers.[80]*

Initially, KKK had been particularly active in major towns. To embrace the concerns of the oppressed classes, it blended its rhetoric with the issues of the peasantry. One of the significant demands of KKK was to protect their means of income, such as their fields, from pawnbrokers who confiscated them in the name of the law.[81] KKK aimed at distancing itself from religious and nationalist rhetoric and emphasised class-related issues. KKK argued, "From now on, people of Cyprus are not classified as Greeks and Turks who struggle against each other. The division exists as the rich and the poor."[82] Although KKK's class-based approach anticipates the developments that can take place in the future on nationalist polarisation, it did not win the attention of the masses.

Since nationalism impeded KKK's efforts to win the support of the masses, the Communist Party decided to change its rhetoric. The communists reformulated their discourse calling for a united front against foreign powers in Cyprus. In this call, KKK rejected Enosis, but this time they lowered their tone against it. KKK's decision was a strategic choice to gain the support of the masses.[83] It is worth mentioning that, other than its class-based understanding of political affairs,

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[79] Ahmet An, "KKK/AKEL Belgelerinde Kendi Kaderini Tayin Hakkı ve Kıbrıs Türk Toplumuna İlişkin Kronolojik Değerlendirmeler", *Kıbrıs Dün ve Bugün,* Ed. M. Kürkçügil (İstanbul: İthaki, 2003),171.
[80] Yiannos Katsourides, *The National Question in Cyprus and the Cypriot Communist Left in the Era of British Colonialism (*1922–59). Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16(4), (2014): 480.
[81] Mihailidis, *Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Sınıfı,* 304.
[82] Ibid, 307.
[83] An, *KKK/AKEL Belgelerinde,* 171.

KKK did not recognise Enosis, as they did not find it to be a viable political choice.[84] However, Turkish Cypriots' involvement with communist movements were not welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot elite. As far as Turkish nationalist elites were concerned, these movements had a pro-British position, and such cooperation undermined their growing interests by relying on Britain. In 1931, days before the 1931 Uprising, the Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper *Söz* reported:

> *We regret to learn that some unknown Turks have enlisted as communists. We blame their action, as they have done something which is contrary to the public opinion of the Turks of Cyprus and may put the community in a difficult position. We have professors and teachers none of whom is a communist, whom they ought to have consulted beforehand. The proverb says: The stray lambs are seized by the wolves*[85]

This announcement is particularly important because it can show the reactionary stance of Turkish Cypriot political elite on the possibility of the communities to have reached a shared understanding that they could have a common interpretation of the future of Cyprus.

In a nutshell, from the period of colonisation until 1931, initial grounds for ethnicity-based politics were becoming popular. Greek Cypriots showed determination for the unification of Cyprus with Greece and the Muslim community showed dissatisfaction on this political demand while showing signs that they are shifting from religious identity to national identity. The colonial authorities preferred not to mediate these concerns and, base their colonial existence on the ethnic division. Nevertheless, the economic transformation created new opportunities for Cypriots to act together and perhaps find a common ground with a possibility of common future -; however, in the following section, the suppression of this possibility will be addressed allowing us to better examine Britain's response/ plans.

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[84] Umut Bozkurt & Nicos Trimikliniotis, "Incorporating a Class Analysis within the National Question: Rethinking Ethnicity, Class and Nationalism in Cyprus", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 20 (2014), 254.
[85] Ktoris, *Akel and Turkish Cypriots*, 16.

1.2.3. The 1931 Uprising – Causes &Aftermath

The third section of this part focuses on the 1931 Uprising. The event had a significant impact in Cyprus as it could be considered as the beginning of a series of events that led to the further polarisation of the communities and boosted the anti-colonial politics in Cyprus.

The momentous 1931 Uprising started on 21st October 1931 and records show that the colonial authorities were unprepared for this kind of event.[86] However, the colonial administration took advantage of the Uprising for colonial interests and gained an authoritarian rule. Furthermore, it is possible to claim that the Uprising was the accumulation of several other resentments towards the British administration.

The Governor of Cyprus, Ronald Storrs reported five thousand people who participated in this incident, which continued for ten days. Incidents were recorded in six major towns, as well as 209 villages. While six of the insurgents were killed, thirty of them were injured along with thirty-eight security personnel. Probably the most symbolic part of the event was setting of the Governor's Residence on fire by the insurgents.[87]

The colonial narrative framed this event as a "purely Greek rebellion" and blamed Enosis agitators, meaning the Greek nationalist.[88] However, there are multiple aspects of the event that deserve attention because of the way the colonial government handled the aftermath of the uprising.[89]

There are multiple causes of the incidents in 1931. The first dimension was economic. The incident happened following the Great Depression of 1929.[90]

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[86] Bestami Sadi Bilgiç, "The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's Reaction: The Place of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the Eyes of the Greek and Greek Cypriots." *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 4 (2005): 97.

[87] Bilgiç, *The Cyprus Crisis,* 97.

[88] Robert Holland & Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 187.

[89] Altay Nevzat. "Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave." (PhD diss, University of Oulu 2005), 406-407.

[90] The collapse of the stock exchange in the United States had a viral effect on the rest of the world. British exports rapidly dropped, and the percentage of unemployment doubled. The rising unemployment and the perpetual reduction of overall demand affected the entire economic system. One of the impacts of the Great Depression was the creation of tensions in several regions of the world and this had also reflections to the Colonies of Britain.

Cyprus was severely affected by the economic depression.[91] Also, there were structural problems[92] (over-reliance to agriculture and severe climate conditions of the time) as well as limited capital accumulation due to the 92,800 tribute payment. In a nutshell, the colonial economic policies, particularly the tribute payment and followed by unfavourable conditions, constituted lack of resilience.[93]

Another cause was the role of the Greek Foreign Policy. In 1925, the Greek Foreign Minister stated that an immediate response to Greek Cypriots' demands on the unification of Cyprus would be a dangerous utopia.[94] Regarding the issue of Cyprus, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised: "Greek Cypriots to pursue internal changes in the administration of their homeland."[95] However, the appointment of Alexis Kyrou as the General Consul of Greece to Cyprus made an impact. Klapsis explains Kyrou's involvement as a turning point for the 1931 events. Kyrou had a personal interest in Cyprus, as he was originally from the island.[96] Following his appointment in 1930 as a general consulate, he became involved on island politics promoting Enosis. As a first step, he moved the office of the consulate from Larnaca to the administrative and political capital of the island, Nicosia.[97] Next, he tried to convince the British administration on the necessity of Enosis, rather than self-governance.[98] Kyrou, alone, insisted on Enosis and tried to alter Greek foreign policy. Following the 1931 Uprising, the British colonial officials accused Kyrou as the instigator of the events. The Greek government in Athens tried to

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[91] Alexander Apostolides,. *Economic Growth or Continuing Stagnation? Estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938.* (London: London School of Economics Theses 2010): 26.
[92] Alexander Apostolides, "Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Small debt, large problems in Cyprus: How even small debt in a British Colony led to the political crisis and violence in October 1931" accessed 2012, December 11 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43210/
[93] Ibid.
[94] Antonis Klapsis, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil. The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 24, (2009): 129.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Zafer Çakmak, Z. *Kıbrıs'ta İsyan.* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008) 94.
[97] Turgay Bülent Göktürk, "Rumlar'ın Kıbrıs'taki Enosis İsteklerinin Şiddete Dönüşmesi", *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies* 16, (2008), p339.
[98] Klapsis, *Betweeen the Hammer and the Anvil,* 134.

convince the British government that they were not involved in the violence and called back Kyrou.

The final reason for the crisis was passing of a new bill by Governor Storrs concerning taxes as Order in Council. The governor had to pass the law as Order in Council because the Legislative Council rejected the initial proposal since the Turkish members of the Legislative Council decided vote together with the Greek members. Introducing a new tax constituted to one of the essential aspects of public anger turning the reaction into an uprising. Although Turkish members continued to serve in the Legislative Council, Greek Cypriot members showed their dissatisfaction by resigning from their posts. For the Greek Cypriots, one of the most important initiators of the Uprising was the Metropolitan of Kytion. As he resigned from the legislative council to protest "arbitrary acts of foreign dynasts"[99], the proclaimed:

> *During this dark period of fifty years we have let no opportunity pass of proclaiming our sacred desire to be united to Mother Greece, an inspiration which England was the first to recognize as just and sacred when in 1915 she offered Cyprus to the Hellenic Government of that time. On several occasions, we have sent delegations to London; the memoranda and resolutions in favour of the union… More than a hundred times. We had, or rather taken, two occasions -the first in l907and the second a year ago - to receive, with the blue and white flag of Greece and the cry of "Long live the Union"' two members of the English Government who had come to investigate on the spot; the Cyprian question. Alas! Instead of being moved by this fine sight of a people, little and poor but proud in seeking liberty, you have done and still do anything possible to show us that we have sadly deceived ourselves in relying upon your liberal sentiments.[100]*

Certainly, the call for his fellow Greek Cypriots had a significant impact and mobilized the masses to go on the streets.

The enormous reaction of the Colonial Administration to the 1931 Uprising was not coincidental, but purely opportunist. As the native population's willingness to take control of governing matters was an ominous signal for the British Rule in Cyprus and its future presence in Cyprus. However, it is also essential to

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[99] Bilgiç, The Cyprus Crisis, 95.
[100] Ibid.

focus on the developments within the Turkish Cypriot community before the 1931 Uprising to better understand whether 1931 events were a Greek rebellion as claimed by Governor Storrs or whether they were accumulations of overall dissatisfaction related with the governance. This is a necessary step towards understanding how Britain's plans were formed in the general context.

1.2.4 Winds of Change in Turkish Cypriot Political Landscape

Altay Nevzat captures the political developments in detail in that period. One of the most critical development in Turkish Cypriot politics, which affected the 1931 Uprising, was the emergence of populist nationalism led by Mısırlızade Mehmet Necati Özkan.[101] Those were the Turkish nationalist elites who were not satisfied with the British Colonial Administration. They were Kemalists, and they were under the influence of Turkish Ambassador Asaf Bey.[102] The new nationalist trend in Turkish Cypriots was first observed during discussions on the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the British rule in Cyprus in 1928.

Several examples were showing the differences between the new elites and the former elites. One of the interesting examples of this differentiation is the way they celebrated British rule. While the former elite embraced the celebrations of the British rule, new elites did not follow the same way. Their manifesto for that particular event reads as follows:

> *To the respected public of Nicosia:*
> *We all know that until fifty years ago we, Turks, were the rulers of this Island.*
> *The lack of equilibrium in the East caused by the Turco-Russian war resulting unfavourably for the Turks brought, on 12th July 1878, British Administration to our Island and thus our three-century-old sovereignty over this Island came suddenly to an end. As every one of us knows, while passing from supremacy to a state of subjection the Turkish mass in Cyprus has kept its cold blood; it has, in keeping with old Turkish and Muslim tradition, always remained loyal to the Laws and the administration of the new Government and had*

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[101] Mısırlızade Mehmet Necati Özkan (born in 1899) was one of the wealthiest business persons of that period. He owned a cigarette factory, hotels, as well as a cinema. He claimed that his surname (Özkan, meaning pure blood) was given to him by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding president of the Republic of Turkey. (Nevzat, *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus*, 359) He became a candidate for the Legislative Council when he was thirty. He was highly respected among the society and eventually became popular whereas there are poems written on him calling him "Go up front, lead us Necati; We are thirsty, give us the water Necati"

[102] Xypolia, *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,* 144.

endeavoured to forget the painful change at least outwardly. Although during the past fifty years we have been subjected to all sorts of conditions, good or bad, and although, particularly the recent policy [of the Government], has been aiming at throwing us under the feet of the majority, yet, we Turks, have not for a moment failed to respect other people's feelings and have never tried to cause misunderstandings by recalling our past of fifty years ago. It is to be regretted that the Government has decided to hold festivities during these days of mourning for us. ... we, Turks, are not so stupid as not to be able to realize that these festivities are for the celebration of a day which has put an end to our sovereignty and which is, consequently a day of mourning for us. Once this point is understood, we will naturally be excused from participating in such festivities.
We deem it a duty to submit this point to the respected public of Nicosia for their consideration. We trust that our public will not debase themselves to the extent of joining those persons who rejoice on the day of their father's death, and we hope that they will not take part in any of the festivities whether actually or as on-lookers.[103]

The manifesto of the emerging elite was controversial to the former, who had strictly remained allies with the British administration. The former elite blamed the emerging elite as "unpatriotic and devoid of the national spirit is an unpardonable sin." Also, the two leaders of the political front exchanged their views. Mehmet Munir, representing the former elite and Necati Özkan representing the emerging elites entered into fierce competition in 1930 elections. While Necati Özkan accused Mehmet Munir of nepotism, Mehmet Munir accused Necati Özkan of being 'pro-Greek'. Eventually, Özkan secured his place and he made choices that broke the traditional British – Turkish Cypriot cooperation. A new wave of nationalism started to influence Muslim Cypriots, particularly after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (29 October 1923). Under the influence of Kemalist ideology, elected representatives in the following period, they aimed to introduce new perspectives to frame their relations with the coloniser.

The shifting attitudes of the Turkish Cypriot elites made the administration of the colony much harder for Governor Storrs. In his letter to the Secretary of State on 4th June 1931, a few months before the 1931 Uprising, Storrs expressed his concerns:

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[103] Nevzat, *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus,* 362-3.

The attitude of the Greek members, always disagreeable and sometimes trying has been ineffective for so long as the Government could rely on loyal Turkish cooperation. This is no longer available as the Greeks, taking advantage of personal and party rivalries within the Turkish community, have been enabled to buy or otherwise persuade a recently elected Turkish nonentity, Nejati Bey, to vote with them, thus effectively blocking the passage of the Customs Bill, of a Village Authorities Bill introduced to remedy the evil reported in my confidential despatch of the 17th April 1931, and other measures. There is every reason to suppose that Nejati Bey can be counted upon for full participation in all steps taken to embarrass the Government. He has recently joined Mr Theodotou, a Greek member of Council of the extreme left-wing, in moving a resolution for the abolition of the post of Director of Education as at present constituted and for substituting, therefore, a Greek and a Turkish Director. No ardent supporter of the Union movement could wish for anything better, and if the resolution is brought under debate, it would, of course, be carried. Nejati Bey has travelled through the country stirring up Turkish national feelings. On the 1st May, he assembled a meeting of Turks from all parts of the Island to appoint a Mufti as a political and religious leader and a committee to take over the Evkaf Department. This meeting, composed of some 140 persons, was entitled a National Congress and manifestos, of which I enclose copies, were issued by the Central Committee and the "Mufti." Needless to say, this was followed by the strongest possible protest from Turkish notables, preachers and representatives of villages.[104]

Later on, his reference to Necati as "worthless" was framed by being referred to as "the 13th Greek in the Legislative Council."[105] Repeatedly the Colonial Administration raised concerns about the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots towards Britain. While Storrs explained to the Secretary of State, his worries:

The Turkish and communistic movements, while mischievous, are in no way alarming. Their importance lies only in the fact that disorder if it arose, might take somewhat longer to quell than would otherwise be the case.

A united and loyal Turkish community has always been regarded as a useful safeguard in troubles times, but this cannot at present be guaranteed. The communists would, of course, take such action as would promote and prolong disturbances.[106]

Also, Cowell noted:

The difficulty is that any change in the constitution could have no hope of success unless it involved a drastic reduction in the powers possessed by the Elected Members. So long as the present spirit prevails amongst the Turks in Cyprus, there is no hope that any

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[104] Nevzat, *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,* 396.
[105] Nevzat, *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,* 398.
[106] Ibid, 397.

constitution, however ingenious its provisions, can be worked efficiently unless it gives the Governor complete ultimate control of legislation and finance. On the other hand, the present constitution can still be made to function more or less imperfectly, since we always have in the last resort the power of legislation by Order in Council. If the Elected Members should unite to reject the Budget, presumably it would be carried by Order in Council as was done on a previous occasion, and the ordinary routine administration of the Island can be carried on even if a number of desirable legislative acts which it is not worthwhile to enact by Order in Council must remain unpassed.[107]

Considering that the correspondences above took place before the 1931 Uprising, then it is evident that the British administration in Cyprus had no exit strategy. As a result, they preferred to wait, and 1931 became a good pretext for the change, including the dissolution of the legislative council and ruling Cyprus in a coercive manner.

Storrs's telegram to the Colonial Office emphasised that the 1931 events were "purely Greek rebellion".[108] After the Uprising, punitive taxes were imposed on Greek Cypriots a list of oppressive measures implemented. The measures targeted both communities and consisted of 1) the dissolution of the Legislative Council, 2) the suspension of municipal elections, 3) the Governor to have exclusive rights on appointing village head-person/ mukhtars, 4) propagating Enosis criminalized, 5) forbidding the use of foreign flags, 6) prohibiting the unauthorized assembly of five or more people, and 7) the imposition of media censorship.[109] The oppressive measures started the emergency rule, which continued until the end of the colonial period. Emergency measures led the Greek Cypriot population to form its narrative supporting Enosis. Among Greek Cypriots, it played a significant role, since it became the source of narratives related to national identity. Those narratives later became the cornerstones of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement.[110]

The British Administration's decision to act in a coercive manner eliminated the formation of any common ground, which would have been possible had the

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[107] Ibid.
[108] Robert Holland & Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes,*187.
[109] Alexis Rappas, "The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26 (2008): 364.
[110] Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında,* 6.

Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot cooperation continued. The communities lost the opportunity to envisage a shared future after the rupture in 1931,[111] which led to the formation of different narratives. After 1931, it is possible to claim that communities of Cyprus started their nationalist polarisations. In other words, it could be seen as the beginning of the colonial intervention that exploited the nationalist feelings, deepening the level of conflict in Cyprus.

1.3 British Administration in Cyprus Following 1931 Uprising (1931 – 1950)

British Colonial Administration in Cyprus entered to a new trajectory in Cyprus after the 1931 Uprising. The determining aspect of this period was the dismissal of the constitution and the limited representative rights of the Cypriots under the legislative council. The lack of a constitution created much authoritarian governance that goes with several measures aiming at repressing the nationalist reactions. The repressed nationalist sentiments resulted in both communities' deepened attachments to their own national identities.

Greek and Turkish nationalisms started to define the political identities of the communities and their political narratives and actions. The competitive characters of those nationalisms began to constitute two political communities with contrasting political ideals.

During the period from 1931 to 1950, Cyprus had six different governors namely Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer, William Denis Battershill, Charles Campbell Wooley, Reginald Fletcher, 1st Baron Winster and Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright. Each governor served in different lengths and during their rule, they gave a mix of signals as Britain's colonial policy subject to change largely because of the pre and post Second World War conditions.

This section is divided into three sub-sections with reference to the chronological developments. The first sub-section focuses on the developments from 1931 Uprising until the Second World War. The effects of

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[111] Claiming that the measures taken after the 1931 created grounds for anticolonial Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot movements cannot be answered completely. One of the primary reasons behind this is the limitations from the British Archives as the issue cannot be tracked back in more detail until January 2031, when the relevant Colonial Office documents under the reference CO 67/239/4 and CO 67/242/5 become available.

the 1931 Uprising and its impacts on the political narratives of the two communities will be elaborated. In the second sub-section, the developments during the Second World War will be covered. Particular attention will be given to the developments concerning Enosis demand in the Greek Cypriots. Also, the evolution of the Turkish nationalist discourse and the political developments will be covered in the same section. The third sub-section will focus on the post-2nd World War period until the 1950 petition of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis. The reflections of the developments after the 2nd World War will be covered and the reference on the notion of self-determination discussed.

1.3.1. Period Between 1931 & Second World War

Following the shockwave after the 1931 Uprising, for Britain, it was the time to reconsider the British policy in Cyprus. Once the 1931 Uprising's initial shock was over for the Colonial Administration, Edward Stubbs was appointed as a Governor in 1932. He was replaced by Herbert Richmond a year later.

Stubbs tried to understand the developments in the island by deploying some research missions. He prepared a document called *Memorandum* covering some of the political ideas on the governance of Cyprus. He also commissioned two other reports that are *The Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus* and *Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus*.   Stubbs underlines the increasing mistrust between the communities in Cyprus in his *Memorandum* emphasizing the risks of competitive nationalist projects.[112] Stubbs, explains the need for advanced western training for the natives to overcome mistrust. In his report, he underlined the necessity for the reform of secondary education to address the influence of Communists and the Greek Orthodox Church.[113] He was convinced that Cypriots were unfit to govern their country by saying; "I know of no community which is so utterly unfit to take any responsible part in the Government of its native country as is that of Cyprus"[114].

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[112] Rappas, *The Elusive Polity,* 367.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.

Until the Second World War, Stubbs' interpretation of Cyprus played a vital role in the policies that shaped the colonial administration. Richmond Palmer defined his aim to protect peasants from the Enosis obsession of the elites.[115] However, his methods of protection the peasants were authoritarian. Palmer's six-year rule named as Palmerocracy due to his authoritarianism...[116] In his remarkable essay[117], Alexis Rappas explains 1931 as a traumatic experience for the political actors at a time. Rappas emphasizes that the period between 1931 and the Second World War was not a dull period of authoritarian governance, neither the denial of the emerging nationalist aspirations in Cyprus. On the contrary, Palmer introduced some policies to legitimize the colonial administration in Cyprus by attempting to understand the Cypriot affairs much in details.[118] Those policies largely relied on three major pieces of research that were commissioned by Stubbs.

Palmer took the post-1931 conditions as an opportunity for the Colonial Administration to penetrate the community. Palmer also implemented some managerial techniques, primarily, the decentralisation of the colonial administration. Palmer created a new institutional framework that deploys more powers to the district commissioners. Six district commissioners gradually gathered a significant portion of the power and became the decision-making actors. The idea of decentralized administration primarily aimed at following the political activities in Cyprus to protect the government from the island-wide political movements like the case in 1931. Palmer, also, revised the Cyprus Criminal Code and introduced "political activity" as a criminal offence. Also, the freedom of press largely put under censorship as Palmer stated that "in the Near East freedom of the press means the suppression of free speech or at least honest free speech: it puts a premium on corruption, intimidation and fraud."[119]

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[115] Richter, *Kıbrısın Kısa Tarihi,* 44.
[116] Rappas, *The Elusive Polity,* 364.
[117] İbid.
[118] İbid, 365.
[119] İbid, 369.

Palmer believed that decentralisation and effective criminal code the agitators can be kept under control. At the same time, he acknowledged the need for a better education system. For this reason, he took various steps including centralization of the education curriculum and ban on the books that arrive from Greece or Turkey. He believed that once a new generation of Cypriots who had trained with modern British education can make mature decisions. Accordingly, after a certain level of political maturity, the representative structures can be introduced.[120]

Palmer underestimated one of the most effective institutions in the island: Church of Cyprus. As an institution, the Church was considered as the enemy of the administration as it was involved in the 1931 Uprising and punished by the government by sending three of its bishops to exile. In 1933, Archbishop of Cyprus Cyril III died and Leontios Savvas assumed the position of *Locum Tenens*. As the three bishops were in exile; holding an election for the new Archbishop became impossible. Colonial Administration in Cyprus tried to show its decisiveness by not allowing the exiled bishops to return. Administration's attitude undermined the legitimacy of the Colonial Administration across the Greek Cypriots. Palmer's attitude to prolong the Church's activities under the interim-Archbishop brought reactions and created enabling grounds for the Church to intensify political debates between the candidates of the Archbishop position. As the "Church Question" became a societal issue, the Church gradually take a stronger position in the public domain. Until the time that the elections for the new Archbishop concluded, the Church was better organized.

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community believed that they were unjustly punished by the 1931 Uprising. However, the Colonial Administration did not make any distinction. The results of the 1930 elections and the events that unfold in the Legislative Council showed that the Kemalist nationalist elites were not as loyal as the former elites. The influence of Young Turks and the rising Kemalist Turkish nationalists were damaging the balance of power in the legislative council. For this reason, 1931 Uprising was an opportunity to cease

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[120] Rappas, *The Elusive Polity,* 370.

the presence of representative structures once and for all. Colonial Administration instrumentalized the conditions to eliminate the influence of nationalisms.

Also, Palmer focused on the Turkish Cypriots education system and took some reforms. However, the reform actions were not fulfilling the desires of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots' demand for communal educational reform to have absolute control over the education system. Secondly, the textbooks that come from Turkey were banned and finally, the number of Turkish Cypriot students allowed to study in high school was limited only to fifty.

In addition to the measures in education, British administration continued to cooperate with the loyalist elites like Munir Bey and ignored the Kemalist elites. Despite the declining popularity of Sir Munir, Britain preferred to cooperate with him turning the relations with the Turkish Cypriots into an unsatisfactory dimension.

British administration also complained about the Turkish Ambassador in Cyprus as they believed that the ambassador supported the Kemalists that agitates against the British interests. Palmer also complained about the Turkish Cypriot nationalist newspapers in Cyprus. In one of his memos to the British Embassy in Turkey, Palmer stated that "among the Turks, some journalists and politicians are Kemalists. Ses and Soz newspapers agitate for Turkish nationalism and they have a secessionist and seditious attitude."[121] Gürel also shares another important conversation between British Ambassador in Turkey Percy Loraine and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras. In the lengthy note that Gürel shares, Turkish Republic's views on the increasing influence of Kemalists in Cyprus seen as a concern as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras stated his readiness to cooperate with British Ambassador to dismantle his concerns concerning anti-British sentiment among the new wave of nationalist Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, he declares those who do not cooperate with Britain are the enemies of Kemalism.[122] It is possible to conclude from that note, by the

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[121] Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi 1878-1960,* (Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985), 190
[122] Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi*, 192

end of 1930s, the Turkish government prioritizes her relations with Britain and approach Cyprus issue as an ally of Britain.

Considering the whole period of Palmer's Governorship, it is possible to conclude that his plans utterly failed. The efforts for decentralisation were unable to prevent the rise of the Church as a political actor. The intervention of the Colonial Administration to the Archbishop elections fired back and brought the Enosis demand back to the agenda. In the case of Turkish Cypriots, Britain was convinced by Turkey; however, failed to address the growing nationalist movements in the Turkish Cypriot community. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots did not radicalize their position and followed the instructions by keeping the Turkish – British cooperation alive while the governance of Cyprus entered a new phase once the Second World War started.

1.3.2. Cyprus During the Second World War

The period from 1931 to 1939, the Colonial Administration in Cyprus aimed at forming an effective government through several measures. In 1939, William Dennis Battershill replaced Richmond Palmer and became the new Governor who was considered to be more tolerant and liberal. One of the crucial matters that remained unanswered as Battershill took the role of the Governor was related to the Constitution of Cyprus as the island was administered by executive orders.

A.J. Dave, a principal player in the colonial office, stated that: "the defects of the Constitution had, of course, been realised and the riots of 1931 were in some respects a godsend, as they braced us up to abolishing it."[123] However, the lack of constitution from 1931 onwards became the core matter of political discussions. Despite the House of Commons decided that it would "be

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[123] Diana Markides & George Georghallides, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, (1995): p.68.

necessary hereafter to review the whole question of the constitutional future of the island"[124] the attempts repeatedly failed.

Battershill period provided a much dynamic political atmosphere for the communities. During this period, nationalist feelings were also acknowledged by the administration; for instance, the former law banning the use of foreign flags was removed.[125] This led the people of Cyprus to initiate a nationalist race by hanging Greek and Turkish flags.[126] Municipal elections also took place in 1943 for the first time following the 1931 Uprising.

Battershill's liberal attitude also continued by the following Governor Charles Campbell Woolley who served for five years. These two governors that served in Cyprus during the Second World War played a vital role in the transformation of the political landscape.

1.3.3 World War II, Impacts and Aftermath (1939-1950)

When Greece entered the Second World War along with Britain, the Greek Cypriots considered this as an opportunity to reach their national aspirations. As the notion of self-determination was also on the rise, Greek Cypriots started to have a much cooperative stand which also amazed the Governor Battershill.[127]

In 1940, the Cyprus Regiment was established. In total, 11.749 Cypriots from both communities served in the Cyprus Regiment until the end of the war.[128]. By doing so, both communities expected to influence the British administration's views on the future of Cyprus by showing their loyalty and contribution to the war efforts. While this meant the continuation of the status quo for the Turkish

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[124] Markides & Georghallides, British Attitudes to Constitution-Making, 69.
[125] Anastasia Yiangou, *II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Kıbrıs: Doğu Akdeniz'de Siyaset ve Çatışma*, (Lefkoşa: Khora Yayınları, 2016) 90.
[126] Ibid, p.91.
[127] Yiangou, *II Dünya Savaşında Kıbrıs*, 59.
[128] George Kazamias, "Military Recruitment and Selection in a British Colony: The Cyprus Regiment 1939 – 1944" *Greek research in Australia: proceedings of the sixth biennial international Conference of Greek Studies* (333-342). Adelaide: Dept. of Languages - Modern Greek, Flinders University,335.

Cypriots, for the Greek Cypriots the expectation was the fulfilment of the Atlantic Charter's which may in return bring Enosis.

Despite the different reasons, during a Parliamentary debate regarding the "War Situation" on 16th January 1940, the British Prime Minister recognised the Cypriot regiment by stating:

> *Colonial Empire continues to bring valuable reinforcement of many kinds to our war effort. Hon. Members will know that the first Colonial contingent has now arrived in France in the form of a transport unit from Cyprus. It is representative of all those Colonial military forces which are ready to defend their own lands and liberties against the common enemy.*[129]

The acting Archbishop of the Cyprus Church promoted Greek Cypriots to join the Greek army. Subscription to the Greek military raised the concerns of the Governor and considered the encouragement of the Church as "political opportunism."[130] However, there was no intervention by the Church with regards to this matter. On the contrary, at first, Colonial Administration perceived communist affiliations as a reason for rejecting to subscribe to the regiment.[131] This exclusion ended in 1943 when AKEL decided to subscribe hundreds of its members to the Cyprus Regiment.

Simultaneously, discussions on the future of Cyprus got intensified as the outcome of the war may have caused several disruptions in the region. Following the occupation of Crete by the Axis Powers, British War Cabinet seriously considering to cede Cyprus to Greece once again.[132] However, Gürel

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[129] 356, Parl. Deb. H.C, (1940), cc33-102.
[130] Yiangou, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Kıbrıs,* 11.
[131] Ibid.
[132] The memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies includes an analysis of the situation. Accordingly, he provides several options to consider as a future step in case of the German occupation of Cyprus. He listed three options: a) To remain indifferent and expect the worst-case scenario from German propaganda, b) To declare the UK's willingness to discuss the basis for leaving Cyprus to Greece on specific conditions (including a base in Cyprus or elsewhere) prior to the potential German occupation of Cyprus, c) To meet with Greece directly and consult on potential German tactics, prior to potential German involvement. The memorandum concludes with the urgency of Britain to meet with the Greek government. Also,

indicates another note, dated 2nd June 1941, from the British Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of State Anthony Eden. According to this memorandum, Churchill emphasised the British position as zero territorial concession during the war. Churchill indicated the Muslim presence in Cyprus who would "react against leaving Cyprus to Greece."[133] Churchill's stance caused a bitter reaction in his Greek counterpart. [134] However, even the signs on the possibility of uniting Cyprus with Greece perceived positively across the Greek Cypriots Enosis supporters. In short, it is possible to interpret that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots' participation to the Cyprus regiment was a tactical move motivated by each community's desires about the future of Cyprus.

However, the developments in that period were not only limited to the war; there were two more important political developments: Firstly, the foundation of AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού – Progressive Party of Working People) in 1941 and secondly, the foundation of KATAK (Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık Kurumu - Cyprus Island Turkish Minority Institution) in 1943. These two organisations represented two important political streams other than the one represented by the Church.

AKEL was the rebranded version of the Cyprus Communist Party. Following the decision in April 1941, AKEL was founded (with leading KKK figures) along with some of the respected liberals aiming at representing the working people/class. However, representatives from rural areas, peasants and Turkish Cypriots were absent at the foundation of the party.[135] Plutis Servas was the Secretary-General of both parties which clearly shows the continuity from KKK. As a communist party, AKEL also put rights of the working people in its agenda. On the national question, in the beginning, there were no explicit references to

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the memorandum states that the British government must be ready to declare her willingness to talk about the future of Cyprus with Greece, and consent to a common declaration to discuss the transfer of sovereignty of Cyprus from Britain to Greece details are from United Kingdom, British Archives, CO 67/316/37 from 2 June 1941, *Future of Cyprus*.

[133] Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi*, 27.
[134] Yiangou, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Kıbrıs,* 131.
[135] Ibid.

Enosis, and they maintained their position from KKK as "the recognition of the national identity of both communities."[136]

However, in the following years, position on the national question began to shape, and a more explicit reference to self-determination started to be emphasized. On 30th May 1942, AKEL's memorandum to the Governor demanded the right to self-determination to be implemented for Cypriot people in consistence with the Atlantic Charter.[137] During the third-party congress in April 1944, AKEL asked for the recognition of the Cypriot people's right to decide national restoration. Consequently, in the fourth party congress in July 1945, AKEL openly endorsed Enosis, demanding the union with the motherland Greece.[138] Furthermore, AKEL's executive bureau stated that KKK's demand for autonomy was a mistake.[139]

The political transformation led by AKEL influenced the labour unions. Few months after AKEL's foundation, labour unions were organised at a national level. On 16th November 1941, the second conference of Cyprus unions, a governing body called Pan-Cyprian Trade Union Committee (PSE), was established.[140] The strengthening trade union movement brought more support to AKEL. Also, the British administration was pressured into introducing new legislations, including a law on minimum wage, labour dispute resolution laws and laws on arbitration and examination of labour disputes.[141] This enabled, AKEL to appeal to the ordinary people via using its strength in the labour unions.

Nearer the time of municipal elections in 1943, AKEL's hegemony became threatening to the Church's hegemony. As a counter move, the Church started to reorganize themselves around the Enosis discourse. The active presence of AKEL in rural areas curtailed when a right-wing Cyprus Agrarian Union (PEK) was founded. Nevertheless, AKEL further established themselves through PSE

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[136] Ibid, 483.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Katsourides, *The National Question*, 484.
[139] Katsourides,Kıbrıs Komünist Partisi Tarihi, 101.
[140] The committee was renamed the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) once some of the nationalist trade unions decide to leave and form Cyprus Workers Confederation (SEK) in 1944. Yiangou, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Kıbrıs*, 127.
[141] Yiangou, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Kıbrıs*, 130.

in towns, mostly because of the rising number of workers. Furthermore, they tended to develop contacts in London to advocate local problems as well as the issue of Enosis.[142]

In 1944, a pamphlet was written by a prominent pro-AKEL figure, Doros Alastos. Alastos demanding the British government and the people of Britain to support Cyprus's right to determine its future in accordance with the Atlantic Charter.[143] Alastos also explained AKEL's vision of Enosis as follows:

> *Demand for ending the imperialist connection does not mean the ending of all contact with Britain. We feel sure that new forms of international organisation will emerge as a result of this war which in themselves, will impose certain limitations to unbridled national or state sovereignties, and under these conditions – with Cyprus as part of Greece – arrangements can be made for questions of defence, of bases, etc. Under such conditions Cyprus, united with Greece, will enjoy not only national and political freedom but also a certain degree of local autonomy in which Greeks and Turkish will have an equal voice, an autonomy calculated to uphold the right of the minority on a footing of absolute equality with the majority and guaranteed both by Britain and Greece.[144]*

Alastos's vision makes AKEL's position on Enosis clear that it was not only for Greeks but rather seem like an inclusive project for Turkish Cypriots. The statement recognizes Turkish Cypriots as a minority within Greece. The crucial and lacking point is that how this was interpreted by Turkish Cypriot communists. Turkish Cypriot members of the communist party in this period were already influenced by the Kemalist ideas but the question that cannot be answered is whether they perceived this as a compromise or not. What is known is that the most influential Turkish Communist poet Nazım Hikmet supported the idea of Enosis and called Turkish Cypriots to act together with their Greek Cypriot comrades.[145]

It is possible to claim that the Enosis demand was an authentic desire of the Greek nationalists in Cyprus and rejection of this was the authentic desire of Turkish nationalists in Cyprus. So, in the case of Cyprus, de-ethnicization of

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[142] The Autonomy for Cyprus Committee was one of the active organisations during that period supporting AKEL's policies on various grounds. One of the members of the committee was Ezekias Papaiaonnu who became the second Secretary General of AKEL from 1949 to 1989.
[143] Alastos, *Cyprus Past and Future,* (London: Committee for Cyprus Affairs. 1944) 58-9.
[144] Ibid, p. 75.
[145] Ahmet An, *Kıbrıs'ta Üç Dönem Üç Aydın*. (İstanbul: Yazılama Yayınevi, 2013) 72.

politics was somewhat impossible. For example, in 1944, a significant number of Greek Cypriot workers participated in a pro-Enosis demonstration. This was perceived negatively among the Turkish Cypriot community which led to the creation of Association of Turkish Cypriot Workers Unions (KTİBK) representing the split of working class on ethnic lines.

 Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu's remarkable article on Halkin Sesi newspaper towards the end of the 2nd World War tells a lot about this development and the dilemma of class and nationalism. In his article Kavazoğlu, criticized the Pan-Cypriot Federation of Labour (PEO) in 1944, for their support for Enosis. He wrote a letter explaining why the working class will be divided based on the ethnic lines and explained why the nationalism has the primary responsibility on this result. The letter published in *Halkın Sesi* in 1944 under the alias of D. A. Alkan, signed as a Turkish worker, and called Greek Cypriot leftists to think:

> *You should know that Turkish workers have never done anything against or contrary to the working population by anyone's motivation or by falling into a dream.*
>
> *On the contrary, Turks are also working for the interest of all labourers and artisans. However, allow me to explain the many reasons why we are parting from you. If you think unbiasedly, and duly examine your constitution, you will easily understand that the Turkish Workers Union is not working against you. However, if you choose not to understand this, allow me to do the explaining for you as to why we are leaving. On the 25th March, you decorated your union building with your flags, and although you chanted orations declaring the importance of this day for you, you have never put any Turkish flag on your building to celebrate any of our national days and never uttered a word that acknowledged our national days. The worst is, on 19th May which is the biggest sports day, you did not even let us listen to the radio announcements from Ankara. Despite your union's mandate being only about protecting the rights of artisans and labourers, without any authority from any Turkish labourer, your Secretary-General Mr Zartides sent a stilted telegram to the British Prime Minister on the annexation of the island to Greece. Despite your union having hundreds of Turks and many Armenian members, in some general assemblies, you chant, "Brothers! Because we are Greek, we should continue our struggle to organize, so we can advance our nation". If indeed you do not discriminate against race and religion, why is there no Turk in the government-recognized district council? In your article, you said, "Turks have auxiliary councils." Without the approval of the district councils, what is the value of the auxiliary councils?! Our auxiliary councils, which were not free, only and solely operated as a propaganda tool to put your annexation litany into our minds. That's*

> *what you need to think about with a neutral mind. Sir, I am sure that you will approve our concerns and hold our hands to cooperate in raising the issues of the workers.[146]*

Such a substantive critique of Kavazoglu indicates the reasons why the working class was split into different ethnic camps. The split in the working class represents the major breakdown in the fabric of the society in Cyprus. Ktoris (2013) examines the relations between AKEL and Turkish Cypriots from 1941 to 1955. According to Ktoris, AKEL acknowledged that supporting Enosis, distanced Turkish Cypriots from the party. However, he also added that AKEL believed that Turkish Cypriots should understand the strategic necessity of such a policy.[147]

The nationalist wave among the Turkish Cypriots was as strong as the Greek Cypriots. As a result, AKEL's expectation of Turkish Cypriots to understand the strategic value of their policy worked oppositely. Starting with the working class eventually, the conditions created a duplication of social, economic and political organisations based on ethnicity. The vacuum of the nationalist politics gradually brought conditions that also desired by the colonial administration since they can instrumentalize the ethnic difference to sustain their presence in Cyprus.

The transformation in the political landscape was not only limited to the working class. As the left-wing was putting self-determination as a progressive policy and popularizing it, the Church did not want to share the leadership with the left. As AKEL was getting stronger as a political party, the Church realized the need for an alternative party. Shortly after the AKEL's success in municipal elections, Greek Cypriot nationalist Themistoklis Dervis announced the foundation of Cyprus National Party (KEK) on 6th June 1943. KEK's programme aimed at coordinating and uniting the national powers of Cyprus (as oppose to AKEL a communist party which was not considered as a national element) for the unification of the island with Greece, by strengthening and preserving the ideals of Orthodox Christians and securing the welfare of the island by

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[146] Kızılyürek, Kıbrısta Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi, 55-6.

[147] Ibid, 26.

developing the Cyprus economy.[148] The foundation of the nationalist party brought yet another actor for the promotion of national self-determination. A nationalist party instead of a communist one quickly attracted new supporters and the Church was able to enhance its narratives. New political party strengthened the hands of the Church as well as expanded the grassroots of Enosis movement.

Finally, the other nationalist stream that is worth taking into consideration is Cyprus Island Turkish Minority Institution (KATAK) under which Turkish Cypriots were being organized based on the nationalist lines during the Second World War. In 1943, the first nationalist organisation of Turkish Cypriots, KATAK, was founded with 76 prominent figures of the Turkish Cypriot community, including members of the local and Legislative Councils, businessmen, artists, and teachers. The initiative led by pro-British Sir Münir attempted to re-establish his leadership in the community. However, this attempt failed as the Kemalists had already reached a much decisive strength. In the following year (1944), Dr Fazıl Küçük formed the first political party of the Turkish Cypriots called KMTHP - Kıbrıs Milli Türk Halk Partisi (Cyprus National Turkish People Party). After the foundation of the KMTHP, labour unions were re-organised around KMTHP under an umbrella organisation that was named Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birlikleri Kurumu - Association of Turkish Cypriot Workers Unions (KTİBK). On one hand, it is possible to observe the British Colonial Administration's role to establish a counter-power against the Greek nationalists. However shortly after Kemalists' take-over of the nationalist cause can be seen also the escalation of nationalist politics. However, Kucuk states the insufficient level of political organisations in the Turkish Cypriots:

> *As painful as it is, we must admit that we, Turkish Cypriots, are extremely backward in social areas when compared to our neighbours (Greek Cypriots: MH). We have either chosen to ignore*

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[148] Ibid, 187.

> *the things happening around us or be oblivious to the numerous organisations that they have set up, tirelessly and insistently.*[149]

It is possible to claim that the Turkish Cypriot community perceived itself as an inferior subject, while Enosis, as a national goal, was getting more consolidated among the Greek Cypriot community. Although the Turkish Cypriot community did not see Enosis as its desired project, neither did it develop any national goal to ascribe. Those developments led the anti-Enosisist character of the Turkish nationalism. Additionally, Kemalism included anti-communist principles, and Turkish Cypriot communists were also considered as traitors.[150] During World War II, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites' position was conservative both in cultural and political manners.

In short, from 1931 until 1945, the common ground between the two communities eroded. The momentum for the formation of a unifying identity was over once national kinship became the primary determinant of politics. Also, the class-centred approaches gradually became obsolete as the nationalism also became the source of the friction between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot working classes.

In Cyprus, several groups including Communists, Church and the Turkish Cypriots had different aspirations and after the Second World War they did not comprehend a vision for Cyprus that could embrace all nationalisms but instead, there was a competition of nationalisms. When the War was over, Cypriots experienced the transformation in the international community and tried to influence the global view over the notion of self-determination. The next section focuses on the period from 1945 to 1950 and shows the significance of the 1950 Enosis Referendum in Cyprus.

1.3.4 End of War and the 1950 Enosis Referendum

The end of World War II was a turning point for world politics, and for the people of Cyprus, there was no exception. Although Britain announced her victory, the catastrophic effects of the war were to come. It became clear in no time that

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[149] İbid, 49.

[150] Nevzat, *Nationalism among the Turks of Cyprus,* 329.

running an empire was now extremely costly, which eventually became impossible to manage. This had led to the end of colonisation in the history as places in various locations including India was decolonised.

After Britain abandoned one of its most valuable overseas territories, Cypriots hoped that they would be next. However, the colonial secretary at the time did not share the same idea.[151] While Britain was attempting to secure its presence, Greek Cypriots were competing with against each politically whilst being united on the national cause called Enosis. The political rivalry amongst Greek Cypriots (regarding who was going to rule Cyprus) redefined the politics on the island from 1945 to 1950. Even though both sides supported Enosis, they competed for the leadership of their community. The struggle for leadership of the Enosis movement did not consider the Turkish Cypriots' political concerns.

Contrary to the decolonisation and its international political matters, the fundamental rights in Cyprus improved. Britain started to consider promoting self-government with limited autonomy via offering a constitution. In the Cold War era, AKEL's popularity was increasing, British Administration in Cyprus started to consider ways to undermine the strength of the communists. Particularly following the 1946 local elections, support for AKEL further increased and AKEL won six out of the eight municipalities. AKEL's victory sent a clear message to Britain and raised concerns over the risk of the Sovietisation of Cyprus.

To counterbalance the communists, Colonial Administration started to take steps which strengthened the Church's position. One of the major moves of that time was to allow the exiled bishops to return to Cyprus as well as granting further freedoms to the Church. At this point, Britain's liberal attitude towards the Church was a tactical move to create stronger power bloc to slow down the rise of the communists which threatened Britain's presence on the island. In the first archiepiscopate elections following the post-1931 conditions, Leontios was elected. However, he died a month later on 26th July 1947, and he was replaced by Makarios II at the age of 78. Makarios II claimed that he was the

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[151] Richter, *Kıbrısın kısa tarihi,* 49.

legitimate representative of Greek Cypriots. The split between democratic and traditional representations caused a rift among the Greek Cypriot community. As Holland (1998) argues, the political polarisation amongst Greek Cypriots turned into a "bitter struggle between the ecclesiastical Right and the secular Left for the dominance of the Greek community."[152]

Despite his power struggle with the communists, Makarios II promoted the Enosis demand by uniting several other groups to ally and reclaiming the political representation of Greek Cypriots under the Church. In August 1947, representatives of the Church, right-wing organisations, labour unions, and many other organisations convened. Makarios II announced the foundation of the Council of the Ethnarchy. The Council of the Ethnarchy was a consultative unit to coordinate relations between the colonised and the coloniser in discussions for constitutional reforms. However, the Council of the Ethnarchy unanimously agreed to reject every proposal that did not unite Cyprus with Greece.[153]

In Cyprus, the Church was constructing new rules to bring the people together. The reorganised right-wing forced the communists to realize that they were no longer the only organised group. The communists decided to take part in the Legislative Council and show their willingness to collaborate. However, their participation in the Legislative Council backfired, led to the erosion of AKEL's support across the Greek Cypriots. It was considered as a deviation from the national goal of Enosis. Once Britain realized that the Consultative Assembly was not going to produce any meaningful result for a new constitution, it was abolished in 1948.

The right-wing claimed that Enosis was the only remaining solution for Cyprus. Following the Governor's decision, AKEL held its general assembly and purged those members who supported the idea of joining the Consultative Assembly, including the founders of the party. The new conditions damaged the left, AKEL

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[152] Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959.* (New York: Oxford University Press 2002) 15.

[153] Richter, *Kıbrısın KısaTarihi*, 51.

received significantly fewer votes in the 1949 local elections. Greek Cypriot voters were shifting to side with the Church yet again. The Church's unreconcilable, norm-making way of politics was proving to be successful.

As the polarisation between the Greek Cypriot Left and the Right continued in 1950, an idea of putting the Enosis demand on a referendum dominated the public sphere. The Governor of the time Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright claimed that the referendum was not legitimate. Also, how the Enosis Plebiscite was carried out resembled a petition campaign, without the participation of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot newspapers boycotted the campaign and declared it illegitimate. The total number of Turkish Cypriot participants in the Plebiscite for Enosis was only 42.[154] The referendum resulted in a 96% support of Enosis, making it the common political goal of Greek Cypriots.

The Referendum in 1950 represents one of the important turning points in the political history of Cyprus. The referendum was an exemplary case for the democratisation of the Enosis demand. Also, it offered a legitimate ground for the internationalisation of the concerns of the natives regarding the Britain colonialism as the notion of self-determination turning into a legal demand. Secondly, since the referendum took place under the auspices of the Council of the Ethnarchy, turning the Cyprus Orthodox Church the vanguard of Enosis. From this point onwards, the right-wing nationalists became the flag carrier of the Enosis cause. Thirdly, Turkish Cypriots perceived the referendum with suspicion and fear and interpreted the outcome of the referendum as a tremendous threat. The manipulation of their fears led Turkish Cypriots to reorganise themselves in a more reactionary nationalist way. Finally, due to the rising Turkish Cypriot concerns, Turkey was forced to take a stand on the politics and future of Cyprus. During a debate in the Turkish National Assembly, a former foreign minister re-affirmed Turkey's respect towards the British sovereignty on the island through these words: "we do not have any problem called Cyprus". This became a milestone in the political discussions which

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[154] Ktoris, AKEL and Turkish Cypriot, 30.

made Turkish Cypriots to realize that Turkey-Cyprus relationship requires more attention.

The outcome of the referendum created a massive distrust among the Turkish Cypriots. *Hür Söz* (trans. Free Word) was one of the few daily newspapers that were printed only in Turkish and had a wide circulation. The newspaper covered the issue of the referendum from day one. Weeks before the referendum, the newspaper dedicated a section on the front page that urged Turkish Cypriots:

Dear Citizen!

> On 15th of January Greeks of Cyprus are going to petition for the annexation to Greece. Do not sign under any condition if they give you a paper for your signature. Despise the ones who ask you to sign. Down with annexation and plebiscite! - Emphasis as in original- [155]

Another newspaper, *İstiklal* (trans. Liberty), was owned by a prominent Turkish Cypriot nationalist and a former member of the Legislative Council who was considered as a leading figure of the new generation Turkish Cypriots, Necati Özkan. Özkan also called Turkish Cypriots to boycott the Enosis referendum. On the day of the referendum, January 15th, the front page of Istiklal newspaper had a red image illustrating a Turkish soldier from Turkey walking towards Cyprus. Beneath this illustration, there was a paragraph that read:

> *CYPRUS IS TURKISH AND WILL REMAIN TURKISH*
>
> *If one day England decides to leave Cyprus, the heroic Mehmetçik – Turkish soldiers -who wrote Turkish history on golden pages will write a new history in this land that is part of the homeland.* [156]

On the other hand, Necati Özkan's article on 18th January 1950 warned Turkish Cypriots:

> *Turkish Cypriot citizen! Today, tomorrow or any other day, if anyone comes to you asking for your signature for the lists of the plebiscite, if they offer you money for it or threaten you, respond with the voice of your national soul. Never - neither with money nor with any material support- will we trade the Turkish heart.*

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[155] Hür Söz, *Rum Basını*, p.1.

[156] İstiklal, *Kıbrıs Türk Halkı Rumların Bugün Yapacağı Plebisiti Reddeder.*, p.1.

> *Believe in this and do not derail from this path. The plebiscite will destroy you and the community to which you belong. No Turkish Cypriot, without a doubt, will dig his own grave with his own hands. If there ever is someone who makes this mistake, history will condemn them vehemently and curse on them.*[157]

Besides the calls to boycott the referendum, several other articles were published in Turkish newspapers urging Britain to consider the option of returning Cyprus to Turkey, since the latter had replaced the Ottoman Empire. The inter-war period allowed nourishment of the nationalist ideas Second World War transformed the World Politics, including the British Empire. The developments in Cyprus were also the consequence of the post-war setting. The rise of the demand for self-determination was also the outcome of the Second World War. This demand was not only limited to Cyprus but it was a main anti-colonial demand. 1950 referendum could be seen as a solid form of the declaration Greek Cypriots' desire for self-determination, and it is an essential landmark in the history of Cyprus.

The list of events that are being shared in this chapter shows some of the important turning points in the history of Cyprus which led nationalist politics to define the political landscape. By considering all of those events, decisions and the concerns, Said's notion of the gravity of history becomes very useful as in the following chapter it will be possible to observe revitalisation of the memories of the past to defend diverging positions over the understanding of self-determination. Moreover, also the chapter shows how local events like 1931 Uprising or international events like World Wars influenced the politics in Cyprus.

In the following chapter, the political and legal foundation of the self-determination will be covered. The historical narrative covered in this chapter intended to provide an opportunity to situate the notion of the gravity of history better to the developments that are covered in the following decade until the decolonisation of Cyprus. Considering this chapter as a whole and touching upon particular moments of the first seven decades of colonial history; it is possible to claim that the colonizer-colonized relationship shaped the

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[157] İstiklal, *Uyanık Olalım*, p.2

nationalist agenda. British Administration policies were not dividing and ruling the communities vertically (ethnic), but horizontally (class).

Chapter 2: The Right to Self Determination: From Politics to Legal Doctrine.

The right to self-determination was established as a political programme before it evolved into a universally accepted legal principle. This chapter will reflect on how the way self-determination was fashioned in the rise of a decline of imperial power. It will focus on the historicity of the notion of self-determination and its political and legal dimensions. It also tracks the political idea of national self-determination and its evolution into a legal notion.

The primary sources of the idea of self-determination rest in the history of modern political struggles. The modern politics of self-determination is bound up with the American and French Revolutions; the American Revolution was an explicitly anti-colonial mass uprising which succeeded in ending the British rule and creating the interdependent Republic. However, the French Revolution overthrew the aristocracy in the name of the people. From this point of view, the French Revolution was a popular liberation movement replacing the will of the monarch with the will of the people. On the other hand, the American revolution produced a discourse of liberation by emphasizing the equality of all men and the people's right to alter or abolish the governments once a government became tyrannical. While posed in universal terms, both the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, relied on the classical notion of citizenship which meant relying on the principle of rights backed by a constitution.

The American Republic in the late 18th century was a slave-owning society, and African Americans were to be excluded from the notion of citizenship

altogether.[158] Even after the Civil War, African Americans were to experience a further century of legally imposed discrimination. In the early traces of modern movements of national self-determination, the rights were endowed to white men. The principle of universality was asserted and this allowed later generations to wrestle the concept away from the exclusionary legal framework and become a site for inclusion and emancipation. The women's movement and civil rights movement demonstrate how malleable the dominant discourse universality can become.

The emancipatory beginning of the notion of self-determination largely influenced politics in the following decade whilst nationalism defined the course of political history. With the advancement of the Industrial Revolution, irrepressible changes occurred both in the daily lives of people and how they were governed. Consequently, it let to the new waves of political narratives for the future. In that respect, it is possible to say that self-determination was one of the determinants of this new political discourse.

2.1. Modern foundations of Self-Determination

Self-determination is usually considered to be the demand of people who share a collective experience and a similar form of life in defined territory. This demand comes from the need to redefine the power relations in specific territories. The notion of self-determination is the product of a way of thinking that emerged from the European Enlightenment. The understanding of the importance of the state is about its capacity to guarantee a certain level of prosperity to its fellow citizens is owned by the European Enlightenment. The French Revolution brought an expectation of the fulfilment of such demands by the rulers and if not at a satisfactory level, giving the people the power to replace them.

Along with history, it is possible to say that each self-determination struggle had these characteristics. As stated before, in the case of France, it was the French

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[158] Lynn Hunt, "The French Revolution in Global Context," in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context*, ed. D. Armitage, & S. Subrahmanyaj (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 20-36.

aristocracy that people rebelled against; however, in other cases, there were different trajectories. For example, in the case of Greek Uprising (against the Ottoman Empire), the leading factor was the rigid social system called the Millet System that kept the Orthodox population inferior to the Muslim population. In general, as nationalism gain further legitimacy in public, inferiority that created by the Millet System became one of the many other reasons that bonded Greeks to rebel. This may have been motivated by resentment of the Ottoman Empire but also by the desire for national freedom. The substance of Greek nationalism consisted of a sense of linguistic and cultural unity, a shared experience of Ottoman rule and the particular role of the Orthodox church in preserving a national consciousness. Factors that initiated Greek rebellion against Ottomans can also be observed in other uprisings against other Imperial structures all across the periphery of Europe and in the Middle East. Each may have had different trajectories but all aimed at contesting the traditional power structures. Among all trajectories, certainly the colonialism deserves further interrogation.

The elements that feed the politics of self-determination largely rely on a specific way of thinking associated with nationalism. The notions like national liberation and national restoration were widely seen as the constituent elements behind the politics of national self-determination. The demand for self-determination has a strength that brings together different elements and those are crystallized in the ideology of nationalism. For this project, it is crucial to define the nation and nationalism as an essential link that can help us to narrate the political and legal aspects of self-determination. The next section will serve this purpose.

2.1.2 Nation and Nationalism

Theories of nationalism have two main points of departures a) primordialism and b) modernism. While the primordialists represents an early attempt on nationalism, it perceives nationalism as a natural part of human being and

claims that nationalism carries the antiquity of the nation.[159] On the contrary, modernists claim that nations and nationalism are historically constructed and are the outcomes of modern processes like the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.

Additionally, modernist scholars have different priorities in explaining nations and nationalism. Among them, one of the first illuminating analysis of nationalism was written by Elie Kedourie, stated that nationalism is a doctrine and "pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population properly to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and the right organization of a society of states."[160] According to Kedourie, the "humanity is naturally divided into nations, those nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."[161] However, he objects the linguistic criteria that primordialism had claimed as the source of the idea of the nation.

He explained the modern roots of nationalism and referred to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens that put "the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the nation: nobody of man, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it" in which he emphasizes "nationalism is not conceivable." [162]

At this point, it is important to answer the question of "what the nation is". Kedourie answers this question by referring to Sieyes who quoted it as "a body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature".[163] He takes Sieyes's explanation further by adding, "a nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through their legislature; a body of people associating together, and deciding on a scheme of their

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[159] Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Criticial Introduction.* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000).
[160] Elie Kedourie. Nationalism. (London: Hutchinson & Co Publishers Ltd, 1961) 9.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid, 15.

government."[164] Although, he has provided some fundamental understandings of nationalism, theories on nationalism are not limited to the views of Kedourie. One of the most popular accounts of explaining nationalism was written by Ernest Gellner. As a modernist, Gellner also rejects the views that nationalism is a natural phenomenon. According to him, "nationalism is a primarily a political principle which holds the political and the national unit should be congruent."[165] In his explanation, he highlights that the nationalism is the main principle of the modern world, and therefore, it is not possible to talk about nationalism or nationalist principles for the societies established in the pre-modern times. Explaining the phases of humanity from hunter and gatherers to the industrial societies, he makes the distinction between the role of power, hierarchy, and communication. He mentions that in the pre-modern societies, ruling classes and the others were differentiated, and categories were rigid. There was no need for cultural homogenisation and as a result; there was no need to create a nation. However, in the industrial societies Gellner explains, "a high culture pervades the whole society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity."[166] From a socio-cultural perspective, Gellner compares the role of shared culture in agrarian societies and industrial societies.

He emphasizes that culture plays an active role in industrial societies based on the idea of economic growth. The system requires a dynamic workforce with a certain level of technical skills enabling social mobility and culture that has literacy. This requires a level of the centrally planned educational system and a generally accepted culture. Gellner goes on saying "modern society is, in this respect, as a modern army, only more so. It provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualification: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills."[167] Once the centrally planned educational system is identified as an essential need that fulfils the requirements of industrial society, state and culture are linked. As Gellner puts it "the imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture

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[164] Ibid.
[165] Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) 1.
[166] Ibid 18.
[167] Ibid 27.

must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about."[168]

Gellner's theory of nationalism shows that "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire population and not just elite minorities".[169] Although Gellner's analysis is crucial as it touches upon the factors that caused the universalisation of the nationalism in which the societies ascribed their future with the demands of self-determination, there are critiques against Gellner's theory as well. For instance, theorists like O'Leary perceive it too functionalist[170] while others like Zubaida it too vacuous.[171]

One of the key critiques came from Benedict Anderson whose well-known theory on nationalism has introduced the idea of imagined communities and advanced the theoretical boundaries of nationalism. Anderson explains that the nationalists and nationalism are cultural artefacts and how those artefacts had such a strong impact over people. Anderson's theory of nationalism finds a solid ground due to how he defines the nation. According to Anderson, a nation is "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[172] According to this view, a nation is imagined because even the smallest nations will never get the chance to know each member, but they are convinced that each member thinks, believe and act alike. Also, it is imagined as limited because every member also convinced that the nation has finite boundaries and acknowledge that there are other nations. The limitation brings the imagination over the territorial landscape. Moreover, it is also imagined as sovereign; because the nations are the product of modernism and their freedom is directly tied with an understanding that they are sovereign in the limited

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[168] Ibid, 38.

[169] Ibid 55.

[170] Brendan O'Leary. "On the Nature of Nationalism: An appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism" in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner,* ed. J. Hall, & I. Jarvie (Atlanda and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 85-86.

[171] Sami Zubaida. "Theories of Nationalism." *G. Littlejohn*, in *Power and the State*, ed. J. Wakefield, & N. Yuval-Davis (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 56.

[172] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* (London: Verso, 2006), 6-7.

boundaries that they have. This brings us to the point where the self-determination is also perceived as a territorial concept. Lastly, it is imagined as a community because members of the nation conceive "deep horizontal comradeship" no matter what the conditions of inequalities, exploitations and others are.[173] The exploitation of minorities, woman or any other vulnerable groups for the nationalist cause is often tolerated; for instance, child soldiers that are recruited for the nationalist fight is painful but also a vivid representation of the "deep horizontal comradeship" in the idea of the nation.

Following his claim on "imagined communities"; Anderson, looks at the history and argues that the decline of the religious community and the dynastic realms created a space for nations. He particularly focuses on language and emphasizes that print capitalism caused the rise of the vernacular languages and the decay of the sacred language in Europe called Latin.[174] The decay of the sacred language also eroded the limits of knowledge. The accessibility of the knowledge in the vernacular languages erodes the religious meanings that aimed at universalizing the meanings of life, death, right and wrong. It does not automatically secularize the society, but rather than devoting oneself to abstract Latin teachings of the Church or for the Christianity, the concern of the fellow man and woman strengthened the limits of the imagined community.

Also, the idea of empty time transformed into a continuity, simultaneity, and a limitless future. The simultaneity turned out to be a measurable coincidental event that has a tangible meaning that can be measured via the clock and the calendar. Anderson refers to novel and newspaper as the sources of the construction of the imagination of the community. The headlines of a newspaper covering an incident in a far country, with a date complementing the occurrence of any incident, enables the boundaries of such imagination. As Anderson suggests "all these acts performed at the same clocked, calendrical time, but by actors who may be largely unaware of one another, shows the novelty of this imagined world conjured up by the author in his readers' mind."[175]

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[173] Ibid, 8.
[174] Ibid, 12-10.
[175] Ibid, 26.

Anderson claims the novel impact on the meaning of time contributes to the development of the idea of the nation. Although people had never met or known other members of the community, the idea of the nation developed an anonymous and a simultaneous act of togetherness. The coincidental visibility on the newspapers creates an imagination of "us" and "others" with a territorial significance that contributes to the understanding of the nation.

Without doubt, aforementioned points of Anderson's theory have expanded the understanding of the idea of the nation at the time; however, he failed to understand the development of the idea of the nation in the non-Western world. Anderson's interpretation of the nation for the rest of the world choose their imagined community from a certain modular form of the existing nations. Therefore, this creates a rather odd phenomenon that the non-Western idea of nation is somewhat the imitation of Western nations.

To challenge Anderson's theory and perhaps try to demonstrate his limitations, Chatterjee rejects this view and questions whether the colonial societies may have a choice between Anderson's interpretation of nationalism by asking 'what do they have left to imagine'. His answer to his question, "even our imaginations must remain forever colonized" makes Chatteriee one of the leading critics of Anderson's theory.[176] Chatterjee claims that the colonial nationalism cannot be seen just in a modular form of choice. He claims that the most evident form of nationalism in the colonized territories could be seen over the differences in the identity that the West tried to establish in a hegemonic way.

According to Chatterjee, the history which is nationalism's autobiography is fundamentally flawed."[177] Chatterjee, claims "anti-colonial nationalism creates its domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power."[178] He considers that anti-colonial nationalism, divides the social practices into two domains that are a) material and b) spiritual. While the material domain is consisting of the areas that are Western superiority

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[176] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5.
[177] Ibid, 6.
[178] Ibid.

including technology, economy, science etc; the inner domain includes the elements of cultural identity, which represents the distinctiveness that possibly comes from the hybridity. For Chatterjee, the fundamental future of the anticolonial nationalism is "the greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture."[179] For the anticolonial nationalism, preservation of the spiritual domain is the declaration of sovereign territory and denials the colonial power to intervene in that domain.

Chatterjee goes on saying that in the anticolonial nationalism, the contest for political power begins from the point of preservation of the inner domain. Acknowledging Anderson's point that print capitalism plays an important role[180] and emphasizes its significance in the creation of the national consciousness. However, what he also emphasizes is the conditions in colonial cases which had different patterns of development that deserve to investigate the voice of the colonized and the way that it resists preserving its inner domain. In other words, he suggests that, instead of being a modular choice of the colonized, it bears its elements of history in opposition to the colonizer.

Having considered all those views on nationalism, it is important to acknowledge that the European enlightenment has had a role; but, technologies of governance brought the current interpretation of the nation and nationalism. Furthermore, centrally planned educational system and the impacts of print capitalism played a distinctive role in shaping the understanding of the nation. As Anderson puts it, the imagination of a nation is not a fake domain; but neither it is one fits all kind of interpretation. There are nationalisms that require the careful elaboration of the history of a contest for the power. Understanding the nation as a contest for power, Spivak manifests a rather radical point of interpretation that is worth mentioning.

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[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid, 7.

For Spivak, "national liberation is not a revolution."[181] She dismisses the idea that anti-colonial nationalism can bring emancipation. She had a rather fierce and critical stance against the way that the anti-colonial nationalism's retribution to imperialism. She emphasizes that national liberation is not a revolution; because it failed by bringing nationalist leaders and Western colonizers to a new power-sharing arrangement. She believes that the independence movements ignore the voices of the oppressed and excluded. On the contrary, she portrays them as the usurpers of liberation. Using a Leninist perspective, she assumes that the leaders of anti-colonial movements as the members of the progressive bourgeoisie.[182]

Spivak also suggests that the nationalism and the nationalist movements lack the inclusivity of others as the national consciousness assimilates the elements of hybridity into the homogeneity of the nation. She rightly underlines that the minority groups or socially non-hegemonic actors, like women, are entirely under-represented by national liberation movements. And because nationalism cannot offer a universal liberation of the oppressed, anticolonialism meant new elites to usurp the power that they justify through the shared experience of colonial oppression.

The contest for seizing power is expressed in various forms but eventually, the expression had a universal meaning through the demand for self-determination. Remembering what Mill stated years ago, "it is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities"[183] becomes prophetical and attainable with the demand for self-determination. The rising expectations to reach the idea of national self-determination is subject to change the course of history for the world. Considering the theoretical framework on nationalism, it is important to note that the whole discussion will be carried out within the limits of modernist interpretation of nationalism and its anti-colonialist reflections. The next section focuses on the historical roots of the self-determination demand and brings

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[181] Gayatri C Spivak, "A borderless world?" in *Conflicting humanities*, ed Rosi Braidotti & Paul Gilroy (London: Bloombery,2016), 51.

[182] Ibid, 51.

[183] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government,* (London: Blackwell, 1948), 294.

forward the discussions around the idea of self-determination which eventually led to bringing political and national unit congruent and developed a technology of governance via the post Second World War order.

2.2. Universalising Nationalism(s): The Notion of Self Determination

The modern foundation of states dates back to the Westphalian order. However, the transformation of these states into popular sovereignties of people across the globe took decades as well as the creation of an international system that played an enormous role. The fundamental notion of self-determination played a crucial role in the formation of understanding throughout history.

The understanding of the popular sovereignty of people represents the reflection of the European enlightenment at a universal level. However, this does not mean that the enlightenment project offers a completely new affairs of governance. The gradual creation of the states based on popular sovereignty and constitutional order did not mean that the imperialist acts of states are over. On the contrary, international treaties and international organisations that have been created since the League of Nations played a role to universalize the norms of governance unable to fully eliminate the spirit of imperialism where self-determination is seen as the emancipatory desire of the suppressed, exploited, and vulnerable nations. For this reason, the principle of self-determination attained sympathy from those living under defeated multi-ethnic empires of the war. Starting from the First World War and until the end of colonisation, self-determination characterized the aspiration of the communities forming those empires. However, it was not over once the empires collapsed. Self-determination as a notion periodically emerges also when the states disintegrate. The decolonisation represents one of the most remarkable period of self-determination. However, the rise of the discussions on the notion of self-determination was also seen after the break-down of the Soviet Union or during the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

However, to understand its genealogy it is important to revisit the situation after the First World War. The developments from the First World War to the end of the Cold War the demand for self-determination experienced different phases and helped the development of vast amounts of literature about it. On one hand,

it was a way to create new states relying on popular sovereign, and, in some examples, the way that principle of self-determination applied had faced with resistance from other constituent elements breeding new ethnic or nationalist polarisations. This also led to the rise of secessionist claims which are not seen as legitimate due to the established international order.

The established international order that we consider having a legitimate ground for self-determination dates back to the end of the First World War. With the creation of the League of Nations and it is quite remarkable to see how the notion of self-determination, which is twined about nationalism gradually de-nationalised by the international community, as the claimants continued to take a nationalist view.

A brief genealogical analysis of self-determination possibly started with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens in 1789, proclaims the "natural, inalienable and sacred right of man" [184] makes 'man' central to the state and thus overthrows the role of Monchacy.

Douzinas puts the new conditions as such:

> *the early declarations of rights established the power of a particular political association, the nation-state, to become the sovereign, of the constitutional assembly to assume the role of the lawmaker and a particular 'man', the national citizen, to become the beneficiary of rights.[185]*

Following the First World War, the international order was reformed. Some of the Imperial power structures were dissolved, and new modern nation-states started to emerge in Europe while the others changed shape such as Tsarist Russia becoming the USSR. League of Nations was to be at the centre of the new international system. Part of this new system was the League of Nations in the mandate system.[186] The new order was an attempt to modernize

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[184] Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights,* (New York: Norton & Company, 2007),16.

[185] Costas Douzinas, *Human Rights and Empire: The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism,* (New York: Glasshouse, 2009), 97.

[186] Deborah Whitehall, "A Rival History of Self-Determination", *The European Journal of International Law* 27 (2016) : 719.

imperialism.[187] The mandate system operated on the assumption that some people were not yet ready to exercise self-determination. As a result, article 22 of the League's Covenant, asserted that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations." At this point, it is possible to claim that self-determination was not a right but a political ideal that people pursue.

Nevertheless, the recognition of self-determination by the League of Nations was highly conditional. The conditionality was also evident in the two vital political centres of the era (Western Liberalism and Communism), which advanced the notion of self-determination at the time. To better understand that, it worth to revisit Wilsonian Liberalism and Lenin's Bolshevism.

2.2.1 Wilson, Lenin and Self-determination

This section primarily provides brief information on the background of the political epicentres of self-determination discourses after the First World War. It argues two points of departures in the comprehensive positions on self-determination, broadly speaking the USA's and the USSR's, after the First World War. This section also analyses the developments after WWII and its wider influences over the notion of self-determination concerning the UN Resolutions and some of the other relevant international court decisions.

The evolution of the notion from a political demand to a legal notion is one of the most fascinating part of the self-determination. In the beginning, self-determination had an entirely political stance and US President Wilson and the USSR President Lenin were the two of the leaders that influenced the interpretations of self-determination after the First World War.

The rise of Woodrow Wilson's popularity on the way to the Paris Peace Conference was remarkable. Wilson was known with fourteen points that he suggested for world peace.[188] The end of the First World War saw the creation

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[187] John Strawson, *Partitioning Palestine: Legal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, (London: Pluto Press, 2010) 37-41.

[188] Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. (2019, May 14). *President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.* Yale Law School - Lillian Goldman Law Library: retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.

of a new balance of power as some of the empires that ruled millions came to an end. Some others that survived eventually became the champions of the new political conditions. Woodrow Wilson "announced self-determination as the peace strategy for the liberal flag."[189]

Woodrow Wilson thought that self-determination would create a world without wars. However, his secretary of state, Robert Lansing, thought that self-determination was "loaded with dynamite" that "will raise hopes which can never be realized."[190] Wilson was hopeful for the new era while Lansing was prescient. Erez's in-depth study on the 'Wilsonian Moment' offers a detailed account of the reflections of Wilson's principle of self-determination to international politics and particularly to the anticolonial nationalism.[191] Although Wilson was mainly interested in a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Europe, Erez emphasised the rising expectations of the colonised people all over the world to become self-determining subjects of the modern world. Erez explains the expectations of that period as follows:

> *groups aspiring to self-determination formed delegations, selected representatives, formulated demands, launched campaign and mobilised publics behind them. (…) They quoted at length from the president's Fourteen Points address and his other wartime speeches, praised his plan for a League of Nations, and aimed to attract his support for their struggles to attain self-determination.[192]*

In 1919, the expectations of the colonised people turned out to become a disappointment. Erez underlines the crucial elements of Wilson's perspective following the WW1. For example, "equality of the nations" emerged as an essential pillar of this idea. This principle allows any nation, whether small or large, weak or strong, to be treated as equals. The equality of nations work with the "right over might" principle that allowed the resolution of the disputes through peaceful means instead of armed conflict. Finally, Wilson emphasised

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[189] Whitehall, A rival history, 720.

[190] Benyamin Neuberger. *"*National self-determination: dilemmas of a concept*", Nations and Nationalism* 1 (1995): 297.

[191] Manella Erez. *The Wilsonian moment : self-determination and the international origins of anticolonial nationalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[192] Erez, The Wilsonian moment, 5.

the "consent of the governed" constituted the democratic grounds and rejected the arrangements for the future of a nation without their will.[193]

Wilson's principles had a huge response. From Africa to the Middle East, the inhabitants in the colonies were following his rhetoric. Nevertheless, there were contradictions. Erez identifies those contradictions focusing on Wilson's personal experiences about the equality of nations versus his understanding and interpretation of race. Referring to the works of biographers, Erez underlines that Wilson believed that "blacks were inferior to whites but adds that he thought that they would eventually achieve parity." He also believed that "with proper instruction, they could eventually learn the habits of civilisation, including self-government"[194] however, the way that the nations were categorised was a clear representation of intrinsic racism in Wilson's thoughts. From this point of view, it is rather naïve to believe Wilson was encouraging for the universal application of self-determination.

Wilson perceived self-determination as the central pillar of US foreign policy which also aimed at reorganizing Central Europe (Austria Hungarian Empire and Ottoman Empire) and redrawing the frontiers of Europe in accordance with the interests of the colonialists rather than the colonized territories.[195]

During his period, the mandate system was one of the racist applications of self-determination. The colored people of the global south and the east were not considered as equals. Smut's Practical Suggestions for the League of Nations can be shown as an example of that angle.[196] Smut suggests:

> *German colonies in the Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense. They might be consulted as to whether they want their German masters back, but the result would be so much a foregone conclusion that the consultation would be quite superfluous.*[197]

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[193] Ibid, 21.

[194] Ibid, 28.
[195] Pau Bosscacoma Busquets, *Morality and Legality of Secession*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) 154.

[196] Jan Christiaan Smuts. *The League of Nations: A practical suggestion*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918).

[197] Ibid, p15.

For Wilson, self-determination of nations was a tool for achieving peace in Europe while enabling the colonial system to work. On the contrary, the revolution in the Soviet Union also interpreted self-determination to pursue its imperial ambitions. As much as Wilson, also Vladimir Ilyich Lenin advocated the notion of self-determination. Lenin claims "the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, political secession from the oppressing nation."[198] He also adds that "this political, democratic demand implies complete freedom to carry on agitation in favour of secession, and freedom to settle the question of secession using a referendum of the nation that desires to secede."[199] However, he also underlines that the right to secession does not mean the formation of ineffective small states.[200] He poses self-determination as a way of resistance against imperial oppression.

The guiding principles of Lenin's view on self-determination was included in the documents of "Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination" dated back in the early 1910s.[201] Lenin underlines that "Victorious socialism must achieve complete democracy and, consequently, not only bring about the complete equality of nations but also give effect to the right of oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession."[202] According to him, national self-determination was divided into three groups 1) advanced countries where he believed that national movements came to an end a long time ago and emphasise these countries as oppressive; 2) the countries that developed the bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement. Lenin believed that these countries could assist other countries to have a socialist revolution by championing the right of nations to self-determination. He emphasized merging the class struggle of the workers in the oppressing nations with the class struggle of the workers in the oppressed

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[198] "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." Vladimir I. Lenin, accessed November 8 2018, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jan/x01.htm

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid.

[201] Ibid.

[202] Ibid.

nations; 3) semi-colonial countries where there are limited bourgeois-democratic movements and Lenin believed the importance of supporting the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation to advance them to socialism.[203] In a nutshell, Lenin did not challenge the idea of nation and self-determination; on the contrary, he categorised it in an entirely strategic manner. Lenin considered self-determination as a tool to expand its influence to realize the revolution against the bourgeois state and structures which would consequently bring those states under the influence of the Soviet Union.

In this categorisation, Lenin tried to formulate an understanding of social class. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe similar points of departures; like Wilson's. His uses class as a reference instead of race. His interpretation had a narrative of liberation from the oppressor. However, both Wilson and Lenin understood self-determination as a tool to legitimize their hegemony to reach their end goals.

 Another guiding text of Lenin's view on self-determination can be found in his essay called "The discussion on self-determination summed up."[204] Here, Lenin goes on a discussion with the Polish Social Democrats and explains the relationship between socialism and the self-determination of people. What is underlined here is that socialism will abolish all kind of oppressions, including the national one; in a socialist system the nation will cease to exist indicating how strategically he perceives the self-determination. However, following that Lenin makes a point by levelling the types of oppressions and explains the liberation of oppressed nations via a dual transformation that is 1) full equality of the nations and 2) freedom of political separation.[205]

The political separation of the nations is about the demarcation of state frontiers which he then defines as:

> by transforming capitalism into socialism, the proletariat creates the
> possibility of abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes

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[203] Ibid.

[204] "The Discussion On Self-Determination Summed Up", Vladimir I. Lenin, Accessed 8 March 2018, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jul/x01.htm.

[205] Ibid.

reality "only" – "only"!- with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the delineation of state frontiers in accordance with the "sympathies" of the population, including complete freedom to secede.[206]

Probably one of the most critical aspects of Lenin's position on self-determination in colonial states is explained in his response to the question of; "is it right to contrast "Europe" with the Colonies?". Arguing the reasons of immediate liberation of colonies as "impracticable," he reminds us that this demand is "nothing more than the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination" explaining the fallacies and the capitalist reasoning behind the inapplicability of self-determination on colonies, Lenin emphasises the importance of the right to secede which would lead viable conditions to liberate the oppressed nations.[207]

Lenin's universalism founded on the idea of the liberation of oppressed nations. The ideological conditionality was to strategically place oppressed nations on the side of the struggle for socialism. This conditionality had a significant impact over the anti-colonialist movements, although the competition was between the Western and the Eastern imperialists. Comparatively, both Lenin and Wilson have a conditional view on self-determination underpinned by racist or classist assumptions about the stage of development of people. For Wilson, it was sustained by race and for Lenin by the forces of production. They have both seen self-determination as a means of changing the world to their favour – a liberal world order conducive to capitalist expansion or an international socialist system.

That is why Lenin opposed the expansion of the right for the national self-determination in the West. He considered this as a way of strengthening the bourgeois state that meant strengthening the West. However, in the West, the creation of new bourgeoisie states considered as new members in the international community that can create resistance against the formation of a

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[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid.

socialist state. The way that Lenin pursued his agenda tends to neglect the role of the nationalism in the West.

According to Lenin, freedom of secession in the colonised countries was glorified. Lenin stated that:

> *We demand freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is inconceivable without the freedom to secede.[208]*

In general, Lenin's interpretation of self-determination is much in line with the emancipation and liberation, allowing even the far less developed nations to be able to overthrow the old regimes that allied with the colonialists. For Lenin, non-recognition of self-determination meant supporting the oppressive nations. That is why he believed in the right to secede if necessary. One of the main flaws of Lenin, on the other hand, was his conception of socialist revolution which had priority over self-determination.

In a nutshell, it is possible to summarize the differences between Leninist and Wilsonian perspectives in three points: Firstly, Lenin proposed a socialist perspective over self-determination as opposed to Western imperialism while Wilson had a transitional perspective on the liberalisation and democratisation of the former European system. Secondly, Lenin acknowledged the external self-determination from the right perspective and included the right to secede with anti-Western colonisation of the Southern nations while Wilson remained largely on self-government on the southern nations. Finally, Lenin acknowledged the unilateral self-determination of people and supported the revolutionary and violent methods while Wilson took a moderate approach of exercise of the right through the means of international law and referendum.

In any case, neither of these views offered an unconditional vision of self-determination. Wilson remained in liberal constitutionalism while Lenin

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[208] Bill Bowring, "Positivism versus self-determination: the contradictions of Soviet International Law," in *International Law of the left*, ed Susan Marks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143.

perceived the notion as a means to reach international socialism. Both political views failed to understand the role of nationalism behind the desire for self-determination. Either of them portrayed their position according to their geostrategic interests and the right contained within a political reasoning. Nevertheless, those visions also played an important role to secure certain minority rights in the newly established states. The First World War started a new period in which two major powers in Europe invested in the idea of self-determination and turned it into a mainstream political concept.

2.2.2 League of Nations and Self-Determination

In his illuminating study, Anghie explains the politics behind the League of Nations and the mandate system. His work critically engages the creation of the League of Nations and the creation of a new actor in the international legal system to manage international relations. One of the fundamental aspects that he elaborates about the League of Nations is the emergence of a new purpose. Unlike distributing the territories as the spoils of war, victorious powers decided to resolve them under a system of international tutelage. The aim was to integrate colonized and dependent people into the international system as independent, sovereign republics.[209]

However, the nature of the international institutions was Eurocentric; in other words, by no means they recognized the non-European states as equally sovereign which reaffirms the dominance of imperial powers. The mandate system came forward as a way to preserve and enhance the conditions of the non-European territories and to guide to self-government or independence.

Anghie explains that the mandate system of the League of Nations was to effect changes in international order without disturbing the dominance of the Imperial powers.[210] The mandate system constitutes the new conditions of the colonised East and the South. Anghie emphasises that "Mandate System was an

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[209] Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 115.

[210] Ibid.

international regime created to govern the territories that had been annexed or colonised by Germany and the Ottoman Empire, two of the greater powers defeated in the First World War."[211] Mandate system primarily aimed at permitting the victorious powers of the World War I keeping the territorial conquest of Ottoman and German colonies while dignifying the process as an act of a beneficent international organization that would guide the territories to self-government at the convenience of the mandatory state.

Indeed, 22 of the League Covenant speaks the notion of "sacred trust of civilisations" emphasising:

> To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
> The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.[212]

The same article also prioritises the regions based on their degree of advancement and articulates ways of administration for different territories. As the section follows:

> The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.[213]

Also, Article 23 of the covenant regulates various issues of the standards in the mandates. Article 23 of the League of Nations covenant dealt with the topics of

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[211] Ibid, p116.

[212] League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html [accessed 7 November 2021]

[213] Ibid.

labour conditions, commercial and industrial relations, treatment to the natives, traffic in woman and children as well as traffic in opium and other drugs, trade in arms and ammunition, maintaining communication and finally; focuses on the prevention and control of diseases.[214]

These two articles define the main point of departure for the mandate system; the reflections on sovereignty and self-determination are remarkable. Both the creation of international institutions that supervising the mandate system and the evolution of colonised states into sovereign states required rethinking on how the international legal system works.

Anghie's examination of the system emphasises several points that help reflect on the character of the state sovereignty. He demonstrates international law's colonial origins imprints itself on the debate about self-determination. Western states dealt with the demands for self-determination to sustain the status quo that was favourable to their interests. In other words, "all states are not equally sovereign and that this is because of international law and institutions rather than despite international law and institutions."[215]

Despite all the intrinsic controversies, a new way of understanding international law was being established. Primarily, the League of Nations challenged the pure interpretation of the notion of sovereignty. The League of Nations entered as a new actor in international law, which projected the power and values of victors of the First World War. The principal allied powers took possession of the colonies of the defeated states in the name of a new internationalism. As Anghie comments:

> *Within the mandate-system sovereignty is shaped by and connected with issues of economic relations between the coloniser and the colonised on the one hand, and comprehensively developed notions of the cultural difference between advanced Western states and backward mandate peoples, on the other. It was in the Mandate System that international law and institutions could conduct experiments and develop technologies that were hardly possible in the sovereign Western world.[216]*

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[214] Ibid.

[215] Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making…,* p118.

[216] Ibid, 136.

It is possible to claim that the development of international law on self-determination went hand in hand with the Mandate system. The influence of Wilson's politics was significant. While the historical roots of the Wilsonian principle evolved from French and American revolutions in the previous century, it also affirms the erosion of the feudal Empire relations — his views to grant statehood to the areas identifiable by people of a given region.

Probably, one of the most fundamental controversies that the League of Nations addressed was the case on the Aaland Islands. The case of the Aaland Islands was a controversial topic as the island remained under Swedish control for centuries and then it was ceded to Russia together with Finland after 1809, following Sweden's elimination by Russia. However, Finland declared its independence in 1917, following the Russian Revolution and the dispute was on whether the Aaland Islands should remain in Finnish or Swedish territory addressed by the League with a conclusion of: "Aland islands' culture should be safeguarded by granting the autonomy of the island under Finnish sovereignty" however, the Commission also underlined that "under extreme oppression self-determination by Aland citizens might be possible".[217]

The Aaland opinion is significant as it gave the first glimpse of the interpretation of self-determination demands by an international organisation. The League's mandate system appears to be a clever reinvention of colonialism. In practice, it was extremely fragile and provoked major popular uprisings against the system: Syria 1919, Iraq 1919-1920, and Palestine 1936-9. More broadly the period after the war saw the creation of the modern anti-colonial movement, especially in India with the mass protests against British rule instigated by the Khilafat Movement 1919-1923.[218] The European colonial system was weakened, and the political discourse of self-determination was to become an increasing feature of discussion of the future of international relations. The

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[217] Hirst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination", *Virginia Journal of International Law* 34 (2001): 8.

[218] Akshay R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2016).

Second World War was to see the process of self-determination radically develop.

2.2.3 UN System and Self-determination

The Atlantic Charter was a joint political statement between the United Kingdom and the United States, which gave a profound influence over the political setting during and after the 2nd World War. Its content also reflected in the UN Charter. Initially, it was a joint document of the UK and the US but later the propositions also endorsed by the Allies of the World War II (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China as well as France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and Czechoslovakia governments in exile). There is no formal document of the Atlantic Charter. Primarily, Axis powers interpreted the charter as an alliance against them, leading them to increase their aggressions. Nevertheless, it also mesmerized anti-colonial movements as there was a reference to self-determination which increased the hopes for independence. Despite the document largely being seen as a blueprint for the future, Churchill claimed that the references to the end of the colonialism referred only to the areas in Europe occupied by Nazis.

The Charter set out the principles on which post-war international order would be based. Its third article dealt with the Nazi-occupied countries of Europe, stating that it would "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."[219] The charter also puts forward neither countries seek aggrandizement. Other clauses deal with free trade, global cooperation, the advancement of welfare and labour standards.[220]

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[219] "The Atlantic Charter", *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16912.htm

[220] The all points of the Atlantic Charter are; First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other, Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; Fourth,

The Charter's position that self-government should be "restored to those forcibly deprived of them," while not referring to the colonies of the European powers. Colonialism, after all, was a system which "forcibly deprived" the inhabitant of the conquered territories form self-government.

This sentiment undoubtedly played a role in terms of political motivations when it was the time to draft the United Nations Charter. However, there is a significant difference between the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Charter. While the former constituted a legal framework for the self-determination of people, the latter was a political statement. As the Second World War was over, the UN Charter became the legal document after it was signed on 26 June 1945 and played an overwhelmingly important role to define international affairs.

The first article of the United Nations Charter states that one of the purposes of the organization was "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the people."[221]

Article 55 also mentions "creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."[222]

The two articles broadly refer to the 'peoples' that constitutes the essential challenge as it also means the 'states' since the Charter and the international law is about the states. Additionally, the following articles strengthen this

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they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. (NATO, 2018)

[221] "UN Charter Full Text", *United Nations*, Accessed 17 April 2019, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
[222] Ibid.

position because they deal with specific areas that are to say non-self-governing territories.

Three chapters of the charter deal with "non-self-governing territories." Chapter XI outlines the principles; Chapter XII outlines a system for international trusteeship and Chapter XIII creates the Trusteeship Council. The principle behind this is laid in article 73, which provides explanations on the peoples in the non-self-governing territories:

> Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
> a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
> b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement

The reference peoples for those located in non-self-governing territories does not frame the details of 'full measure of self-government', thus, enabling colonial powers to dictate their terms unilaterally. Nevertheless, the articles turn the aspiration of self-determination as a universal principle.[223]

Quane analyses the principle of self-determination according to the 1945 conditions. Accordingly, self-determination can apply to states and the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories and Trust Territories. However, she makes a distinction by emphasizing that "when the principle applied to the states it meant the sovereign equality" however "when the principle applied to the inhabitants of NSGTs and Trust Territories; it meant self-government or

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[223] Ibid.

independence. In this context, there was no legal right to self-determination. It was simply a goal to be pursued."[224]

When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights voted in 1948, two important notions were missing: a) self-determination and b) minority rights. So it is possible to claim that even in 1948, self-determination was unable to attain the status of the rule in international law. It took two more years for the UN General Assembly to recognise the right of self-determination as a fundamental human right.[225]   However, the notion of self-determination was not codified clearly. Benjamin Rivlin's essay in 1955 analyses the uneasy relationship between self-determination and dependent areas.[226] Underlining, the unclear nature of the notion of self-determination, Rivlin questions:

> *it has not been developed as a general principle of international law with a definition describing the criteria and standards for its application. Is it then an ideal? A right? A doctrine? A principle of international morality? It has been used with each of these connotations. Much of the confusion has arisen out of its identification with such equally difficult to define concepts as democracy, nationalism, independence.*[227]

It is, Quane who provides the answers to Rivlin. Quane argues that "the inclusion of articles on the right of self-determination was a logical fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, for it was a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other human rights and therefore, must be included in the covenants on human rights."[228] Nevertheless, self-determination did not progress into a universal principle immediately. In 1960, the "principle" of self-determination evolved into the "right" to self-determination after the United

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[224] Helen Quane. "The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination" 47 (1998): p547.

[225] Gerry J Simpson, "The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-Colonial Age", *Stanford Journal of International Law* 34 (1998): 268.

[226] Benjamin Rivlin, *Self-determination and Dependent Areas International Conciliation*, (New York : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1955) 195.

[227] Ibid, 199.

[228] İbid.

Nations General Assembly issued resolutions numbered 1514[229], 1541[230] and 1654[231]. The resolutions came after the intensification of the anti-colonial movements.

The Covenants mentioned, "all peoples" enhancing the universalist interpretation of the notion. However, those documents did not frame what exactly 'people' is leaving the notion to its prior interpretations; in other words, those who live in organised states or colonies. By referring to "all peoples", neither was there a provision nor any hints on the right to secede. In other words, any group can seek to be recognized as people, in which it can determine its political status, but at the same time the people cannot be divided, or entity can secede.

UNGA Resolution 1514 is considered as one of the most significant developments on the legal right to self-determination for the colonial people. This Resolution voted 89 in favour and nine abstentions without any rejection.[232] The General Assembly's resolution on *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* brought further clarification on the issue of decolonization. Since, the conditions of delaying independence were not on the agenda anymore, points like "preparedness of the people" were omitted.[233] Simpson underlines a significant observation at this point. He indicates that:

> *the declaration thus gives legal approval to the change in the intended beneficiaries of self-determination: from a pre-World War Two concentration on "cultural and linguistic communities without political organisation" to the present "politically defined but culturally diverse colonies and ex-colonies of the developing world."[234]*

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[229] Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV), accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f06e2f.html.

[230] Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter, 15 December 1960, A/RES/1541, accssed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0654c.html.

[231] The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 11 December 1963, A/RES/1956, accessd 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1da5c.html.
[232] Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving, 551.

[233] Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty,270.

[234] Ibid, 270.

Even though the UNGA Resolution 1514 was not regarded as legally binding at the beginning, nevertheless, as Higgins argues, some resolutions can reflect customary international law. This resolution came to be seen as such certainly in 1970 after the adoption of UNGA resolution 2625 'Declaration on International Law' which incorporated 1514 principles - a position taken the International Court of Justice for 50 years – and re-affirmed in the most recent Chagos Island case in 2019.

Having said that, reminding the UNGA 1514 resolution affirms "all peoples have the right to self-determination" is important since it frames "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."[235] The resolution urged the end of colonialism by underlining that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." The same resolution called for rapid decolonisation of colonizing countries to take immediate steps without any conditions or reservations and distinction as to race, creed or colour.

The vital point in this resolution is how it handles the issue of universality. The Resolution recognizes that the self-determination has been exercised legally by the UN member states. The notion is being universalized by acknowledging the colonial people, which means inhabitants of the a) Trust Territories and b) Non-self-governing territories. However, the legal status of the people inhabiting those two areas remained ambiguous. Nevertheless, the most important point at this stage is, apart from the human rights, self-determination seen as a right relating to the territory.

Another complicated notion was reference to the 'people' since it carries a vagueness in terms of which people have the right of self-determination in the case of multi-ethnic territories. The statement requires clarification whether the term 'people' refers to each ethnic group or whether it refers to the inhabitants of a colonized territory as a whole. If the right is considered applicable for each

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[235] Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV), accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f06e2f.html.

ethnic origin, then it could create enormous number of state that would be harder to manage the international affairs. This point was also reinforced with the article "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Charter". This meant the inhabitant of a given territory required to exercise the right to self-determination jointly. However, another problem emerges over the boundaries of the territorial unit. At this point, it is possible to approach the issue over two arguments: According to the first one; the Resolution calls for the respect to the territorial boundaries of the colonial countries, and the 'peoples' refers to the entire population of a colonial country.[236] For the second one, it refers to the pre-colonial entities which "would require the restoration of colonial territory to the unit from which it was originally separated."[237] At this stage, the legal problem was over the basis of the transformation of administrative borders into international borders and ensuring that every group that resides in that territorial area have equal access to the human rights.

The guiding principle behind the self-determination of colonies comes from the UN Res 1541's reference that the Chapter XI of the Charter is applicable "to territories which were in colonial-type".[238] UNGA 1514 was re-affirmed a year later by UNGA 1654, which recalled paragraph 5 of the UNGA 1514 to intensify the efforts for the decolonisation to overcome the risk against international peace and security.

In 1966, with the recognition of self-determination as a universal principle that took place when the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social Economic and Cultural Rights were adopted. The two covenants affirmed the recognition of the right of self-determination of "people" while most of the decolonisation movements had managed to gain political powers playing a critical role in the emergence of independent nations.

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[236] Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving, 550.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination,13.

When UNGA2625 (The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States) was adopted[239] it was considered as the comprehensive formulation of the principle of self-determination. The Resolution 2625, which is also known as The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States addresses diverse issues; however, the part on self-determination is one of the most detailed accounts. The article follows:

> *By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.*
> *Every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in order:*
>   *a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among states; and*
>   *b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to charter.[240]*

As quoted above, the Declaration explains the equal rights of the people to be free from *alien subjugation* and considers the continuation of the relationship as the denial of the fundamental human rights which is against the UN Charter. However, the right is offered for the colonies, not the components of a multi-ethnic state. Furthermore, the referred articles of the declaration explain modes of implementation of the right of self-determination emphasizing that "establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free association or integration with an independent state or the emergence into any other political

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[239] Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV), accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html
[240] Ibid.

status freely determined by a people"[241]. Finally, the declaration also emphasizes that "every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country."[242]

The selected points in the UNGA Resolution 2625 demonstrates that the "self-determination" is an applicable right but under very carefully designed conditions. The criteria also explained within the perspective of territory. In the case of post-colonial context, the applicability of this right is significantly limited because the right particularly focuses on the distinct status of "a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory" and the same paragraph uses the "people" as singular. According to Hannum, "the use in the same paragraph of the singular "people" suggests that various minorities within a territory may not enjoy the same right of self-determination as that possessed by the people as a whole."[243]

It is possible to claim that UNGA Resolution 2625 includes an elaboration of the principles of self-determination that forms the heart of the doctrine. It is a notable instance that the universality of the self-determination of the people is also acknowledged. However, the universality of the principle does not mean that every group of given population can exercise self-determination; i.e. every ethnicity. Paragraph 4 and Paragraph 7 of the Resolution is crucial as they give further clarification on the notion of self-determination. In paragraph 7, the notion of the people addressed. The relevant resolution goes on as follows:

> *Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.*[244]

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[241] Ibid.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Hannum, *Rethinking self-detrmination*, 16.

[244] Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV), accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html

The resolution emphasizes the significance of territory in the self-determination claim of people. It suggests the limits on the respect to the territorial boundaries, in which, the declaration urges that a government ought to represent the whole people.

While the UN Resolution 1514, emphasized the importance over the respect on the territorial boundaries of a country over the self-determination claims, in 1970, the right of people on self-determination evolved into a new episode of understanding as a universal principle and the references over the territory got stronger. In Resolution 2625, the notion of people is interpreted as enabling secession from a state. However, the Resolution does not provide secession as an automatic right as a form of self-determination. Resolution 2625 emphasizes the importance of representation; in case a government is not fully representative of its population. In other words, if the government excludes authentic people that inhabit in the same territory according to race, colour, culture or any other criteria to the extent that can destabilize international community than self-determination of the oppressed can be recognized. In the same Resolution, two criteria identify the execution of self-determination: Firstly, "the whole people belonging to the territory" draws a territorial concept of people and the phrase "race, creed or colour" shows the significance of personal criteria but these criteria can be triggered if those groups face with no representation in terms of governance.

In the 4th Paragraph, also the resolution navigates the meaning of self-determination. The paragraph emphasizes "establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right to self-determination."[245] One of the most crucial points in this paragraph is on the "freely determined" which shows the importance of the consent of the whole people; in other words, in the case of multi-ethnic or multi-national setting, it will require all peoples determination on the devolution of power.

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[245] Ibid.

Since the Declaration of Friendly Relations, it is possible to conclude that the principle of self-determination formulated with the higher objective of respecting on territorial boundaries or political unity. At this point, it is crucial to introduce Koskenniemi's comment on the role of territory in self-determination claims: "the application of the *uti possidetis* principle in the determination of post-colonial boundaries lived always somewhat uneasily with the official ideology of decolonisation as a restoration of authentic communities, destroyed by alien rule."[246] Even though the official ideology of decolonisation comes from nationalism - in Gellner's definition of the nation it is the ideology that holds the national and political unit congruent- the international law is not interested to fulfil nationalist aspirations.

From the perspective of international law, national self-determination is "dormant and enclosed within the sovereignty."[247] As Koskenniemi puts it "during periods of political transformation, however, when the existence of states becomes uncertain, self-determination becomes applicable to reconstitute the political normality of statehood."[248] The political normality here requires somewhat a democratic order to fulfil internal self-determination so the new state of affairs can be achieved.

In addition to the UN Resolutions, also the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe also known as Helsinki Final Act is an important document on the principle of self-determination. The document portrays an understanding of 35 participating states. Principle VIII states:

> *By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples have the right, in full freedom, to determine when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, social and cultural development.[249]*

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[246] Martti Koskenniemi, "National Self Determination Today Problems of Legal Theory and Practice" *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 43 (1994), 243.
[247] Ibid, 246.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) : Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde4f9b4.html.

The scope of the Principle VIII may expand the scope of the self-determination in comparison to the other UN Resolutions, as it refers to "all peoples" in plural tone; however, it is important to view the Helsinki Final Act as a whole document, together with the Principle III and Principle IV emphasizing the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of all states. Those principles limit the definition of "peoples" which does not give any grounds for sub-state groups to have the right to self-determine without any reference to the other populations of the state. In other words, the Helsinki Final Act also excludes the possibility of secession.

To sum up, the stages of the notion of self-determination emerged as a political principle to resolve the dissolving Empires who had lost the war; however after the Second World War, the notion was viewed as a legal right. The fundamental difference was the shift from an understanding based on nationalism to an understanding based on territory, thus turning the administrative borders to the international boundaries. However, the different interpretations of self-determination continued to emerge and the notion continued to pose risks in the international governance. There were some exemplary cases that International Court of Justice provided opinions that sheds some light over the ways in which we can understand self-determination as a principle in which we can draw some parallels as well. The following section will focus on some of the relevant International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinions on self-determination as well as the European Commission (EC) position on Yugoslavia and finally the most recent case on Chigos Archipelago that ICJ also shared opinion.

2.3 International Court of Justice Opinions on Self-Determination

A year after the Resolution 2625, *The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States*, Namibia opinion of the ICJ concluded.[250] The Namibian case is significant for its attempts to enhance the understanding of self-determination.

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[250] Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, *International Court of Justice (ICJ)*, 21 June 1971, accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a2531.html.

The background of the Namibia case consists of South Africa's stance to not accept the Trusteeship System. South Africa claimed that Namibia will remain part of South Africa. When the UNGA rejected this view, South Africa stated its position to keep its status under the former agreement that was reached in 1920. Since South Africa did not fulfil its obligation to submit annual reports except in 1947, ICJ reported advisory opinions, primarily, stating that Namibia has distinct international status.[251] Later in 1970, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 276, to end the rights of the mandate administration and a following Resolution 284 (1970) questioned the presence of South Africa in Namibia.

In 1971, the ICJ emphasized that the Charter of the United Nations and the applicability of self-determination right to all countries. ICJ sought to refer to the UN Charter and the Resolution 1514 while the jurists emphasized that the self-determination is a practice of the international law.[252] Furthermore, the Court emphasized, "the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned."[253] The most critical dimension of this opinion is its stance that self-determination is applicable in the context of decolonization and self-determination is regarded as a universal right.

This decision also enabled self-determination to be considered as a part of international law. At this point, ICJ's decision on Namibia was an important milestone providing self-determination with recognition as a right by an international court expanding its limits outside the colonial period.

Four years after the Namibia case, came the *Western Sahara* opinion.[254] Western Sahara case was over a disagreement on defining the future of

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[251] South-West Africa Cases; Advisory Opinion Concerning the International Status, *International Court of Justice (ICJ),* 11 July 1950, accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4028e9d44.html.

[252] Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, *International Court of Justice (ICJ)*, 21 June 1971, accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a2531.html.

[253] Ibid.

[254] Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, *International Court of Justice (ICJ)*, 16 October 1975, accessed 7 November 2021, http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1975.10.16_western_sahara.htm.

Western Sahara once the Spanish colonialism was over. The two African states Morocco and Mauritania had claimed over the territory, while Spain claimed that Western Sahara was *terra nullius;* as a result, it claimed continuation of its presence over the territory until 1973. In 1973, a referendum was recommended by the United Nations for the right to self-determination but Morocco contested the modality of the referendum. On December 13, 1974, UN General Assembly adopted resolution 3292 to request and advisory opinion of International Court of Justice on two issues: Whether Western Sahara was a *terra nullius* at the time of colonization by Spain; if the answer was negative, the second question was 'what were the legal ties were between the territory of Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania?[255]

The ICJ evaluated the merits of the case and considered the first question of whether the territory was *terra nullius* or not. Based on the evidence, in the relevant period, Western Sahara had nomadic tribes with applicable rules, social and political organizations. As a result, ICJ concluded that the territory was not *terra nullius* before Spanish colonization. This was an important shift from "territory that was inhabited by the natives" idea that fundementally ignores the presence of self-styled socio-political organization prior to the colonization in the relevant territories.

After that, the court assessed the legal ties of Western Sahara with the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court acknowledged the geographical similarities, but also underlined that there was no evidence of the effective authority of Moroccan state in the area. In the case of Mauritania; the court emphasized that the Mauritania entity was called *Bilad Shinguitti* prior to the Spanish colonization and underlined that this entity did not represent sustainable sovereignty over the Western Sahara's territory.

As the opinion primarily aimed at providing a legal character of self-determination in the case of decolonization of Western Sahara, the court considered that its role must be guidable within the international legal argument instead of deciding on the fate of Western Sahara.

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[255] Ibid.

As a response to the disputed parties (Morocco and Mauritania), the court did not choose to rule which party can claim pre-colonial sovereignty over it. Instead, the Court left this decision to the General Assembly. The Court argued that Western Sahara's Spanish colonization provides a pre-text for neither Morocco nor Mauritania to claim sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Court expresses that the application of "the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory."[256]

The statement of the Court suggests the overwhelming importance of the freely-expressed will of people that goes beyond the automated outcomes for the application of self-determination. The stance of the court enables various possibilities and in Paragraph 59 this issue elaborated as such:

> *General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not consititute a "people" entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances.*

In the Western Sahara opinion the absence of reference to the "right" of self-determination is an important shift. In the case of Namibia, the Court considered self-determination as a right because of its colonial context; however, in the case of Western Sahara, the Court had a different wording considering it as an "entitlement." The wording enables new interpretations including self-determination is not necessarily a legal obligation of the UNSC.

As the UN system was evolving and the process of decolonization was over, the long-standing *uti possidetis juris* principle became one of the defining aspects of the principle of self-determination. However, one of the important aspects is that the notion of *uti possidetis juris* emerges episodically. The principle also holds a weight to limit the secessionist demands. One of the remarkable developments that made *uti possidetis* as the central element of the self-determination demand happened during the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during events in 1991; after the political turmoil in Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence and Federal

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[256] Ibid.

Government of Yugoslavia used force to oppose. As the attempts considered as secession, European Commission initially approached the issue as secession and supported the unity of Yugoslavia. At the same time, they opposed the forceful measures taken by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia. Eventually, the positions of the EC and the US changed. They started to emphasize that the "Yugoslav state cannot be preserved through the use of force".[257] Since the dissolution of the Yugoslavia was one of the remarkable instances that the *uti possidetis juris* came forward, it is necessary to take a step back and focus on the specific notion more in detail.

2.3.1 *Uti Possidetis Juris*

Contemporary interpretations of the notion, *uti possidetis* primarily focuses on the territorial aspect of the stage to independence. The term can be translated as "as you possess." It is one of the fundamental principles in the state creation process. This doctrine originates in Roman law that aimed to preserve the status quo of a situation while in the early periods of colonisation, the notion appeared as a dispute resolution principle endorsing actual possession of land.[258] It was revived in the 19th century to address the borders between the new states of Latin America as they broke away from the Spanish Empire to prevent border conflicts between the successor states in the Spanish Empire. It then went into abeyance and does not make an appearance in international legal discourse. So almost after a century, references to the notion moved from Latin America to Africa. However, in Africa number of colonial actors were involved each of them had different colonial practices and the boundaries were drawn geometrically, without referencing to the local ethnic divergences. The appropriation of the territories during decolonisation relied on the colonially defined territories, creating wider complexities of addressing the self-determination of the people. Since, decolonisation understood as self-determination of the colonized entities; the question of appropriating the

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[257] Hurst Hannum, "Self-Determination, Yugoslavia and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles", *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* 3, (1993), 60.
[258] Malcolm Shaw, "Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries", *Europan Journal of International Law,* 8, (1997), 492.

territorial framework resolved with the re-emergence of the notion of uti possidetis. The Organization of African Unity in Resolution 16(1) of 1964 adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris that the colonial boundaries would constitute the borders of the new independent states. Even though, at the beginning the principle was limited to the colonial conditions, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, transformed the principle that was applied only in colonial context transformed once more and turned into a general principle.

The question of identity versus territorial boundaries of a state goes to the heart of the doctrine of self-determination. The key instruments – UNGA resolution 1514 and 2625 – assert an alinement between the two issues – all people have the right to self-determination and self-determination includes territorially defined area. As it was mentioned in the earlier section the ICJ in the key cases on self-determination in a colonial context have tended to side with the issue of territory. Such as in the Western Sahara case (1975) the opinion of the court was that despite pre-existing legal ties between Morocco and the territory it was Spanish colonialism that gave the inhabitants the right to self-determination. This principle was recently re-affirmed in the opinion on the Chagos Islands (2019). In this case the Court found that the attempt by the colonial power to dismember a colony just before interdependence, was unlawful. Martin Shaw argues that the doctrine of uti possidetis is the starting point of the discussion of borders but not necessarily the end point.[259]

The transformation of *uti possidetis* into a general principle observed during the disintegration of Yugoslavia by the Badinter Arbitration Commission. This essentially based the demarcation of the new states on the boundaries between the union republics in the old federal system. The emergence of the Yugoslavia conflict followed by *de facto* secession of the republics, EC adopted a common position for the process of recognition, that referred to principles of self-determination that was drawn in the Helsinki Final Act, Charter of Paris. The position also included references for the protection of the rights of ethnic and national groups, minorities as well as the inviolability of all frontiers,

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[259] Shaw, Peoples, *Territorialism and Boundaries,* 483.

disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.[260] The list of requirements for the recognition was extensive; nevertheless, it did not refer to the principle of self-determination. As the case of Yugoslavia was considered as a dissolution of a state, the emergence of the new sovereigns and their recognition required both political and legal backing.

For the recognition of the newly emerging states from the Yugoslav Federation, an International Conference on Yugoslavia called. The conference aimed at mediating different groups for a peaceful settlement. Also, during the Conference, an Arbitration Commission was established to derive legal ends to the new state of affairs. The commission was chaired by Robert Badinter, whose name extended to the Badinter Commission. The Commission sought to answer some of the legal questions including whether the developments mean the existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the light of secession or whether it is the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

While there are established interpretations of statehood. For example, Montevideo Convention suggests a widely accepted formulation criteria for statehood in international law, underlining that it should possess a permanent population, defined territory, legitimate government, and capacity to enter external relations. However, the Commission choose to offer slightly modified version of definition as such: "the form of internal political organization and the constitutional provisions useful in determining the Government's control over the population and territory."[261] As a result, the Commission assessed the federal composition of Yugoslavia and concluded that the Yugoslav Federation no longer offers the required level of participation and representation in a federal state. This led the Commission to conclude: "the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is engaged in dissolution" and referred to the constituent republics to deal with the problems of state succession based on "principles and rules of international law, in particular assuring respect for human rights and respect for that of peoples and minorities."[262] This remark is particularly

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[260] Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, 60-61.
[261] Ibid, p64.
[262] Ibid.

important, as the Commission referred to the state-dissolution; rather than the reference to the civil war, as the latter may represent an interpretation that civil war may justify secession due to the legal opinion that participation and representation are inherent in a federal state. That is why the commission aimed at creating a rule, that is to say; in the case of federally founded state's constituent republic(s) cease participating in federal government this may deprive the state's recognition as a whole.

Secondly, the Commission was asked whether Serbian population in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia have the right of self-determination? The question is quite important in terms of defining the limits of the execution of the self-determination right. However, the Commission referred to the principle of _uti possidetis_ as it involves also changes in the boundaries of Yugoslavia as a whole. To this critical question, the commission concluded that the minority groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have the right to self-determination in terms of recognition of their identity to the extent that they can choose their nationality; however, this does not mean "right to secession."[263]

At this point, _uti possidetis_ started to dominate the arguments once again. In principle, the concept of _uti possidetis_ is a continuation of the former administrative borders as the external borders of the new entities. The principle has both negative and positive sides. On the positive side, _uti possidetis_ may suggest a blueprint for the solution of the border disputes by offering certainty of the borders on any irredentist or secessionist ambition. On the other hand, as a general rule in international law, it may fuel the ambitions of ethnic groups to demand a transformation of administrative borders to international ones.

Koskenniemi proposes an international legal perspective to the post-1989 self-determination question by focusing on the relationship between the notion of self-determination and statehood.[264] He emphasises that self-determination "expresses the political phenomenon of state patriotism"; however, he also underlines that "a justification of statehood, has not always been apparent."[265]

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[263] Ibid, p65.

[264] Koskenniemi, _National Self-Determination Today,_ 241-269.

[265] Ibid, p245.

Koskenniemi reminds the ambiguous relationship with statehood and self-determination, whereas self-determination must address the boundaries of territory and acknowledge the position of the groups that may be excluded from the ruling.

As the European model of developed state was a legitimising factor in the international legal practice, the heterogeneity of the population and the systematic choices of exclusion of minorities in many of the emerging states caused bad practices. The problems particularly occurred in the situation of the minorities. The guiding principle purported by the UN Secretary-General called *Agenda for Peace* following the request of the UN Security Council emphasises "if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and well-being for all would become even more difficult to achieve."[266] When the new states were born through the ashes of the Yugoslav conflict, the principle of uti possidetis confirmed the territorial interpretation of self-determination, rather than the ethnic interpretation.

Furthering our understanding of the self-determination and the principle of *uti possidetis,* that strengthens the territorial interpretation of self-determination came forward with the most recent case of Chagos.[267] As one of the most recent opinions on self-determination; it sheds light on the aspects of lawful completion of self-determination following the separation of Chagos Archipelago in 1965. The background of the Chagos Case deals interrogates the historicity of the implementation of self-determination of Mauritius which was a British colony in 1968. In 1965, three years before the independence of Mauritius, the UK separated the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and established it as British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). This was a Lancaster House Agreement of 1965 in exchange Mauritius negotiated its independence and UK paid 3 million GBP as a compensation.

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[266] Ibid, 257.
[267] Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. Advisory Opinion, *International Court of Justice,* 25 February 2019, accessed 7 November 2021 https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf

Mauritius had to agree to the Chagos proposal as a colony as this was the condition to gain its independence. Later, the UK removed the inhabitants of the island and prohibited them to return and leased the region to the USA as a military base. According to Mauritius, BIOT was a continuation of colonialism and claimed that Mauritius's right of self-determination was not respected.

In June 2017, Mauritius referred the case to the ICJ for an advisory opinion asking two questions a) whether the process of the decolonisation of Mauritius had been lawfully completed when it achieved independence, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago, having regard to international law and b) or what were the consequences under international law of the continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago by the UK, including the inability of Mauritius to resettle the Chagossians on the Chagos Archipelago.[268]

Despite UK's claims that the ICJ is not sufficient to decide on a bilateral issue; ICJ stated that the Opinion is for the UN General Assembly to decide and emphasized that the General Assembly's long history of producing decisions on ending colonialism and the ICJ's opinion would only assist in defining its decolonisation policy in a particular context.[269]

To answer the first question, ICJ sought whether the self-determination was applicable in the relevant time, that is to say in 1965 when the Chagos Archipelago was separated from Mauritius. If the ICJ perceives self-determination as an established rule of the customary international law than the UK has to respect the colonial boundaries, within the perspective of *uti possidetis.* This means that by separating the Chagos Archipelago, the UK did not fulfil its legal obligation to respect the Mauritius's self-determination since its link with the territory was broken.

As the court took the gravity of the history into account, instead of focusing the moment of independence, it aimed at the historicity of the notion and its evolution into a law. As the court described self-determination as a fundamental

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[268] Ibid, 8-9.

[269] Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. Advisory Opinion, *International Court of Justice,* 25 February 2019, accessed 7 November 2021, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/169-20180301-WRI-05-04-EN.pdf*, 86-90.*

human right,[270] it was considered as an "important consideration due to the possible consequences flowing from a finding of a breach thereof."[271]

Also, ICJ, defined the content of the self-determination law, in particular, responded the time that the notion had become a rule of customary law. The ICJ emphasized Resolution 1514 (XV) 1960; "a declaratory character concerning the right to self-determination as a customary norm, given its content and the conditions of its adoption."[272] In other words, the court defined 1960, as the date that the self-determination turned into principle.

After defining much precise time for the beginning of the self-determination, ICJ responded that would define whether the self-determination properly applied in the case of Mauritius. ICJ underlined that self-determination is the right of the people that reside in the entire territory. From that point of understanding, ICJ affirmed that the Chagos Archipelago belonged to Mauritius since the territory needs to be considered as a whole.[273] Following that, ICJ referred to UN Resolution 1541(XV) mentioning possibilities of independence that require a free and genuine expression of the will of the people. The Court ruled that no such consultation took place. As the UN General Assembly attributes the application of self-determination to administering powers, the UK did not fulfil its obligations fully to Mauritius.[274] Furthermore, ICJ also ruled that the circumstances that led to the separation of Chagos Archipelago represent an unequal bargaining power as the time of the agreement, Mauritius was under the authority of the other party.[275]

In general, ICJ convinced that the UK, as the administering power of the time, obliged to respect the the territory of Mauritius as a whole with its peeople. The

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[270] *Ibid,* 144.

[271] Gino J. Naldi, "Self-Determination in Light of the International Court of Justice's Opinion in the Chagos Case", *Groningen Journal of International Law* 7, (2020): p223.

[272] Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. Advisory Opinion, *International Court of Justice,* 25 February 2019, accessed 7 November 2021, *https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/169-20180301-WRI-05-04-EN.pdf*, 150.

[273] *İbid,* 165.

[274] Naldi, 2020, p228.

[275] Ibid, 172.

ICG declared that the separation of Chagos Archipelago was a violation of the decolonisation process of Mauritius when it gained independence.

The ICJ opinion on Chagos is important on many respects and will have implications to some other exemplary cases; such as Cyprus, as the Republic of Cyprus also provided a written statement on the matter emphasizing the two Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.[276] Quite similar to the Chagos, the two sectors over Cyprus similarly gained their status towards its independence. The analogies between the two cases could create conditions in terms of the exercise of the free will of the people. As a result, the Court ruling would create pressure ovre the British military bases in Cyprus too.[277]

To sum up, the Chagos case is an exemplary case for many aspects. First of all, it showed that the issue of self-determination is still an important matter for contemporary debates and *uti possidetis* is a general principle that also requires a fair analysis of the bargaining power of the parties toward the independence. Secondly, the Chagos case brought significant clarity on the law of self-determination. It enabled establishing the view that the right to self-determination is a concrete rule of customary international law in the 1960s.

Considering all those interpretations of the ICJ on the issue of self-determination, the concept of *uti possidetis* is a general principle that the states has to follow; and with the decision on Chagos, it is possible to see further discussions on the topic. The Chagos opinion clarifies the scope of the doctrine of self-determination in the colonial context. It underlines the transformation of a political idea into a legal right which guarantees a former colonial people the exercise of their sovereignty over the territory delimited by the colonial power. Attempts by a colonial power to change that delimitation to gain permanent control over parts of that territory considered as unlawful. As the ICJ determined in the case of the Chagos Islands, this attempted acquisition of territory was

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[276] Submission of the Republic of Cyprus, International Court of Justice. (2018, February 12 *). Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*. Retrieved from Written Statement of Cyprus https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf p4.

[277] Yiallourides, Constantinos, First Chagos, Then Cyprus? Cyprus Gains Legal Tool in ICJ Ruling on Chagos Islands (March 12, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351969 p3.to

accompanied by coercion. This places on the agenda the issue of the legal status the sovereign British Bases in Cyprus and the wider question of whether the decolonization of Cyprus has been completed lawfully. However, to better understand the question, whether the decolonisation of Cyprus was completed, it is necessary to focus on the last decade of colonialism in Cyprus, which would give important points to develop much coherent understanding on the substance of the question and the conflict.

While the ICJ opinions gives us important indications in terms of implementation of the self-determination as a final remark it is also essential to visit the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights since it is distinctive with its references to the collective rights. The Charter was adopted in 1981 and came into force in 1986 as a regional human rights instrument. As the Charter targets pan-African integration based on rule of law, African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) also decides on the individual and collective rights including self-determination.

Within the boundaries of this discussion, it is essential to investigate few exemplary opinions related to the implementation of self-determination within the ACHPR decisions. The first one to focus is Katanga case[278], in which the President of the Katangese Peoples' Congress requested three points from the ACHPR to 1) recognize Katangese Peoples' Congress as a liberation movement, 2) recognize the independence of Katanga and 3) help the evacuation of Zaire from Katanga. Since the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission) was the first decision that they ever produced on implementation of self-determination, it is considered as a landmark decision. Accordingly, the Commission evaluated the situation and emphasized that there is no allegation of a specific breach of human rights apart from self-determination. Furthermore, the decision portrayed that self-

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[278] Mtendeweka O. Mhango, "Recognizing a Right to Autonomy for Ethnic Groups under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire", *Human Rights Brief* 14, no 2, (2007): 11-15.

determination under ACHPR can only be achieved consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.[279]

While the Commission recognize all peoples right to self-determination; the definition of the peoples and content of the self-determination right needs to be addressed. On the issue of the definition of the people; the people of Katangese were not defined, and no evidence has been provided as well as the Commission choose not to respond to it.

On the content of self-determination, the Commission emphasized different forms of exercising self-determination including independence, self-government, local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any from that represents the will of the people; however also emphasized that those needs to be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the Commission upholds the territorial integrity of Zaire, a party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the commission declared that independence for Katanga had no merit under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Looking into the decision, the Commission demonstrated that the self-determination right is justiciable. Furthermore, it developed a precedent for its enforcement; however, it did not give any hints on the internal application of self-determination right. Also, as the Commission notes, the applicant had complained only of a violation of Charter Article 20 (self-determination) with no indication of other rights were being violated. This shows, how the Commission approaches to human rights violations; that is to say; it shows that it also looks whether the will of the people is denied through lack of participation to the governance structures to consider recognizing secession. This gives the possibility to interpret that the possibility of "remedial secession" is not entirely unexcluded. However, it also raises the bar to nurture conflicts since only widespread human rights violations can give an opportunity for the recognition of secession also could make militant groups to engage further violence to make their point. To better understand the Commission's way of handling on

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[279] Ibid, 14.

self-determination there is another exemplary decision to look into and it is on Southern Cameroon.

Southern Cameroon's situation is linked to its colonial past and the creation of Cameroon as an independent state in 1961. Prior to independence Cameroon was divided between English speaking Southern Cameroon and French speaking Republic of Cameroon. As the decolonisation was taking its time the parties come into terms to unite under Federal Republic of Cameroon. However, more significant part of Francophone Republic of Cameroon eventually controlled smaller Anglophone Southern Cameroon. However, Anglophone Southern Cameroonians continued to assert their self-determination rights via non-violent means.

One of the ways of reclaiming self-determination right was through the application to the ACHPR. Southern Cameroon Peoples Organisation and the Southern Cameroons National Council claimed systematic human rights violations targeting Southern Cameroonians and asserted self-determination for South Cameroon in January 2003.

While there were claims that there are number of violations of African Charter; they argued Republic of Cameroon occupies the territory of Southern Cameroon violates Article 19 and 20 of the African Charter. The Commission's vital decision was the recognition of Southern Cameroonians as "people" under the Charter. However, also the Commission emphasized that the Southern Cameroonians does not qualify for the right of self-determination and further stated that the Commission "condone or encourage secession, as a form of self-determination for the Southern Cameroons", affirming the sovereignty of the Republic of Cameroon and invited parties for a national dialogue.

Considering the previous case on Katanga, where the Commission indicated significance of the widerbroader human rights violations as a remedial way of secession, in the Southern Cameroon case by recognising Southern Cameroonians as a "people" but without providing any guideline on internal or external self-determination creates an abstract environment on the possibility of implementation of self-determination. It also further encourage further violence since it portrays an understanding that the depth of the conflict defines the possible political and legal status.

The Comission in both cases also stick to the principle of *uti possidetis* since in both decisions, the respect to the previous boundaries were not disputed. From this point of view, as a regional human rights instrument, the Commission fulfils its role within the international legal framework. However, increasing debates on self-determination also shows that the conflicting parties does not see guidelines of the Comisssion as the last remedy. The conflicting parties tend to take those decisions as they see how they fit to their legal discourse and fuel the conflict further.

The main point of discussions in the next chapters will focus on the discourses of self-determination in the Cypriot communities from 1950 to 1960. The selected incidents, texts, announcements and any other secondary sources as well as the archival materials aim to provide substantive understanding of the historicity of the conflict. Parallel to the overall arguments throughout this project, the resolution of a national conflict via a negotiated solution requires a clear understanding of diverging interpretations of self-determination and its linkages with the history. From this point of view, it is crucial to identify the causes and effects of abnormalities that prepared grounds for Cyprus to be globally recognized with its conflict.

Chapter 3 – Greek-Cypriot Pursuit of Self-Determination: 1950-1960

This chapter reflects on how the demand for self-determination was consolidated by the Greek Cypriot community as the demand for Enosis from 1950 onwards. The previous chapters dealt with the British Colonialism in Cyprus and the notion of self-determination. The first chapter drew attention to how British rule transformed Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and affected them while constructing their national identity. After the 1950

referendum, the Greek Cypriot community embraced Enosis much broadly. The second chapter focused on the notion of self-determination. It mainly focussed on the evolution of self-determination from a political demand to a legal principle. This chapter provides the history of self-determination demand by focusing its emancipatory claims and its treatment of the history of the Cyprus conflict. This chapter focuses on the discursive content of the self-determination among the Greek Cypriots and how it shaped the struggle against the British colonialism.

3.1 Greek Nationalism and Enosis

In the previous chapter, the theoretical framework of nationalism was discussed. The politics of nationalism in the case of Greek nationalism consists of some events that also internalized in Cyprus. Solid beginning on the Greek nationalist politics started with the revolt against the Ottoman Empire that revived the idea of Hellenism and recast it in the form of Hellenic Unity in the 1820s, which led the creation of the modern Greek state. It was very much part of the rise of a particular form of territorial ethnic nationalism that marked European politics in the nineteenth century. The idea of the territorial state based on a single ethnic group often clashed with a multi-ethnic reality. In the case of Greek nationalism, this was complicated by the history of a far-flung Greek world that historically has been a cultural and linguistic influence over a large part of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even in the nineteenth century, this history had affected Greek-speaking and Greek Orthodox communities in Anatolia, the Levant and Egypt – and of course, Cyprus. As demonstrated, the struggle against British rule offered a new opportunity for Greek Cypriots to connect to this process.

As with all nineteenth-century European national movements, Greek nationalism was imbued with a great deal of romanticism. This was underlined by the fact that most Greeks lived beyond the borders of the new state, which had led to the *Megali Idea* or 'the Great Idea' to extend the borders of the state until all Greeks were encapsulated; representing a good example on *Imagined Communities* explanation of Benedict Anderson.

This idea became increasingly appealing to Greek Cypriots from 1878 onwards. By 1950, Britain (like other European Imperial powers) faced powerful anti-colonial movements that sought immediate independence. While the British had been forced to relinquish the control of India, as with other European powers, it had failed to appreciate that the age of Empire was over. The British in Cyprus assumed that they would be able to continue ruling over the strategically important island for some time to come. The Enosis movement was to provide a new twist in the anti-colonial struggle – a struggle not for a sovereign state, but the unification of people and the territory with an existing sovereign state.

Numerous studies are analysing Greek nationalism; for example, Kitromilides emphasizes the *Megali Idea* as an ideological expression of the Greek nation-state and its relationship with nation-building, while explaining the intellectual content of Greek nationalism where[280] Byzantium becomes the integral

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[280] Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus. *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1990): 3 - 17.

component of Greek history.[281] On the other hand, Prevelakis presents Greek nationalism using a three-stage analysis.

According to his argument, the first stage of Greek nationalism did not primarily show any interest in territorial expansion or liberation of Greeks located outside Greece.[282] In the first stage, Greek nationalists associated themselves with Ancient Greeks which they idealized and sought to recreate it. Alexander Ypsilanti led the uprising in 1821 can be seen as an example to that.[283] It had civic and individualist characters. *Megali Idea* is seen as the transforming element, and it constituted the second stage in Greek nationalism, where the Greek state and people associate themselves with the Greek identity. Although *Megali Idea* was evoked the Byzantine Empire, when first used, it lacked this implication.[284] In 1830s Greek nationalism was more about the recreation of Ancient Greece on a national basis.[285] Prevelakis suggests that attempts to materialize *Megali Idea* led to the third stage of Greek nationalism which was rather complex, as it consisted of limited success stories of Greece followed by betrayal, and feelings of resentment; all of which can be counted as some of the main elements of the transformation of Greek nationalism. The final phase, that is ethnic and collectivistic started from the mid-19th century and with known obstructions in the 1920s in continued until 1950s. Prevelakis' theory concludes

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[281] Ibid, 19.

[282] Nicos Prevelakis, "The spirit of Greek Nationalism: the Greek case in the light of Greenfeld's conceptual framework" Hellenic Observatory: Accessed 11 November 2021 from http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/N_P revelakis_paper.pdf, p11.

[283] İbid, 10.

[284] Ibid, 11.

[285] İbid.

that pressures led to an ethno-collectivist transformation of Greek nationalism that primarily functioned as a mission for transcending the civilisation;[286] arguably one of the best examples of which can be observed through the educational systems in Cyprus.

Kitromilides considers the formation of the educational network between the Hellenic identity as a radical break:

> *The educational effort of the nineteenth century promoted the linguistic homogenisation of the Christian Orthodox populations of the East, as the basis of their incorporation into the broader community of the Greek nation. It is significant that language was replacing religion as the major unifying bond of nationality under the new conditions. In ideological terms this represented a transition from the older community of the Orthodox millet in whose context linguistic differences were immaterial, to the new community of the Greek nation, which, following modern nationalist doctrine, used language as its foremost hallmarks.*[287]

As *Megali Idea* constituted the external pillar of Greek nationalism,[288] the doctrine also transformed Greece into the 'national centre'.[289] The territorial boundaries of the Kingdom of Greece expanded further from the 19th to the mid-20th century; significant achievements of this expansion can be listed as the inclusion of Ionian Islands with the support of Britain in 1863, ceding part of Macedonia and Crete in 1913, the inclusion of Smyrna, Eastern and Western Thrace in 1920 followed by the Dodecanese Islands in 1947. The idea of uniting the Greek-speaking Orthodox population was the overarching goal of the

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[286] Ibid, 14.

[287] Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus", *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1990) :7-8.

[288] *Megali Idea* means 'the great idea', which would unify the entire Hellenic population under the same state, as a microcosm of the Byzantine Empire.

[289] Kizilyürek, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında, 168.

external pillar of the Greek nationalism.[290] The territorial gains that Greece made were with the support of the Great Powers, Britain in particular. Greece and Britain had close relations since the Greek War of Independence.[291] However, Britain was not disposed to support any movement towards Greece by the Greek population of Cyprus. While it was in Britain's interests to see territorial gains by Greece at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, after 1878 it would have been contrary to their interests to undermine the British presence on the island.

The year of 1923 setback the tide of Greek nationalism, as Greece suffered major losses at the end of the Greco-Turkish war. Turkey occupied Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. In its weakened state, Greece was forced to accept the Treaty of Lausanne,[292] which not only recognised these new realities but acknowledged British control of Cyprus with the Turkish abdication. This, however, led to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed between Greek and Turkish governments on 30th January 1923. It involved the movement of 1.5 million Greeks living in Turkey to Greece

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[290] Yanna Delivoria, "The notion of nation: the emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of 'inside' and 'outside' Greeks in the nineteenth century." *In Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)* edited by Roderick Beaton, David Ricks (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009) 109-123.

[291] Erik Goldstein. "Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920" 32 *The Historical Journal* (1989): 339-356.

[292] Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne states, "Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 4th November, 1914." Considering the treaty was a document binding Greece as well, it also recognizes the annexation of Cyprus as Article 1 states: "from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the state of peace will be definitely re-established between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of the one part, and Turkey of the other part, as well as between their respective nationals." The full treaty is accessible from: *The Lausanne Treaty,* (24 July 1923).20-21, accessed 11 November 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa

and some 500,000 Turks living in Greece to Turkey. The population exchange had dramatic impacts on demographics, the economy as well as the political situation both in Greece and Turkey.[293]

The intention behind the population transfer was the ethnic homogenisation which was consistent with their mutual ethnic nationalist agenda.[294] For Turkish nationalism, the ethnic homogenisation of Anatolia eliminated any possibility of Greece reclaiming areas in Turkey such as Smyrna (İzmir). The population exchange was an important victory for Turkish nationalism achieving their national vision, *misak-i milli (*national oath).[295] For Greece, it was catastrophic on various aspects; the arrival of 1.5 million new citizens put considerable pressure on the Greek society, culture and economy. It also created tensions between the new and settled populations.[296] This experience made the Greek elite somewhat wary of Megali Idea's practical implications. Cyprus as a result was not seen as a priority following the catastrophe that Greece experienced.

In the1940s Greece was in a deeper crisis. The war had begun well for Greeks in the autumn of 1940 as Metaxas' government was able to defeat Italian invaders and push them back to Albania. That defeat forced Germans to retrieve the situation in the spring of 1941 with a major offensive that

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[293] Nedim Şeker, "Forced Population Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic: An Attempt at Reassessment through Demographic Engineering*" European journal of Turkish Studies* 16 (2013): 1-16.

[294] İbid, p4.

[295] Misak-i Milli was a decision that constitutes the basis of the Republic of Turkey. This decision is referred to as The National Pact. According to this decision, territories inhabited by a Turkish majority would be considered a Turkish homeland.

[296] Mustafa Suphi Erden, "The exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 1920s and its socio-economic impacts on life in Anatolia". *Crime, Law & Social Change* (2004): 275.

overwhelmed the Greek positions and led to a vicious occupation regime. Members of the Greek government were forced to flee to Cairo.[297] From 6th April 1941, the country was run by Axis Powers and a puppet government. However, almost immediately a Greek resistance emerged. However, this divided a royalist movement (EDES) supported by Britain and a communist movement known by the initials EAM/ELAS. This division in the opposition to the Nazis was to have a major impact on Greek politics after the war and implications on its future policy on Cyprus. British support for EDES was significant.[298] However, both movements were to prove effective in harrying the Germans and establishing areas outside of their control by 1943. Britain's support for EDES was fuelled by the desire to prevent a communist take-over of Greece after the war.[299] At Yalta, it was evident that the only country where clarity on the sphere of influence (USSR/USA-UK) was blurred was Greece. At the end of the war, there was a vicious civil war between the former allies of EDES and EAM/ELAS. As a result, Greek politics turned inwards; first because of the fighting for the civil war and then after 1948 attempting to deal with its consequences. The Enosis referendum in Cyprus was thus, not a major event for Greece, on the contrary Greece was not willing to engage into a new political crisis.

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[297] Richard Clogg, "The Greek Government-in-Exile 1941-4", *The International History Review* 1,(1979): 376-398.

[298] Mark Mazower, *Hitler's empire Nazi rule in occupied Europe,* (London: Penguin Books, 2009),.350.

[299] Haris Vlavianos, *Greece 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) 27.

The Cold War also had a significant impact on Greek politics. Greece was a buffer zone between the Eastern and Western bloc, and this reflected local polarisations. The ideological polarization of the Cold War had devastating results in Greece, with its internal strife causing further instability. The first phase of the civil war started in late 1944, after the end of the occupation. The civil war was between the two rival groups: the Eastern bloc-backed Communists, and the Western bloc-backed Royalists. During the second phase of the Greek Civil War, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania also became involved, making the second stage of the Greek Civil War an international conflict rather than an internal one. Ultimately, communists lost the Greek Civil War. The primary reason for their defeat was Stalin's unwillingness to support Yugoslavia, partially due to the Yalta Agreement in 1945.[300] However, it was the ideological split between Tito and Stalin that exacerbated the situation. At the same time, the Truman Doctrine was to strengthen the Greek government's fight against the "communist threat".[301] This signified the beginning of the United States' influence in the country. After World War II Britain's weakened position meant that it increasingly became reliant on the US and became part of the Western

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[300] Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American embrace: Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, the US and the Western alliance*, (London: IB Tauris 2009) 30.

[301] The Truman Doctrine was the United States foreign policy to counter-balance the Soviet influence announced by US President Harry S. Truman on 12 March 1947. For more details on Truman Doctrine and its role in the Greek politics: Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American embrace: Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, the US and the Western alliance* (London: IB Tauris, 2009) 51-52.

Alliance. It is this context that the United States was to become more influential in the affairs of Greece. [302]

Despite US support, Greece remained politically weakened. Between 1948 and 1952, Greece experienced governmental instability. During the four years, thirteen different governments were established, and from 1946 to 1964 Greece had nine national elections.[303] Clearly, 9 elections in such a period show that Cyprus was not the most important issue in Greek politics.

As a front-line Cold War state Greece became one of the chief beneficiaries of US support as it acquired $1.7 billion in economic aid and $1.3 billion in military aid.[304] This further strengthened relations between Greece and the USA. The US embraced Greece as a partner in the fight against communism in the Balkans. However, inter-state relations were not balanced. A report from the US State Department indicates that the ambassador in Athens had a role in decision making on various issues which amounted to interfering in Greek domestic affairs.[305]

When the Cypriot delegation arrived in Athens to present the referendum results, Greece was not in a position to take any significant political steps. While King Paul vocalized his support of the results, the Greek government tried to

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[302] Lieutenant-General Ronald Scobie served in Greece from 1943 to 1946 to fight against the Germans as he was not only appointed to the post of General Commander of the British Forces but also the Greek Army. After the end of the German Invasion, he was also involved in the Greek Civil War. For a more detailed outlook of the Greek Civil War: Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: the experience of occupation, 1941-44.* (London: Yale University Press, 2001).

[303] The election years were 1946, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1963, and 1964.

[304] Kassimeris, *Greece and the American embrace*, 36.

[305] Ibid.

remain neutral.[306] While Cypriots were demanding for Enosis, the Greek government preferred not to act. The Greek opposition on the other hand was looking into the chances of bringing Cyprus issue upfront. The delegation of the Greek Cypriot unable to get what they had expected about Enosis. The visit to Athens ended up being highly symbolic on an official level. However, it played a significant role in making the Greek public pressurize their government.

In November 1951, Greek Foreign Minister Sophocles Venizelos asked Britain to cede Cyprus by offering four bases in Greece and any facilities that Britain demanded to have in Cyprus.[307] The British Foreign Minister rejected this proposal on the grounds of Britain's long-term defence.[308] However, things were about to change in the course of Greece's foreign policy with its initiation into NATO.

Greece joined NATO in 1952, together with Turkey. NATO membership was considered a new path for Greece.[309] Following Greece's NATO membership the foundations of the Greek foreign policy defined.[310] From this point onwards, Greek foreign policy entered a more predictable path. Allowing both Greece and Turkey to NATO at the same time meant a step to ensure the power balances in the region. Although there were still unresolved issues between the two

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[306] Alexios Alecou, *Communism and Nationalism in Post-War Cyprus*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2016) 129.

[307] Brendan O'Malley & Ian Craig, *The Cyprus conspiracy: America, espionage and the Turkish invasion*. (London: IB Tauris, 2001). 12.

[308] Ibid, 12.

[309] Dionysios Chourchoulis & Lykourgos Kourkouvelas. "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12 (2012): 497-514.

[310] Ibid, 497.

states, by joining them to the same alliance, they both showed the desire for stability as well as strengthening the strategic interests of the Western alliance. For Greece, joining NATO confirmed their foreign policy's lines in general, and on Cyprus.[311] When Greece joined NATO, the Greek government did not put unifying Cyprus as a foreign policy goal. This was primarily because of the possible Turkish reaction regarding Greece's expansionist desires related to Cyprus. Similarly, Turkey deployed a position affirming the British presence and its sovereignty over Cyprus. As Turkey was approaching towards NATO, Turkey was fine-tuning its rhetoric on Cyprus and banning the groups that damage Turkey's progress to NATO.[312]

However, the impetus coming from the nationalists in Cyprus was putting Greece into a difficult position. Greek Cypriots were increasing calls for self-determination and it was almost impossible for any Greek government to remain unresponsive. Two years after the NATO accession, Greece brought the self-determination demand of Greek Cypriots to the UN General Assembly. This political manoeuvre of Greece raised questions in the wider interests of the Western Alliance as it was important to keep Greece and Turkey on a smooth track. However, the whole setting became problematic once bombs campaign began in 1955 with the foundation of the nationalist Greek Cypriot organisation EOKA / Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.

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[311] İbid, 500.
[312] Closure of the Kıbrısı Koruma Cemiyeti "Association of Protecting Cyprus" in 1950 can be seen one of the moves that aimed to protect and preserve British perspective on Cyprus. Tanıl Bora. "Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs", Birikim Dergisi 77 (1995) : 19.

The 1950s were paradoxical for Greece and Greek Cypriots. At the beginning of the decade, Greek political elites tended to distance themselves from Enosis, while Greek Cypriots popularised the Enosis discourse in the context of their right to self-determination. At first Greek Cypriot Enosisists did not find a corresponding voice in the Greek government. However, eventually, masses started to mobilize and the relationship has changed. Cyprus was to have a significant impact on Greek nationalism. Athens, perceived as the centre of the nationalist quest, eventually owned the Enosisist discourse and started to contribute to the campaigns from 1954 onwards. The new setting in the Greek foreign policy on Cyprus also affecting relations with Turkey and the UK.

3.2 First Phase: Enosis Ideology 1950 – 1955

As the outcome of the petition for Enosis in 1950 demonstrated, Enosis had established itself as a hegemonic demand among the Greek Cypriot community in Cyprus. The emerging alliances in the Greek Cypriot community for Enosis, as well as its wider implications of distaste from the colonial administration on the experiences from the daily life, contributed to the movement. From this angle, it was difficult for the Colonial Administration to ignore the transformation of the political landscape. Yet, the way the Administration dealt with the emerging Enosis demand were mostly to suppressing it. In this section, examples of Greek Cypriots' actions for Enosis are provided. The examples can be seen as how Enosis being accumulated in the public discourse but also it enables to comment on how the Greek Cypriots interpreted Enosis in general and also the responses from the colonial administration.

One of the interesting events happened in Limassol in the early days of the year 1950. The leftist Greek Cypriot mayor of Limassols, Costas Partasides changed the names of 45 streets in the town. According to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Hür-Söz, British authorities rejected two of these changes. The newspaper details that the two rejected names were *28th October* representing the 'Oxi' day, and one named after a soldier – *Takis Kitreotis* –from the Cypriot regiment who fought in World War II.[313]

Formerly*, 28th October Street* was named *Churchill Street*.[314] The Colonial Administration rejected the changes that promoted Greek nationalist sentiments symbolizing Greek dictator Metaxas' rejection of the ultimatum from Italian dictator Mussolini on 28th October 1940. The street called *Churchill Street* was renamed as a result of the Governor's decision to be called *Richmond Palmer* Street who was a very unpopular former Governor of Cyprus*.* The selected names and the responses from the colonial administration indicate briefly the antagonistic relationship between the British Administration and the Greek nationalists in Cyprus. Also, it represents an aim to transform the public spaces from British identity into a Greek identity that goes hand in hand with the Enosis demand.

The second controversial name was Takis Kitreotis who was a symbol of the refusal of Greek Cypriots to collaborate with Britain after the defeat of the Nazis. He was recruited by the communists to fight against the Nazis within the Cyprus

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[313] "Rum Basını" *Hürsöz Newspaper*. 1 January 1950.

[314] Holland, R. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus* 1954 - 1959. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002) 22

Regiment. After the end of the war, he refused to fight regiment as a political protest. Once World War II ended, Greek Cypriots had two expectations from Britain: to dissolve the Cyprus Regiment and cede Cyprus to Greece as a reward for the contribution of Cypriots in World War II. Neither of these expectations were fulfilled. The Cyprus Regiment was active from 1940 to 1950. Like Kitreotis many others also who fought against the Nazis wished to continue serving the British interests once World War II was over. Communists in the Cyprus Regiment refused to fight for colonialism when the force was to be sent to Egypt to fight in various British fronts in the Middle East. Those who refused to fight were gathered in the concentration camps in Egypt and Cyprus. Takis Kitreotis was to die in Egypt. Costas Partasides, when elected as a mayor of Limassol (from communist AKEL), sought to promote the heroic stance of Takis Kitreotis; and he also aimed to furnish a political message by making a nationalist point. The ideologic position was to remind British Administration in Cyprus that the political elites in Cyprus had expectations since the Second World War for the decolonization. The interaction with the public sphere as well as monumentalizing the fallen in the Second World War helps the Greek Cypriots to sustain the legacy of their expectations.

However, each action was subject to a reaction. In fact, the response of Governor Wright to the changes in the names of the streets was beyond expectations. Governor considered the mayor's choices on the names as seditious. As a result, the mayor and the members of the municipal council were imprisoned, and the mayor was replaced by the governor's nominee.[315] This

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[315] Holland, Britain and the revolt, 22.

was an example of British Governor Andrew Barkworth Wright's way of handling the moves that aim to accumulate an understanding on the self-determination of the Greek Cypriots. The criminalisation of the self-determination demand of the Greek Cypriots considered as a way to keep the order in Cyprus. The administration sought to preserve order on the basis the British rule would continue in some form, the Greek Cypriots were caught-up an international anti-colonial political wave that was to end the European Empires much more speedily than the metropolitan centres anticipated. This clash between colonial pragmatism and an insurgent nationalist ideology was to be the hallmark of the period.

Another significant development that is worth to mention was the election of Makarios as Archbishop, as he came to the position to personify the case for Enosis. However, as much as his cult of personality, he also effectively established institutions to carry out the anti-colonial nationalist project. The establishment of the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly constituted the ideological seedbed of the anti-colonialist and Greek nationalist EOKA organisation. Undoubtedly the Enosis referendum was to prove to be the deceive moment in the forging of Greek Cypriot politics. The Church of Cyprus was positioned at the core of the nationalist movement. The long history gave the Church a pivotal role in society which was to become increasingly central as the struggle against the British intensified.

Makarios initiated his steps to carry Enosis to the forefront of society by bringing together elites and grassroots. To accomplish this, he followed a two-tier strategy. First, he attempted to unite the political elites through the Ethnarchy

Council.[316] The Ethnarchy Council established an additional instrument called the Office of the Ethnarchy. The Ethnarchy Office played a significant role as an executive political body. Makarios left the Office of the Ethnarchy and joined right-wing conservatives and anti-communists under the same umbrella.[317] In 1952, the Ethnarchy Council gathered various organized groups and summoned the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly where Makarios derived his sacred authority into a legitimate authority emanating from the popular will of the people.[318] A relatively democratic model — gathering one representative from each one thousand inhabitants— established the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly.[319] On 25th March 1952, following the meeting of the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly, these decisions were made:

> *a) Enosis expressed the popular will, b) the devotion and loyalty of the people to the Ethnarchy was democratically legitimized, c) the rejection of any proposal by the British for a Constitution constituted a patriotic duty, d) the Greek state was recognized as a spokesman of the will of the unredeemed part of the nation and e) recourse to the UN for Enosis constituted the popular demand for the freedom of the Cypriots.*[320]

The resolution of the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly affirmed that the request for Enosis was an integral aspect of the freedom of Cypriots.[321] The Enosis

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[316] John Milios & Tasos Kyprianidis, "Greek and Greek-Cypriot political strategies on independence: class, nation and statehood" in *Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A state and society in transformation,* ed. Nicos Trimikliniotis, & Umut Bozkurt (London: Palgrave, 2009) 99- 118.

[317] Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III, 1950 - 77: Creating the Ethnarchic State", *The Archbishops of Cyprus In The Modern Age*, Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) 246.

[318] ibid

[319] Ibid, 252.

[320] Ibid.

[321] İbid.

demand became a sacred and political goal that eventually enabled Makarios to champion this nationalist ideology in Cyprus. Informing the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly, Makarios fused the national and religious demands of the Ethnarchy. By taking advantage of the Office of Ethnarchy as well as the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly, Makarios became the indisputable leader, which meant he could wield substantial influence over the nationalist elites.

Also, Makarios was able to encourage grassroots to embrace the nationalist ideology and thus, mobilize them. He promoted several campaigns to ensure the popularity of Enosis. Public meetings held graffiti advocating Enosis and were systematically painted in public places, weaving Enosis into the fabric of worship. Pro-Enosis grassroots organisations like PEK (Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus), PEON (Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organisation) and OHEN (Orthodox Church's Youth Movement) also played a significant role in the campaign. While PEK represented the rural population, OHEN and PEON were mostly organised in the cities. All members of these organisations later became part of the Enosis movement, either in the armed division or organized within the towns.

Greek Cypriot nationalism was led by a young archbishop who acquired the position at the age of 37 and was able to communicate his message to the masses, compelling them to realize that they were subjects of the nationalist liberation. In addition to his charisma, the efficient use of the nationalist discourse played a significant role.

One of the important examples of how the campaign of Makarios led nationalists came into a significant ideology can be seen only two years after

the 1950 referendum. A gathering was organized for the second anniversary of the Enosis referendum. Despite the Cypriot government-issued ban on any public gatherings from 11th to 15th January 1952, the event took place on 13th January 1952 emphasizing that the referendum was for national self-determination despite the non-Greek Cypriot population did not participated to it.[322] During the event, Makarios delivered his famous speech titled "Call to Youth" at Faneromeni Church. Despite the ban on public gatherings, the speech created euphoria. Holland narrates the event as: "walls and streets in Cypriot towns daubed with Enosis slogans; the letter 'A' for 'Anti-stasis' or 'resistance', ran through this graffiti, and translations such as 'Greeks, liberty is won with blood – Enosis, A/A/A".[323] These sorts of demonstrations occurred not only in Nicosia but also in other towns. Also, the municipal buildings hung Greek flags to show their support of the referendum outcome in 1950.

The ideological spread of Enosis also carried out by the two youth organisations PEON and OHEN. In June 1953, Greek Cypriot nationalist youth of PEON and OHEN initiated nationalist campaigns aiming at raising anti-colonialist sentiment. However, one of the most noteworthy incidents happened during the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, where 800 youths were present at the coronation in Paphos when Evagoras Pallikarides, a 15-year-old schoolchild, pulled down the Union Jack.[324] This was the most remarkable and unexpected

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[322] Ahmet Gazioğlu, "Tehlikeli Bir Söylev / Dangerous Discourse." *Bozkurt*, 1.

[323] Holland, *Revolt in Cyprus*, 27.

[324] Ibid, p.31.

anti-British demonstration that happened after the 1931 Uprising. From this point onwards, the Colonial Administration became more rigid against the nationalist demands of Greek Cypriots.

Another remarkable aspect of the Enosis nationalism among the Greek Cypriots is its transformation from a nationalist ideology to an international policy position. Makarios was able to play this role effectively.[325] He enhanced relations with Greece over Enosis, also visited former colonies and other neighbouring colonized territories to boost support for the cause, and pressurised the UN to act upon their demands.[326] The decision of the UN General Assembly on "the right of self-determination of the peoples" on 16th December 1952 had positive impacts for the internationalisation of the Enosis demand. As the resolution defines self-determination as the prerequisite to "the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights" based on the respect for equal rights that can strengthen universal peace, the Enosis discourse turned out to be the liberationist discourse attracting sympathy internationally.

However, as it was noted it refers to *preparations* for the exercise of the right and requests colonial powers to take steps in that direction, rather than the immediate realization of self-determination. The resolution recommends the "promotion of the right to self-determination of the peoples of the non-self-governing and trust territories."[327] In calling on colonial member states to begin taking practical steps it specifies that these should be "in the legislative and

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[325] Holland, Britain and the Revolt,17.

[326] İbid, p23.

[327] Ibid.

executive organs of government of those territories and prepare them for complete self-government or independence."[328] This resolution created an agenda that colonial peoples could begin pressing on the Imperial powers. Those powers, by and large, imagined that the "practical steps" would be implemented over decades, However, the colonised peoples had much speedy decolonisation process in mind.

Greek Cypriots, as the people of a colonized territory of the United Kingdom, took the resolution as a way to add legitimacy to their cause. From December 1952, Makarios sought ways to advance the case of Cyprus at the UN General Assembly to achieve the self-determination of Cypriots, without considering Turkish Cypriot political demands; even though Turkish Cypriot political elite were aligned with the continuation of the status quo.

As a first step, he pressured the Greek government to carry this issue of Enosis forward diplomatically. In the meantime, Makarios travelled to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria to gain support. His tour for self-determination also included the United States. During his visit, Makarios gave an interview to a journalist stating:

> *Cypriots are Greeks, but they are slaves. They are slaves, and they are seeking freedom. They are Greeks, and they are asking for their union with Greece. We will claim our national rights in every possible way."*[329]

The statement of Makarios was a typicalexample of his argument. However, it is still disputable whether the position held by Makarios could be seen as a

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[328] Ibid.

[329] Anagnostopoulou, Creating Ethnarchic State, p.243.

matter of human rights. The narrative reflecting resistance to the British was certainly exclusionary of Turkish Cypriots since he referred that the oppressed groups were only the Greeks. Probably, the fundamental flaw in the Makarios's politics was the lacking political stance to include the other groups in Cyprus. In other words, while he advanced his rhetoric to a level of the self-determination of the people in Cyprus; he did not cooperate with other groups like Turkish Cypriots or the Maronites, Armenians, Latins. And yet at the same time, it bore nationalist rhetoric on liberation from the foreign rule. It reduced anti-colonialism to the liberation of the Greek Cypriots and the unification of the Greek nation. The ethnic interpretation of self-determination was the typical paradoxical problem that observed in different colonial contexts. Such an approach ignores solid complexities on the island itself as well as the legal foundations of the self-determination. Also, this way served the colonial interests because it also nourished the counter-nationalist aspirations. Makarios was advocated for the national self-determination of Greeks in Cyprus despite the issue should have been understood as the self-determination of the people of Cyprus.

Despite, those flaws in Makarios's rhetoric there were sympathy internationally with the self-determination demands of Greek Cypriots. The Greek government, however, moved carefully around the issue of Enosis demand of the Greek Cypriots. Ultimately, Greek government rejected responding to the plebiscite in 1950. Starting with the December 1952 resolution of the UN General Assembly, Makarios began lobbying Greek governments to take the case of Cyprus to the

UN. The response to his first formal request came from the Greek Prime Minister Plastiras who was rather condescending:

> *Listen precious Makarios, if you visit my poor house and ask me to fight for Cyprus, I will do it with pleasure because I am a soldier. However, you are visiting the office of the Greek Prime Minister demanding me to burn Greece without giving any advantage to Cyprus. In other words, let's put it this way, do not meddle.[330]*

The paradox was that Greece, the national centre of Greek nationalism, was less enthusiastic in comparison to the Greek Cypriots whom fervently wanted to unify with Greece. Indeed, the Greek government became concerned about the rising Enosis movement in Cyprus and the implications it had for domestic and regional politics.

Minister Giorgos Papandreou explained the reason Greece wanted to keep its distance from Enosis in these words, "Today Greece is able to breathe with two lungs, one is British, and the other is American".[331] Such a lukewarm response interestingly created opportunities for Makarios to intervene in Greek politics. In broadcast speech Makarios demonstrated a talent for turning the table on the reticent Greek government through carefully crafted national rhetoric:

> *"People of Greece…I know that you did not want thanks, because… you feel your participation in the Cypriot struggle as your National duty. For me, however, as the head of the struggle designated by will of God and the love of the Cypriot people, it is a duty… to express to you my thanks… You did all that was possible up to now, people of the Free Motherland… There is something… that you should still do… To render legitimate and possible your demand for recourse to the United Nations. In a democratic country, like Greece, you are the*

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[330] Makarios Drousiotis, *EOKA Karanlık Yön,* (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayıları, 2005) 47.

[331] Pantazes Terlexis, *Greece's Policy and Attitude towards the Problem of Cyprus*, (New York: N.Y. University, 1968) 91.

> *spokesmen, you are sovereign… Therefore, I am entrusting to you
> the handling, on the Greek side, of the sacred cause of Cyprus".*[332]

It was a case of the peripheral nationalistic rhetoric of Cyprus defining the route of the Greek nation. Such an intervention was to have an impact on Greek domestic politics too. The opposition took this as an opportunity to press the government on the issue. As a result, from 1953 onwards, the Greek government signalled that it could be favourable to Enosis.

In 1953, when the Greek delegation addressed the UN General Assembly, while diplomatically observing the Cyprus issue as a matter that could be resolved between Greece and Britain. Interestingly, the spokesperson of the Greek delegation wase Alexis Kyrou who was also explained in the first chapter played a role in 1931 Uprising and deported from Cyprus as the former Greek Ambassador of Cyprus. He was acting as the UN representative of Greece in 1953. In his speech, he referred to Cyprus by referring to Makarios's visit as follows:

> *...the spiritual and national chief of four-fifths of the Cypriot population
> addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a
> memorandum requesting the inclusion of that question on the agenda
> and, the adoption of a resolution recommending that the United
> Kingdom should accept the right of the people of Cyprus to self-
> determination, in compliance with the provision of the General
> Assembly resolution.*[333]

He further added:

> *…my government, therefore, does not at this moment contemplate
> bringing the matter before this organisation, since it is convinced that
> the close relation exists between Greece and Britain (…) my
> government definitely prefers the method of friendly bilateral*

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[332] Anagnastopolou, Creating Ethnarchic State, 244.

[333] United Nations General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 439 (VIII), 21 September 1953.

> *discussion, since that is warranted by the very nature of our long-standing cordial relation.[334]*

The Greek delegation's refusing to officially add Cyprus to the UN Agenda, but to mention it during their speech was the example of Makarios's public pressure and its reflection. It is also possible to speculate, Kyrou personally supported Enosis since 1931 and he preferred indirectly bring Cyprus issue to the UNGA's agenda at least rhetorically. The Greek delegation aimed to deflect this topic with a diplomatic formula.

Nevertheless, Greece changed its political position.[335] On 24th August 1954, Greece officially made an application to discuss the future of Cyprus at the UN General Assembly. However, their quest on the resolution for the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus did not gain enough support. [336]

Such a shift in Greek foreign policy demonstrates the strength of the anti-colonial nationalism over Greek foreign policy and the influence of the periphery over the core. The transformation led to the success of Makarios's political

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[334] Ibid.

[335] The shift in political position relied on internal and external factors. Internally, Greek public opinion became more aware of the Enosis movement in Cyprus and Makarios was effectively communicating this to the masses in Greece, putting the government in a difficult position. When Eden visited Athens in September 1953, Greek Prime Minister Papagos asked for a 'discreet Anglo-Greek' demarche on the future of Cyprus. However, Eden's response was: "The question is closed for us (…) after all, there was a considerable Greek population in Alexandria and New York, but he did not suppose that the Greek Government was demanding Enosis for them." (Holland, Britain and Revolt in Cyprus, 32) This is believed to be what made Greece take the issue to the UN General Assembly.

[336] United Nations General Assembly, A/Res/814(IX) *Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus* (17 December 1954), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/814(IX)

strategy to include Greece in the Cyprus issue. As well as, showing Makarios's significant achievement of internationalisation of Enosis.

However, the mounting sentimental position was not the only achievement for Makarios; Grivas was equally important as an actor from the beginning. It is possible to claim that, without the involvement of Grivas, the rise of the Enosis movement might not have become as influential, due to Makarios being reluctant to initiate a violent campaign against Britain. However, Grivas was considered 'the man of violence'. He emphasized the possibility of initiating an armed struggle against the British, while Makarios remained sceptical. On Makarios's scepticism, Grivas commented in his memoirs, "It was obvious that Makarios had serious doubts, it seems he agreed on the vision, but he was not yet convinced."[337] No one other than Grivas was enthusiastic about a violent campaign in Cyprus. In his memoirs, Grivas explains his discussion on armed struggle in Cyprus with Greek Prime Minister Papagos.[338] Once Grivas saw the unwillingness of the Greek government, he claimed that a '"fight" in Cyprus is a "right and duty"'.[339] Quite contrary, Grivas' comprehension above reflects more as the desire of national self-determination to encompass the demand for national liberation. Grivas's interpretation of the right of self-determination was

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[337] Charles Foley, *General Grivas Hayatım*, (Lefkoşa: Khora Yayınları 2012) 36

[338] Alexandros Papagos was the former field Marshall. Later he resigned from the army and founded the Hellenic Rally. In 1952, his party gained 49% of the votes. He served as a Prime minister from November 1952 until his death in 4th October 1955. His election was considered a major milestone in Greek politics that guaranteed Greece's position in the cold war with the Western Alliance.

[339] Foley, *General Grivas Hayatım*, 41.

drawn from a nationalist point of departure and a great example of the ethnic interpretation of the self-determination demand.

The nationalist boundaries of being the subject of having a right constitute one of the paradoxes of the self-determination demand. Considering that at a time, the UN also did not come up with a clear definition of self-determination and its relationship with the ethnic element. The discourse that supported the Greek Cypriot self-determination demand was more in line with the pre-Second World War definition.

The final element to discuss the Greek Cypriots' self-determination demand was its relationship with the left or more precisely with the communist movement in Cyprus, In one interview, Makarios openly stated that "he is the biggest anti-communist in Cyprus".[340] Furthermore, Grivas's rhetoric focused on the self-affirmation of the people in Cyprus. However, when he was pointing this out to the people in Cyprus, he had a certain understanding and from his political position, utilised elements from the Greek civil war. Grivas, as leader of the monarcho-fascist organisation 'X', was an Orthodox fundamentalist and an anti-communist. Grivas perceived the 'people of Cyprus' as having the following characteristics: being Greek, being Orthodox, and not being a communist.

Considering the previous municipal elections communists constituted thirty percent of the population of that time and also Turkish Cypriots made up twenty percent of the population. However, the way Greek nationalism emerged in

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[340] Halit Kıvanç, "Kaynayan Kıbrıs 2", *Milliyet,* 11 July 1955, 3.

Cyprus was bound to have hostility from both of these groups. In the later stages, Enosis movement gained grounds among the communists but Turkish Cypriots fiercely opposed it. Eventually, Greek Cypriot nationalist majority considered Turkish Cypriots as a minority and Makarios have never considered their fears as legitimate. Also, there was no alternative proposal for a compromise from the Enosis nationalist Makarios at a time. For example, one of the powerful members of the political elite of that period, Themistocles Dervis,[341] briefly explained the perceptions of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots as, "minority is subject to the majority."[342] Remembering, the previous chapter whereas Spivak's criticism of national liberation can be useful at this point. Spivak emphasized that the independence movements ignore the voices of the oppressed and excluded, adding that minority groups or socially non-hegemonic actors, like women, are entirely under-represented by national liberation movements.[343] At this point, the stance of the Greek Cypriot nationalists toward the Turkish Cypriots is a clear example to Spivak's critique. However, Enosis and the Left requires further interrogation. It is a fact that the way how the left mainstreamed Enosis nationalism had an overwhelming impact as the history of Cyprus unfolded.

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[341] Themisteklis Dervis was the longest serving mayor of Nicosia, nicknamed 'Gigi'. Despite disruptions due to the developments on the island, he served from 5.04.1929 to 28.05.1946 as mayor of Nicosia. In the 1946 elections, he lost against Ioannis Kleridis (father of the former President of Republic of Cyprus Glafcos Kleridis). However, in the following elections he ran for the post again, winning the 1949 mayoral elections. He served from 01.06.1949 to 18.12.1959. From the founding of the Republic of Cyprus until his death in 1968, he wrote for Ethnos newspaper. He was fierce opponents of the independence of Cyprus, and continued demanding Enosis after the independence.

[342] Halit Kıvanç, "Kaynayan Kıbrıs 3", *Milliyet*, 12 July 1955, 3.
[343] Spivak, *A Borderless Word,* p51.

3.2.1 Enosis and the Left

In the early 1950s, there were two strong left-wing organisations in Cyprus; the communist party AKEL and the left-wing labour union PEO. The two organisations were strongly tied, having no competition in-between. After the end of World War II, the Colonial Administration considered the presence of strongly organised leftist organisations as a fundamental problem for the continuation of the British presence in Cyprus.[344] However, the presence of the leftists in Cyprus was not the real threat to Britain, as the Cypriot communists were not the real trouble makers. However, the British administration did not easily realize this and approached the matter within the wider perspective of Cold War.[345] For example, AKEL had responded positively to Britain's constitutional initiatives and had attended the preparatory meetings to reintroduce a new constitution in 1947[346], which essentially turned out to be a lost opportunity for Britain to strengthen the colonial presence. Also, AKEL showed no interest on the violent nationalist campaigns, they were not pushing for total independence and the solutions like self-government were acceptable compromises for many of the leading figures in AKEL of that time.[347] In comparison to Makarios's rigid *Enosis Only Enosis* position, the communists' attitude that accepted self-government as an option made them "non-national

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[344] Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878 - 1960) 2*. (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinları, 1985), 57.

[345] Robert Holland, "Never, never land: British colonial policy and the roots of violence in Cyprus, 1950–54", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21 (2008) :158.

[346] Gürel, Ş. S. *Kıbrıs Tarihi*. p.61.

[347] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Kıbrıslı Rum Solcular: Kıbrıs'ı Nasıl Düşündüler?,* (Nicosia: Heteretopia Yayınları, 2015), 91.

element" in the eyes of the Church and Greek nationalists. This polarisation led violent incidents in between the Greek Cypriot communists and nationalists while the right-wing blamed communists as the organisation included "alien elements".[348]

Despite the shifting political landscape, AKEL had significant support among Greek Cypriots in the late 1940s, which compelled AKEL to raise its voice and claim leadership of the Enosis movement. AKEL, also, reframed its position on Enosis and considered it as an opportunity to side with the masses that demand it.[349] Furthermore, in the early 1950s AKEL also showed some efforts to form a wider Enosis coalition with the Church, however, their proposal was rejected. The Church considered communists as their political rivals and Makarios-led Enosis movement systematically excluded the left during the colonial period.[350] As an example, the idea of a referendum for the self-determination belonged to the communists, however, the Church effectively owned the campaign and became the organiser of it. By owning the referendum campaign, the Church legitimized its leadership on Enosis cause. Moreover, Makarios worked systematically to marginalize the left.[351] He created obstacles to remove communists from the national movement at all levels, including their participation in the Pan-Cyprian National Assembly meetings.[352]

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[348] Katsurides, *Kıbrıs Komünist Partisi Tarihi*, 292.

[349] Ibid, 292.
[350] Ibid.

[351] Yiannos Katsouridis, *The National Question in Cyprus,* 493.

[352] An, *KKK/AKEL Belgelerinde*, 174.

The exclusionary practices of the Church against AKEL made party leaders consider ways to combine notions of class and nation to have wider legitimacy. In their intra-party debates, particular attention was given to understand the significance of Enosis in the context of a progressive struggle. AKEL as a mechanism began to terminate memberships of some of its prominent members, particularly those who joined the party from KKK.[353] The process commenced in 1949 after the party announced a self-criticism on wider political stance but Enosis was at the core. Accordingly, most of the central committee members agreed that party leadership was influenced by *petit-bourgeois* tendencies. As a result, the central committee and the political bureau members resigned to help the party produce better policies.[354]

Plutis Servas was probably the most prominent member of AKEL, whose membership was terminated. Servas was the founder of AKEL and the Secretary-General of the party until 1945.[355] Plutis Servas was expelled from the party in 1952 on ideological grounds. Although he had statements published in AKEL's party newspaper *Aneksartitios* (trans. Independent), such as, "for a Greek Cyprus, liberation does not mean anything other than the unification with motherland Greece from whom we were forcefully cut off",[356] later the party saw

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[353] AKEL was founded in 1941 while the Cyprus Communist Party – KKK – joined AKEL in 1944. For three years both parties operated parallel to each other and members of KKK resisted the party's dissolution.

[354] The 6th party congress took place on 27-28 August 1949. Ezekias Papayuannou, who was a firm supporter of Enosis as a solution to the national question, won the party elections and served as Secretary General from 1949 until his death in 1988. His long service to the only left wing political party among Greek Cypriots made him decisive on many aspects of the developments in Cyprus. An,KKK/Akel belgelerinde ,175.

[355] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin Saklı Tarihi*. (Nicosia: Heterotopia, 2015) 83.

[356] Ibid, 63.

it necessary to have a more consistent alignment with the majority of Greek Cypriots. The reason for Servas' expulsion arose particularly from his decision to participate in the constitutional reform alongside the British administration and Turkish Cypriots on self-governance. This decision was considered as inconsistent with Enosis and a deviation from national liberation. Another prominent person whose membership was terminated at the time was the former Mayor of Famagusta, Adam Adamandos. Adamandos was elected as the Mayor of Famagusta in 1943 from AKEL and served until 1953. He was banned from the party because of his outspoken opposition to Enosis.[357]

The new leader of AKEL, Ezekias Papayiannou, aimed to reframe a new political paradigm for AKEL. Supporting Enosis was considered as a way to gain further legitimacy from the masses, as the Church had accused AKEL of being a *non-national element*. The policy shift of AKEL toward Enosis had a positive impact with regards to gaining more support among the Greek Cypriot community.[358] When Papayiannou asked about the U-turn from self-government to Enosis, he explained how the AKEL leadership comprehended the developments:

> *Yes, at the time we made a mistake. Today, we fixed our error. Our struggle is to get rid of fascist Britain and unite Cyprus to our motherland Greece… The Greek fighters are fighting against the fascists in our motherland. AKEL, as an actual national liberation force will fight to realize the national rights of the country and go further to establish socialism. Enosis is the sincerest factor of this struggle. (…) However, this means the annexation of Cyprus to Greece will not harm the Turkish minority living in Cyprus. On the contrary, in time, the Turkish minority will gain absolute and complete*

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[357] Kyriacos Cambazis, *Bir Mitin İfşaası*. (Nicosia: Işık Kitabevi, 2013) 55.

[358] Katsouridis, *The National Question in Cyprus*, 482.

> *economic, political, religious and national rights that are deprived under the British administration.[359]*

AKEL changed its political paradigm and consolidated its views on Enosis like any other nationalist in Cyprus. In the party positions, AKEL considered the policy choices including autonomy, self-government, or independence as mistakes. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, AKEL reached to a decision that the reconciliatory positions with the British imperialism only served British imperialism.[360]

Despite their new-found understanding of Enosis, AKEL failed to expand its influence. First of all, the isolation by the British administration decisively chose to weaken the left in Cyprus. The regulation that ceased fund-raising activities of political parties due to concerns relating to the advancement of communism in Cyprus gave significant defects to AKEL's finances.[361] Secondly, AKEL failed to become a leading actor due to its organisational setting. AKEL followed a peaceful political opposition against colonialism for Enosis. However, the radicalization of right-wing politics negatively affected the significance of AKEL over the Enosis movement. Also, "intra-party turbulence had repercussions on the party's militancy."[362] Problems within AKEL resulted in significant losses in the 1953 municipal elections.

Furthermore, the developments in Greece affected the communists in Cyprus. The deteriorating conditions of the Greek communist party in Greece and its

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[359] An, *KKK/Akel belgelerinde,* 177.

[360] Katsouridis, *The National Question in Cyprus,* 483.

[361] Ibid, 491.

[362] Ibid.

loss of grounds in political settings impacted AKEL. Papagos' leadership ignored the communists in Cyprus but strengthened their ties with the right-wing and the Church. The polarisation between communists and the right-wing reached to a level as Makarios publicly announced that an opposition in Cyprus existed between communism and Hellenism. The limitation of the left-wing's power, especially over the Enosis movement, meant the elimination of the option for peaceful opposition to colonialism. Society had a wider acceptance of radicalism. The radicalisation represented the transformation of the political climate, where peaceful mass demonstrations were turning into violent campaigns for self-determination, manifesting nationalist ideology.

This social transformation was unavoidably rendering the Enosis discourse hegemonic in society. Needless to say, it also distanced the Turkish Cypriot community from the Greek Cypriots. Some of the Turkish Cypriots who split from Cyprus Workers Union in 1943 due to the rising Enosis demand established Turkish Labour Office in 1944. Nevertheless, in 1951 Turkish Cypriot labourers decided to re-join the Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO). The cooperation between the labour unions continued to grow in the following years, bringing new hopes for the future of the island until the violence reached a new level.[363]

3.2.2 Obscure form of Colonial Governance in Cyprus

With the Cold War, the eastern Mediterranean's strategic significance started to increase and Britain's position in Cyprus appeared to be advantageous.[364]

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[363] An, *KKK/Akel belgelerinde,* 74.

[364] Holland, *Britain and Revolt in Cyprus*, p22.

World War II had weakened Britain, who saw its power diminishing as the empire disintegrated. The rapid British withdrawal from regions was to fuel anti-colonial movements across the colony. Thus, Britain take the lead to offer a new constitution in Cyprus to regain political support from the Greek Cypriot nationalist elites to strengthen the British presence in Cyprus. Nevertheless, these attempts were unsuccessful. Furthermore, British Colonial Governance had utterly failed to understand the local context and only further polarized her relations with the local population.

Primarily, wider British Colonial governance understanding shaped the concerns on Soviet expansion. This also rose the fear of rising Soviet influence in Cyprus. Britain was concerned about the Cypriot communists potentially garnering control of the governance structures via elections.[365]

As far as the colonial policies in Cyprus concerned, Governor of Cyprus was the responsible person to implement the policies and since the the suspension of the constitution after the 1931 Uprising, governors gained had absolute control over all institutions. There were no participatory mechanisms, like legislative or executive councils that enables locals to participate governance of the island. There were only mayors (who had limited power) of local governments elected by the people. However, due to the suspension of the constitution, governors can override the decisions of the mayors. The governors' power included the right to dismiss and appoint mayors if their acts potentially threatened the government. Rural areas were ruled by *mukhtars*

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[365] Holland, *Britain and Revolt in Cyprus,* 158.

(village head-person). However, they were also appointed by the governor. In short, every aspect of governance was under the personal authority of the governor.

From 1950 to 1955, Cyprus had two governors. They were Andrew B. Wright, who served from August 1949 to 1954, and Robert P. Armitage, who served from 1954 to 25 September 1955. Both expected to create constitutional democratic self-governance to sustain British presence in Cyprus. However, neither of them was able to create these structures. Moreover, throughout the period that Wright governed Cyprus, h sought further coercive powers that none of the other colonies had, according to the legal adviser to the Colonial Office;[366] even a visitor named Cyprus as a "police state".[367] Holland emphasized that the British administration knew nothing about what was happening in Cyprus in the 1950s. For Wright, the fundamental principle of governance was "if you wave sticks at Cypriots, you do not have to call out the garrison."[368]

Governor Wright ruled the island with emergency measures despite there being no credible emergency. Wright constituted the reason for keeping such a stance as perceiving the communists as the real danger, entirely sticking to the global colonial policies of Britain rather than the local particularities in Cyprus. To weaken the communists, he aimed to isolate the presence of AKEL in the political sphere. However, communists in the labour unions were able to secure several rights for the workers in Cyprus. As a result, Wright's responses to the

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[366] Holland, *Britain and Revolt in Cyprus,* 20.

[367] ibid.155

[368] Ibid, 23.

communists did not create a significant impact. On the contrary, his paranoid opinion of communists brought new polarisations. The colonizer's attempts at isolating the communists also strengthened the self-sufficiency of those groups rather than eradicating them.[369] Solely focusing on the communist threat, he was unable to respond to the rising self-determination demand of the nationalist elite appropriately. Colonial administration's choices also made communists stick to the nationalist ideology, complicating the situation further.

To exert power, Wright relied on legal methods. The criminal code's limiting fundamental freedoms of the people were expected to eradicate any danger to the continuation of British presence, including demands for Enosis or communists.[370] The initial version of the criminal code was passed after the events in 1931, however, it was modified several times. Most of the changes happened from 1949 to 1954, during Wright was serving as the governor. The rising political polarisation between anti-colonialists and the government of Cyprus was furthered by the suppressive criminal code. For example, there was a clause on sedition, stating the criminalization of "any public advocacy against the Government of Cyprus." [371] Another clause in the criminal code controlled

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[369] Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 897.

[370] Leslie Sebba, "The creation and evolution of criminal law" *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History / Societies* 3 (1999): 83.

[371] Section 48 of the Criminal Code (1951) defines seditious action as an intention a) to bring hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person of Her Majesty, Her Heirs, or Successors, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of the Colony as by law established; or b) to bring about a change in the sovereignty of the Colony; or c) to excite Her Majesty's subjects or inhabitants or the Colony to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other matter in the Colony as by law established; or d) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the administration of justice in the Colony; or e) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects or inhabitants of the colony; or f) to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different communities or classes of the population of the Colony.

the press, giving the courts power to close seditious publications. When it came to defining *seditious publications,* it was vaguely done, thus leading to the subjective interpretation of what qualified as 'seditious', granting the governor sole authority on full-control of the media.[372] The regulation of seditious publications forced publications to pay fines regardless of the context in which an article contained the word *Enosis*. The scope of the law also influenced British magazines sold in Cyprus, as they also had explicit references to self-determination and Enosis. Shortly after, a parliamentary debate took place on anti-sedition and press laws in Cyprus.[373] The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lennox-Boyd, claimed that there was a misunderstanding, and the decision was the responsibility of the local distributor.[374] Even though the administration in London was informed of a rather liberal approach to the practice of fundamental freedoms in Cyprus, these freedoms were not carried out as narrated by Lennox-Boyd to the members of the parliament. The limitations on the fundamental freedoms by the Government of Cyprus were expanding. Also, regarding the criminalisation of publications, another clause called *Possession of documents having a seditious intention and publication,*

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[372] The 47th Section of the Criminal Code (1949) defines seditious conspiracy and publications with seditious intentions as any person who a) conspires with any other person or persons to do any act in furtherance of any seditious intention common to both or all of them; or b) publishes any words or documents or makes any visible representation whatsoever with a seditious intention, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years.

[373] 531 Parl. Deb. HC (20 October 1954) col. 1185-7.

[374] 531 Parl. Deb. HC (28 October 1954) col. 2142-54.

etc., of propaganda of unlawful association limited any view that disagreed with the Government of Cyprus.[375]

The clause on possession of documents containing seditious intention restricted the exchange of opinions, and reference to unlawful associations criminalized alliances of the people, because of this vague definition, which allowed the Governor to decide whether an organisation was lawful or not.[376] The criminal code consisted of clauses that enabled the governor to repressively control residents including gathering of the small groups seen suspicious. However, other codes also strengthened the power of the governor in various dimensions. For example, the code on *Aliens and Immigration* gave power to the governor to refuse re-admission into Cyprus for native Cypriots

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[375] The 59th section of the Criminal Code (1951) rules any person who a) transmits through the post or who, without lawful authority or excuse, the proof of which lies upon him, has in his possession any book, periodical, pamphlet, poster, proclamation, newspaper, letter or any other document or writing whatsoever having a seditious intention as defined in section 48 of this Code or b) prints, publishes, sells or exposes for sale or transmit through the post or who, without lawful authority or excuse, the proof of which lies upon him, has in his possession any book, periodical, pamphlet, poster, proclamation, newspaper, letter or any other document or writing whatsoever which advocates or encourages any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the section 63 of this code or which is issued or appears to be issued by or on behalf of, or in the interests of, an unlawful association, is guilty of a felony and liable to imprisonment for three years.

[376] The 63rd section of the Criminal code defines "unlawful association" as a) anybody or persons, incorporated or unincorporated, which by its constitution or propaganda or otherwise advocates, incites or encourages any of the following acts – i) the overthrow of the constitution of the Colony by revolution or sabotage; ii) the overthrow by force or violence of the established government of the Colony, or of any other civilized country, or of organized Government, iii) the destruction or injury of property of the Colony or of property used in trade or commerce with other countries or in the Colony; b) anybody of persons incorporated or unincorporated which by its constitution or propaganda, or otherwise advocates or encourages the doing of any act having or purporting to have as an object the carrying out of a seditious intention as defined in section 48 of this code; d) anybody of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, or any organisation whether within or without the Colony which is declared by Order of the Governor in Council to have among its aims or to be used for the promotion of general strike, or of disorder of any kind or of the spread of sedition within the Colony and to be proscribed within the Colony.

who were found guilty of vaguely defined accusations.[377] This ambiguity allowed the governor to decide arbitrarily on whom he wanted to keep in Cyprus. Wright referred to the law and exercised various practices that created inconvenience for residents. For example, he employed his authority concerning the relevant clause of the code on Aliens and Immigration to deport 127 Greek school teachers from Cyprus, as they were found guilty of advocating Enosis or communism.[378]

Wright was insistent on keeping the status quo. For this reason, during his term in Cyprus, he never initiated any mechanism forming a constitutional order, neither he discussed self-government, nor considered options to satisfy the rising demands from Greek Cypriots on Enosis. In London, the members of the British parliament raised questions about Cyprus, particularly focusing on the developments in the constitution; however, the responses were always along the lines of:

> *His Majesty's Government, in 1948, made an offer of a new Constitution subject to certain conditions. This offer remains open. The so-called "plebiscite" of 1950 has no relevance to the question."*[379] *However, the debates on the future of Cyprus brought sharp polarisations. In a fierce discussion, one of the most critical remarks exhibited*

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[377] The Alien and Immigration Law defines *Prohibited Immigrants* in the 6th Section. The law lists several other groups, but relevant points related to Enosis were f) any person who, from official Government records or from information officially received by the Governor, from a Secretary of State or from the Governor of any British Colony, Protectorate of Mandated Territory or from the Government of any foreign State or from any other trusted source is considered by the Governor to be an undesirable person; g) any person who is shown by evidence which the Governor may deem sufficient, to be likely to conduct himself so as to be dangerous to peace, good order, good government or public morals or to excite enmity between the people of the Colony and Her Majesty or to intrigue against Her Majesty's power and authority in the Colony; h) any member of an unlawful association as defined in section 63 of the Criminal Code or any Law amending or substituted for the same.

[378] Simpson, *Human Rights and End of Empire*, 898.

[379] 523, Parl. Deb HC, (02 February 1954), Col 31-2W32W.

Britain's position. The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, stated relation to Cyprus: "it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent.[380]

This statement raised several questions among members of the British parliament, but also reflected on Cyprus. The debate had obvious repercussions, as Hopkinson's statement rejected the independence to happen immediately.

Moreover, Britain tried to overcome the pressure and extend its presence in Cyprus by claiming that the colonial administration had prepared or was preparing the people of Cyprus to independence by creating self-governing institutions. Hopkinson's stance represented a wiser way of justifying the British administration's preferences while at the same time fulfilling British strategic interests.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the British position was shaped within the framework of the Cold War. Since World War II, Soviet influence on the Middle East increased. For the Government of Cyprus, giving the communist party a chance to raising its influence in the political sphere meant putting Cyprus into the effective control of the Soviets.

Such understanding dominated the British stance on the future of Cyprus. As a result, Britain kept trying to fine-tune conditions to legitimise her presence, hoping that the national self-determination demand of Greek Cypriots would disappear. However, Wrights' oppressive policies through the criminal code

[380] 531 Parl Deb HC (28 July 1954) Col 504-14504.

caused a significantly opposite climate. It led politicisation of the masses along an emancipatory discourse. For the Greek Cypriots, Enosis was the core of the emancipatory discourse, the combination of colonialist idiocracy and nationalist agitation created the enabling grounds to hegemonize Enosis as an emancipatory discourse.

While the internal conditions were only conducive for the rise of nationalist sentiments also wider British Colonial policies had indirectly supporting further development of anti-colonial sentiments. In December 1954, following the British's withdrawal from Suez, Britain decided to transfer their military Middle East Headquarters to Cyprus.[381] While Britain was trying to build Cyprus as a gate to Middle East, Greece was already prioritizing Cyprus as a foreign policy matter. When British Prime Minister Eden visited Greece, well-known Eden-Papagos incident took place where Eden clearly stated that there were no Cyprus Problem for Britain and adding that there was a Greek population in Alexandria and New York but Greek Government is not demanding Enosis for them.[382] Holland considers this the "beginning of the end of the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship," and the incident that triggered Greece to puts its weight in order to support the internationalization of the Cyprus question.[383] Following the incident, Greece was convinced that the expected resolution of Cyprus favouring Greece would not materialize through maintaining good relations with Britain. Once Britain realized that the issue was

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[381] John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland*. (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 89.

[382] Holland, Britain and Revolt, 32.

[383] Ibid.

developing into a bigger problem, a new initiative was attempted to establish self-governance in Cyprus however, it was way too late. First, the Enosis movement was reaching wider support. A unilateral move of introducing a modified version of the 1948 draft constitution to sustain British presence in Cyprus referred "a constitution for Zulus" to in Durrell's *Bitter Lemons*.[384] The lesser-liberal constitution package of the government was criticized by the opposition members of parliament too. It was clear that not only did the new constitution lack sovereignty but was also "a denial of complete self-government by Cyprus."[385]

Following the attempts to govern the country with the new constitution, Armitage was unable to unite the leaders of the communities. On the contrary, like Wright, Armitage tried to sustain the reliance on oppressive codes relating to sedition, limiting the quest for Enosis in the public sphere. The answers to the Greek Cypriots' Enosis demands were unfavourably received in Cyprus.

In early March, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lennox-Boyd stated, when talking about a constitutional future for the island, "The constitutional proposals for Cyprus have not disclosed, but they will be when people are prepared to come forward and discuss them."[386] A month after his statement, he was proved wrong, as seen from on the 1st of April, EOKA announced its foundation, commencing the anti-colonial insurgency against Britain.

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[384] Lawrance Durrell, *Bitter Lemons.* (Faber and Faber, London, 2000) 147.

[385] 531, Parl Deb HC (28 July 1954), col 504-14504.

[386] 537 Parl Deb HC Deb (02 March 1955), col2053-4.

To sum up, as the Greek Cypriot nationalists were turning the Enosis into a fundamental ideology with a vision of internationalizing it, British Administration in Cyprus aimed to suppress the issue through the legal tools. There were repeated questions in the House of Commons in London, concerning the violation of the human rights for the population in Cyprus, the Colonial Administration choose to disregard those. Also, there is a significant point to emphasize that the British Administration in Cyprus widely perceive the Enosis as an internal matter and by the mid-1950s ignored its international impacts. Approaching the second half of the decade, Greece started to act more decisively at the international level and the real trouble for Colonial Administration started. However, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey will come to rescue Britain as the administration of Cyprus eventually when the efforts got out of control. In the next section, the rise of EOKA and its attempts to drive out the British administration from Cyprus and regain political power and self-governance for Cypriots is analysed. A close analysis of these next five years of the island, from the side of the Greek Cypriot political elite shows the factors that led how self-determination got its ethnic weight among the Greek Cypriot community and how the notion of the people was homogenized and limited within an ethnic nationalist interpretation.

3.3 Insurgency in Cyprus (1955 – 1959)

Bombs exploded in sixteen different locations of Cyprus in the early hours of 1st April 1955, and EOKA (Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) announced to the public the start of the anti-colonial armed struggle. The day was a landmark in the nationalist insurgency of Greek Cypriots against British

colonialism. The most successful attack was on the transmission station in Nicosia, which damaged most of the equipment at the station. Together with the explosions in various towns, the total damage is estimated at around £56,000. (1,5 Million Pounds in current prices)[387] The only civilian causality was a member of EOKA, who was electrocuted by mistake.

EOKA was a small organisation but committed several deadly attacks and violent campaigns in Cyprus. The total number of EOKA fighters were considered to be around 1250 people from 1955 to 1959 (1000 underground and 250 regulars) Even at its highest point, it is considered that there were around 250 actively fighting. On the other hand, the British army's population reached up to thirty-five thousand on top of approximately five thousand people in various police force branches.

This section discusses the insurgency and how this period is critical in the construction of identity in Greek Cypriots. Simultaneously, it observes the attempts of Greek Cypriots to articulate their visions of self-determination. The insurgency also forced the British to review their attitude towards the future of the island, and in particular, self-determination.

There are three critical and comprehensive analyses on the period from 1955 to 1959 constituting the core of this discussion. Each of the studies approaches the insurgency in Cyprus from a different point of departure. Robert Holland's *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954 – 1959* discusses the period in detail, focusing on documents from the Public Record Office of the UK, Parliamentary

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[387] 539, Parl Deb HC (06 April 1955), col 98-101W.

Papers, Secretariat Files of the Government of Cyprus, and many other official British publications. Even though it provides very substantive and balanced information, the study mostly relied on information gathered from the colonizer. Another study was authored by Andreas Varnavas. His book, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA (1955 – 1959)* narrates EOKA's struggle from the Greek Cypriot perspective. The study relies on information acquired from the members of EOKA. This study gives an authentic account of how EOKA was perceived among the wider community. Thirdly, Makarios Drousiotis 's book on EOKA, *Karanlık Yön EOKA / Dark Side of EOKA* is another comprehensive analysis of EOKA on its activities from a critical perspective. Drousiotis's analysis of EOKA shows the role of this organisation after the independence of Cyprus as well. Other than those three source, there is only a single study that focuses on the role of violence in Cyprus in a critical manner. Kızılyürek's *opus magnum* on violence is a unique analysis, focusing on different stages of Cyprus history and the role of systematic violence.[388] Also, his analysis argues the validity of violence and its reflections on ethnic nationalism. While the three books narrate the history of EOKA, some chapters of Kızılyürek's book on violence demonstrate anti-colonial resentment and its transformation into intercommunal violence.

All these studies focus on a historical period and narrate the history of the events, touching upon their link with the demands for self-determination. However, none of them juxtaposes the law and the discourses on self-

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[388] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi: Kıbrıs'ta Statü Kavgası ve Etnik Çatışma*. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016).

determination rights of the people that period. From this point of view, this analysis aims to fill this particular gap while narrating the history of EOKA's struggle until the end of the colonial era. However, to fill this gap, it is essential to introduce the link between law and violence.

3.3.1. A Critical Beginning: Violence

In the colonial context violence can be seen as an integral part of the colonial administration. Simatai notes "colonial violence begins at the very point when regulation or conquest of space and territory takes place."[389] Fanon explains, "colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence."[390] On the other hand, Ngugi puts forward a similar view on the anti-colonial violence:

> *We are not murderers, we are not hangmen—like Robson—killing men and women without cause or purpose… We only hit back. You are stuck on the left cheek, you turn the right cheek. One, two, three—sixty years. Then suddenly, it is always sudden, you say: I am not turning the other cheek any more . . . you strike back . . . we must kill.[391]*

It is important to deal with violence in a broader context. Violence is deeply rooted in the modern state, and its role is not only limited to minimal definitions. It has a much broader and transcendental meaning. Walter Benjamin's essay *Critique of Violence* from his book *Reflections* shows the relations of violence

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[389] Tirop Simatei, "Colonial Violence, Postcolonial Violations: Violence, Landscape and Memory in Kenyan Fiction", *Research in African Literatures 36* (2005): p.89.

[390] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth.* (London: Penguin Books, 2001) 48.

[391] Simatei, *Colonial Violence, postcolonial violations,* p.89.

with law and justice. In this section, the overview of Benjamin's critical engagement with violence would help to understand what is deeper in the self-determination and violence.

Benjamin argues that the primary relationship within any legal system is that of "end to means". On this account, violence is the means, not the end.[392] Assessing violence as a means, it is plausible to ascertain whether it has just or unjust ends. Benjamin sought to answer whether the violence could be moral if it provided just ends.

It is possible to interrogate the violence in Cyprus, from the lenses of Benjamin, since it can also enable assessing the anti-colonial violence in Cyprus whether it was just or unjust, whether the atrocities had a meaning or whether it was just a terror. It can also show whether whole debate around the national self-determination came from a higher good for justice or whether it is an unjust, an ethno-religious fanaticism.

To provide better answers for those aforementioned points, Benjamin's framework could guide us. In his essay, he compares the position of the natural law and positive law understandings of violence. For natural law, violence as a means for just ends does not pose any problem. Benjamin explains his viewpoint of natural law, "According to this view (for which the terrorism in the French Revolution provided an ideological foundation), violence is a product of nature, as it were a raw material, the use of which is in no way problematical

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[392] Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" in *Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writings,* ed. P. Demetz,(New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) 277.

unless force is misused for unjust ends."[393] On the other end of the spectrum, the positive law considers the law a product of history. While natural law comprehends existing law by critiquing its ends (whether there is justice), positive law comprehends it by critiquing its means (whether it is legal). However, Benjamin emphasizes one significant point:

> *Both schools meet in their common basic dogma: just ends can be attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends. The natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to "justify" the means, positive law to "guarantee" the justness of the ends through the justification of the means.*[394]

Then, Benjamin returns to the original question of justification of the ways that constitute violence. He leaves natural law aside and focuses on the positive law as this dogma allows a distinction between kinds of violence independently.[395] He emphasizes: "if the criterion established by positive law to assess the legality of violence can be analysed about its meaning, then the sphere of its application must be criticized about its value."[396] Benjamin explains the importance of thinking beyond natural and positive legal philosophy. He considers that a *historical-philosophical* view can offer an alternative way of comprehending law.

For Benjamin, the law considers the violence that the individual uses as a threat that may undermine the legal system. The state holds the monopoly on violence as a means, and by functionalizing the law, it tends to preserve the legal ends.

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[393] Benjamin, *Critique of violence,* 278

[394] Ibid.

[395] Ibid, 279.

[396] Ibid.

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The intention of the state is not offering divine justice. Instead, the reason is to maintain its existence.[397] Benjamin's deconstruction of violence sheds light on the foundations of law.

He draws attention to moments of "peace" where the violence reaches an end. As an antonym of war, peace emerges from violence. Peace means a new law. The emergence of a new law demonstrates the *law-making* character of violence.[398] Thus, violence and law are interwoven. In other words, the sovereign sustains itself from the law-making character of violence in a specific territory in which it exerts its power. Boundaries represent the sovereignty of a state. Thus, violence gains an institutional status of *law-making* over a specified area. However, the ability of an individual to decide to use violence as means counter-acts the state's legitimacy and its sovereignty. For this reason, violence is not only about law-making, but more than that. Violence means preserving the law. Taking violence as a law-preserving function, Benjamin exemplifies compulsory conscription as the state coerces inhabitants to risk their right to live by protecting the state.[399]

After critiquing the law, he concludes the function of law is an instantaneous expression of violence. However, the duality of the *law-making* and *law-preserving* functions of violence are visible in the case of Cyprus. The particular dimension of this period is how the violence acted to justify the means (self-

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[397] Ibid, 281.

[398] Ibid, 283.

[399] Ibid.

determination for Greek Cypriots - sustaining the British presence for Turkish Cypriots) for the ends (Enosis / Taksim —Colonialism).

In short, the law does not disown violence, on the contrary, it institutionalizes it. However, Benjamin's contribution to the role of violence is not limited to the law-making and law preserving functions. Violence has broader impacts. For example, violence can also function as a means of forming an identity. The violence in Cyprus consists of the components of anti-colonial resentment, inter-ethnic rivalry, and nationalism. These components organized around EOKA/TMT and played a determining role in the formation of national identity as well as the discourses of human rights based on the identity that is being prioritized. Violence created counter-violence, and this had a significant role in the way the Turkish Cypriot identity formed. As far as the clarity of the relationship between violence, identity and law go, it is important to narrate the history of violence in the Greek Cypriot community to situate its law-creating function. Interestingly, in each respective community's engagement in violent activities; demonstrates the re-emergence of the dichotomy of the natural and positive law. The colonized justifies the use of violence from the natural law's perspective to express that it is being used for the just end, while thee colonialist's use of violence relies on the positive law. For the colonialist the use of violence guarantees the justness of ends through the justification of the means. In such a divided and polarized view, probably the only remarkable point starts when the just violence according to natural law, re-defined after the end of colonialism and transformed itself again into positive law. The next part will give the essence of how the violence is being used to reach to just ends

(self-determination) in the case of Greek Cypriots covered. The analysis will focus detailed account of the history from 1955 to the independence of Cyprus.

3.3.2 EOKA: Violence Redefines Relations

According to the reports, the intelligence in the Colonial Administration did not expect any kind of organized insurgency in Cyprus.[400] Their expectation was more of a sporadic event, which was not a complex organized movement.[401] In the reports, it was clear that the British intelligence failed to recognize EOKA and their resentment towards the colonial order by the local population.

The leader behind the military wing of the EOKA movement was Colonel George Grivas. Grivas planned the insurgency in Cyprus in four phases. The first step starts with the student revolts, distribution of leaflets, explosions and sabotage. The second step targets the assassination of the Greek Cypriot police forces or Greek Cypriots who were against EOKA. The third phase targeted British troops, or Cypriots serving either as police or soldiers for the Government of Cyprus. The fourth phase was "Passive Resistance".

The EOKA pamphlets give plenty of insight on how the organisation situated itself against British colonialism. Grivas, using the code name Dighenis, the name of an epic Byzantine hero, distributed the first pamphlet. In the announcement, Dighenis, who is a called the aim of EOKA's struggle as "fight to overthrow of the English yoke."[402] The proclamation of EOKA was a call to

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[400] Aydın Akkurt, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı 1957-1958 Mücadelesi.* (Nicosia: Bayrak Yayınları, (1999). 82.

[401] Ibid, 85.

[402] Andreas Varnavas, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA (1955-1959).* (Nicosia: C. Epiphaniou Publications, 2004) 58.

the Cypriots to fight. However, EOKA's reference to Cypriots consisted of only the Greek Cypriots. For example, the organisation called all Cypriots: "with god's help, with faith in our honest struggle, with the support of the entire Greek world and with the help of all the Cypriots."[403] Non-Greek inhabitants in Cyprus were not included in the "imagined community" of EOKA that were being referred to as "Cypriots".[404] There are other examples from the announcement that demonstrated the "people of Cyprus" were limited to Greek Cypriots. For example:

> *Under the motto left for us in sacred trust by our ancestors 'either with it or on it' Cypriot brothers, looking at us from the depth of the centuries are all those who made Greek History shine, to preserve their freedom: the Marathon fighters, the Salamis fighters, Leonidas' Three Hundred and the more recent ones of the Albanian epic. The fighters of 1821 are looking at us…[405]*

In its pamphlets, EOKA romanticized the Hellenic history and formed the nationalist discourse. The past and contemporary events were linked. The narratives aimed to show the continuity of the Greek nation's transcendence. Also, by referring to the victories in distinct territories, EOKA related Cypriots to the extended Greek identity within the imagined territorial area of the Byzantine Empire where Greek irredentism emanates from. Finally, the proclamation did not target any non-Greek inhabitants, neither did it call them to support their fight. The non-recognition of the specific audience shows that those groups were not considered part of the political subjects of the struggle. At this point,

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[403] Ibid, 59.

[404] Detailed discussions on Cypriotism demonstrates that Cypriot discourses carried elements of Greek national identity in the 1950s (Cambazis, *Bir Mitin İfşası,* 2013), an interpretation that sustained until the 1980s. (Mavratsas, *Helen Milliyetçiliğinin Kıbrıstaki Yönleri,* (Nicosia: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 2000).

[405] Varnavas, *A History of the Liberation Struggle*, 59.

nationalism had failed to acknowledge the universality of the demand for self-determination. In other words, since the beginning, the other elements of Cyprus was left out. The whole goal was to accomplish the national aspiration and the others were taken care off once they had reached their goal.

As the principle of self-determination is attributed to the 'people', the people of Cyprus as a self-determining entity consisted of more than one ethnicity and they developed in contradiction to each other. Furthermore, there is no evidence any sort of a dialogue between different groups. In Cyprus, the fight for emancipation was purely ethnic. The lack of acknowledgement of other- largely because of perceiving the Turkish Cypriots as inferior subjects- and instead of territorial thinking developing an ethnic interpretation of self-determination brought EOKA's violence into a one-way street that the revolt against colonialism forced Turkish Cypriots as the allies of the colonialist. EOKA's ethnocentric interpretation of 'people' was ill-born since the beginning and the quest for being who is the people that endowed right of self-determination created only bitter relations. No wonder, Grivas's fascistic background had a role in this.

Assessing the EOKA's point of departure from those lenses is crucial to understand the paradoxes. The first part of EOKA's announcement demonstrated the nationalist framework and EOKA's justification. The second part posited an idea regarding the political dimension of the organisation. The reasons for the self-determination of people of Cyprus were put forward as well as the international diplomacy's apathy. Furthermore, the pamphlet narrates an authentic demand for liberation:

> *…if our oppressors do not want to give us our freedom, we shall fight for it with our own hands and with our blood. Let us show to the world once more that the Greek of today, like its ancestors, cannot tolerate the foreign yoke. The fight is going to be tough. The oppressor has the means and numerical advantage. We have the soul for it; we have the right on our side.*[406]

The resentment of the foreign yoke and the desire for freedom demonstrates the anti-colonial character of the EOKA movement. It founded over Greek mythology mixed with Greek irredentist desires and anti-colonial resentment. Furthermore, by referencing rights, it positions itself within the international discourse of self-determination. The reference to international diplomats was an expression of disappointment. It is possible to observe from the initial pamphlet that the start of violence was linked to the failure of diplomacy, more precisely the delay of the decolonisation following to the end of the Second World War.

The responses after the first explosions demonstrated that the nationalists were behind the EOKA movement. The start of a Church-led anticolonial nationalist violence can be identified as a major weakness for the British administration as they choose to suppress communists in the previous period. However, in the wake of the attacks communists and Turkish Cypriots both were in denial.

AKEL's statement harshly criticized the people who caused the incident and the Government of Cyprus considered these wrongdoers as terrorists. AKEL's political bureau announcement on 2nd April 1955 shows their concerns:

> *It is possible that some people of good faith, influenced by demagogical words, believe that these tactics serve the national cause. Unreservedly, however, AKEL says: this kind of activity can only damage the Cyprus cause. We also believe that the Cypriot people, relying on its experience, absolutely agrees with this position. The patriotic Cypriot people have*

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[406] Varnava, A History of the Liberation Struggle, 59.

nothing to do with these terrorist acts. The unmistakable conclusion that every Cypriot patriot must draw is that such methods can never advance the cause of national liberation. These methods cause the struggle to degenerate and expose it to the slander and the blows of its enemies.[407]

AKEL's announcement established that they were not part of the insurgency, nor that they were part of it. Following AKEL's announcement, left-wing labour union PEO also announced similar lines.[408] A much provocative point of view was raised by AKEL's newspaper *New Democrat* suggesting that the insurgency could have a pro-imperialist design. The newspaper singled-out the leader of EOKA, Dighenis, as "Pseudo Dighenis" and targeted those claiming to be EOKA fighters with harsh words.[409] In the beginning, AKEL distanced itself from EOKA.

However, AKEL was not aware of EOKA's way of ensuring loyalty and the strategy that the organisation had. Shortly after the commencement of EOKA's foundation, the organisation attacked Greek Cypriot members who were considered collaborators, traitors or communists.[410] The reason behind attacking civilians who had been considered as collaborators and traitors by EOKA was an assumption that they might have cause harm to the nationalist struggle.

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[407] Varnava, *A History of Liberation Struggle*, p. 71.

[408] Ibid.

[409] Ibid.

[410] It is important to note that EOKA did not attack Turkish Cypriots at first. There was a relatively minor amount of Turkish Cypriot killings. Also, violence toward Turkish Cypriots was not for ethnic reasons in the beginning. However, once the police force became dominated by Turkish Cypriots, the clash of ethnicities was unavoidable. EOKA's violence was not intended for Turkish Cypriots, but the numbers of deaths increased as a result of the EOKA's clashes with the police force, almost entirely made up of Turkish Cypriots. The death toll in 1955 consisted of 12 Greek Cypriots and 12 British, 24 in total. In 1956 the number of deaths increased to 214 consisted of 115 Greek Cypriot, 81 British, 13 Turkish Cypriot and 4 from other nationalities.

Also, strategically it was important to show the polarisation between the British Administration in Cyprus from the Greek Cypriot community. Although communists announced their support of Enosis, they were still targeted by EOKA. There were a couple of reasons behind EOKA's target to communists.

Firstly, EOKA perceived communists as *non-national elements*. In other words, Greek nationalist ideology did not consider them as constituent elements. They were perceived as the enemy within the nation. Secondly, EOKA aimed to become the sole representative of Enosis. As a result, targeting communists was a decision to eliminate a competitor on the nationalist fight. Finally, it was a crude public relations move that can be summarized as either the public is with EOKA or they are against EOKA, as a result, they are either a traitor or a collaborator of the British. It was harsh but decisive move to suppress alternative positions and easily to homogenize the political spectrum under the fight for national liberation.

Once communists became the target of EOKA, the death toll increased. AKEL was unable to protect its members from EOKA's violence. Once the attacks intensified, AKEL made a public announcement[411] recognizing EOKA's

[411] The Central Committee openly underlines that "in our stance towards EOKA we committed a series of mistakes, some of them quite serious. First of all, we seriously under-estimated the EOKA movement from the start, considering it to be a movement by a few dozen rightist fanatics, destined to die out in a few months, and we failed to follow the preparations that had been going on for three years." Secondly, the announcement by the Political Bureau in April 1955 was a very hasty and unwise move, that confusion and a lack of self-control and in the was the issue tackle, by theorizing about individual terrorism using quotes from Lenin, did not help at all the masses to properly understand the reasons for which our party disagreed with the tactic of armed struggle. Thirdly, the characterisations we have to EOKA and its fighters in our announcement and articles, calling them 'pseudodighenides', 'thugs', 'firecrackers', 'bungers' etc. were provocative and sectarian and while they did not serve at all our national cause and the unity of the people, we armed EOKA and monarchic fascism in their attack against the party and the People's movement, carrying water to the mill of discord and risking civil war. (Varnava, A history of liberation, p73-74)

leadership in March 1957. This new stance also included AKEL's self-critique on the initial stance towards EOKA. In their announcement, AKEL openly supported EOKA and acknowledged its leadership in the anti-colonial fight.[412]

The antagonism between AKEL and EOKA was mutual. Before AKEL raised critiques of EOKA, EOKA also declared its position on the leftists in the island. One of its leaflets manifests their view of the left:[413]

> *EMAK (Former name of the EOKA - MH) demands from them (communists -MH) and their party not only to be opposed to EMAK but also not to get involved in the armed conflict, just like the population will. We will not accept communists at EMAK, mainly for purposes of feasibility and if the communists are really interested in the Enosis, they will not desire to get involved in the battle for liberation… The best patriotic action they can do is not to participate and one day this action will be recognized as wise and patriotic. The communists should be sure that EMAK has the necessary soldiers and all the means that will lead them to a successful liberating struggle…[414]*

EOKA's leader was Grivas and he used to be the leader of a Fascist organisation X. Ideologically, EOKA would talk about national liberation but its ideological foundations at the leadership level comes from fascism. Approaching EOKA from this perspective can also show why they have ignored the Turkish Cypriot community, other minorities or the communists.

While EOKA and AKEL became rivals based on nationalist ideology, Turkish Cypriots growing nationalist feelings were also ignored. EOKA expected

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[412] Varnava, *A history of liberation struggle,* 73.

[413] The leaflet was found once British security captured a ferry called Agios Georgios smuggling weapons to Cyprus. In addition to the weapons, the leaflet was found undersigned by EMAK. It is known that EMAK (National Force of Liberation of Cyprus) was the former name given to EOKA and renamed later once their manifesto was revealed.

[414] Alexis Alecou & Andreas Kapardis "British Security: Confronting the Communist and the Nationalist Threat in Cyprus, 1920 – 1955", *European Academic Research* 2 (2014) : 7128.

Turkish Cypriots not to interfere in the struggle for Enosis. The character of Greek nationalism, also pushed for rival nationalisms to emerge.[415] Enosis was never considered as a viable option for the Turkish Cypriot masses. Once the violence had started, Turkish Cypriots also raised their concerns about EOKA's campaign. Turkish Cypriot National People Party Leader Fazıl Küçük condemned EOKA and demanded the Colonial Administration to act appropriately.[416] EOKA expected some reaction from Turkish Cypriots, however, underestimated its intensity once it reached its peak. At first, to satisfy any concerns that may arise from Turkish Cypriots, EOKA distributed pamphlets in the Turkish language in Turkish neighbourhoods, explaining that they could live peacefully if they did not hinder EOKA.[417] A few months later, another pamphlet was distributed saying that: "*our intention towards the Turkish inhabitants of the island are honest and friendly. We regard them as genuine friends and allies, and as far as we can help it, we shall not allow their dignity, life, honour and property to be the least affected.*"[418] However, the developments already put Turkish Cypriots into the opposing camp of EOKA. Turkish Cypriots grew closer to the British as a shield because they were still supporting the status quo and they did not hesitate to serve for the British interests. Communists remained isolated, resulting in an enormous amount of violence targeting them. The British administration in Cyprus took advantage of

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[415] Kyriakos Cambazis, *Bir Mitin İfşaası*, (Nicosia: Işık Kitabevi, 2013) 23-24.

[416] Varnavas, *History of liberation,* 69.

[417] Kızılyürek, *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi*, 93.

[418] Varnavas, *History of liberation*, 70.

the Turkish Cypriots' loyalty and EOKA enjoyed support from the Church and the Greek Cypriot nationalists.[419]

The Colonial Administration tried to estimate the strength of the reaction of Greek Cypriots. Since Colonial Administration did not have any strategy to tackle the rising nationalist sentiments.[420] As a result, the administration was paralyzed.[421] The failure to respond rapidly brought international attention to Cyprus as well. EOKA's initial campaign turned out to be one of the most critical developments in the history of Cyprus, as the main rupture. As EOKA established, Makarios consolidated his political power and became the voice that claimed the future of Cyprus. However, what was underestimated by Greek Cypriots was the influence of Turkish Cypriots on the future of Cyprus. Although Turkish Cypriots were initial unprepared, their stance eventually got harsher against Enosis[422] since Britain was developing strategies to sustain its presence including conscripting Turkish Cypriots to fight together with Britain to sustain their presence on the island.

The beginning of violence in Cyprus redefined the intra-island alliances. Colonial Administration and Turkish Cypriots were on the one side and the Greek Cypriot nationalists were on the other side. As far as the communists concerned, they had nothing to do but allied themselves with the nationalists for the national liberation. At this critical point, violence played a crucial role; but

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[419] David French, *Fighting EOKA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 44.

[420] İbid, 75.

[421] İbid, 250.

[422] İbid, 255.

it failed to offer a just end that it promised. On the contrary, the British Administration recognized that it is time to pull Turkey into Cyprus which got things more complicated. As Turkey involved in Cyprus, the Cyprus issue was not an isolated colonial matter but a problem that involves other regional actors. With EOKA, Cyprus problem got internationalized but the balance of power over the international question had also changed. Now, it was seen that the political impediments had overarching impacts than the fundamental demand of self-determination. As a result, by a unilateral move of EOKA by starting the national liberation from an ethnoreligious perspective, had its first sign of failure despite it was not acknowledged at the time.

3.3.3 Bandung Conference and Internationalisation of Self Determination in Cyprus

Following the initial attacks of EOKA, Governor Robert Perceval Armitage tried to impose very strict rules and regulations.[423] The Curfew Laws 1955 and the Detention of Persons Law 1955 passed. As a result of the severe regulations, 3300 Greek Cypriots were detained under the measures between 1955 and 1959.[424] Furthermore, Governor Armitage demanded further emergency actions including the imprisonment of Makarios.[425] The pressure was mounting and the desire of Greek Cypriots for liberation was becoming militant, violence was becoming just for either of the parties. Armitage's policies and responses created fertile grounds for EOKA as the polarisation emerged. These policies

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[423] The detention law of 15 July 1955 was passed by the governor. The oppressive measures were taken into effect immediately. The law stated "any person who was a member of an illegal organisation, could be arrested with a warrant and held as a political detainee without any charges being brought against him and without trial for as long as it was necessary" (Varnava, History of liberation, 93).

[424] Ibid, 94.

[425] Brendan O'Malley, & Ian Craig, *The Cyprus conspiracy,* 19.

had the opposite effect of what they had intended and EOKA rapidly became legitimate in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot community. In the following years, the repressive measures brought forward to the European Court of Human Rights by Greece and constituted another legal and political obstacle to the United Kingdom. Eventually, the insurgency was legitimized as just while the justness colonialist's violence started to erode. In a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, raises this issue to the Cabinet.[426] In the confidential document, there were complaints on various levels including "torture, degrading punishment, inhuman treatment, arbitrary arrests and detention, censorship of correspondence, restriction on the right of public assembly." Also, the document informed that the submitted complaint, found admissible by the Court and the document draws advantages, disadvantages and plans for the next steps. However, in the political sense, the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue was creating significant disadvantages to Britain.

Another important development happened when Makarios participated to the Bandung Conference. As far as, EOKA military action began at a fortuitous time, internationally almost coinciding with the Afro-Asian Congress at Bandung, Indonesia, 18-24 April 1955. Makarios participated in this conference as the Cypriot representative to lobby for Enosis and demonstrate solidarity to African and Asian nations. Makarios's move has to be seen within his for internationalization of Cyprus issue and to ensure justness of the insurgency.

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[426] United Kingdom, National Archives, CAB-129-82-2 from 25 June 1956, M*emorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs – Cyprus*.

Also, the Bandung Conference was considered a significant initiative in the anti-colonial struggle as it assembled the leaders of 29 countries, most of them newly independent.[427] The leaders at the conference represented a total population of 1.5 billion people.[428] The aim was to solidify common interests and concerns of the countries in Asia and Africa to achieve better economic, cultural, and political cooperation.[429]

The final communiqué of the conference set a post-colonial vision for the world with an emphasis on the significance of the link between self-determination and political-economic and social rights. They represented a formative element in the creation of the Third World on nonaligned countries and movements.[430]

Cyprus was not the main point of discussion in the Bandung Conference, however, Makarios was able to address the participants and lobby for support

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[427] Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri & Vasuki Nesiah, *Bandung, Global History and International Law*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 3.

[428] The list of the participating countries included the hosts Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, The People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Las, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, State of Vietnam, and Yemen.

[429] The four aims of the Asian-African Conference were 1) to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations, 2) to consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented, 3) to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, and problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism, 4) to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Asian - African Conference Bulletin No1. (1955, March). World Opinion. Bandung Bulletin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, p. 1. Bandung Conference is an important meeting because it paved the way for the foundation of Non-Aligned Movement later and it carried human rights to the heart of the international political debate. For more detailed analysis see Roland Burke, *Decolonisation and the Evolution of International Human Rights*, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 13.

[430] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Ed.). *Asia-Africa speak from Bandung*. Djakarta: 1955, p. 161-169.

for the Greek Cypriot view of Cyprus. British authorities monitored Makarios's activities at Bandung.[431] At Bandung, Makarios established himself as a champion of anti-Imperialism.[432] His speech had strong elements, like the Conference "is a historic step toward the final burying of colonialism" and it continued that "Cypriot people participate in these feelings." He also acknowledged the support given by the Asian-African countries in the UN." Finally, he concluded his speech, saying that "colonialism in its flight from Asia and Africa should not find refuge in Cyprus".[433] He mentioned the importance of the right of self-determination for the Cypriots and complained about the colonial policies of Britain.[434]

The Greek Cypriot discourse around Enosis became synonymous with the anti-colonial movement in Cyprus with Makarios's appearance in Bandung. The Greek Cypriot anti-imperialist discourse chimed well with the politics of the times. The final communiqué of the conference called for an end to colonialism and emphasized the right of self-determination of peoples. [435]

In the following UN General Assembly, the participating countries had an opportunity to set a firm line, supporting self-determination and their interests within the agreed parameters. This undoubtedly opened the way for the

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[431] John Reynolds, "Peripheral Parallels? Europe's Edges and the World of Bandung", *Bandung, Global History and Internarional Law*, ed. " L. Eslava, M. Fakhri, & V. Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): p.252.

[432] Reynolds, *Peripheral Parallels,* 247.
[433] Ibid, p.252-253

[434] Asian - African Conference Bulletin No8. (1955, April 23). World Opinion. Bandung Bulletin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, p. 10.

[435] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Ed.). *Asia-Africa speak from Bandung*. Djakarta: 1955, pp. 161-169.

General Assembly to see the Greek Cypriot demands in this light. At the same time, plans to bring the Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly were being considered by Papagos' government in Greece.

3.4 Diplomatic Efforts for Cyprus: Conference in London

The timing of EOKA's armed campaign coincided with the time of Wilson Churchill's retirement as Prime Minister. It was a period of political transformation and the Middle East was a pressing issue for the British Government. During that time Cyprus was an underestimated challenge. In early June, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd warned ministers of the potential of Greece raising the Cyprus issue at the next UN General Assembly.[436] Armitage tried to brief the newly formed government about the chaos in Cyprus. He spoke bluntly, asserting that if the colonial administration was unable to maintain internal security, only terrified Turks and Armenians would be on their side.[437] To respond to the rising violence in Cyprus and increasing international pressure, London decided to involve Turkey and call for a conference for the settlement of the Cyprus issue.

There were several reasons for Britain to involve Turkey in the Cyprus Problem, the most important being Britain's colonial interests.[438] Despite the Lausanne Treaty; the inclusion of Turkey officially at this stage indicates Britain realized

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[436] O'Malley, B. & Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy*, 17.

[437] Holland, Britain in Revolt, 57

[438] A report on the military importance of Cyprus prepared by a chief of staff was against conceding any real power to Cypriots. The report claimed Britain's military needs on the island could only be met if control of defence, external affairs and internal security remained in British hands. The report also mentioned "we must therefore have full control of the island in all respects in war" (O'Malley and Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy*, p.20).

that it underestimated the risk of national self-determination coming from the Greek Cypriots. Keeping British sovereignty over Cyprus was crucial for Britain. Particularly, the decision in 1952 to make Cyprus the host of Middle East Headquarters of the armed forces shows that Cyprus had central role in Britain's foreign missions.

A repetition of the situation in Egypt would damage Britain's further interests in the region, also enables Soviet's to advance. Britain already took strategic steps initiating the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) brought together Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey.[439] This move aimed to sustain the wider interests of Britain in the Middle East within the wider interests of the Western alliance. Also, there was an inconsistency between the United States and the United Kingdom on their views to self-determination. The United Kingdom tried to persuade the United States to change its position on self-determination as it was damaging Britain's colonial interests and the wider Western interests that the US was also tied with. Britain hoped that the United States, a keen supporter of the right for self-determination, would treat Cyprus differently due to the threat that the USSR might use any changes in the region to its advantage.[440] Britain's declining

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[439] The Baghdad Pact (CENTO) was a mutual cooperation and protection model aiming non-intervention of each other's affairs. The aim of the organisation was to establish a line against the Soviets' southwestern frontier.

[440] On 20th June 1955, at the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the UN, the speech delivered by US President Eisenhower mentioned "every people has the inherent right to the kind of government under which it chooses to live and the right to select in full freedom the individuals who conduct that government. Hence the Charter declares: that on every nation in possession of foreign territories, there rests the responsibility to assist the peoples of those areas in the progressive development of free political institutions so that ultimately they can validly choose for themselves their permanent political status." Chris Tudda, *The Truth is Our Weapon: The Theoretical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower*. (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2006) 92.

power meant it sought to gain influence on the US as a way of keeping itself at the highest levels of international politics. This came to be known as the special relationship.[441]

Under those circumstances, Britain called for a conference in London. British Prime Minister Eden sent an invitation to both Greece and Turkey to London on 30th June 1955 to discuss the political and defence issues affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including the developments in Cyprus.[442] Makarios opposed the initiatives and called on Greece not to participate. Makarios believed that he should have been invited to represents Cypriots as well. The Ethnarchy Council considered that the London Conference had been called to 1) to frustrate and undermine Greek attempts to raise Cyprus at the UN, 2) to use the influence of the Greek Government to weaken Greek Cypriot resistance to British rule and 3) to turn the issue into a dispute between Greece and Turkey.[443]

In fact, the Ethnarchy Council's interpretation was quite accurate, however Greece did not listen to Makarios's call. On 7th July 1955, the Greek government accepted the invitation. Only few days after Greece's response, Makarios visited Athens and made suggestions, including putting Cyprus on the agenda of the UN.[444] The conference started on 29th August without Cypriot presence. Those attending were the three ministers of foreign affairs from the UK, Greece,

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[441] O'Malley & Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy* .18.

[442] Varnava, *A liberation struggle,* 102.

[443] Ibid.

[444] Makarios also asked Greece to accept the British Government's invitation to the Tripartite Conference in London, once the British Government undertook her obligation to grant self-determination for the Cypriot people. However, Greece did not fulfil this request. (Varnavas, *A liberation struggle*, 104)

and Turkey respectively, Harold Macmillan, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.

The British Foreign Secretary proposed self-government for Cyprus and a promise to discuss the status of the island at some future stage.[445] In a Cabinet Paper, the details of the conference clearly explained.[446] According to the Cabinet Paper, while the central aim of the conference was to bring both Greece and Turkey to the table, it would also demonstrate to the US that Britain remained a pivotal power in the region. The strategic position of Cyprus was critical for NATO, as both Greece and Turkey were NATO members. While Britain was ready to discuss the two scenarios that are to say: a) introducing a new constitution that can lead to self-government and protection of the minorities and b) future international status of Cyprus, including the exercise of self-determination by the Cypriot people; the intention was to show that the parties do not have any compromising position. For Britain, the solution of the problem at a later stage would be to consider a tri-dominion over Cyprus "whereby the United Kingdom retained sovereignty, but in which Turkey, as well as Greece, would play a role in the administration of the island."[447] Britain hoped that its position would appeal to Turkey's opposition on Enosis[448] while offering Greeks a formal role in Cyprus. However, it was clear from the beginning that Turkey's position primarily aims to block the demand for self-determination for

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[445] O'Malley and Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy*, 17.
[446] *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, CAB-129-77-17 C.P.(55) 117 (National Archives September 1955, 3).

[447] Ibid, p.59.

[448] Ibid, p.21.

Cyprus. Thus, Turkey's compromise was on the continuation of British Colonialism in Cyprus.

During the meeting, the Greek Foreign Minister initially responded that any solution would only be possible after an immediate plebiscite for self-determination. However, Turkey responded that "alteration of status quo in Cyprus would automatically throw into question the legal basis of the settlement arrived at in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923."[449] This argument of Turkey was significant but it was not convincing as the 20th Article of the Treaty emphasizes "Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government."[450] In other words, recognition of annexation does not mean that Britain cannot transfer the sovereignty of the island to any other entity.

The Turkish position had an impact on Greeks who in the end conceded that an immediate declaration of self-government with the recognition of the self-determination rights of Cypriots for the future would offer a way forward in the immediate future. However, if Enosis was the ultimate result, both British and Turkish interests in the island would be protected, including the provision for British military bases and the security of the Turkish minority of the island. The Turkish position followed the logic of their interpretation of the international legal status of the island. That meant that Cyprus was an issue to be negotiated between the British and Turkish governments. If Britain wanted to leave Cyprus then it should revert to Turkish rule since it claimed the continuation of the

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[449] Ibid, p.73.

[450] The full treaty is accessible from: *The Lausanne treaty.* (1926). Editorial research reports 1926 (Vol. II). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Retrieved from http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1926060100

Ottoman Empire. However, despite the rhetorical demand Turkish position to claim reverting Cyprus to Turkey had no legal basis. Turkish point of understanding on Cyprus's future was mostly based on not allowing Greece to get any advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the Greek point of understanding was effectively using the diplomacy and international legal understanding to strengthen their political position and support the policies that can serve for Megali Idea. It is a fact that the competing antagonistic perspectives in Turkish and Greek affairs were a zero-sum game.

The London Conference produced no tangible results. The political context, however, was to worsen as, on its penultimate day, riots against the Greek minority in Turkey broke out, sparked by a Greek attack on the Thessaloniki historic house of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic.[451] A group called *Cyprus is Turkish* organized some of the attacks and it is suggested that it was supported by the Menderes government. The unrest resembled a pogrom in areas of Izmir and Istanbul, resulting in widespread casualties and the destruction of property.[452]

The failure of the conference and the communal disorder in both Greece and Cyprus helped the British as they were able to portray themselves as an arbiter standing between two nationalisms. The new situation putted Britain into a

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[451] Güven, D. (2006). *6 - 7 Eylül Olayları*. Istanbul: İletişim.

[452] Per Turkish resources, the number of civilian causalities during the incidents in Turkey were 11, while Greek resources claim that they were 15. Additionally, there were up to 300 wounded people. Güven (2006) claims there were around 400 rapes, and 5317 buildings severely damaged. Among those buildings were 4212 houses, 1004 work places, 73 Churches, a synagogue, 2 monasteries, 26 schools as well as factories, hotels, bars (Güven, 6 - 7 Eylül Olayları, 2005).

delicate but a favourable position, where they can claim that they are balancing the wider problem of Turkish and Greek nationalisms. The events would not have been missed on Washington and policymakers would be concerned about increased tensions between the two NATO members in an unstable region.[453] As a result, the US thought that referring Cyprus to the UN would be premature[454], and so the issue did not appear on the agenda of the General Assembly.

For Turkey, the London conference brought the satisfaction of formal involvement with Cyprus. Now engaged in the issue, the Turkish government began to provide economic and strategic aid to Turkish Cypriot organizations, including armed militias resisting Enosis. Henceforth, Turkey's involvement with Turkish Cypriots became more visible in the island's politics.

Shortly after the events, Greek Prime Minister Papagos died. The Greek Monarchy intervened, and Konstantinos Karamanlis was appointed Prime Minister of Greece. Karamanlis played rather a technical role and had a moderate view of the Cyprus issue. While his government continued to support the Greek Cypriots, he focused more on diplomatic moves at the UN.

Ultimately, London Conference produced nothing but improved the British position, and let involvement of Turkey to Cyprus issue. While the conference was a set-back in terms of finding a solution, it provided Britain better regional

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[453] Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 77.

[454] Diana W. Markides, "Britain's 'new look' policy for Cyprus and the Makarios - Harding talks, January 1955 - March 1956", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (2008) : 481.

context. Emboldened by the new situation, the British replaced Governor Armitage with an outstanding military commander, Sir John Harding. It was a clear signal that Britain established its case to act violently against the insurgency in Cyprus.

3.5 Military Efforts Against EOKA's Demand for Self-Determination

John Harding had an exceptional military career. He retired from the Army as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. His appointment as the Governor of Cyprus sent a very clear message regarding British position with regards to the island. It also showed that Britain is an engaging into much decisive military responses.

For this reason, the appointment of Harding was a punishment to the Greek Cypriots while Turkish Cypriots perceived him as a messiah.[455] His repressive policies strengthened Greek Cypriots' solidarity and further alienated them from colonial structures. However, British PM Eden expected Governor Harding to bring an end to the problem in Cyprus.

Before his arrival, Harding agreed with the Prime Minister to have a political mandate to discuss the future of the island and military empowerment to fight against EOKA. Also, he requested a direct line of communication with the office of the Prime Minister.[456] Although he got strong backing from Eden, there were reservations in some quarters on whether the appointment of a military person as governor would solve the issue.[457] However, the government thought that

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[455] Nikolas Stelya, *İstenmeyen Bebek Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti*. (Lefkoşa: Khora Yayınları, 2012) 26.

[456] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt,* 83.

[457] Ibid, 83.

Harding's combination of military and administrative experience would strengthen Britain's position.

Harding arrived in Cyprus with three points to achieve. First, he needed to bring a political solution for Cyprus suitable for wider British interests in the Middle East. This meant granting internal self-government to Cyprus while Britain remained in overall control of the defence, security, and international relations. Secondly, he had to end the EOKA armed actions and capture Grivas. As a military commander, Harding was considered the right person to do this. Thirdly, he needed to quell public distress. This was to be achieved by regaining the support of the local population. To do this, London came up with a generous economic development package. [458]

Before his departure to Cyprus, Harding was advised by Eden to take the necessary steps to achieve self-government.[459] After Harding arrived in Cyprus, he immediately called for a meeting with Makarios to discuss grounds for settlement of the political problem. Ironically for Harding, the talks merely confirmed to Greek Cypriots how successful EOKA's violence was in forcing official talks with the Greek Cypriot political leader. Harding and Makarios held three meetings in October 1955.[460] There were concerns in London that Harding had not yet grown accustomed to the situation. Nonetheless, the meetings provided the opportunity for Harding to explain Makarios face-to-face

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[458] İbid, 84.

[459] Ibid.

[460] Holland 85-90

that the only option on the table was self-government. Makarios rejected this out of hand and the meetings ended.

Harding and Makarios decided to end their efforts as neither of them could see any possible progress being made. Harding reported this to London and based on the Governor's information to the cabinet, alternative scenarios were brought forward. This time, the purpose was to offer a face-saving deal to Makarios, which could have potentially divided the nationalist camp.[461] The Cabinet decided that it was necessary to refute the position of the Minister of State in the Colonial Office, Henry Hopkinson, in the House of Commons in 1954 when he said that the full rights of self-determination could 'never' be extended to the people of the island.[462] The Cabinet's Colonial Policy Committee received an authorisation from Eden on 19th October 1955 "to discover golden words on self-determination which might serve Harding's purposes."[463] The committee recognized that the status quo was not sustainable in the face of the EOKA insurgency.

3.5.1 Turning Cyprus into a Battlefield

While the UK appointed Harding as a punishment, EOKA's military leader Grivas considered the decision on the appointment of Harding as Governor of Cyprus as a compliment to the efforts of EOKA.[464] In the meantime, Grivas started a new campaign against the British. He named this campaign "forward

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[461] Ibid, 88.

[462] Robert Holland, "Never, never land: British colonial policy and the roots of violence in Cyprus, 1950–54", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21 (2008):148.

[463] Ibid.

[464] Foley, *General Grivas,* 71.

to victory".[465] Before initiating the new campaign, he waited for the result of the first talks between Makarios and Harding. Following the end of the inconclusive discussion, EOKA initiated another violent campaign which caused further repressive measures.

Initially, to avoid nationalist agitation, Harding ordered a ban on celebrations for two public holidays, one Greek and one Turkish. 'Oxi' Day or 'no day' on October 28 marks the entry of Greece into World War II having rejected Italian demands to let Axis forces occupy Greece. At the same time, Harding banned public displays of Turkish Cypriots to celebrate 29th October marking the creation of the Turkish Republic. The Turkish Cypriot community accepted the restrictions without further questioning while EOKA ordered people to celebrate 'Oxi' day no matter the orders of the governor. Ignoring the Governor's edict, mass rallies were held in Nicosia. It became a badge of nationalist honour to defy British laws. The demonstrators were further incensed when the handing down of the first death sentence for Michalakis Karaolis became known.[466] He had assassinated a Greek Cypriot member of the British police.

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[465] Grivas assessed the weak points of the colonizer and noted that their main mistake was the high number of soldiers. He interpreted this as something that made the Colonial Government of Cyprus less flexible. Thus, he considered tactics, such as bombings and sabotage, to cause increase the number of wounded or killed military personnel. As a result, he was convinced that this would demonstrate the power and legitimacy of EOKA. (Foley, *General Grivas*, 2012, 56)

[466] Karaolis was on the execution team of EOKA. It was the first ever murder directly targeting British personnel in Cyprus. This was a new method of violence and eventually increased. The Colonial Administration aimed to punish this act in the strongest way to stop its repetition. The murder that led to Karaolis' death sentence was the execution of police constable Pullis on 20th August 1955, following EOKA's decision to execute Greek Cypriots who cooperated with colonialists. Pullis worked as an intelligence officer at the Cyprus police services' special branch. The execution team composed of four people; Yorgacis, as the execution team leader, Michalakis Savvas Karaolides, Gorgios Yoannu and Andreas Panayotu. While, Karaolides was sentenced to death, Yoannu and Andreas were sentenced to 5 years of

The execution of Greek Cypriot fighters, repressive measures and the nationalist political agitation strengthened the national identity and anti-colonialist desire. In his speech on the day that celebrations were banned, Makarios draw some parallels between Greek "oxi" and Greek Cypriot "oxi" day, framed it parallel resistance movements to preserve liberty. In his speech, Makarios said: "The spirit of the liberation struggle which is being waged this moment in Cyprus is not alien to the spirit of the great day we are celebrating today."[467] The liberation from the colonial yoke aims to determine the future of the island was highly visible in Makarios's speeches which popularized the discourse of liberation and freedom through the national self-determination. During the demonstrations, clashes took place between security forces and demonstrators. The tough stance of the Government of Cyprus boosted resentment. According to the police reports, people were shot in Morphou region; bloody clashes occurred in Nicosia, and more than one thousand people were arrested in Famagusta.[468]

On 18th November, Grivas-led EOKA initiated another stage of the *forward to victory* campaign. Bombs exploded all around the island, thirty attacks in total according to Grivas. The targets included military barracks, public buildings like post offices, but also bars that were regularly frequented by British servicemen.[469] At least five people died.

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imprisonment and Yorgacis was freed after their trial was concluded at the colonial court. The execution of Karaolis took place on 10th May 1956. (Drusotis, *EOKA: Karanlık Yön* p98-100)

[467] Varnavas, *History of Liberation*,128.

[468] Ibid, p. 129.

[469] Foley, *General Grivas,* 78.

Despite EOKA's violent campaign, Harding continued his efforts for a political solution. As mentioned above, the British government had become more sensitive to the linked issues of self-government and self-determination. His efforts appeared to be helped by a letter sent to Makarios from London. This seemed to offer hope to Harding.[470] The letter Harding received on 21st November 1955[471] included a passage that offers the basis for discussions on the future of Cyprus from the British perspective and expected Harding to convey the message to find a compromise in Cyprus. The letter read:

> *"Her Majesty's Government shares in the principles which have been incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Charter of the Pacific, to which it is a signatory. It is not, therefore, the position of the British Government that the principle of self-determination can never be applied to Cyprus. Its view is that this principle is not a proposal that can be applied now, both on account of the present strategic situation and the consequences that it will have on the relations between the powers of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the Government must be satisfied that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and its allies. Her Majesty's Government has now offered measures of broad self-government. Should the Cypriot people participate in the constitutional development, Her Majesty's Government is prepared to work towards a final settlement, which would satisfy the aspirations of the Cypriot people, in the framework of the treaties and alliances to which the countries interested in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean are parties. Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to discuss the future of Cyprus with representatives of the Cyprus people when self-government proves to be a proposal capable of functioning satisfactorily and able to safeguard the interests of all the sections of the community.".[472]*

The proposal continued with vague formulations about the timing of self-determination which does not fulfil the ambition of Makarios. The following

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[470] Before leaving for Cyprus, journalists asked Harding about the prospects for peace in Cyprus to which Harding responded, "I have some ideas" (Holland, *Britain and Revolt*, 93).

[471] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 94.

[472] Ibid, p.120.

paragraphs of the letter referred to the strategic situations, considerations about NATO, and the Eastern Mediterranean. In here, particular importance was on the interests of the two main actors of Cyprus that are Greece and Turkey as it pointed to a future "final settlement, which would satisfy the aspirations of the Cypriot people in the framework of the treaties and alliances to which the countries interested in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean belonged."[473]

It ends with a rather ambiguous construction that studiously avoids any direct-reference to self-determination; "Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to discuss the future of Cyprus with representatives of the Cyprus people when self-government proves to be a proposal capable of functioning satisfactorily and able to safeguard the interests of all of the sections of the community."[474]

This letter was unsatisfactory to Makarios for various reasons. First of all, self-determination was linked with some complex grounds of strategic interest and other considerations, and the interested parties in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean referred to Turkey, which ultimately meant the blockage of Enosis demand. Furthermore, a reference to the future of Cyprus did not indicate any period but mentioned the ability of London to decide at a later date, which might have never come. Also, it is possible to claim that for the time being, the self-determination demand was not considered as a right of the people of Cyprus but an administrative decision of the colonizer.

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[473] Varnavas, *Brief History of Liberation*, 120.

[474] Ibid, 120.

From the perspective of international law, it is possible to claim that Eden's proposal represents how self-determination was understood by the colonizer. On the one hand, referring the UK as the signatory party of the UN but on the other hand, limited interpretation of the self-determination as a right represents the diverging opinions on self-determination between the colonizer and the colonized. Furthermore, the international legal order in 1955 enables colonialism that meant Britain's intention to keep Cyprus under British control was within the limits. From the perspective of international law, the lack of compromise from the colonized also effectively helped to develop the valid legal arguments on self-determination.

Despite Makarios having grave concerns about those proposals, he agreed to put it on the Ethnarchy Council's agenda. The proposal was rejected by the members of the Council as a basis for the settlement on 21st November 1955. Despite its vagueness, Harding's proposal was considered positive by Greece. Spyros Theotokis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, said to the British Ambassador of Greece, "it would be an act of bad faith if Makarios turned it down."[475] Also, there were indications that Turkey was aware of this proposal and did not reject it.[476] Harding was frustrated once more with Makarios.[477] Two days after the collapse of the talks on November 23, trade unions in Cyprus announced a general strike. Also, another group of British personnel in two

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[475] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 97.

[476] Varnava, *History of liberation,* p.121-122.

[477] He explained Lennox Boyd of his disappointment in the following statement: "it is essential to recognize that he (Makarios) is determined to be master of events. If he enters an agreement, it is because he believes that it will serve his aims to do so. For him it will not mark the end of the conflict, but the beginning of another phase." (Holland, 2002, p.95)

armoured vehicles were ambushed on the same day. EOKA's violent attacks on British personnel and the general strike of the trade unions became the reason for Harding to file a formal request from the government to declare a state of emergency.[478] While waiting for a response from the government, on 24th November, another British Army sergeant was assassinated by EOKA. In this worsening situation, Harding's request was successful and on 26th November 1955, he declared the state of emergency. From this point onwards, the colonial repression was widespread and the terror in the island was mostly out of control.

As a colony, Cyprus was already a government in a highly centralized and quite authoritarian fashion. Since 1931, the colony was under the direct rule of the Governor. In other words, the state of emergency merely added more power to those who already had it. Holland quotes a telegram to London whereas Harding presented two options for Cyprus:

> *One of the two courses had to be decided upon. Either there must be offered some prospect of ultimate self-determination, though subject to requirements of the strategic situation and to progress in self-government, or a regime of military government must be established and the country run indefinitely as a police state. No middle course was any longer open.[479]*

Within the conditions of the state of emergency, violence becomes the means of sustaining the power. The failed attempts of a settlement of the problem and

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[478] Chares Demetriou. "Political Violence and Legitimation: The Episode of Colonial Cyprus". *Qualitative Sociology* 30 (2007) : 175.

[479] Quoted in Holland, *Britain and Revolt*, 91.

continuing violence of EOKA forced Harding to turn Cyprus into a police state.[480]

The new phase of the conflict is remarkable because of further restrictive measures introduced. Enabling grounds for the violations of the fundamental rights established. The law-making function of violence was observed once Harding announced the new measures and published them in the Cyprus Official Gazette. Accordingly, "*anyone to discharge a firearm against any person or throw or place a bomb, carry any firearm, ammunition or other explosives without legal authorisation*" is considered an unlawful act and punishable by death. Furthermore *"possession of bombs without legal authorisation and various acts of sabotage, which affect the communications, electricity cables, the water supply"* were also considered unlawful, and the penalty was life incarceration. Similarly, actions such as declaring or inducing others to participate in strikes were criminalized. Gatherings, in general, were banned, excluding religious services and ceremonies in Churches and mosques.[481] The limitations were not restricted to violent acts; there were also severe regulations imposed on daily life. For example, arrest without warrant allowed police officers and members of the armed forces to detain anyone considered detrimental to public order. District Commissioners had the authority to prohibit the gathering of more than five persons. The governor had exclusive control over the island, including imposing curfews or forbidding anyone from entering or leaving the island. Also, the governor could decide to terminate the term of

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[480] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt,* 98.

[481] Varnava, *Brief history of liberation*, 132.

Municipal Councils (only elected bodies) and appoint Municipal Committees and exercise the duties of the Council.[482] The display of the national flag, banner, or emblem was also forbidden. Male persons below eighteen were sentenced to flogging. Finally, in addition to the punishments of individuals, the district commissioners allowed the imposition of collective fines. The scope of collective fines consisted of the imposition of collective fines on male inhabitants of the area where the offence has been committed, closure of all the shops in the area or any of them until the next decision, the order of confiscation of the movable or immovable property of any inhabitant, all or any of the houses of the said area be closed and remain closed and not available for human habitation for a specified time.[483]

As the administration became more repressive, Greek Cypriot attachment to Enosis became more intense. Punishments like flogging made youths proud of their uncompromising actions. Being a subject to punishment became another way of representing loyalty to the nationalist ideology. Following the state of emergency measures, instead of leaving self-determination aside, Makarios continued to demand self-determination as a key to ensuring the normalisation of the conditions.[484] At the same time, the mounting reaction to the state of emergency increased the public's trust of EOKA. Concurrent events took place across the island. When the second attempt of a political solution failed, Harding pressured Makarios to abandon EOKA to strengthen Britain's position

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[482] Ibid, 133.

[483] Ibid, 134.

[484] Ibid, 135.

in the next talks. However, his attempt produced another miserable failure. Until 14th December 1955, several British personnel were either murdered or wounded, but the administration was unable to capture Grivas.

After each failed attempt, Harding produced further radical steps. However, neither his diplomatic attempts nor the oppressive legal measures helped him reach his initial targets. On 14th December, Harding decided to arrest communists, consistent with the emergency regulations. 132 members of the communist party, including its secretary-general and several other members of the political bureau arrested. The policy towards communists was another problematic approach of British colonialism. Although communists did not take arms, their imprisonment increased the unmanageable conditions on the island. Arresting peaceful supporters of the nationalist cause was just another failure of the British Administration as there was less violent activity in the areas where communists were well-organized. Arresting communists were allowing nationalist to replace their presence and increase tension. On the other hand, British administration claiming that targeting communists was a pre-emptive measure to prevent a potential communist takeover in case Britain introduced self-government in Cyprus.[485] Harding also halted the production of two AKEL supporting newspapers[486], *New Democrat* and *Independent*. He then banned AKEL and the various small organisations affiliated with AKEL, including AON (Progressive Youth Organisation), EKA (Cypriot Farmers Union), and PODG

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[485] Foley, *General Grivas,* 90.

[486] Andrew R. Novo, "On all fronts: EOKA and the Cyprus insurgency, 1955-1959." (PhD Dissertation, 2010) 77 retrieved from https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9fcd14f8-f60d-49b3-82b4-411e3370e890.

(Pan-Cyprian Organisation of Democratic Women). The Colonial Administration of Cyprus justified this position because "there is no doubt that the directorship of the Party and its satellite Organisations has been in the hands of fanatically dedicated people to the course of international communism."[487]

At the time, communists were relatively isolated and exerted little influence over the Enosis movement. According to Grivas, the arrest of the AKEL members was a tactical move by Britain to cast a shadow on EOKA's hegemony by boosting communists, aiming perhaps to split the movement.[488] However, this had the opposite effect. Makarios felt obliged to oppose the banning of the communists and so a new line of alliance evolved.[489] The tactical move of Makarios, where he embraced them too enhanced Enosis. Now, Greek Cypriots tend to have a united front against the British Administration in Cyprus.

After the communists' arrests, repression continued. The numbers in the police forces were changing drastically. Kızılyürek notes that the number in the police force reached 4500 by 1956. Furthermore, he adds that the Government of Cyprus issued a call for auxiliary police in August of 1955. The auxiliary police department was a special department that countered EOKA insurgents and relied on the Turkish Cypriot recruits. Numbers of personnel in the auxiliary police department started with 165 people and by the end of 1958, the number

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[487] Varnava, *Brief history of liberation,* 141.

[488] Later in 1957, Grivas directed its power to Greek Cypriot communists murdering many of AKEL's members. Grivas' violence against communists was also observed during the Greek Civil War when leading 'X' (chi) against Greek communists.

[489] Varnava, *Brief history of liberation,* p.141.

reached to 1770. All 1700 of the auxiliary forces consisted of Turkish Cypriots.[490]

The effect of the composition of auxiliary force was to create confrontation between the two communities – albeit in this case the Turkish Cypriots standing proxy for the administration. This was further dramatized by the involvement of some Turkish Cypriots officers in the systematic torture of their Greek Cypriot compatriots. [491] The involvement of Turkish Cypriots in the brutal acts made EOKA fighters more hesitant toward Turkish Cypriots. In the beginning, EOKA's leadership was careful not to engage in a direct clash with Turkish Cypriots. Notwithstanding, Grivas was careful not to incite a fully-fledged battle with Turkish Cypriots, but nationalist propaganda was still dominant.

Kızılyürek notes the presence of Greek to Greek campaigns in the economic relations as well as the announcement of EOKA's restriction of sales of British products in Greek Cypriot shops. Furthermore, EOKA pushed Greek Cypriots to restyle their shops with Greek names to make the visibility of Greek Cyprus as Greek as possible.[492] The spatial interventions to increase the Greek character is remarkable. The public representation of political demand played a role in the interpretation of the national identity.

Governor Harding's efforts to stop EOKA and to reach a consensus with Makarios did not produce any outcome. On 11th January 1956, when police

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[490] Kızılyürek, *Bir hınç ve şiddet*, 90.

[491] Ibid, 108.

[492] Ibid, 83.

constable Abdullah Ali Rıza was assassinated by EOKA in Paphos, conditions changed drastically.[493] The murder of a Turkish Cypriot for the first time initiated a wave of reaction among the Turkish Cypriots in which inter-communal relations evolved into a new level.

The assassination of Abdullah Ali Rıza created nationalist reactions among the Turkish Cypriots, and eventually, resentment toward Greek Cypriots turned into violent actions. From this point, Turkish Cypriots demonstrated against Greek Cypriots, demanding 'blood'. During this period, minor incidents mostly targeted Greek Cypriots' property. The murder of a Turkish Cypriot represented a new milestone in Cyprus affairs. From this point on, EOKA needed to consider counter-attacks instigated by Turkish Cypriots as well as the Government of Cyprus. From the perspective of Britain, the conditions for 'divide and rule' was shaping without the need for a catalyst, in a way that served the colonial interests. The repression of the demand for self-determination in Cyprus and failure to develop a dialogue mechanism brought multi-level conflict that Britain had to act decisively to stop. Nevertheless, the anti-colonial demand for self-determination was not limited to Cyprus. Numerous other territories were demanding the same, the international opinion was changing and the British Empire was waning.

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[493] Abdullah Ali Riza was one of the team members who captured Agios Giorgios, a boat used to smuggle arms into Cyprus. The colonial administration and weeks before the incident he honoured by the governor with a medal due to his services. ("Bir kayık yakalandı" *Hürsöz Newspaper*,13 January 1856.)

3.5.2 Exhausting Diplomacy: "God Save Your People"

The environment was deteriorating for every sub-group over Cyprus. British counterinsurgency was intensifying. At the same time, Governor Harding pushed for another attempt for the political settlement. On 27th January 1956, Harding put forth a new formula for settlement to Makarios nevertheless it was mostly about re-wording of the previous proposal.

Makarios called for a national consultation on 30th January- 1st February.[494] The proposal states that the delay of self-determination pertaining only to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The instability of the Middle East was also a concern shared by Makarios as he was not a supporter of the Soviet's increasing power in the region. The second letter included a reference to the Cypriot people's aspirations. Unlike the previous one, this one was placed at the top of the strategic interests of the British Government and her allies. Also, the reference to the treaties and alliances of the other countries was completely removed from the text.[495] This draft statement was prepared according to the concerns that were raised ensuring the proper climate to progress with Makarios.

Ultimately, Makarios sent a letter for further clarification on 2nd February together with a provisional acceptance emphasizing "to agree to enter into talks on interim constitution (…) satisfaction on the Greek elected majority, on the nature of transitional powers and the potentially thorny matter of an amnesty."[496]

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[494] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 109.

[495] Varnava, *A brief history,* 123.

[496] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 110.

Governor Harding's response on 14th February did not fulfil expectations. Following an exchange of views on 25th February, Makarios wrote to Harding: "In conclusion, we must emphasize that in our desire for the island to live through a peaceful period until the time of applying self-determination, we made every possible concession, beyond which our national conscience and dignity does not allow us to proceed."[497] The negotiations ultimately collapsed after the arrival of British Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd on 29th February.

During the last meeting, three demands of Makarios was rejected. The demands were a) elected Greek Cypriot members must be the majority in the Legislature b) elected representatives to control the police, not the Governor and c) Britain to grant amnesty to EOKA fighters.[498] The talks finalized once Lennox-Boyd responded to Makarios: "God save your people."[499] During the meeting between Makarios and Lennox-Boyd, 21 explosions happened signalling EOKA's rejection of British proposals.[500]

Britain did not aim to give control of Cyprus to the Cypriots.[501] A British Member of Parliament criticized the stance of Britain: "we stood alone in 1940, but it was a noble isolation. We are almost standing alone today, but it is an ignoble loneliness we are achieving".[502] Same day that the Harding – Makarios talks collapsed, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Glubb, who was the head

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[497] Ibid, 125.

[498] French, *Fighting EOKA*,103.

[499] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt,* p.114.

[500] French, Fighting EOKA, p.103.

[501] O'Malley, B. & Craig, I. *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 30.

[502] 550, Parl. Deb. H.C. (1956) col.*387-523*

of the Arab Legion.[503] The dismissal was another worrying sign for Britain in the region.[504] Deterioration of the British position in the Middle East was pushing the colonial office to consider alternatives to keep the status quo on the future of Cyprus.[505]

As an ultimate measure, Harding made a radical decision by exiling Makarios and other leading figures consisting of Bishop of Kyrenia Kyprianos, Kyrenia's diocesan Secretary Polycarpos Ioannides and the priest in charge of the Phaneromeni Church and the President of OHEN Papastavros Papagenthelou to Seychelles.[506] Harding's decision once again showed his similar trend of taking oppressive steps once his attempts for solving the issue failed. The failure reflected a political decision that made inhabitants feel the oppression on a more symbolic level. Even though he aimed to fight effectively with the anti-colonialists, the decision only created more chaos, as from this point onward, there was no one like Makarios to counterbalance Grivas. There were no political representatives to negotiate. Also, the dialectics of violence once more showed that either party used violence to reach just ends. For Harding, the use of violence was necessary to sustain order. Even his order to exile Makarios legitimately justified providing just ends. On the other hand, Makarios

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[503] Simon, C. Smith, *Reassesing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008): 4.

[504] İbid, 69.

[505] İbid, 81.

[506] Harding's order "Because I the Governor am convinced that it would be in the public interest to order the deportation from the Colony of Michael Kykkotis, Archbishop of Cyprus III, hereinafter referred to as 'the said person', therefore in the exercise of the rights, given me by article 7 of the Emergency Regulations, I the Governor hereby order the deportation of the said person from the Colony" (Varnava, *A brief history of Liberation*, p.152).

was demanding self-determination referring to the natural rights of the people and legitimized violence as a tool to reach just ends.

The exile of Makarios excessively impacted the British position in Cyprus. The pressure was mounting despite all British efforts to sustain their presence on the island. Even the British press was severely criticizing this decision. For many, the damage of sending Makarios to Seychelles was bigger than letting him stay in Cyprus and continue his efforts.[507] The exile of Makarios was another milestone in the island's history. Probably, from this point onward Makarios started to reconsider his views on Enosis, as his return from exile also landmarked the split between his former ally Grivas. However, the period enabled a new point of understanding on the future of Cyprus.

3.6 Future of Cyprus

Makarios was exiled to Seychelles on 9th March 1956 and remained there until 5th April 1957. During this period, British foreign policy was occupied with the crisis in Suez, and the policies on Cyprus were determined according to the developments in Egypt.[508] Due to instability in the Middle East, Britain considered 'Cyprus as a base' to sustain its presence. Harding began to grasp that Enosis was a demand which was deeply embedded in the Greek Cypriot public consciousness. He also realized that the exile of Makarios did not

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[507] Varnava, *Brief history of liberation,* p.157.

[508] The Baghdat Pact was considered as an attempt to empower the Egyptian leader Nasser's main rival, Iraqi leader Nuri as-Said. From 1955 onwards, Nasser became one of the leading figures of the third World and champion of anti-Western discourse. Following the overthrowing of Glubb, Eden considered Nasser as the main enemy of British interests in the Middle East. His hatred for Nasser includes plans to overthrow him in order to secure British interests. Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East*. (New York: Amana Publications, 1988) 180.

weaken but strengthened the determination of the Greek Cypriots to prevail against the British. At another level, Harding understood that Makarios' absence had narrowed the option to negotiate with the British administration.[509]

From this point onwards, there was little room for a political solution. Harding and Grivas engaged in an asymmetric battle, which became the pattern in colonial conflicts. In Cyprus, as elsewhere military commander pondered how to use their well-equipped trained forces against small but very flexible ideologically driven insurgents. For Harding, all the power of his armed forces, the police, the auxiliaries and his intelligence service was unable to crush EOKA. The execution of two members of EOKA Michalis Karaolis and Andreas Demetriou on 10th May 1956 merely underlined to the Greek Cypriots the injustice of British rule.[510]

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[509] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question, March - December 1956", *The Journal of imperial and Commonwealth History* 19 (1991): 248.

[510] The executions of Karaolis and Demetriou had a huge impact in Cyprus and abroad, and was considered an important example on the erosion of British colonial presence in Cyprus. One of the most notable reactions was by Albert Camus in a letter he sent to *L'express* magazine regarding the executions. Translated, it reads "... For a few weeks, the revolutionary Cyprus has become a hero in the face of young Cypriot student Michael Karaoli sentenced by UK courts to death by hanging. In that happy island where Aphrodite was born, people die today in a horrific way. Once again, the humble claiming a people remained silent for years and was intercepted just wanted to manifest, now breaks out in rebellion. Once again, the rebellion had been blind oppression. Once again, the occupation authorities who asserted that the dominant concern was class, forced to install their courts and make an even greater oppression will bring another result despite the proliferation of rebellions. England, however, does not deny the rights claimed by Cypriots nor the fact that 80% of the inhabitants of the island are Greek nor even that a free referendum would give an overwhelming majority in favour of union. Her only argument, that also claimed some time ago and a French writer, is of strategic importance: Cyprus is the advanced aircraft of British and western power. It is therefore wiser Na accept the sensible suggestion of Greek government offered to guarantee the bases, from the moment you carried the union? Let's not forget that there are loyal friendships that are worth more than steel and cement. With its remarkable resistance against the German and Italian invaders, but by refusing to submit to the Greece revealed to the whole world that the friendship is worth much more than what some other friendships. I will not hide from my side, feelings of affection and love that gives me the Greek people, who, like myself found is with the Spanish from those communities will be needed in the future barbaric Europe to re-create a culture. If the English Conservatives are opposed to the union, is why they abandoned Egypt and now do not want to

Harding's report on the *Future Policy in Cyprus*[511] emphasized the need for the "placation of Greek Cypriot nationalism."[512] He argued that self-determination of Cypriots had to be recognized with a defined road map to it.[513] It needed to be time-bound to convince Greek Cypriots that accepting self-government was a genuine stepping-stone to self-determination. Despite Harding's suggestions, London was reluctant to respond. From the perspective of international politics, this shows the unwillingness of the colonizer to proceed with the decolonisation process particularly those of strategic importance.

On the ground, tensions were also spilling over across the communities. On 23rd April, another police officer was murdered and in response, Harding imposed a curfew.[514] On 30th May 1956, authorities divided Nicosia into ethnic lines. It was immediately dubbed the 'Mason – Dixon line', the same name that divided the USA during the civil war. The same line extended to the whole territory of Cyprus and known as the Green Line.

The short-term military gains were doomed to fail in Cyprus without a political solution. On 12th July, British Prime Minister Eden offered a lengthy explanation of the British attempt to introduce a constitution in Cyprus.[515] He appointed Lord Radcliffe to commence work on drafting a constitution. Eden, however,

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lose their prestige. But they will lose much more prestige if the necessarily temporary extension of the current situation, finally paid the murder of a child, Michael Karaoli ... " (Camus, 2017)

[511] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 371/123920/1081/1877G, *EOKA suspension of terrorist activities and future UK policy in Cyprus: Sir John Harding's views*.

[512] Lawrance Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, p.227-228.

[513] Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 131.

[514] Mihalis Mihaliadis, *"Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Sınıfı ve Kıbrıs İşçi Hareketi 1920 – 1963"* in *Kıbrıs, Dün ve Bugün,* ed Masis Kürkçügil, (Istanbul: Ithaki Yayinlari, 2003), 331.

[515] 556 Parl. Deb. HC (1956, July 12) col 595-602.

explained that the constitution could only be put into effect once terrorism had ended.[516] In the Parliament, Eden emphasized the importance of the constitutional initiative but talked in very general terms about a solution to the Cyprus conflict. Self-determination was not openly mentioned, and he underlined Britain's responsibility of ensuring a solution that satisfied all parties. He explained the importance of the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the importance of taking into account the concerns of the other parties, specifically Turkey. Eden's statements showed that there was little change in British policy toward Cyprus. When questions were asked by the opposition members' of the parliament on the self-determination of the Cypriot people, Eden reiterated the proposal for broader self-government.[517]

The British position demonstrated that in Cyprus, there was no intention of granting independence soon. Governor Harding was well aware of the British Government's position. However, his experience in Cyprus also made him aware that any constitutional deal without a commitment to self-determination would prove fruitless.[518] Following Eden's decision, Lord Radcliffe set about his task.[519] This was made all more difficult as the Greek Cypriot leadership barred talking to him while Makarios was still in exile. As a result, Radcliffe's report

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[516] Ibid.

[517] Ibid.

[518] Holland, Britain and the Revolt, 140.

[519] The prepared Radcliffe report envisioned a policy for Britain once the violence was over. Secondly, the report did not carry any intention to change the status of the island. Moreover, it was essentially planned to keep `all matters relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of HMG or Governor` and confer `a wide measure of responsible self-government'. Metin M. Hakki, *The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007) 12.

relied heavily on the opinion of the British service personnel in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot elites, and Governor Harding. Radcliffe's report was published on 19th December 1956 as a White Paper – five months after the mission commenced. At the centre of his constitutional proposals was for the single-chamber Legislative assembly of 30 members of which 6 would be reserved for the Turkish Cypriot minority. The executive arm of government would be a Cabinet presided over a Chief Minister. The Cabinet would be responsible to the Assembly. It would have full powers over internal affairs except for security. In the words of the report "all matters relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government or the Governor."[520] He also made proposals to enshrine the protection of minority rights, especially language and religious rights in the constitution. This was his approach to dealing with concerns of the Turkish Cypriots. However, he had rejected calls for the equal representation in the Assembly of the minority, "the claim that the Turkish Cypriot community should be accorded political representation equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community, that 18 percent of a population should share power equally with 80 percent, has not been accepted."[521]

Radcliffe thought that the crisis in Cyprus has been exacerbated by the lack of strong political institutions. He proposed to address that. Necessarily, the self-government formula meant the creation of a system of institutions which would constitute rival centres of the power the elected Cypriot government and the

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[520] ibid, 12.

[521] Ibid, 13-4.

Governor's office. While this was to be the British practice across its colonies, it necessarily fell short of Greek Cypriot demands.

The Secretary State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, called the report "a fair balance between the different and often conflicting interests"[522] He also underlined those consultations had been held on its contents with both Greece and Turkey. In his parliamentary statement, Lennox-Boyd explained that the Radcliffe report dealt with a constitution for self-government,

> *As regards the eventual status of the island, Her Majesty's Government have already affirmed their recognition of the principle of self-determination. When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination.*

And he continued to explore the implications of this:

> *When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be Oven freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.[523]*

Lennox-Boyd's reference to partition is remarkable. He further reflected on this by saying,

> *I was able to explain this in considerable detail to the Turkish Prime Minister two or three days ago. But I think we must recognise the natural anxiety of the Turkish people in the longer-term future of the island if the principle of self-determination is applied. I cannot see how it is anything other than logical to grant a community with*

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522 556, Parl. Deb, HC. (1956, December 19), col595-602.

[523] 556, Par. Deb HC. (1956, December 19), col 595-602.

> *such close interests with Turkey, and only 40 miles away, the same rights as we are prepared to recognise should go to the Greek community.*[524]

The British references to self-determination in connection to the Turkish Cypriots as well as to Cyprus contain elements of an appeal to universal principle that can be helpful to state policy. It must be remembered that the principle of self-determination of peoples would not be elaborated by the UN General Assembly until the adoption resolutions 1514 and 1541 in 1960. By in portraying both communities as peoples with the right of self-determination the British neatly place themselves in the centre holding the ring between two conflicting rights. However, this ethnic interpretation of self-determination was entirely based on sustaining the conflict rather than resolving it. As a result, the failure was clear. Also, it reflects that thee British Government considers that the partition as an option can be included in the application self-determination in the mixed populations like in India. One of the critical problems in the case of Cyprus demonstrates that not only th Cypriots but also the Colonial Administration adopted an ethnocentric view on the right of self-determination. The ethnic interpretation of the self-determination is not applicable since it can cause inconsistencies in terms of preserving the colonial boundaries, *uti possidetis*. It is important to address the shift of the interpretation of self-determination from an ethnic perspective to territorial understanding to ensure the consistent application of self-determination. The articulation of what appeared to be a universal right, had, of course, implications for Cyprus. The partition option represented a new opportunity for the Turkish Cypriot anti-

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[524] Ibid.

Enosisist, nationalist cause. Approaching the self-determination in the similar ethnic point of departure creates a new point of departure for the Turkish Cypriot nationalist discourse. Advancing the ethnocentric interpretation of rights enabled Turkish Cypriots further their political presence. The slogan "either partition or death" became popular amongst Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots considered the new proposal as an attempt to veto Enosis. An already tense intercommunal environment worsened.

For Grivas, Turkish Cypriots were seen as an absolute barrier to Enosis.[525] The mention of the double self-determination endowed to the Turkish Cypriots as a gift of their loyalty nevertheless it was not applicable neither there was a legitimate basis for double self-determination. However, the demand for Taksim (partition) had now been legitimized by the British and as it became widely embraced by Turkish Cypriots, the political scene for EOKA changed.

Both communities now articulated their national solutions, Enosis for the Greek Cypriots and Taksim for the Turkish Cypriots. The British attempted to hold a superior position above the fray while at the same time balancing their regional interests through bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey. For the British, it was these wider considerations that were much to the fore in 1956, following the disastrous Suez Problem. As Egypt was becoming another problem for the British in the region, Cyprus becomes important asset and Turkey who saw the rise of Egypt as a regional power as an unwelcome development, take the

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[525] Foley, *General Grivas*, 141.

advantage of the developments in Cyprus to impose its terms.[526] Britain's floating of the idea of partition, therefore, fitted well into its regional policies and its rapprochement with Turkey.[527]

In the lights of the regional developments, a compromise in Cyprus brought forward as a way to establish a buffer between the hectic Middle East and Europe. However, the terms to reach an agreeable solution required to satisfy Turkey's political plans as well as the self-determination right of the Cypriot communities.

3.7 The Compromise

At the beginning of 1957, in the wake of the Suez crisis, Harold Macmillan replaced Eden. Having served as both defence and foreign secretary between 1954 and 1955 and having been under-secretary of state for the colonies during part of World War II, Macmillan had a useful background to deal with the Cyprus Problem. By April 1957 it became evident that the existing policy of Britain in Cyprus had been a failure. The choices only helped further militarization of the conflict, narrowed the room for negotiations and putted Britain in a difficult situation.

As has been pointed out, Makarios had been exiled to Seychelles since 1956. This meant that there was no Greek Cypriot leader with a political significance to talk to since Grivas was declared as the terrorist. However, the British authorities were reluctant to allow Makarios back to Cyprus. As a result, he was

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[526] Hatzivassiliou, *Blocking Enosis*, p. 259.

[527] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, p. 156.

released from Seychelles but decided to be sent to Athens. As Makarios arrived in Athens from the exile, he got the backing of thousands and showed that he is the representative of the Greek Cypriot political will.

The exile of Makarios can be seen as a serious policy mistake by the British Administration in Cyprus. Later, in that period Britain re-adjusted its foreign policy and Makarios had a central role in the new changing policy. On the day Makarios informed that he was leaving Seychelles, the White Paper was published by Britain and presence in Cyprus reconsidered. A former defensive strategy that positions "Cyprus as a British base" changed to "to have a base in Cyprus."[528] The changing British defence strategy demonstrated a transformation regarding the debates on the future of Cyprus. In May 1957, at a NATO Council, a case for the independence of Cyprus was raised by the NATO Secretary-General.[529] According to the developments in the region, the issue of independence perceived within the lenses of territory. It is believed that offering independence to Cyprus can help the West to create a better strategic advantage than letting Britain drown into a war that can cause further destabilisation. The new interpretation of the power balances in the region relied on the creation of an area of cooperation for the regional actors and Western Alliance in general. This led Britain to restructure its policies based on Britain's diminishing role in the region. The involvement of NATO pressured Britain to find a solution to Cyprus. Britain insisted on excluding Cypriots in the

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[528] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, p.195.

[529] NATO Secretary General and former Belgian statesman M. Paul Henri Spaak explained the Belgian independence and the relations of the Walloons of Belgium with France. He considered how this could be the case for Greek Cypriot and Greek relations, however the United Kingdom representation ignored this option (Holland, 2002, p.196-7).

settlement process to fine-tune its gains which would only represent the colonial arrogance. However, the lack of Cypriot involvement never allowed them to negotiate their position and reach a consensus. On the contrary, it only served Greek Cypriots (and later Turkish Cypriots) to remain on the opposite side of the proposals and rigidly at a maximalist position.

In July 1957, the British Prime Minister Macmillan put the *tridominium* on the table. Macmillan aimed to offer a strategic solution by involving Britain, Greece, and Turkey with the concept of *triple-sovereignty* over Cyprus to provide internal self-government and preservation of British bases.[530] This strategic policy change was an alternative to the partition proposal. However, neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots considered this as a viable option. [531] Greece had been actively engaged in foreign policy to ensure 'proper' application of the right to self-determination to the Cypriot people.[532]

Greek Foreign Ministry insistently carried the Cyprus case to the UN General Assembly from 1954 to 1958. It is possible to observe that EOKA's fight synchronized with the UN General Assembly meetings, taking the space as the only way to elevate the national self-determination of Greek Cypriots. Following to Makarios's deportation to Seychelles, Greece made its third application to

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[530] Ibid, p.199.

[531] Stephan G. Xydis, *The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-58*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (1968) 158.

[532] *Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus,* 814 (IX) (UN General Assembly, 17 December 1954).

the UN on 13 March 1956.[533] In the following year, after Britain's *tridominium* offere, Greece submitted a resolution to the UN General Assembly for the fourth time. The fourth attempt was unable to gather the required two-thirds vote. However, the Greek proposal mentioning: "the earnest hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken promptly and in a spirit of cooperation with a view of applying the right of self-determination in the case of the people of Cyprus" gained the backing from the majority of the UN member-states. In other words, the UN General Assembly was convinced of the idea of Cypriot self-determination.[534]

Since international and local dynamics were changing and Britain finally acknowledged that Harding's mission failed. It was not only the failure of Harding's mission; it was also the failure of the British Empire in general. In fact, in Cyprus Harding strengthened the police forces and significantly damaged EOKA. Also, the social conditions led polarisation of the communities based on ethnic divergences. When Britain abandoned the policy "Cyprus as a base" and altered it to the "base in Cyprus", Harding's second goal was reached to a limited extend since this enabled securing the British sovereign bases. Even though such outcome brings a doubt over the proper application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, still the British sovereignty over Cyprus continued. Ultimately, Harding sought to gain the trust of the local population.

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[533] The Eleventh assembly produced decision 1013 (XI) which emphasized support of the negotiations between Hardin and Makarios and expressed its desire for a peacefully democratic and just solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Ibid, p.144.

[534] Xydis, *The UN General Assembly,* p.151.

However, Harding's period was the period of violence.[535] As Holland explains, he lacked the 'public relations' element.[536] He only visited the popular destinations in Nicosia weeks before his departure with a large number of bodyguards.[537] Harding left his position on 4th October 1957 and was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, the last Governor of Cyprus.

Once Foot arrived in Cyprus on 3rd December 1957, EOKA was not as troublesome since the organisation had already been weakened by Harding's tactics.[538] During the period from late 1957 to early 1959, EOKA targeted Greek Cypriot leftists and individual targets, mostly those who were considered traitors. The scale of EOKA's attacks got smaller in comparison to the violent campaigns that ensued previously.

Governor Foot claimed that the solution could only arise once the communities in Cyprus conceive their solution by self-government. To create a better environment, he freed hundreds of prisoners and eased the emergency measures and various other restrictions erected by Harding. He mentioned that a precise solution necessitated a transition period of 5 to 7 years. His position based on the main pillars of the Macmillan Plan. He tried to established contacts with the local population. Foot acknowledged his optimism conflicted with the realities as well as the concerns of the Colonial Office. [539] Upon Hugh Foot's

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[535] Andrew R. Novo, "An insoluble problem: The Harding - Makarios negotiations, Turkey and the cause of Cypriot Enosis", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 24 (2015) 90.

[536] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt,* 211

[537] İbid.

[538] İbid, 213.

[539] Ibıd, 214.

arrival, the balance of power among the communities had changed. EOKA largely damaged but at the same time, Turkish Cypriot armed groups became the real cause for concern for the Colonial Office.

Turkish Cypriots' nationalist claimed partition as violent as EOKA. They were initially empowered by the colonial government and later by the support from the Turkish government.[540] Despite the small size of their population, Turkish Cypriots were strongly armed, and their power brought a new dimension to the conflict. By the end of 1957, Britain lost its control over Turkish Cypriots. From December 1957 onwards, the situation in Cyprus was not just a colonial conflict. Eight decades of colonialism in Cyprus finally turned into a civil war. Britain's preference to frame self-determination from ethnic lenses now causing a bigger problem. Because now two ethnic groups were fighting to reach their goals by approaching the issue in purely ethnic perspective despite the British Foreign Policy of that time required cooperation.

Macmillan came up with another proposal for Cyprus when Britain acknowledged that they do not have any power to implement any unilateral policy on Middle East independent from the USA and out of the scope of NATO,. The new proposal was reframed version of Macmillan's and it called Foot's Plan which also failed following to the Turkish opposition. Macmillan presented the plan during the House of Commons debate underlining the four main purposes of the government as:

> a) To serve the best interests of all the people of the island, (b) To achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the island and the Greek and Turkish

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[540] Drousiotis, *Karanlık yön: EOKA,* 226.

> *Governments, (c) To safeguard the British bases and installations in the island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations, (d) To strengthen peace and security and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies, in a vital area.*[541]

Parallel to the four main purposes, Macmillan raised an opportunity of a partnership between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom sharing the sovereignty of the island. Furthermore, he outlined the main aspects of the plan including the association of Cyprus with the British Commonwealth and also with Greece and Turkey. Either of the Turkish and Greek governments were to appoint a representative to cooperate with the Governor, allowing each community to exercise their autonomy in its communal affairs. The setting would allow residents to be recognized as Greeks and Turks, as they could enjoy also their Turkish and Greek national identity, the British government would allow them to retain British nationality. While the international status of the island remained unchanged for seven years, a new principle on the new partnership could be put in operation.[542] In the same parliamentary debate, Macmillan also mentioned the essential provisions of a new constitution.

Despite Macmillan plan's aim to converge concerns of all relevant parties, neither of them supported the plan. Turkey responded that they were not considering any other option than the partition of the island, Turkish Cypriot emerging political figure Denktaş considered the plan as a stepping stone for Enosis in the long term so he rejected it.[543] However, big changes with irresolvable consequences happened on 7th September 1958 once Makarios

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[541] 589, Parl. Deb. HC. (1956, December 19), Col 1315-20.

[542] Ibid.

[543] Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi*, 141.

informed the Greek government that he was ready to accept a solution based on *independence* following self-government.[544]

On 22nd September, Makarios had a meeting with Barbara Castle who was serving as the vice-president of British Labour Party and detailed what he expected from the independence formula. Accordingly, Makarios envisaged a self-government period that led to an independent Cyprus state that would be neither part of Greece nor Turkey. The UN would guarantee its independent status of the Cyprus state while the Turkish Minority would be protected.[545] Despite, Turkish Cypriots rejecting the independence formula, in the following months, the 13th Session of the UN General Assembly became the decisive moment on the future of Cyprus. Makarios's return and his re-adjustment of its policies with the international law and the framework of the UN's decolonisation plans enabled him to adjust the independence formula from the interpretation of territory instead of ethnicity.

The General Assembly approved Resolution 1287 (XIII). This resolution recalled Resolution 1013 (XI) that expressed the earnest desire "that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of UN and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end.[546]" Following the UN General Assembly

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[544] Ibid,144.

[545] Ibid, 144-5.

[546] United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/1013, Question on Cyprus (1957), http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGA/1957/16.pdf.

resolutions 814 (IX), 1013 (XI), 1287 (XIII), the increasing support of the Cyprus

case also demonstrated the transformation in the perception of UN members.[547]

Following the 13th Session of the UN General Assembly on December 1958,

Greek and Turkish positions started to change, and both parties had

independence on their agenda. A new set of meetings on Cyprus's

independence started to take place despite Turkey's campaign for the partition

of Cyprus and Greek Cypriots' campaign for Enosis just a few months earlier.

From the beginning of January 1959, Turkey and Greece intensified their

discussions on the way for independence. Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü

Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff made their first common

declaration on 11th February 1959 announcing that Turkey and Greece agreed

for a plan on the future of Cyprus within the independence formula.

Concerns emerging from the wider geostrategic developments made Cypriot

independence possible.[548] The power-sharing principles and various

dimensions of the arrangements, such as the 'ethnic' municipalities in the

towns, made the Cypriot solution a "constitutional oddity."[549] However,

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[547] The changing perception of the UN-member states toward the idea of self-determination shows the change in their characteristics. In 1954, the UN consisted of 60 members. From 1955 to 1958, that number reached 82 where most of those countries were decolonized entities. The rising number of new states created international solidarity among them for self-determination rights of the people.

[548] Iraq was backed by Soviet weapons; the Egyptian air force went to Soviet control and the only pro-Western neighbour of Turkey was Greece. For NATO's interests and regional geostrategic concerns, Turkey could not carry the burden of any hostility with Greece. Greek foreign Minister Averoff failed during the UN General Assembly to protect its national interests, however, decisively moved forward with Turkish requests to talk about Cyprus (O'Malley & Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy*, 71).

[549] The statement was made by former UN mediator Galo Plaza in 1965 after the wave of violence started with the incidents in 1963. Adel Safty. *The Cyprus Question: Diplomacy and International Law*. (London: iUniverse, 2011) 110.

analysing from the understanding of internal and external self-determination, the power-sharing model that initially proposed can be a starting point for the communities to rule themselves internally without external interference. Also, the creation of President and Vice-President status in an independence formula considered to enable Cypriot communities to be able to cooperate for the future of the island.

However, the proposed plan subject to work if there will be goodwill, in other words, a determination to sustain the new arrangements. Cyprus solution had nothing to do with the existing discourses for self-determination. Greek Cypriots were decisive on Enosis, but they were not powerful enough to impose their will on Turkish Cypriots and Britain. Turkish Cypriots demanded partition, but this demand was rejected by all other parties. The guaranteed independence did not satisfy either of the communities' expectation. Also, giving out bases upon the realization of the independence raises questions about the proper implementation of the self-determination in the first place as the colonial boundaries Cyprus had not been respected and diluted by providing sovereign base areas to the UK with the independence formula. As far as the proposed solution primarily targeted the fulfilment of the wider geostrategic interests and to ensure the stability in the fragile Middle East. The self-determination demands of the Cypriot communities were ignored. The obvious inconsistency of application of the self-determination and harmonisation of new formula from top to down approach did not satisfy the masses that were fighting for nationalist ambitions in this period.

Guaranteed independence of Cyprus was not the real desire of the communities in Cyprus, however, the context in which it took place deserves careful attention. It neither offered a satisfactory outcome for the nationalist aspirations nor was it executable without the willingness of the two communities. As a result, both sides considered the proposed solution a stepping stone to their political ambitions.

Negotiations held by Turkish and Greek foreign ministers Zorlu and Averoff reached an agreement on a solution based on guaranteed independence, which was the hybrid of the former Macmillan Plan and NATO Secretary-General Spaak's proposal of a solution which included a) communal chambers for each community, b) house of representative on the affairs of both communities c) executive council with the involvement of both communities led by the Governor of Cyprus d) the Governor having exclusive control on the issues related with external affairs, defence and security e) independent tribunals by communal chambers in the situation of disputed topics, and f) the maximum length of the seven-year transition period.[550]

Finalized plans for the independence of Cyprus was announced on 19th February 1959 once the sides announced the Declaration of the Final Settlement of the Cyprus Problem. Makarios was reluctant to agree to the new proposals. He was willing to accept a solution that excluded Enosis providing it freed Cyprus from colonialism.[551] As the agreements were signed in London at

[550] Gürel, *Kıbrıs tarihi*, p.148.

[551] Hannes Lacher & Erol Kaymak. "Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of NonSettlement in North Cyprus", *Mediterranean Politics* 10 (2005) 151.

Lancaster House, this paved the road to independence. The Lancaster House agreement was also supported by the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.

The Treaty of Guarantee signed between the Republic of Cyprus as one party, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as the other. The first article of the treaty, "prohibits any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island" and it gives the unilateral right to intervene as the fourth article of the treaty emphasizes that "each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."[552] Also, the Treaty of Alliance signed between The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey stated that they would "uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them." The treaty aimed to co-operate on common defence by providing Greek and Turkish contingents respectively 950 Greek officers and 650 Turkish officers.[553]

The agreements created reactions among the Greek Cypriots. While those who interpreted the guarantees positively considered it as essential to secure the unity of Cyprus,[554] *Eleftheria* raised concerns during the discussions on guarantees mentioning that "guarantees in favour of the Turkish minority for the implementation of the regime under discussion, in such a way that it is not very

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[552] "Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 11 21, 2017, Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/treaty-concerning-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus.en.mfa

[553] "Treaty of Alliance", Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 11 21, 2017, Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/FB80B3D87DE5A915C2257F95002BE30E/$file/The%20Treaty%20of%20Alliance.pdf

[554] "Does Not Exclude Independence Precluding Enosis," *Ethnos*, (1959, January 3), 4.

different from the partition."[555] In the same manner, Makarios reacted to the Guarantees development in case it caused the establishment of a Turkish military base saying that "Cypriot people will not accept any possible reduction in their sovereign rights."[556] Another article in *Eleftheria*, which comments on the Zurich Agreement, states:

> *By this agreement, the holy right of the Cypriot people for self-determination, made holy by the sacrifices and the blood of the four-year liberation struggle, is precluded, and the expressed will and command of the people to self-determination and Enosis is violated.[557]*

The statements as a whole show a significant reaction among Greek Cypriots on the treaties that constitute the basis for the independence of Cyprus. It is possible to claim that a substantial reaction existed on the founding treaties that contributed to the final settlement of the Cyprus Problem. Unsurprisingly, those treaties (brought independence under the tutelage of the guarantor powers) were inconsistent with the Greek Cypriots' nationalist desires and it did not completely fulfil their demand for self-determination. Also, from the legal perspective guarantees were limited the sovereign rights of the people of Cyprus, since it provides a pre-text for foreign intervention. Also, the establishment of Sovereign Bases in two areas over the island of Cyprus, contradicts with the principle of *uti possidetis*.

Considering this period, EOKA failed to reach its desired goal of reaching Enosis. Greek Cypriot nationalist elites agreed to the new state of affairs as a

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[555] "Calibration of Reality and the Possible Developments of the Cyprus Issue", *Eleftheria,* (1959, January 4), 6.

[556] Ioannou, "On Cyprus Issue", *Altihia* (1959, January 26), 6.

[557] "In Depth Analysis of Zurich Agreement", *Eleftheria* (1959, February 17), 8.

new phase of a political struggle. For Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were a vain minority that gained political equality. The development of the Greek national consciousness was based on the ethnic and cultural unity with Greece. However, the result of this struggle brought guaranteed independence that primarily bans the desire for unification with Greece. The outcome did not meet the nationalist desires of Greek Cypriots and it did not eliminate the colonial legacy from Cyprus entirely. Makarios's statement demonstrated how the solution failed to fulfil the nationalist desires, "the agreements did not create a nation but a state." [558] Makarios referred to Turkish Cypriots as "neighbours" rather than fellow citizens.[559] His approach hindered any potential to form a collective identity.

For Greek Cypriots, Enosis and EOKA were still the central elements of the idea of liberation and the route to national restoration within the scope of self-determination. One prominent political figure Glafkos Kleridis stated the "Cypriot flag is the best flag on earth because no one was ready to die for it."[560] The proposed solution was not full independence of Cyprus and primarily it eliminated Enosis for once and all. The discourses on human rights were formed according to this resentment and feeling of revenge. From this point onwards, "the name of the liberation was to get rid of the Cyprus state."[561] During the Greek Cypriots' presidential elections for the Republic of Cyprus, *Eleftheria* demanded people vote for Makarios because "he is not the leader of

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[558] Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında,* 103.

[559] Ibid, 104.

[560] Ibid, 105.

[561] Ibid, 106.

a political party but the Christian leader of the Greek people of Cyprus."[562] Makarios emphasized that he would realize the "aspirations" of the people by putting self-determination as a way to reach Enosis because the bicommunal state was an unjust imposition.[563] Likewise, actors other than Grivas and Makarios also raised concerns. Neither the nationalist party nor the communist AKEL supported the Zurich and London agreements. AKEL issued a statement, criticizing Makarios by disowning his 'Faneromeni Promise' that called to fight for "Enosis, only Enosis."

The period from 1955 to 1959 concluded with independence that was a sham. The inter-communal affairs on the island fully deteriorated before independence and avenues of cooperation was not in place. Despite, it is claimed that there is an end of colonialism in Cyprus; it is clear that colonial interests are continuing and the cost of the new face of colonialism also boiled ethnic hatred among the communities.

The post-colonial setting in Cyprus was unable to bring an end to the problem. The extremist and nationalist elements in both communities and their respective motherlands had a role in this, but Britain played a major role in the formation of such an environment. The British insistence on controlling Cyprus without having any credible plan of leaving created a political condition that neither of the communities was able to work in a constitutional setting that could function bi-communally.

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[562] Ibid, 108.

[563] Ibid.

The compromise came after the mounting international pressure and Britain's declining power following to the post-World War II that enabled the decolonization of the island. However, the decolonisation happened by the terms of the colonizer rather than the people of Cyprus. The suppression of the nationalist desires replaced with resentment again that ultimately became the source of a conflict in the post-colonial period that is beyond the scope of this project. However, one point that is not discussed is the Turkish Cypriot narrative on self-determination. The following chapter will focus on that.

Chapter 4: Turkish-Cypriot Pursuit of Self-determination 1950-1960

In this chapter, the emergence of much coherent nationalist politics of the Turkish Cypriot community between 1950 and 1960 are explored. The period represents an intensification of the nationalism, as well as the discourses on the self-determination. The historical contextualisation of nationalist movements and groups will equip the reader with an understanding of nationalist attitudes within the Turkish Cypriot community.

Throughout this chapter, the nationalist discourses in Turkish Cypriot communities are critically analysed from 1950 to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus based on the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959. Furthermore, it focuses on the significant events in the given period that demonstrate the influence of nationalism over legalistic rhetoric and the reflections over the discourses of the right, which reveal the transformation of nationalism in Turkish Cypriot community. Additionally, the shifting political paradigms of Turkish Cypriots are analysed. The shifting paradigms largely based on the reactions to Greek Cypriots, Turkey, and Britain. This section explores the impact of the British colonial policies, Turkey's involvement with Cyprus affairs, and the Greek Cypriot nationalists influence on Turkish Cypriots; and interrogate how the Turkish Cypriots comprehended the notion of self-determination.

Various studies on nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot community narrated rights discourses from an anti-Enosisist dimension as a reaction to Greek nationalism.

In the colonial context of Cyprus, the reference to the Turkish Cypriots' nationalisms had to be treated with the lenses that it is a minority nationalism that emerged relatively later than the Greek nationalism in Cyprus. From this point of understanding, nationalism was not only a political reaction or an ideological ambition but it played a role in building an identity for the masses. In this section, one of the main observations is that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideology lacked a coherent plan on understanding of the future of Cyprus for a long time. Turkish Cypriots mostly originate their national politics a pursuit for a guardian for their existence. During the period that is subject to this study, the weaknesses of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus would be an indicator that shows that it is ideologically nascent.

Two fundamental sections of the chapter analyse both the identity building process and nationalist politics as an ideology. The identity building process of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus created institutions, political parties, and its political projects. The process should be observed, as it also gives hints on the way that Turkish Cypriots defined their relationship with British Colonialism and their national kinship with Turkey. The adoption of the Turkish Cypriot identity was partly volunteer but partially organized process with the support of British Colonialists and in certain instances forced by the local political elites like it was the case in Greek Cypriot nationalists too. As the chapter unfolds, it is going to be clearer that Turkey widely ignored Turkish Cypriots' authentic political demands and preferred understanding the issue as solely British Problem. It is possible to claim that the foundation and the development of the Turkish

identity, in the form of it is experienced in the 1950s, were also socially engineered.

However, it does not mean that it came out of the blue. Towards the end of the 1940s, the significance of Turkish Cypriot nationalist politics became much visible. Following the intensification of the Enosis movement, Turkish Cypriot grassroots organised and started to challenge the Enosis project. Once the armed rebellion of Greek Cypriots commenced in 1955, Turkish Cypriots' engagement with politics also radicalized.

At the beginning of the 1950s, Turkish Cypriots had a rather weak political response to the emerging demands for Enosis,[564] either opting for the status quo or reverting the governance of the island to Turkey. In that time, the main anti-Enosisist slogan was, 'Cyprus is Turkish' (Kıbrıs Türktür). Turkish Cypriots' demand to unite with Turkey was not powerful enough, neither in legal nor political terms.[565] Continuation of the status quo could only be justified if the British intended to remain in Cyprus. However, Britain acknowledged that the colonial presence in Cyprus was not sustainable, and thus they altered their Cyprus policy. This made Turkish Cypriots realise the urgency of having a

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[564] The first rally against Enosis took place in Nicosia in 1948. Hur-Söz newspaper of that time (28 November 1948) claimed that there were more than 15000 people while Reuters quoted the number as 6000. ("Miting Manzaralarından", *Hürsöz,* 30 November 1948) During the demonstration New nationalist elites like Denktaş and Küçük addressed the crowd. However, most of the speeches consisted of anti-enosisist sentiments and call on the continuation of the status quo (Eleni Apeyitou, "Turkish Cypriot Nationalism: Its history and development," *Cyprus Review* 15 (2003) 83).

[565] The legal source of this demand was based on the 1878 Berlin Agreement. However, later Cyprus was annexed by Britain (1914) and in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which was the founding year of the Republic of Turkey. Political parties in Cyprus (of each national community) recognized it as part of Britain. As a result, legal sources of the slogan "Cyprus is Turkish" was not legally well founded.

political project to counter Enosis, as Enosis nationalist Greek Cypriots had no interest to include Turkish Cypriots to their anticolonial struggle neither they envisaged tangible political areas of cooperation with them.[566] For the first time, British rule on the island presented Cypriot communities with the option of double self-determination towards the end of 1956, constituting as a basis for a new political project for Turkish Cypriots.[567]

While Greek Cypriots relied on Enosis, Turkish Cypriots had their version of dividing the island and uniting Cyprus with their 'motherland' Turkey and Greece. Taksim understood as the division of Cyprus between the two communities with each practising their self-determination rights equally, consistent with the Lennox Boyd's statement. However, geographically, Cypriot communities were scattered throughout the island, so the option for partition was not viable without any population exchange and relocation.

Turkish Cypriots elites quickly internalized the partitionist discourses. Although Britain proposed the idea of partition, at the official level they withdrew the idea. However, Britain allowed Turkish Cypriots to carry on their campaign for Taksim in order to counter-balance emerging demands for Enosis.

Meanwhile, a new Turkish nationalism emerged in Cyprus starting in the early 1950s. The new nationalism had two champions: Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Raif Denktaş. The main difference between the new nationalist elites was their oppositional stance on Britain, which radically differed from the stance of the

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[566] The policy shifted from "Cyprus as a base" to "a base in Cyprus", which is explained in detail in the previous chapter.

[567] 562, Parl. Deb. HC. (1956, December 19), col1267-79.

former Turkish Cypriot political leader, Sir Metin Munir.[568] The mid-1950s onwards was the time when Turkish Cypriots started to question colonialist policies and demanded weight to speak about the future of the island. They claimed that dividing Cyprus between Greece and Turkey was an option and they expanded their nationalist campaign over this discourse.

From 1956 onwards, Turkish Cypriot political elites campaigned for the partition of Cyprus with no hesitation to use violent methods to back up the demands. This began to re-allocate the distribution of power between the two communities, as the Turkish Cypriot community adopted the tactics and attitudes of the Greek Cypriot community and applied it to their political plan in a reactionary fashion. Plenty of parallels can be drawn between the developments of tactics by the Turkish Cypriot community through the example of the Greek Cypriot community. One of the responses of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist politics were organised around the motto of 'Ya Taksim, ya ölüm', meaning 'Either Taksim or Death'. This dominated the heart of the Turkish Cypriot political discourses from 1956 onwards. Another slogan was; 'Taksim Sadece Taksim' borrowed from Greek Cypriot nationalists' motto 'Enosis, Mono Enosis'.[569]

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[568] The recent history of Turkish Cypriot politics is largely dominated by three people. From the 1920s until the mid-1940s, Sir Mehmet Münir was considered the political leader of Turkish Cypriots. He held various important positions largely because of his extreme loyalty to Britain. He faced strong opposition in the consultative council from Necati Özkan. Necati Özkan was perceived as the 13th Greek by Governor Storrs after he cooperated with Greek Cypriots and side-lined the decades long Turkish - British cooperation. Later, from mid-1940s to mid-1960s, the political leadership role was fulfilled by Fazıl Küçük. From the mid-1960s until early 2000s, Rauf Raif Denktaş became the political leader of Turkish Cypriot community.

[569] While the slogan 'Enosis mono Enosis' means 'Enosis only Enosis', 'Taksim sadece Taksim' means 'Partition only Partition'.

Although the Turkish Cypriots started by imitating Greek Cypriots in developing strategies as well as narratives, this was subject to change. Taksim discourse—together with the colonial policies—brought significant results to the Turkish Cypriot community. Probably the most significant result was the recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as the equal founders of the Republic of Cyprus following to the decolonisation. Despite their population-wise minority status enabled them not to be categorized as a minority group politically. However, this was largely due to the British Colonial policies that aimed to ensure a balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the region.

To be able to pinpoint the phases of this transition, it is necessary to closely observe the events and their influences over the changing narratives of nationalism for the Turkish Cypriot community over a decade-long period. In this chapter, I argue that the significant role of the nationalist politics, as well as Britain's careful position on Turkey's role in the region. It is evident that geopolitical concerns of Britain played a significant role for Turkish Cypriots to be able to upgrade their status to the equal founder of the Republic of Cyprus.

4.1 Invention of Turkish Cypriot Identity as a Political Entity

From 1950, as Greek Cypriots' nationalist actions were getting more intensified, Turkish nationalism within the Turkish Cypriot community also started to intensify. The nationalist elites started to develop hegemonic Turkish nationalist narrative and started to create organisations to spread nationalism. At the beginning there were number of nationalist organisations among the Turkish

Cypriot community but later armed TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation) monopolised the power in the hands of few nationalist elites.

On 23rd October 1949, two important political institutions in the Turkish Cypriot community, KATAK and KMTHP, merged as the Cyprus National Turkish Union (Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği or KMTB). From this period onwards, Turkish Cypriot politics united against the Greek nationalism. However, fundamental difference was that the organisation was not against British colonialism. KMTB was established on four principles:

> *1- Spreading and developing the ideas of unity and cooperation among Turkish Cypriots and institutionalisation of National Democratic ethics and culture. 2- Research and protection of Turkish community's national and political rights 3- Cultural, social, and economic development of the Turkish Cypriots, doing technical research and taking necessary action for the economic and internal development of Turkish Cypriots to ensure its communal existence. Notably, economic development and improving the welfare of villagers and workers who are the veterans of the national wealth 4- Promote Turkish Cypriots to the world and enhance cultural relations with motherland Turkey.[570]*

It is the first time that there was an open reference to the national rights. The developing understanding of group rights showed the early steps of emergence of national identity, however the elites unable to come up with a broadly agreed and legitimate political project. The political goals were mostly on cultural preservation and the political discourse of the organisation was mainly focused on community building exercise.

One of the principal elements of that period was to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot identity. To strengthen the identity, the organisation aimed to develop

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[570] Bülent Evre, *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği,* (Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi, 2004) 114-5.

institutional capacity to show that the community is self-sufficient. To achieve self-sufficiency of the Turkish Cypriot community, isolationist attitudes emerged at an expense of diminishing Turkish Cypriots influence over the island-wide politics. From its foundation, the Cyprus National Turkish Union (KMTB) organised an umbrella of every political view, except for communist tendencies.[571] Another, yet more effective institution created in the same period was the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations (Kıbrıs Türk Kurumlar Federasyonu–KTKF). The federation was founded in mid-1949, as an umbrella organisation aiming to advocate the rights of Turkish Cypriots on cultural and social levels. The federation consisted of representatives from a variety of organisations, such as cultural associations and sports clubs. As an umbrella organisation, it offered support for the social and economic needs of the vulnerable people. The organisation acted as an entity that carries the Turkish Cypriot identity, gradually becoming the institution of the new Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Also, the business elites of the Turkish Cypriot community gathered under the Federation of the Turkish Cypriot Associations. At the beginning, KTKF did not have any decisive impact on Turkish Cypriot politics. However, during the second half of the 1950s, it became the leading institution advocating Turkish Cypriots' rights against the British Colonial Administration.

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[571] The degree of Turkish Cypriots' anti-communist stance is explained by Attalidis. He relates the case of Turkish Cypriot leadership and the conditions of that time to Nazi Germany and Sudetan Germans. "A community that was economically dependent to a large extent on state institutions, numerically a minority, with its left-wing political movement eliminated by the nationalist organisation oriented to Turkey and possessing a highly anti-communist leadership was obviously one capable of turning into a 'strategic' one, quite reminiscent of the Sudeten Germans in relation to Nazi Germany…" (Michael Attalidis, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2003) 84).

One of the most remarkable change happened when Rauf Raif Denktaş became the president of the organization in the late 1950s.[572] When R. R. Denktaş became the president of the organisation, KTKF also transformed into a stronger organisation which defined its objectives according to the nationalist ambitions. This made the leader of the organisation, R. R. Denktaş, to have a right to decide nearly in every aspect of Turkish Cypriot socio-political affairs.

During this period, Turkish Cypriot nationalists started to compete with the Greek Cypriot nationalists. In a similar fashion with the Greek Cypriot nationalists, Turkish Cypriot nationalist sought to show that Cyprus as a Turkish island. To demonstrate the Turkish character of the island, KTKF developed strategies in two ways.

First, they tried to empower the Turkish national identity. *Halkın Sesi* became the mouthpiece of the Federation.[573] In addition to the standard nationalist propaganda, KTKF also held fundraising events, social events, and island-wide nationalist campaigns. The most important nationalist campaign was 'Citizens Speak Turkish'. The logic behind this campaign was to protect Turkish identity by strengthening the Turkish language and by ensuring the difference from Greek population. Those who did not choose to speak in Turkish faced with

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572 Ülvi Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Yayıncılık 2007) 180. Ulvi Keser explains that Denktaş was brought to this position due to the enmity between the leader of the 'Cyprus is Turkish' Party leader Fazıl Küçük and the former president of the KTKF Faiz Kaymak. The enmity between the two figures was part of the leadership race, and Kaymak was eliminated once he was replaced by Denktaş. The justification for this was that it was "time to have a militant person".

573 The first issue of Nacak newspaper was published on 29th May 1959, and was a weekly newspaper published every Friday until 20th December 1963 (one day before intercommunal strife started). The newspaper was owned by R. R. Denktaş in the name of KTKF. For a more detailed analysis of Nacak, see: Ülvi Keser, "1958 - 1963 Mücadele Sürecinde Kıbrıs'ta Basın ve Nacak Gazetesi", *Journal Of Modern Turkish History Studies* 12 (2012), 275-300.

fines. Also, the campaign not only encapsulated daily language but also intervened in everyday life by making shop owners utilise Turkish names. The personnel of the KTKF can also fine the Turkish Cypriots who spokes in Greek publicly. The "Citizens Speak Turkish" campaign able to assimilate the hybrid Turkish Cypriot population into a hegemonic Turkish nationalism. Also, the Federation issued Turkish names to villages that were densely populated by Turkish Cypriots. Within a short period, all the names of the villages that had Turkish Cypriot residents were given new Turkish names.[574] The campaign to Turkify the public sphere was becoming quite effective also helped to demonstrate that Cyprus is not solely a Greek island. Another campaign that established the legitimacy of the Federation was called 'From Turk to Turk'. This campaign aimed to create an ethnic Turkish market and minimised economic relations between the communities. Furthermore, the campaign created a room where Turkish Cypriots could strengthen intra-communal relations. The corporatist economic structure made the KTKF much effective in intra-communal affairs. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot companies were promoted according to their support of KTKF's campaigns. The campaign "From Turk to Turk" had an economic impact as well as, it played a role in strengthening the national consciousness across rural areas and towns. The promotion of an ethnic Turkish market in Cyprus to develop financial sufficiency played an important role to create segregation between the communities. These developments contributed to the emergence of a new nationalist economic elite in the Turkish Cypriot community. While the penetration of nationalism among

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[574] Ülvi Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yer Altı Faaliyetleri,* 202.

the grassroots happened through these campaigns, the people who belonged to class movements gradually distanced themselves from intercommunal spaces. Particularly in the villages, there was a vast influence as the producers were only able to trade their products in the Turkish Cypriot market, minimizing the areas of socialisation across the communities.[575]

Nationalism requires myths and symbols. Turkish Cypriot nationalism relied on these elements too. Especially in the 1950s, there were interesting examples that worth to mention. For example, in December 1951, an article published in *Halkın Sesi* explained the importance of a famous Turkish poet, Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal was exiled to Famagusta for 34 months in 1873 and stayed until 1876.[576] From the Turkish Cypriots' point of view, Namık Kemal's exile in Cyprus was not a coincidence. It is considered one of the most valuable incidents, a landmark of the island's Turkishness. However, this narrative was created decades after. His presence in Cyprus was rediscovered in the context of anti-Enosisist nationalism and glorified by the nationalist leadership in the early 1950s. Almost a century after his exile in Cyprus, his name was given to the

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[575] Separate trade unions emerged in 1942 and eventually PEO's members resigned and joined the Turkish Worker's Union. After 1958, TMT targeted Turkish Cypriots who were members of PEO and murdered them. For more detailed analysis: Nicos Moudouros, "Political Power, Violence and Economy: The Turkish Cypriot Elite's Struggle for Ethno-Communal Formation", *Journal Of Mediterranean Studies* 23 (2014). 66.

[576] Namık Kemal was a prominent figure of the Jeune Turk Movement. He was not the first person exiled to Cyprus due to his views, but was certainly the most famous. It is possible to assume that Namık Kemal along with others who were exiled, were one the first to introduce and spread the notion of Turkishness to the Muslims community of Cyprus. Namık Kemal's exile to Cyprus was due to his theatre play, "Vatan Yahut Silistre" (trans. Country or Silistre). The play was written in 1872 and premiered on 1st April 1973. The play combines elements of love and nationalism. The political situation of the Ottoman Empire was declining at that time and the romantic nationalist narratives of the play provoked its audience. After the first staging, emotions from the play led to a series of incidents in Istanbul. Namık Kemal and his close circle were found guilty of provoking people against the Ottoman Empire and were exiled to Famagusta.

first lyceum in Famagusta[577] (1956) along with the main square[578] in the walled city of Famagusta (1953). It is interesting how nationalist narratives can circulate a story of banishment with such positive effect. Turkish nationalists turned the completely irrelevant presence of Namık Kemal in Cyprus to the source of enlightenment. Namık Kemal's presence in Cyprus suddenly became a touchstone to one of the many narratives of nation-building in the Turkish Cypriot community.

In the early 1950s, to develop Turkish nationalism as the dominant ideology among Turkish Cypriots, narratives repeating the exile of Namık Kemal and his importance frequently reoccurred. There were a series of articles published on Namık Kemal in *Halkın Sesi* newspaper. [579] The articles that were published from 26th January 1951 to 31st January 1951 covering Namık Kemal. By investing in Namık Kemal's legacy, the idea was to raise awareness on Turkishness in Cyprus as well as influence the Turkish Cypriot masses. The primary information on Namık Kemal's exile in Cyprus comes from his letters. Unlike Turkish Cypriot nationalists' positive narratives, Namık Kemal had a negative opinion toward Cyprus and the Muslim community in Cyprus. In his letters, he describes Famagusta— the town to which he was exiled—in a

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[577] The lyceum was founded in 1944 and was called Famagusta High School. However, it gained autonomous identity as Namık Kemal Lyceum on 6th May 1956.

[578] The square was known as Palace Square in the early colonial period as it was located next to the remnants of the Venetian Palace. Later, the square was referred to as the Bazaar Square, as it was (and still is) located next to the market place known as Bandabuliya.

[579] Ahmet An, Kıbrıs'ta Üç Dönem Üç Aydın. (Istanbul: Yazılama Yayınevi 2013).

negative manner too.[580] Despite his negative remarks about his time in Cyprus and the Muslim community in Cyprus, nationalists chose to narrate him as a role model of Turkish nationalism. In a way, Namık Kemal's presence enabled Turkish Cypriots to encapsulate an idealised persona. While Namık Kemal's may have had negative feelings, Turkish nationalist narratives glorified his presence in many dimensions. For example, the cell that he kept for three days on his initial arrival referred was called 'holy sanctuary'.[581]

Also, the first Turkish Cypriot amateur theatre performance was Namık Kemal's 'Vatan Yahut Silistre', which was the reason why Namık Kemal sent to exile.[582] The play was staged on 26th January 1908 in Famagusta, as part of the celebrations of the 609th anniversary of the creation of Ottoman Empire.[583] The reason for staging the play reflected the cultural sensitivity and it gave nationalist message for Turkish Cypriots. The invitations said that 'the play was

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[580] He mentions the ugliness of the cities, sick-looking people, and poverty. He mentioned, "Better to drink alcohol than water that is not clear." (Nesim, *Kıbrıs'ta Namık Kemal*, 36) In his letters, Namık Kemal also explained the backwardness of Cypriots, unbearable life conditions, high taxes and the unjust system (An, *Kıbrısta Üç Dönem*, 25).

[581] Ali Nesim, Fehmi Tuncel & Şevket Öznur. *Kıbrıs'ta Namık Kemal Efsanesi Mağusa'da Bir Özgürlük Anıtı*. (Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs Türk Yazarlar Birliği, 2014) 13.

[582] Namık Kemal had a significant impact over the cultural lives of the Turkish Cypriots with his works Vatan Yahut Silistire and also his second play Gülnihal. Since then, Vatan Yahut Silistire and Gülnihal played several times, particularly from the 1940s to the end of the 1950s.

[583] An, *Kıbrısta Üç Dönem,* 41.

chosen not to promote theatre as an art, but to shake society[584] and call for unity and togetherness.'[585]

At the time, Cypriot Muslims claimed that when Greek nationalist entered the mosque, they felt that "'an unholy hand touched on our edifice."'[586] By narrating an event that happened five decades later, Turkish nationalists aimed to underline the relevance of their nationalist sensitivities. To strengthen Turkish nationalism in the public sphere, nationalists in Cyprus repeatedly mentioned the necessity of erecting a bust of Namık Kemal in Famagusta.[587] Creation of spectacles is one of the common practices of constituting power, and the efforts expended toward having a bust demonstrate can be seen within this intention.

The Turkish Cypriot Cultural Association, as well as the Federation of the Turkish Cypriot Associations, tried to produce a bust of Namık Kemal. Several letters were exchanged with Turkey demanding technical and financial support. Fundraising events were held, and finally, a sports club in Famagusta (Mağusa Türk Gücü - Famagusta Turkish Force) was able to raise the required amount of money. The bust was erected on 15th March 1953. Bozkurt newspaper headlines clamoured that 'Famagusta had an unforgettable and historic day' and announced that 'This historic day will live in the hearts of the Turkish Cyprus

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[584] The mosque was also referred to as Famagusta's Agia Sophia. It is a Catholic cathedral known as St. Nicholas Cathedral and was converted to a mosque once the Ottoman Empire conquered the island in 1571. However, its name changed to Lala Mustafa Paşa Mosque in the late 1950s.

[585] Ali Nesim, Fehmi Tuncel & Şevket Öznur, *Kıbrıs'ta Namık Kemal*, 12.

[586] Ibid.

[587] An, *Kıbrısta Üç Dönem,* p. 60.

as the Turkishness exists.' Furthermore, it is emphasised that "The date 15th March will remain and live as a glorious day in Turkish Cyprus's history."[588] The reflections of the Namık Kemal bust's opening brought together thousands of people. The excitement of the crowd became the narrative of the revival of Turkishness in Cyprus.[589] The inauguration of the statue triggered the rise of the nationalist feelings since Turkish Cypriot nationalists re-invented the history and re-narrated it from the lenses of nationalism.

The invention of politics from the nationalist lenses in the Turkish Cypriot community eventually started further demands including separate services from the colonial administration. The re-invention of politics from the nationalist lenses sometimes brought odd demands as well. For example, in March 1954, the journalist Nafız Obalı argued that it was unjust for Turkish Cypriot minors convicted of criminal offences to attend a rehabilitation centre dominated by Greek Cypriots officials. He suggested that this represented a threat to Turkish Cypriot youth as Greek Cypriot teachers operating in the centre would be subject to 'Greek teachers' and nationalist fanaticism, which would be incompatible with 'our' children referring to the rehabilitation of Turkish Cypriot youths. He demanded that the rehabilitation centre would have to be divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriot sections so that children would be educated separately. Also, in his article, Obalı demanded, "employment Turkish rehabilitation officers by the colonial administration."[590] Thus, what might

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[588] "Mağusa dün tarihi ve unutulmaz birgün yaşadı," *Bozkurt*, (1953, March 16). p. 1.

[589] *Bozkurt*, 23 Mart 1953, p. 3.

[590] Nafiz Obalı," Bitmeyen Dert: Türk Basının Hassasiyeti," *Bozkurt*, (1954, March 16). p. 2.

appear a discrete question of the rehabilitation of offenders, had became a national issue.

The nationalist wave was expanding quite rapidly to every aspect of social life. Another example is in sports. In 1955, shortly after the EOKA campaign started, Turkish Cypriots abandoned the Cyprus Football Organisation (KOP). Despite the official narratives of Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots were blamed, because they sacked Turkish Cypriots from the organisation, Dağlı (2012) argues this issue differently.[591] He claims that Turkish Cypriots did not participate in the General Assembly of KOP on 30th October 1955, instead, they had a separate General Assembly one day before KOP on 29th October 1955 and announced the foundation of the Cyprus Turkish Football Federation (KTFF).

The incident of dividing the football clubs illustrates how contesting the issue of identity used to be divisive and how such divisions might play a role in constructing identities that might be seen to the 'other' community. While Turkish Cypriots promoted history from a different angle to justify their nationalist demands, they also started differentiating themselves from Greek Cypriots at every level. There were several campaigns on differentiating Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots to underline that they had a different understanding of the past, present and the future.

Those are only a few examples that show how the institutionalisation of nationalism played a crucial role to create new narratives. Turkish Cypriots either duplicated or demanded the duplication of every institution starting from

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[591] Okan Dağlı, *İki Toplumlu Futbolcular*, (Lefkoşa: Havadis Yayınları 2012) 152.

education but it reaches out to the economic and cultural institutions as well as the local governments.

Turkish nationalists in Cyprus tried to facilitate the economy, culture, language, and economy in various instances to create a relatively manageable structure to establish an alternative to the Enosis demand. It is possible to observe that since the early 1950s, the nascent form of Turkish nationalism tried to constitute its hegemony via the spectacles, rituals, and campaigns to recreate new narratives to hegemonies nationalist discourses.

It should be emphasised that Turkey played a very limited role in these developments. Eventually, the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was influenced not only by Turkey (because of the pressure coming from the grassroots in Turkey and Cyprus) but also backed by Britain. At the epicentre of all endeavours, it is possible to observe ethnic nationalism, however, it was mostly the existential concerns rather than robust response with the idea of self-determination. From this point of understanding, still in the early 1950s Turkish Cypriots were lagging behind the Greek Cypriots' nationalism. The rise of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism as a decisive power in the island affairs mostly observed toward the end of 1950s. Behind this development, Turkey's engagement in Cyprus's affairs represents a turning point. However, it is important to note that Turkey's attitudes on Cyprus subject to a change in the mid-1950s, mostly because of the Greek nationalist EOKA movement.

4.1.1 'Cyprus is not Turkey's Problem'

In the early 1950s other than a handful of cultural visits of deputies from Turkey to Cyprus, Turkish politicians did not show any interest in Cyprus. Turkey

abstained from discussing Cyprus or to interfere in internal affairs of Cyprus as they acknowledged from the Lausanne Treaty that the island belongs to the UK.

One of the exemplary political statements about Cyprus was found in the parliamentary debate transcripts of the Turkish National Assembly dated 30th December 1949. Turkey's minister of foreign affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, stated: 'We discussed with the British Ambassador, and we told them if Britain intends to leave Cyprus, it is necessary to meet with the Turkish Government. However, this option *(of Britain to leave Cyprus -MH)* is not on the table'.[592] The next day, Sadak expressed his views on Cyprus to a daily newspaper as: 'We do not have anything called a Cyprus Problem'.[593] Sadak was a minister during the late Republican Peoples Party (CHP) rule, and, during that period, the Cyprus Problem was not considered as a priority either in foreign or in domestic policy.

A similar stance was taken by the Democratic Party in earlier years when they were in charge of the government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü, stated on 20th June 1950 during a Democratic Party group meeting: "An issue called Cyprus is not on our agenda. Also, the Greek government does not show any interest in Cyprus. Therefore, our ministry, at the official level, is not informed of this matter."[594] However, public opinion was changed shortly. As the matter becomes more important, civil society in Turkey also started to take steps to influence the Turkish government's opinion.

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[592] Ahmet C. Gazioğlu, *İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs,* (Lefkoşa: Cyrep,1997) p. 452.

[593] "Son Saat Gazetesine Beyanatı", *Halkınsesi*, 1 Ocak 1950.

[594] 26 Demokrat Parti Meclis Grubu Gizli Müzakere Zabıtları, Dönem: IX, Cilt: 3, 20 Haziran 1950, p.34.

For example, in 1952, the National Student Union of Turkey set up a commission to work on the Cyprus Problem. Later, the commission produced a report and presented it to the relevant authorities. However, it did not trigger any policy change. During the same year, KTKF President Kaymak visited Turkey with a delegation from Cyprus to enhance relations with Turkish authorities. Despite the visit, there were no tangible results and no changes in Turkey's official attitude toward Cyprus. Moreover, Turkish foreign minister Fuat Köprülü issued a statement emphasising that 'Now there is Greek friendship. Friendships are necessary. However, we are not going to break our relationship with Turkish Cypriots too."[595]

Turkish Foreign Minister's statement demonstrates Turkey's lack of interest in Cyprus. Also, the way that he framed shows that the issue was not considered as a national issue but a foreign issue matter. According to Kaymak, the only tangible outcome of this visit was leading Turkey to initiate a new financial programme and secure flow of financial support for cultural and educational matters.[596] Küçük emphasised this as the 'biggest success of the year 1952' about Turkey – Turkish Cypriot affairs.[597]

In 1954, Greece officially requested the UN to discuss the future of Cyprus. As the Cyprus issue brought to the international debate, pressure from Turkish Cypriots finally started to get more response from Turkey. While the Turkish newspapers covered the new developments with concern, the Prime Minister

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[595] Faiz Kaymak, *Kıbrıslı Türkler Bu Duruma Nasıl Düştü*? (Istanbul: Alpay Basımevi, 1968) 16.

[596] Ibid, 15.

[597] Evre, *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği,* 119.

of Turkey Adnan Menderes, demanded people 'to remain silent' and called for 'sobriety' on the Cyprus issue.[598] On the other hand, the Secretary-General of the opposition, Kasım Gülek of the Republican Turkish Party, criticised the government for being silent and inactive.[599]

One of the prominent Turkish political journal, *Akis,* covered the developments after Greece referred Cyprus to the UN. The journal criticised the weaknesses of Turkish foreign policy emphasising, "it is obvious that we failed to explain both to the international public and the British government sufficiently why Cyprus cannot be left to the Greeks".[600]

In the meantime, the National Student Union in Turkey—one of the most active organisations of that time—announced the formation of the 'Cyprus is Turkish Committee'.[601] A couple of weeks after its foundation, the committee organised various events to raise awareness on the Cyprus issue. They also attempted to organize a demonstration on 10th May 1954 in İzmir. However, the Turkish government banned the demonstrations. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also explained that they do not want to cause any damage to the tripartite Balkan alliance with Greece. Nevertheless, Cyprus is Turkish Committee exploited the nationalist feelings and played a decisive role to make Cyprus issue as an important agenda item in Turkish politics. Their first announcement emphasized, "The Cyprus Problem is a Turkish matter. For this

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[598] "Hükümet Kıbrıs ihtilafını Hassasiyetle Takip Ediyor", *Milliyet,* (22 August 1954) p. 3.

[599] "Kasım Gülek'in Basın Toplantısı" *Milliyet*, (18, August 1954) p. 3.

[600] Mehmet Hasgüler, *Kim ve Akis Dergilerinde Kıbrıs 1954 - 1968.* (Nobel yayın Dağıtım:Ankara, 2006), 47.

[601] "Gençlik Kıbrıs Davasını Hassasiyetle Takip Ediyor", *Milliyet,* (25 August 1954) p.1.

reason, only Turks can determine the fate of Cyprus. The silence (*of the Turkish government: MH*) on this issue must understand as a result of an ethical stance. Cyprus matter can be solved only from the viewpoint of the Turkish existence".[602] From 24th August 1954 onwards, the committee of 'Cyprus is Turkish' organised several demonstrations. By the end of September 1954, *Halkın Sesi* published a message from the 'Cyprus is Turkish' Committee targeting to the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus. The message emphasised that the Committee would not recognise any annexation of Cyprus by Greece. Also, the committee harshly criticised Greece for engaging in a political game that would potentially damage Turkish–Greek relations, regional stability, and the security of the Western world.[603]

It is interesting that, in the beginning, Turkey suppressed the Cyprus issue to preserve its relations in Greece and the UK. Turkish Foreign Ministry made a statement on their expectation from the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Their expectation was for the UNGA to produce a decision that would not change the status quo. When the UNGA discussed the issue in December 1954, it adopted resolution 814(IX), which decided against taking any position on the future of Cyprus. This decision was in line with Turkey's position. Also, the UNGA 814 gave time for the Turkish foreign ministry to frame its position on Cyprus. By the end of 1954, Turkish foreign policy started to face with further criticisms also at home, a journal at a time brought following critique:

> *It is a real problem that Turkey, has still not decided on its political thesis, and demands. In these days, when the situation has reached*

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[602] "Gençlik, Kıbrıs İçin İlk Mitingini İzmir'de Yapıyor", *Milliyet,* (25 August 1954), 3.

[603] "Kıbrıs Türktür Komitesi mesajı", *Halkın Sesi,* (29 September 1954) p.1.

> *this level of severity, what does Turkey want? (…) We repeat; we have to present a Turkish view -on Cyprus- to the world stage. We cannot link the future of the island to the wishes of the British and Americans.*[604]

However, the following year, due to the start of EOKA's violent Enosis campaign, Turkey found itself involved in the Cyprus Problem as an officially-recognised stakeholder and came up with a political position, compromising British and Turkish interests.

4.1.2 Portraying Cyprus Problem as a Regional Problem

London Conference brought Cyprus to Turkish foreign policy agenda. Britain demanded Turkey's official involvement in the matter, hoping to balance Greek and Greek Cypriot claims in resolving a vexed colonial issue. Turkey's involvement was necessary to reframe Britain's presence in Cyprus as a matter of necessity in regional politics.

British move was a strategic one, turning the problem of colonialism into a wider problem that requires a wider consensus in the region at a cost of denying the self-determination demand of the Greek Cypriot community. Turkey's response and support to Britain on the Cyprus issue represents one of the critical turning points of the debates on the future of the island.

By involving Turkey, Britain expected to gain time to figure out the most effective way of dealing with the self-determination for Cyprus. Turkey and Greece announced that they intended to participate in the meeting in London on 29th August 1955. Turkish public opinion embraced the conference call. The press

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[604] Hasgüler, *Kim ve Akis,* 49.

was quick to call for Turkish participation to "protect and explain Turkey's rights on the island and the safety of the Turks living on the island".[605] Although the conference was inconclusive due to the eruption of violence against Greeks in Istanbul, Britain proposed a solution by providing a new constitution for the island. Provocations in Turkey were influenced by the international environment in 1955, which also gave a straightforward message that Enosis could not be an option as it would lead to Turkish intervention.[606]

By 1956, Britain was considering appointing Lord Radcliffe to start a process of consultations for a self-governing constitution for Cyprus. In the meantime, Britain secretly promised Turkey that Turkey could station troops in the sovereign and permanent enclaves that Britain planned to keep under their control.[607]

Despite the Turkish government's negotiations to gain strategic advantage, *Akis* criticised the Turkish government, emphasising that the government had no national policy on Cyprus. Furthermore, the journal initiated a new discussion by claiming that the events targeting Greeks living in Istanbul in 6-7th September were planned to cover the improvidence of Turkish foreign policy.[608]

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[605] Serdar Sakin & Sabit Dokuyan, *Kıbrıs ve 6-7 Eylül Olayları.* (İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat 2004) 56.

[606] Holland, *Britain and Revolt,* 137.

[607] Ibid.

[608] Hasgüler, *Kim ve Akis,* 73.

The Turkish Grand Assembly had a meeting on 28th December 1956, and the Turkish Prime Minister explained the shift in their position. Menderes stated in the parliament:

> *Taksim (Partition: MH) is not an issue that we steer away from. We discussed this issue firmly. We invited the Turkish community leaders and are currently in a negotiation phase. The Turkish nation of the island has certain rights. […] We did not support the departure of Britain. If they depart from Cyprus, we will say that we would reclaim the island. However, conditions have changed, and Taksim is on the agenda. […] Turkey cannot link all its potential and itself to Cyprus. With all our power, we will defend our rights with regards to the international agreements. We are siding with the partition (Taksim) of the island. Any other status quo or solution is not implementable.[609]*

The adoption of Taksim as the Turkish position for the Cyprus solution had a significant impact on Turkish politics. In the following days, various implications of Taksim being challenged by the opposition occurred, however, none of them rejected the idea.[610] Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük, who was fervently supporting the return of Cyprus to Turkey, shifted his position as well. He mentioned the satisfaction of Turkish Cypriots with a solution plan that could offer the partition of the island.[611]

Following Turkey's formal announcement of Taksim as its policy Lord Radcliffe visited Cyprus to make consultations for a new constitution for Cyprus. At the same time, a prominent constitutional expert from Turkey, Nihat Erim, began

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[609] "Kıbrıs'ın Taksimine Razıyız", *Milliyet* (1956, December 29), 3.

[610] The main remarks posed by the opposition toward the idea of partition include 1) whether the partition thesis helped or hindered Turkey in political meetings with NATO and the United Nations, 2) whether dispersing the Turkish population all over the island would pose as a problem for partition 3) whether the Turks in Cyprus as 20% of the population could own 40% of land (Partition could have resulted in most Turks losing their land, if the partition plans were to be based on population) and 4) the reclaiming of the Turkish Vakıf (pious foundations) properties that existed all over the island due to partition (*Milliyet*, 1956, December 30, p.1).

[611] "F. Küçük Adanın Taksimine Taraftar", *Milliyet*, (1956, December 30) 1.

consultations with the Turkish Cypriot community to devise a settlement plan that would serve Turkish interests. Nihat Erim's involvement demonstrates Turkey's decisive involvement in the question of the future of Cyprus. Following the consultations, Erim presented a set of proposals; the main principles were a) the end of terrorism which meant cease of actions of EOKA and b) the equal application of the self-determination principle to both communities in Cyprus.[612] After Turkey strengthened the position on Cyprus, Turkey openly announced the possibility of rejecting a constitutional proposal if it did not meet with the conditions of Turkey.[613] Once Erim presented his proposal, he also outlined the Turkish position in a concise manner where he made the legal and political case for partition:

> *Once more, I have to repeat that we do not perceive Britain as intractable colonialist that cannot change. Here, the issue is to preserve national identity, strength and liveliness of the Turkish community. Turkish Cypriots are conscious not to bind themselves to the rule of another community… They shall be granted their rights.[614]*

Finally, Turkey had a unifying political position for Cyprus. From 1957 onwards, Turkey's involvement in Cyprus was not only about political support in the international arena but also providing necessary means to ensure that the grounds for Taksim would be in place. Eventually, Britain able to recruit a powerful ally fully-fledged on board, repeating the same position isolating the Greek Cypriots.

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[612] "Kıbrıs'a Dair Türk Görüşü*", Milliyet* (1956, December 12) 1.

[613] "Anayasayı Kabul Etmeyeceğiz", *Milliyet* (1957, January 8) 1.

[614] "Nihat Erim'in Beyanatı", *Milliyet* (1957, January 23) 5.

The British were now able to play referee between Greek demands for Enosis and Turkish demands for Taksim. Accordingly, both were rejected by Britain and presented independence as a compromise between the two extreme positions. Nevertheless, independence was a rhetoric. Britain tried to extend the colonialism by involving Turkey and alter their role in a new kind of colonialism where they can enjoy the geostrategic gains of the island by keeping them under their tutelage and frame it as a "guaranteed independence." At first, Turkey was unhappy with the new formula. Britain's statement provoked the Turkish Foreign Ministry to issue a statement:

> *We are entirely in opposition of any possibility of independence. Independence of Cyprus means Enosis. Ever-lasting independence of Cyprus means nothing for Turkey. Also, there is no guarantee of this to last forever. It is impossible for us to accept independence even if it continues forever. Independence will provide the domination of the minority by the majority. In any condition, independence will be rejected by Turkey, and our position will stay that way.*[615]

Once Turkey realised that Makarios is shifting position and independence was becoming a solution, Turkey deployed more power to Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites and started to follow their suggestions. The first step was to empower the militias in Cyprus. Several nationalist organisations considered armed struggle as the only way for partition. Among them, Volkan was one of the most significant organisations, and later founded the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organisation) (TMT). During this period, Turkey supported the TMT's foundation. It is not surprising that the foundation of the organisation was 27 July 1957, which corresponded to the date that the Ministry of Foreign

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[615] "Kıbrıs'ın İstiklaline Muhalifiz", *Milliyet* (1957, July 15), 1.

Affairs criticised Britain's position for granting independence to Cyprus.[616] From Turkey's point of view, one way of challenging independence was through strengthening the demand for Taksim.

In June 1958, Turkey appointed Rıza Vuruşkan, who was transferred to Cyprus from the military to take charge of TMT's military activities. The organisation followed its strategies parallel to the Special War Department of Turkey and remained completely loyal to it.[617] From the point that TMT was initiated, armed campaigns targeted both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Gradually, Denktaş became the critical political leader of the Turkish Cypriot community replacing Fazıl Küçük.[618] From July 1957, Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus was backed by the unaccountable military personnel within the scope of a project called Kıbrıs'ın İstirdadı Projesi—KİP (Restitution of Cyprus Project).[619]

Turkey's involvement became much decisive from the beginning of 1958. In Cyprus, Turkey was supporting radical nationalist ambitions within the context

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[616] Like the foundation of EOKA, TMT's foundation also had many ambiguities. While its foundation was celebrated on 1st August 1958, Denktaş admitted that it was founded earlier. One of the dates of TMT's foundation is 15th November 1957. Not surprisingly 26 years later on the same day, the unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus took place, again, led by Denktaş. Sources referring to the date as 15th November includes Kızılyürek (2011) p.245. On the other hand, Denktaş cited its foundation as 27 November 1957 and mentioned that 1st August is the time when it got organised across the island. Finally, Keser (2007) clarifies that the foundation of the organisation is 27th July 1957. Considering the overall timeline and the emergence of the independence of Cyprus as an option for the future of Cyprus met with the necessity to establish a pro-Taksim organisation. Also Kızılyürek (2016) changed the date he had previously suggested in a later publication, emphasizing the founding date as 27th July 1957.

[617] Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında,* 247.

[618] Fazıl Küçük, leader of Volkan and the 'Cyprus is Turkish' party, had lost his power. He found out about the foundation of TMT upon finding leaflets making this announcement, which also mentioned that TMT was the only military power representing Turkish Cypriots. This led to the termination of the rest of the organisations for the liberation of Turkish Cypriots, including Volkan (Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yer Altı Faaliyetleri,* 233).

[619] Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında,* 248.

of KİP, however its foreign policy position on Cyprus softened. *Akis* claimed that this was mostly due to declining economic performance.[620] Since the British paradigm of Cyprus changed from 'Cyprus as a base' to a base in Cyprus', and Makarios signalled towards a solution based on 'independence', the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu proposed a new option for the future of Cyprus.

On 6th December 1958, at the UN General Assembly, Zorlu and Averof had a separate meeting in New York. During this session, a solution based guaranteed independence were raised as an option. Turkey proposed a set of political positions that eventually formed the partial parameters of the Zurich and London agreements. The new set of negotiations on Cyprus led by the two foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey changed the climate. To support the constructive atmosphere, the rallies that were previously backed up by the government, on *'Either Taksim or Death'*, were banned.[621] Intensified diplomatic traffic started on 17th December 1958, and in two months, the London agreement was signed on 19th February 1959. In guaranteeing Cyprus's independence, it eliminated—for some time— both nationalist Taksim (partition) and Enosis (unification) projects. The London and Zurich Agreements showed how Britain strategically positioned itself as an intermediary to fulfil its interests. By positioning Enosis and Taksim as two extreme political demands, Britain was able to exit Cyprus by gaining sovereign base areas and acquire support from both Greece and Turkey at the same time. Despite the relatively satisfactory outcome for the political elites in Turkey and Greece, both Cypriot communities

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[620] Hasgüler, *Kim ve Akis,* 136.

[621] Ibid, 137.

were unsatisfied with the outcome, and shortly after the independence, inter-communal strife reached another level. To better understand this asymmetry between the Cypriot communities and their respective motherlands, it is essential to analyse domestic affairs from the lenses of the Turkish Cypriots as well.

4.2 Politics from Anti-Self-Determination to Self-Determination

Turkish nationalism in Cyprus entered a new phase toward the second half of the 1950s. Foundation of the Greek nationalist organisation EOKA in 1955 created hysteria across Turkish Cypriots, as they rapidly comprehend that the development can challenge to the continuation of the British presence in Cyprus. Furthermore, it may pose a significant threat to the future of the Turkish Cypriots. This also triggered more intensive discussions on the national self-determination among the Turkish Cypriots.

However, the fear from Enosis was the primary determinant defining the Turkish Cypriots political choices. For this reason, more than on detailing a perspective on the self-determination, Turkish Cypriots relied on denial of the self-determination. At first, Turkish Cypriots elites comprehended self-determination as the synonym of Enosis. As a result, they considered Enosis can only put Turkish Cypriots into a minority position that can damage their communal interests as well as their nationalist aspirations. Following to foundation of EOKA; Turkish Cypriot elites' interpretation of self-determination made them to further align themselves with the British Administration in Cyprus. Also, ordinary Turkish Cypriots find themselves in a position where they could defend the Colonial Administration via joining the auxiliary police forces. Defending the

British Administration's presence was the only solid way to deny self-determination demand of the Greek Cypriots. Needless to say, British Administration did not refrain exploiting the fears of the Turkish Cypriots to prolong the presence of Britain in Cyprus.

After the first bomb exploded close to a Turkish Cypriot quartet in Nicosia, existential concerns rose exponentially. The elites in the Turkish Cypriot community responded to the developments by symbolic actions; including sending letters to Turkish and British governments mentioning the emergency conditions.[622] Also, they openly stated that they are ready to fight against the Greek Cypriots' armed campaign in Cyprus.[623] Under mixed feelings of confusion and fear, Turkish Cypriots sought a life-line that would ensure their presence on the island. Had it not been for the British administration's help in hiring Turkish Cypriots into the police force and granting arms and power, Turkish Cypriots might not have been able to get organized and empowered so easily.

When EOKA's activities started, one of the first statements came from KTKF President, Faiz Kaymak. Following his visit to Ankara, his public statement emphasizes:

> *In case, Turkey authorises and orders, Turks of Cyprus from the age 7 to 70, all of us are ready for an armed struggle. Today, Cyprus became like a bomb barrel. Terrorists started sabotage actions to end the British rule in Cyprus. Until today, no actions targeted to the Turks.*

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[622] Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri,* 26.

[623] İbid.

> *However, we do not find the movements against the Colonial Government in the island acceptable.* [624]

Turkish Cypriots stance was against the activities of EOKA and at the same time, Turkish Cypriot elite showed a willingness to follow a consistent line with Turkey's political concerns. Although there were no direct threats to Turkish Cypriots, still they comprehended that the anti-colonial movement could only be challenged by combat against it. Otherwise, Turkish Cypriots with their limited socio-economic power may become the victims of the developments. So, Turkish Cypriots developed an approach to serving the interests of the two allies by working actively to attract Turkey's interest over Cyprus via the developments around the activities of EOKA, and on the other hand, they sustained their loyalty to the Colonial Administration to improve their political significance.

To attain those aims, three main points dominated the public agenda. Those include; 1) a narrative that Cyprus Problem is primarily a problem between Greece and Turkey, rather than a colonial matter 2) denial of the self-determination and c) formulating an understanding that politically equalizes Turkish Cypriots to the Greek Cypriots.

Those three points constitute enough room for manoeuvre for the Turkish Cypriots. Firstly, by portraying Greece and Turkey as two states that have conflicting interests, Turkish Cypriots believed that increasing anti-colonial sentiment across the United Nations may create an exception for Cyprus. By portraying the importance of the regional stability -especially by referring to the

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[624] "Kıbrıs Türkleri Mücadeleye Hazır", *Milliyet* (1955, 04 09) 7.

Eastern Bloc's potential gains in the Eastern Mediterranean- Turkish Cypriots also believed that, they can convince one of the strongest allies of the self-determination demand: the USA.

Secondly, by convincing that Cyprus is beyond the applicability of the self-determination demand, Turkish Cypriot nationalists claimed that it would be possible to sustain the status quo in the island. If there would be increasing pressure to apply self-determination, than, Turkish Cypriots tried to propose political equality as a principle, so that, they would propose double self-determination.

As the Conference in London was called, Turkish Cypriots tried to popularize their talking point to take the attention of Turkey but also show their loyalist stance against Britain. Britain, on the other hand, also relied heavily on Turkey to ensure its presence in Cyprus. For this reason, they also shared the advanced warning with the Turkish Government, indicating that the real motivation of Britain was: "to deprive the Greek Government of a pretext for further reference of the Cyprus question to the United Nations, or alternatively to ensure their defeat if they did raise it and by making the establishment of self-government in Cyprus possible, to create vested interests in Cyprus in favour of maintaining the Island's independence from Greece. Turkish Government would be assured that Britain contemplated no change of sovereignty in the foreseeable future and that we intended to remain in Cyprus as long as the world situation continued to make this necessary."[625] While

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[625] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 800/667 from June 21, 1955, *From Foreign Office to Istanbul, Foreign Office Telegram No.75 to Istanbul.*

Britain and Turkey had aligned their interests to prevent the change of sovereignty; Turkish Cypriots' presence enabled Turkey to held power to prevent Greek demands. Through Turkish Cypriots, Britain portrayed the Cyprus Problem as an irreconcilable problem of Greek and the Turks to the rest of the world. This view got support both by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

Also, in the aforementioned telegram, Foreign Office demanded an estimate of how the conference would be received by "Turkish public opinion (including the press"; in which the question responded by the British Consul in Istanbul as "Turkish press will, on the whole, follow the Government's lead" and "one would hope to influence the Turkish minority in Cyprus in favour of the proposals" of the conference.[626] The intel provided by the British Consulate in Istanbul was accurate. During this period, Turkey was also creating influence through the civil society organisations in Turkey but also to the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. The government-backed 'Cyprus is Turkish' Association was the most notable one. The day after the beginning of the EOKA campaign, 'Cyprus is Turkish' Association announced that: "Up until today, the Turkish nation followed the case of Cyprus with equanimity that is idiosyncratic to great and mature nations. From this point onwards, it will not fall into the trap of the communists and will keep its maturity. However, we would like to remind our little neighbour Greece, if they continue with such impertinence, they will face consequences."[627]

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[626] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 800/667 from June 21, 1955, *Istanbul telegram No 88 to Foreign Office*.

[627] "Kıbrıs'ta Rumların Tethişi Devam Ediyor", *Milliyet*, (1955, 04 03) 7.

It is interesting to observe that Turkey chose to narrate the problem within the cold-war rhetoric and blaming communists for the responsible party about the attacks that happened in Cyprus toward the British Colonial Administration. As it was mentioned before, likely, the idea of portraying EOKA nationalists as supporters of communism was more on the public relations issue to benefit from the anti-communist character of Turkish nationalism, but also it provides a pre-text to a perception that the US may withdraw its support to the decolonization of Cyprus. So that the status quo can be preserved.

As Turkey started to bring Cyprus issue forward, Turkish Cypriots were also started to advance Turkey's importance for the resolution of the problem. For the nationalist Turkish Cypriot elites Cyprus issue cannot be solved without Turkey's effective involvement.[628] To portray the issue as a problem between the Greeks and the Turks, several articles can be seen in the Turkish Cypriot media vastly the same narrative as the example from Hürsöz newspaper.

In an editorial opinion, Hursöz newspaper argues: "Cyprus, is the key point in the Middle East. It is necessary to remain in the hands of a strong country, that state can only be either Britain or Turkey."[629] The narrative aimed to show the problem as a problem between Greeks and Turks and emphasized that the regional stability aims to deny the self-determination claims of the Greek Cypriots, as they claim Greece is not a strong state in the region to fulfil regional objectives. Such geopolitical narratives were serving well for the benefit of the

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[628] The same discourse continues to this day, despite the different political setting. However, it is possible to claim that the beginning of this discourse as 1955.

[629] Stelya, *İstenmeyen Bebek,* 42.

Colonial Administration in Cyprus. The denial of self-determination also approached in more theoretical dimensions. Turkish Cypriot elites' denial of self-determination was remarkable in many aspects, For example, Fazıl Küçük shares his views on self-determination as such:

> *This small world will remain in a very chaotic situation if the United Nations or international community recognise self-determination right for every major group or every part of the earth. This can force the USA to dissolve. The fate of a region should not decide on the self-determination right of the majority. The right for self-determination should link and handled with various other geographical and strategic conditions.*[630]

In fact, Küçük's statement is remarkable since he reminds geographical or maybe the territorial dimension of the self-determination. The limitations of self-determination was a significant discussion and still makes sense across the debates on international law and international politics.[631] However, Küçük's interpretation was coming from a motivation to undermine the Greek Cypriot self-determination demand rather than the international legal point of understanding.

Finally, to fine-tune their political position between Britain and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots also started to bring forward their equal rights. Turkish Cypriot political elite raised the demand for political equality which would enable them to have a say on the future of the island, claiming this to be the only way to avoid becoming a minority. From this point of view, such interpretations can be considered as one of the creative elements of the Turkish Cypriots' nationalism

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[630] Fazil Küçük, "Yunanlıların Kıbrıs'ta Hakkı Yoktur", *Halkın Sesi*, (1955, 7 17). 2.

[631] Martti Koskenniemi, "National self-determination today: Problems of legal theory and practice", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 43 (1994) p. 241-268.

framing the Turkish community in Cyprus as a constituent element of Cyprus. For this reason, they claimed that equal positions could enable and ensure their existence in Cyprus.

For example, Halit Alı Riza, a prominent lawyer, a contributor to *Halkın Sesi* emphasized that the communal security of Turkish Cypriots was tied directly to the recognition of political equality of the two communities. To make his point clear, he explained that the fundamental problem was the colonial administration's misrecognition of the situation in Cyprus:

> *The constitution that the British Government wishes to implement in Cyprus conceives that the inhabitants of Cyprus form only "ONE" community (Cypriot). According to this figure, "ONE" assembly will be formed, and people who represent "ALL" Cyprus inhabitants will be meeting in "single" assembly.*[632]

To the Turkish Cypriot elite, colonial plans for a representation based on 'Cypriotness' was considered irrelevant. The nationalism was constructed in the way that primarily legitimates itself over the other community for the Turkish Cypriots and it was simply unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots to silence their national identity. Identity politics played a significant role in defining administrative decisions in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots considered assimilation of their identity as a problem. As Halit Ali Riza also puts, reluctance to accept Turkish Cypriot identity could intensify the problems. "Under these circumstances, Turks will be faced with various injustices; there will be oppression and pressure. A single assembly cannot protect Turk's rights and interests by adding a couple of articles to the constitution."[633] However, he also

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[632] Halit Ali Riza, "Kıbrıs İçin Anayasa I & II", *Halkın Sesi,* (1955, 7 15-16). 46.

[633] Ibid, p. 46.

indicates a reconciliatory position that brings the issue of political equality for Turkish Cypriots framed:

> *The inhabitants of Cyprus do not consist of "ONE" community. In Cyprus "TWO" communities exist separately. Among those two communities, other than the relations exists by living in the same country, there is no common linkage neither any similarity. As a result, the inhabitants of Cyprus does not consist of 400000 Greek, and 100000 Turkish of "ONE" community, irrespective of their population two of them had separately EQUAL and had SAME COMMUNITY RIGHTS. To talk about equal rights, the constitution should provide TWO assemblies, one for Turks and the other for Greeks. The issues that can be defined entirely as "Turkish Issues" should be done by the "Turkish Assembly" and the issues that can be defined entirely as "Greek Issues" should be under the "Greek Assembly". For the "Common Issues" bills can be prepared in any assembly and to make the laws they have to be recognised by both assemblies.*[634]

It is evident from this statement, Halit Ali Rıza was providing fundamental elements for the consociational framework for Cyprus. It seems like, from the colonial period until today, the similar attitude on political equality continues to be the key for reconciliation.

Ali Rıza's comments were unique and certainly, those views were not as popular as Taksim. However, these comments can be seen as much healthy option for the future of Cyprus in the perspective of Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, as the situation was worsening in Cyprus, options for collaboration was eventually ruled out.

Particularly, since Lennox-Boyd stated the partition (Taksim) for the future of the island as an option, the nationalist ideology reached a new milestone. From this point onward, new political discourses started to emerge as well as new tactics that include the elements of violence too. The intensification of EOKA's

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[634] Ibid, 47.

armed action led Turkish Cypriots to form nationalist organisations that aim to fight against EOKA.

As the Turkish Cypriots started to join auxiliary police forces and ensured the continued presence of the British on the island, they also started to train on military tactics to use against EOKA. After a short period, the police force was almost fully concentrated by Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot community became the part of a process that led to the creation of counter-guerrilla forces against the EOKA insurgence.[635] Also, being member of the police forces, Turkish Cypriots had easy access to the equipment that they would need.[636] After a short time, those who were in the auxiliary police forces became part of the underground groups that staged counter-EOKA violent acts and initiated the mobilisation of Taksim.[637]

From 1955 onwards, different Turkish nationalist organisations were formed to fight against EOKA. Among them, the most important ones were KITEMB, Volkan, and Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) (Turkish Defence Organisation).[638] Turkish Cypriot prominent figure of that period, Fazıl Küçük found the first nationalist underground organisation on the 28th June 1955,

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[635] Charles Foley, The Memoirs of General Grivas, (London: Longman,1964) 73.

[636] Ülvi Keser, Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri, 166) cites a member of the auxiliary police forces saying "during the shooting training if I shot 50 bullets, I would write 500 bullets".

[637] From 1955 to 1959, the number of the Turkish Cypriots in the police forces reached 1770 (Kızılyürek, Bir Hınç ve Şiddet, 579).

[638] 'Volkan' means volcano in Turkish, however there are references stating it as an acronym of Var Olmak Lazımsa, Kan Akıtmamak Niye? meaning, 'If We Need to Survive Why not to Shed Blood?' This organisation was founded in September 1955 and eventually merged with the Turkish Defence Organisation (TMT) founded in 1957 but officially known in 1958. In addition to Volkan and TMT, there were other organisations, such as 'Kara Çete' (Black Gang) and the '9 Eylül Cephesi' (9th September Frontier). Nevertheless, the last two organisations were not that significant.

called Kıbrıs'ın İstikbali İçin Türk Mukavemet Birliği (trans. Turkish Defence Union for Cyprus's Future) (KITEMB). KITEMB did not have any significant input other than providing motivational support to Turkish Cypriots. KITEBM was subject to a structural change shortly after visitors from Turkey. Hikmet Bil—President of Cyprus' Turkish Association in Turkey—visited Cyprus in 1955. Hikmet Bil's visit was significant in two ways. First, Fazıl Küçük changed the name of his political party, Cyprus National Turkish Union, to 'Cyprus is Turkish' Party.[639] Fazıl Küçük's choice to change the name of his political party showed the decisive role of Turkish politics in the affairs of Turkish Cypriots.[640] Also, it showed the difference of political relations of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in comparison to their motherlands. For Greek Cypriot nationalism, local political practices within the Greek Cypriot community determined the politics of the national centre, Athens. For Turkish Cypriots, it was the opposite, as the national centre, Ankara, was effective over the decisions of local political practices within the Turkish Cypriot community.

The second significant development following the visit of Hikmet Bil was the decision to establish a new organisation instead of KITEMB, and so, in September 1955 Volkan was established. It is plausible to claim that the organisation's foundation was a milestone in the strategical support coming

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[639] The 'Cyprus is Turkish' Association was found responsible from the Istanbul pogrom following to the London Conference in September 1955.

[640] The relationship between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots was asymmetrical. There were many instances where Turkish Cypriots fulfilled directives coming from Turkey. However, the opposite was not as sufficient as expected by Turkish Cypriots. The difference was because of Turkey's way of handling the Cyprus problem based on her foreign policy issues. Most of the choices Turkey made about Cyprus were determined by cold war strategies within the wider interests of the Western alliance. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot nationalists' political concerns were existential, and their discourses were shaped around the urgent need for political, military and motivational support.

from Turkey. Even though Volkan was not a military organisation, and was not as organized as its counter-force EOKA; still it represents the primary face for the armed struggle in the Turkish Cypriots too. Also, it worth to remind that the oath of Volkan had a robust nationalist tone, inviting its members to die for emancipation.[641] However, in its short presence, Volkan did not perform any attacks. It consisted of militias in villages and the auxiliary police force members of the Turkish Cypriot community mostly residing in the towns. The leader of Volkan, Şakir Özel, did not have a military background too. He was a cabinetmaker who was a close friend of Fazıl Küçük.[642] The organisation only had small arms, mostly acquired from those who were serving as auxiliary police. The organisation was a counter-propaganda tool against the Greek Cypriots' propaganda for Enosis and had no clear anti-colonial stance.

Part of Volkan's role in propaganda was issuing statements and public announcements predominantly to keep Turkish Cypriots nationalism visible. Turkish Cypriots were not represented during the meetings between Harding and Makarios regarding the future of Cyprus. Following the first meeting between Harding and Makarios discussing the termination of EOKA's violent activities, Volkan made a call to Governor Harding:

> *Your Excellency Governor, we have to warn you. Give up the open doors that you propose to the Greeks. We have decided to shut those open doors. We will never allow Turkish Cyprus to become Greek. Do not forget that next to us 25 million Mehmetçik (the name given to the Turkish soldiers - MH) are ready. If you fail to govern Cyprus, return it*

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[641] Kızılyürek, *Kıbrısta Hınç ve Şiddet*, 102.

[642] Şakir Özel's leadership also meant that Fazıl Küçük had good control over Volkan.

> *to its real owner Turkey. Volkan is always ready to fight to protect and deliver Turks their rights.*[643]

Volkan had strong rhetoric, however, in comparison to EOKA, it lacked the military and the political components. Volkan was not anti-colonialist as well.

When EOKA started to target Turkish Cypriot auxiliary police forces as collaborators against Enosis, Volkan claimed that for every Turk murdered, they would kill five Greeks.[644] However, this was also just another threat. Nevertheless, when EOKA started to attack Turkish Cypriot auxiliary police forces, the conflict in Cyprus entered a new phase. Inter-communal relations began to deteriorate severely. The murder of a police officer, Abdullah Ali Rıza, on 11 January 1956 became a turning point, causing further radicalisation of Turkish Cypriots too.[645] EOKA claimed that Rıza, as a member of the colonial police force, was a legitimate target. However, for the Turkish Cypriot community, he was from the Turkish Cypriot community. A number of Turkish Cypriots were part of the auxiliary police forces as a result, they recognized that they were the targets. Following the Abdullah Ali Rıza's murder, Turkish Cypriots held rallies. The British press alerted the public of the risk of a civil war in Cyprus.[646] Fazıl Küçük explained that the reason for the tension in Cyprus was caused by the failure of the UN to firmly reject Greek Cypriots' demands on Cyprus on self-determination.[647]

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[643] Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri,* 82.

[644] Kızılyürek, *Kıbrıs'ta Hınç ve Şiddet,* 111.

[645] Abdullah Ali Rıza was one of the police constables who played a role in capturing the Ag. Georgios boat.

[646] "Rum Basınından Özetler", *Halkın Sesi* (1956, January 14) 4.

[647] Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin Gizli Tarihi,* 111.

On 19th March 1956, there was another attack by the Greek Cypriot nationalists towards Turkish Cypriots civilians in the village of Vasilya, which resulted in the injury of 15 Turkish Cypriots and 2 Greek Cypriots. During this incident, reports show that Turkish Cypriot women were sexually assaulted and the humiliation of the residents in the village subsequently created significant enmity and resentment among the Turkish Cypriots towards the Greek Cypriots. The incident in Vasilya was the first of its kind. Now the security concerns were at a higher level as the ordinary Turkish Cypriots considered that they were under risk. From this point onwards enabling conditions for inter-ethnic violence were in place. Consequently, these incidents led to the generalisation of feelings of resentment from specific organizations and groups towards an entire community, with each viewing the 'other' as the enemy.[648]

After the Vasilya incident, rallies took place led to 11 Greek Cypriots and another Turkish Cypriot being injured.[649] In May, EOKA attacked a British Police vehicle and killed another Turkish Cypriot officer from the mixed village of Afanya (Gaziköy). This death intensified the feeling of enmity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, marking the beginning of a spiral of ethnic violence. Later, Afanya's Greek Cypriot coffee shop was attacked by a Turkish Cypriot gunman injuring 8 Greek Cypriots.[650] Following these incidents, Greek Cypriots protested and an angry mob attacked a Turkish Cypriot passer-by. Ali Mustafa

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[648] İbid, 133.

[649] Ibid, 114.

[650] *Halkın Sesi*, 27 May 1956, 2.

was beaten by agricultural tools and killed by the residents of Afanya, which was recorded as the first civilian death of the intercommunal strife.[651]

In the light of these events, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites decided to advance their nationalist cause. The Turkish Cypriot press played an important role in portraying the attacks as violence by armed Greek Cypriots aimed at a vulnerable community. Turkish Cypriot newspapers reporting the incidents in Afanya overlooked the attack on the Greek coffee shop but concentrated on the death of the Turkish Cypriot civilian. This selective way of narrating the incident was proving effective to distance the communities from each other. The concerns about safety and fear caused many Turkish Cypriots started to resettle into the areas that they believe it is safe creating villages consisting only of Turkish Cypriots.[652]

Despite, Turkish Cypriots were facing with the enormous threat by violent acts in early 1956, still their political rhetoric remains the same. For them self-determination meant Enosis, so they did not talk about the end of colonialism. Turkish Cypriots also acknowledged that, if Greeks can win the fight against Colonial Administration than, they will much subordinate condition. Figures like Fazil Kucuk continued to explain the dangers of attaining self-determination for Cyprus without the recognition of political equality for each community on the island. As the leader of 'Cyprus is Turkish' Party, Fazıl Küçük analyses the

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[651] Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevisminin*, 116.

[652] For example, around 150 Turkish Cypriots from Asa/ Paşaköy left their village and resettled after the Afanya incidents.

constitutional proposals for the island that involves limited self-government. It worth to visit a lengthy quote that put Turkish Cypriot elites' view in perspective.

> *We had a discussion with his Excellency the Governor of Cyprus regarding the constitution that is to be implement in the future, and we responded by stating that any parliament that relies on the majority regime could not protect our rights and the order. We gave the example of the mayoral assemblies and explained the inhumane treatment by Greek Cypriots towards the Turks. He guarantees us and confirms that he will never betray the Turks and will not allow for our rights and order to be broken apart and ensured that there is no reason for Turks to be concerned. Furthermore, the governor claims that one of the reasons for the stalemate in the negotiations with Makarios was the formation of a majority-based parliament that was fervently demanded by the Priest. We do not know the reasons that made such a proposal possible, although initially it was rejected by the governor and therefore, by Britain. However, as a community, we will never accept such a constitution. Because to us, this would mean suicide. Our rights cannot be guaranteed by a couple of lines on a piece of paper. At a time when even the agreements are void, the existence and future of 120,000 Turks can only be possible by forming a parliament based on equal rights and equal representatives. If this is not in place, and if the government decides to do as it pleases, we will be forced to apply to Turkey to protect our rights. Therefore, we as Turkish Cypriots, above everything else, want peace and order and after that, we want our rights, not just on paper, but clearly stated in the constitution, and we can only accept a constitution based on equal rights. As the people, we do not want to be trampled on and crushed by the majority, but we vow to pursue honourable and honest lives. We want to summarise that the British government must understand this as such, and thus, before making its final decision, we invite Britain to reach a complete agreement with her allies and friend the Republic of Turkey. Finally, we believe that self-determination means nothing but Enosis and for us, it is infidelity and a big political mistake. Therefore, we hope the British government in Cyprus does not do wrong to one side while trying to calm the other side by perceiving latter – that is right – weak and without any guarantee.*[653]

Küçük's statement was in June 1956 and it says a lot about the conditions at a time. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that this statement was made before the introduction of the partition of the island as a solution. For this reason, Küçük was considering the option of continuation of the status quo with certain

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[653] Fazıl Küçük, *Halkın Sesi*, 28 June 1956, 2.

refinements, including limited autonomy. The insistence of political equality is demonstrated which tells that Turkish Cypriots has a desire to be recognized as an authentic community within the constituent elements in Cyprus. However, for that time they also perceived equality as an effective tool that could sustain the status quo. Furthermore, the desire to have constitutional clarity represented the deep security concerns among Turkish Cypriots.

Also, it worth to mention Fazil Kucuk's straightforward reference to self-determination. As they understand, the application of self-determination can only serve the majority in Cyprus, which represents the ethnic interpretation of the self-determination. It is a fact that Greek Cypriots historically demanded Enosis, within their ethnic interpretation of self-determination, nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots' blunt rejection of self-determination shows that the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, does not believe that the Turkish Cypriots can rule their state; or can develop a mechanism that can preserve the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Although Küçük did not bring partition as an alternative idea, Turkish foreign policy had already started to consider the option of partition. In June 1956, the Turkish Ambassador at the time, Nuri Birgi, suggested to the British Foreign Secretary that partition could be an option for the future of Cyprus.[654] Kızılyürek (2016) and An (2006) also state that, long before the rise of the formal declaration of Taksim as an option, several others had considered the possibility of partition.[655] However, once the British Colonial Secretary

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[654] United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 371/136329/10344/15G from 1858, *Turkish position: interests and evolution of idea of partition.*

[655] The division of Cyprus was first raised by the Cyprus Turkish Culture Centre President Mehmet Ali Umair in 1948. Also in 1952, Turkish newspaper *Yeni Sabah* mentioned partition as

mentioned double self-determination, it was quickly backed by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots who were thrilled about the idea of Taksim.

The old motto 'Cyprus is Turkish' was abandoned, and 'Either Taksim or Death' dominated the political sphere. Suddenly, Turkish Cypriot elites changed their rejectionist point of view towards self-determination, as the climate now offered a solution that could serve their interests as well. It is a fact that the British government did not put Taksim on the agenda for long. Partition as an option announced on 28th December 1956, while from mid-July 1957, plans for the guaranteed independence of Cyprus had already appeared on the agenda as a new pretext to sustain the colonial influence. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots were not embracing the guaranteed independence formula from the beginning and continued to advocate and act for partition fervently. To materialize partition as a corresponding demand for self-determination, together with Turkey, Turkish Cypriots also founded an organisation called the Turkish Defence Organisation (TMT). The organisation played an enormous role by introducing violent methods, silencing any opposition to partition and despite it is portrayed as it aims to serve for Turkish Cypriots self-determination rights, in addition to that it was also serving British and Turkish imperial interests over Cyprus.

4.2.1 TMT's Way of National Liberation: Partition

During a meeting of the British Cabinet on 17th December 1956, there were preparations on the future of Cyprus.[656] During the meeting, Alan Lennox Boyd

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an option. The same article was republished by the local Turkish Cypriot press as an alternative options (Kızılyürek, *Kıbrıs'ta hınç ve şiddet,* 131).

[656] United Kingdom, National Archives, CAB-195-15-60 from December 17, 1956, *Cabinet Secretary's Notebooks: Cyprus*.

explains about the recent developments on Cyprus and emphasized on Turkey's view, saying that: "their minds are turning to partition, with British enclaves in both zones. They favour early start on working out details- even though we (Britain) envisage it as long-term solution". He then adds; "if self-determination leads to change in the status of the island, Turkish Cypriots would be given the option of electing for partition." Following to Lennox Boyd's remarks, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd responds and add a new sentence citing that the self-determination "may well involve partition of the island", which Lennox Boyd responds that it is important "to get acquiescence of Turks". Later in the discussion, Harold Macmillan, mentions that "a new strategic appreciation may make it practicable to keep a base in enclaves in partitioned Cyprus". Finally, Prime Minister, Anthony Eden interferes and states; "if the base is needed, the partition isn't ideal" and adds "for some years to come, we shall need some base in Cyprus to cover the Persian Gulf." At the end of the discussion, they agreed that Lennox Boyd's statement saying that "Her Majesty's Government recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed community must include partition among the eventual options."[657] The remarks would be seen as the British political elites interpretation of the self-determination at a time, in which, they also consider it within the ethnic lens. The principle of *uti possidites* was not considered at all. This divergence from the pass until today still plays a significant role on the preferential treatment to the discussions on the future of Cyprus.

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[657] Ibid.

Two days after the cabinet meeting that explained above, for the first time Britain raised the possibility of partition on 19th December 1956 precisely in the way that it was agreed in the cabinet meeting saying that "Her Majesty's Government recognises that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."[658] When Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd raised intentions for the partition, during a House of Commons debate, the issue finally became public. As it is clear from the debates in the cabinet, this proposal discussed with Turkey earlier and afterwards it brought to the debate in House of Commmons. The intention was not only to make Greek Cypriots refrain from the consequences of their self-determination demand. Britain, with all its imperial vanity, does not refrain to design the future of Cyprus according to its priorities. Furthermore, nationalists in Turkish Cypriots took this as a viable option for the future of Cyprus and only in few years mobilized the political discourse around the idea of partition.

In the following year, new reports came explaining the limits of partition, mentioning its costs and other potential outcomes. The letters exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom viewed partition as a dangerous policy.[659] Governor Foot openly expressed *Taksim* as the wrong solution and later explained that "partition of the island in less than 15 years can only happen with 'fire and sword'".[660]

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[658] 562, Parl. Deb. HC, (1956, December 19) col 1267-79.

659 Letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles, London, PPS files: Lot 67 D 548 (Department of State January 9, 1958).

660 Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin,* 14.

While Britain started to accumulate new reasons to strengthen the views against partition, the 'Turkish side' (including both Turkey and the nationalists in Turkish Cypriot community) was preparing for an entirely different scenario. Both Turkish Cypriot and Turkish nationalist elites had already mobilised and constituted a remarkable political will on the partition. As a first step, to act decisively and become result-oriented, they decided to end the activities of Volkan to form one political and a military organisation both backed by Turkey.

A few months before Governor Harding was replaced by Hugh Foot, TMT was founded by Rauf Raif Denktaş, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, and Mustafa Kemal Tanrısevdi on 27th July 1957. The foundation of TMT was based on the other organisations that Turkish Cypriots established like KMTB or Volkan. However, the basis of the organisation was planned, organised, and governed by the Special Warfare Department in Turkey.[661] Once TMT was founded, Denktaş resigned from his position in the Government of Cyprus as a judge and became President of the Federation of Turkish Cypriots Associations, KTKF, leading the political wing of the struggle.

Once Denktaş took leadership of KTKF, a new wave of nationalist surge observed among Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist politics got radicalized. TMT's primary strategy was to ensure that partition was the only demand among Turkish Cypriots. Through TMT and KTKF, several campaigns and activities were held to promote the aim of the partition. Turkish Cypriots

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661 İsmail Tansu, *Aslında Hiç Kimse Uyumuyordu*, (Ankara: Minpa, 2001) 30.

made series of decisions to hegemonize Taksim demand to prevent any paradigm change in the future decision regarding Cyprus.

The foundation of TMT represents a new wave of nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot community. TMT must be seen as a new wave of radicalisation as it was taking violent steps including murders of relevant targets among the Turkish Cypriots who were considered as *infidels;* in addition to the Greek Cypriots who were categorized as an enemy.

The polarised nationalist ideas shaped opposing expectations on the future of Cyprus among the communities. Fear was central element in TMT. It is possible to say, TMT's political discourse was primarily built on fear from the organisation as well. In 1957, to strengthen the views of partition as the only solution, Turkish Cypriot nationalists tried to spread a new discourse that is: 'Turks and Greeks cannot live together'. To legitimize these claims, they tried to make some exemplary cases. As their paradigm shifted from denial of self-determination to double self-determination, TMT tried to justify their position by narrating the political incidents in the island to demonstrate partition is a legitimate claim; because Turks and Greeks in the island cannot live together, that's why they should have separate rights of self-determination.

The narratives of this discourse were based on previous incidents. For example, the incidents happened in villages like Vasilya and Afanya exploited heavily. Kızılyürek also outlines two cases of incidents that demonstrate how Turkish Cypriot elites hijacked some of the criminal incidents in different villages and narrated them for nationalist perspective blaming Greek Cypriots were

targeting Turkish Cypriots' lives.[662] Despite the intercommunal affairs were not very healthy, the provocations were causing further problems. One example was the announcement of murders in criminal nature as an inter-ethnic conflict. Once that incident happened, TMT took one step further and issued an announcement after a criminal incident in the village of Melandra and linked them to the incidents in Vasilya and Afanya. The statement reads:

> *The public events in Vasilya and Afanya, other particular events in the villages, the threats to make people leave their village, rapes, attacks on the Turkish mosques, schools or properties and many other activities, the murder of the bravest and capable Turkish police and finally the Melandra Catastrophy. The terrible event in Melandra, as seen previously in Crete, is a movement and a way which signifies the cruellest and most violent massacres to extinct Turkish Cypriots or to force them to leave the island. According to the news from Athens, Greek Cypriots are going to start a public attack targeting Turkish Cypriots.[663]*

This announcement of the TMT narrates the developments in the way to showcase that the communities cannot live in the same island. Furthermore, it draws parallels with the Crete; to make a point that about their fears . However, it is important to recognize that the TMT did not refrain lying to the public to reach its goals. So, from the perspective of the theory of violence that was

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[662] There are two incidents that Kızılyürek (*Kıbrısta hınç ve şiddet,* 2016) analyses. The first was on 9th November 1957. According to the official narrative, Mustafa Ahmet Beyaz was murdered by EOKA, although they rejected this claim. Evidence states that the incident was the result of a love affair gone wrong. Despite the gun (murder weapon) being owned by an EOKA militant, the murder was not ethnically motivated. Also, the deputy governor made an agreement with Fazıl Küçük not to publish the information in exchange for not having any retaliation from the Turkish side (p.137-8). The second was of a more extreme nature, almost a month later on the 4th December 1957 in a village called Melandra near the Paphos region. Three Turkish Cypriots were murdered in the village while working in the forest with axes and hatchets, which were used as murder weapons. Turkish official narratives claim this as a massacre. Fazıl Küçük also suggested these acts as a Greek Cypriot attempt to repeat the Cretan uprising. However, unlike the narratives, Kızılyürek (2016) shows with the evidences that the killings were done by Turkish Cypriots a gunman who had been hired due to a family's hatred. (138 – 141).

[663] Kızılyürek, *Kıbrısta Hınç ve Şiddet*, 139.

shared previously, it is questionable whether it used just means to reach to the just ends.

Starting from the beginning of 1958, TMT started to respond both against the Colonial Administration in Cyprus but also Greek Cypriots. They wanted to consolidate the view that the Greeks and Turks cannot share common livelihoods in Cyprus and that's why partition should be the way that Cyprus problem can be resolved. Unlike the previous position in which they were against the application of self-determination; in 1958, Turkish Cypriot political elite started to demand self-determination in the form of partition. For this reason, they also tried to equalize Taksim and Enosis, although Enosis demand was in place almost for a century while Taksim demand only emerged few years ago. Nevertheless, TMT's use of violence was a way to establish its terms.

When Governor of Cyprus Hugh Foot, came up with a plan to provide a reconciliation for the Cyprus Issue that included set of ideas to restore an order in Cyprus,[664] Turkish Cypriots were not interested with any proposal that may prevent partition. As a result, they decided to create the conditions to show that the partition of the island is the only solution. In early January 1958, Governor Foot was in Ankara negotiating the Foot Plan for constitutional order in Cyprus.

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[664] The main points of the Foot plan were a) formation of constitutional order based on self-governance of the Turkish minority would be guaranteed. The constitution was shaped by the negotiations between the residents of the island. b) At the end of the seven years of self-government, a permanent solution would be offered based on the agreement of the two communities c) Britain's announcement on 19th December 1956 (the right of double self-determination for both communities) would be valid d) Sovereign bases would take place in Cyprus e) England would agree if a permanent solution was to be found between Turkey, Greece and the two communities before the seven-year interim period. The state of emergency would end. If EOKA agreed to a cease-fire, the arrested people would be released and Makarios would be allowed to return (Kızılyürek, *Kıbrısta Hınç ve Şiddet,* 24).

However, the Turkish government had already declared their position on Taksim, and they were not interested to change their position which would give them reputational damage. To eliminate the Foot Plan and demonstrate a paradigm change, Turkey and TMT acted strategically.[665] In January 1958, while Governor Foot was in Ankara to discuss the details of his Plan and Turkey was in disagreement with the Plan, Bozkurt Newspaper headline announced that "Britain accepted Taksim" so the island is going to be divided between Greeks and Turks.[666] Although the announcement was incorrect— the paper claimed that it was a mistranslation from Reuters news agency—Turkish Cypriots gathered in the streets of Nicosia and held a rally for partition. When the Colonial Administration intervened violent incidents erupted. The Government was caught unprepared, the Governor stuck in Ankara and as the incident unfolds two of the demonstrators had died. When news of this spread, the anger against the British grew. Clashes between Turkish Cypriots and government forces started occurring. Eventually, the clashes spread to other towns causing a ripple-effect of violence and growing hatred towards the colonizer. On the incidents of 27th and 28th of January, a total of 7 Turkish Cypriots died. It was portrayed as the Turkish Cypriots' rebellion against colonialism. According to Lennox-Boyd, the attack was organised by the Turkish government to influence the ongoing negotiations between Turkey and Britain. The new conditions demonstrated that the alliance between the Turkish Cypriots and the Cypriot government was over. This development changed the

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[665] Kızılyürek, Şiddet Mevsiminin, 19.
[666] "İngiltere "Taksimi" Kabul Etti", *Bozkurt* (1958, January 27), 1-4.

entire political agenda for each involved party. British intelligence reports cited that security risks shifted from EOKA to TMT as a threat to the continuation of British rule in Cyprus.[667]

However, TMT's ability to put Taksim at the centre of the discussions for the future of Cyprus was not limited with these incidents. Also, the radical nationalist reactions aimed to undermine Greek and Turkish relations in Cyprus. For this reason, TMT focused on the areas that there was Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot collaboration. One of the areas of inter-communal cooperation was within the labour unions. Despite there were frictions due to the Enosis position in the left, still Turkish Cypriot labourers were the members of PEO. Also, there were signed agreements between the Turkish Cypriot Labour Union, KTIBK, and PEO. The cooperation between unions boosted trust and cooperation between the communities. Particularly, the number of Turkish Cypriot members in PEO was still important (despite its decline from 1955 onwards), and they staged various joint actions regarding the workers' rights.[668] However, the labour movement faced violent attacks after the May Day celebrations in 1958.

On that particular event, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot workers participated in the 1st May 1958 celebrations jointly, emphasising unity rather than

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[667] Kizilyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin*, 29.

[668] In that period there was also a right-wing and entirely Turkish Labour Union. However, the power of the Turkish Labour Union and the Turkish Worker Bureau under AKEL had significant membership numbers. One unionist of that time cites the number of members as 25,420. Among them 2,200 were Turkish Cypriot labourers (Kamil Tuncel, *Düşmana İnat Br Gün Daha Yaşamak.* Nicosia: KTÖS Yayınları 2005) 59). Meanwhile, Kızılyürek (*Kıbrıs'ta hınç ve şiddet,* 2016) puts forth the membership numbers of the Turkish Cypriot labour union, both in the Cyprus Turkish Labour Union Association (KTIBK) and PEO Turkish Workers Bureau. According to this, in 1954, PEO had 1,700 while KTİBK had 740 members. In 1955, PEO had 1,400 and KİTBK had 2,214 members. In 1957, the numbers changed dramatically to 1,114 Turkish Cypriots in PEO and 2,800 in KTİBK.

separatism. The unity of the labourers created an image that they are in opposition to TMT's ideological stance and the narrative that it aims to create. Certainly, May Day Celebration in 1958, in which some of the Turkish Cypriot labourers carried Turkish flag along with the Greek flag represents the seeds of exemplary co-existence by respecting each other's national identity.

Nevertheless, only a few days after the celebrations, TMT issued a declaration and called to Turkish Cypriots:

> *Those who act in a reckless and traitorous way, either by announcing the names involved in the TMT or reporting, speaking or acting against TMT are damaging our national interests. Necessary measures will take place against them.*
>
> a) *Our community showed national sensitivity and keen interest by accepting the decision to abstain from establishing trade relations with Greek Cypriots. The inspections of the special teams are going to be handled carefully. No one will be exempt from these inspections.*
> b) *Socialising with Greek Cypriots and going to Greek-owned bars, taverns and nights clubs are forbidden. Special teams are on duty following those who visit these places.*
> c) *The signs and trademarks on shops, buildings and properties belonging to Turkish tradesman and businesspersons must be written only in Turkish.[669]*

The ultimatum coming from TMT was a threat to the Turkish Cypriots were the ones who participated May Day rally; undermining TMT's goals. Like EOKA, TMT followed a similar method, targeting Turkish Cypriot leftists as traitors, claiming that they are pro-Greek.

Three weeks after the ultimatum violent attacks started to labour union members in the Turkish Cypriot community. At the beginning, TMT targeted the Turkish Cypriot labour unionists. The leader of the Turkish Workers Bureau, Ahmet Sadi Erkurt was shot, but only slightly injured. TMT then targeted and

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[669] Aydın Akkurt, *"Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı 1957-1958 Mücadelesi"*, 195.

murdered Fazıl Önder (the editor of a leftist newspaper called Inkılapçı (Revolutionary). Following Fazil Önder's death, on 26th May 1958, TMT made another declaration, taking responsibility of the murders, and threatening those who were considered that works for the communist propaganda. TMT also ordered anyone involved in PEO to issue press statements in the daily newspapers to receive amnesty.[670] The statement that TMT issued is remarkable because it openly accepts its responsibility to attack Turkish Cypriots. It shows its commitment to partition but more than that, TMT provides the blueprint of how it legitimizes the partition claim as a right. Simply, by force.

Following this incident, members of PEO resigned and started putting advertisements in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers stating their loyalty to the nationalist fight and mentioning that they were no longer members of PEO. Despite the announcement, another labour unionist, Ahmet Yahya, was

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[670] Despite TMT's announcement, Denktaş and TMT members denied murdering Turkish Cypriots. Most of the proof documents come after 2010. The full text of the announcement says: "The Turkish Resistance Organisation started its actions and punished cowards and traitors who enjoy serving the Reds (Communists) by death, despite having been warned, they have ignored the existence of 120000 Turks living in Cyprus. Do those worthless degenerates think Turkish Cypriots will ever forgive them? Our only answer to those who try to break and weaken our national unity (whoever they are) is a gunshot to the head. Şadi Erkurt and Fazıl Önder were announced as traitors (by the TMT) and got what they deserved. Likewise, their worthless comrades will be punished. All who take part in communist propaganda, wherever they are on the island, are bound to face the same fate. For now, those who have explained their situation in Turkish newspapers have sincerely cleansed their souls from communist propaganda. However, they are being closely watched, like their shadows. If any bad intentions are observed in their actions, we will end their lives. Our 'hit teams' across the island will receive a preparative order. Dear Turks of Cyprus, the traitors murdered by our organisation were a few of your biggest enemies and degenerates playing with your honour. Never mention anything that you see or know about our organisation or of a crime that is committed. We would like to announce that from here, disclosing information about the organisation to the police, courts or untrustworthy people is considered treason. Your biggest national duty is to help members of our organisation, the ones who indeed are and not disclose anything that you know. Those topics should not be mentioned in clubs, coffee shops or any other premises. Those who speak against the organisation or reject its orders will be punished immediately and will be named in our announcements. Hooray for Turkish Nations. Down with traitors, down with the British who is against Taksim, either Taksim or death, TMT Central Committee, Turkish Resistance Organisation. More on the crime and the organisation (Mete Hatay, "Sendikacı Cinayetleri ve TMT Bildirileri", *Poli 52*, (2015) :3).

murdered on the same day he announced his resignation.[671] Also, number of PEO members choose to leave Cyprus since they afraid that they might be murdered by TMT.[672] The newspapers of a time, like Halkın Sesi or Bozkurt, contains number of declarations from the members of PEO, telling that they do not have any link with PEO anymore, and also stating that they were misguided, that they are committed to the nationalist cause and announcing that they are fully endorsing the views of the Turkish Cypriot community.[673]

The anti-communist attacks of TMT sent a clear message regarding the political stance. From this point onwards, any opposition against TMT among the Turkish Cypriots was almost invisible. TMT effectively used violence as an advantage to strengthen Turkish Cypriots nationalist political discourse. The organisations' domination over the public sphere spread eventually and broke the last remaining part of the interdependence between the communities.

At the same time, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites comprehended Taksim as the only solution and continuously produced its propaganda using the reference to rights. Unlike, the denial of self-determination rights now Turkish Cypriot nationalists were endorsing it. For example, in *Halkın Sesi*, claiming that independence should not be on the table.

> *Under these circumstances, Turks cannot accept autonomy. Under these conditions, an independent Cyprus or guaranteed common*

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[671] Ahmet An, 2011, 132.

[672] Ibid.

[673] Gazedda Editöryal Kolektif. "1 Mayıs 1958 TMT ve EOKA Emek Hareketine Karşı İşlediği Cinayetlerin Sorumluluğunu Almalı", *GazeddaKıbrıs,* accessed 11 November 2021 retrieved from https://gazeddakibris.com/1-mayis-1958-tmt-ve-eoka-emek-hareketine-karsi-isledigi-cinayetlerin-sorumlulugunu-almali/

governance means nothing but the realisation of Enosis. There is no way other than partition. We want freedom which is the right of every human being. We want to live under the shadow of our flag. Cyprus issue is not an isolated case anymore. We want safety of our lives and property and peace. We will find these only and only in partition of Cyprus.[674]

The reference to the partition represents the key rhetoric and they were trying to equalize it with Enosis; even though the Enosis demand had a decades-long legacy. However, the most severe events commenced in the summer of 1958. On 7th June 1958, TMT informed Turkish Cypriots to get ready for the liberation struggle and emphasized that both the British and Greek Cypriots as the most prominent enemies.[675] The same night, a bomb exploded in the Turkish Information Bureau of the Turkish consulate in Nicosia. The explosion represents another rupture in the history of the island after the incidents that happened on 27th – 28th January 1958. While the incidents on 27-28 January were targeted to eliminate the Foot Plan, so it was the anti-British propaganda; from 7th June 1959 onwards was the initiation of a violent campaign against the Greek Cypriots.[676]

Arsonists from the Turkish Cypriot community attacked Greek Cypriot factories, clubs, shops, and properties in Nicosia. The outcome was two deaths. In the following days, similar attacks spread across the island. One of the most violent

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[674] *Halkın Sesi,* (1, June 1958), p. 1.

[675] Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin*, 64.

[676] TMT announced that the bomb attack was an act by EOKA. Much later, in 1984, R. R. Denktaş testified, on an ITV documentary, that it was done by Turkish Cypriots but he did not know about it at the time. An extract of his words states, "There was an explosion at the information bureau of the Turkish consulate. Crowds had already gathered there. Crowds of Turkish Cypriot youth almost immediately decided that Greeks had done it and they were swearing vengeance against Greeks. Later on a friend of mine, whose name must still be kept secret, was to confess to me that he had put this little bomb in the doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that people would know that the Turkish Cypriots mattered." Britain's Grim Legacy ITV documentary, "End of Empire", 26 July 1984.

incidents happened on 12th June, where eight unarmed Greek Cypriots were killed by Turkish Cypriots with knives and axes in Gönyeli.[677] The new wave of violence that started on the 7th June to 12th June, Turkish Cypriot nationalists killed 15 Greek Cypriots. Also 2 Turkish Cypriots were killed during the incidents, and hundreds of people were injured. Also, 600 to 700 families internally displaced to areas they believed to be safer.[678]

Fazıl Küçük elaborated on the developments by stating, "we can say that de facto Taksim happened on the island. In Nicosia and in some of the other central towns, communities are moving apart from each other by their choice. Nicosia has already been divided with barbed wire. […] Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta, Paphos, Limassol, and the Greek Cypriots in the other areas are migrating in large numbers."[679]

The violent incidents in June 1958 became the key to justify Taksim desire of nationalist elites in the Turkish Cypriots by showcasing that the relations between the communities in the island were damaged heavily. Denktaş called upon the TMT militants and said that he 'cannot control the Teddy boys' because of the British position towards the future of Cyprus, which was not in line with Taksim.[680] Following the incidents on 7th June, nationalist Turkish

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[677] Kızılyürek (*Şiddet Mevsiminin,* 2015) analyses the Gönyeli massacre in detail. This incident had been one of the taboos most Turkish Cypriots narrated differently, as opposed to the killings done by the British. However, Kızılyürek clarifies the story in a remarkable way. To this day, one of Gönyeli's street name is "12th June" referring to the day of the incident(p.130).

[678] Ibid, p. 70.

[679] Fazıl Küçük'in Açıklamaları, *Milliyet,*(1958, 7 18) 9.

[680] United Kingdom, National Archives, CO 926/896 from (June 1958,8),*Incidents involving terrorism in Cyprus*.

Cypriot elites took another step to strengthen the segregation of the communities. The aim was the formation of separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities. The intention of creating national municipalities was the decisive step to separate the only mutual governance structure of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

The preparations to build separate municipalities started at the same time when British Administration withdrew their position about Taksim in 1957. As a first step, all of the elected Turkish Cypriot members of the municipal council resigned on 3rd June 1957. Küçük announced the reason; "for extended years, relying on their majority in councils, Greek Cypriots always acted against us. With this move, we have shown the global public, with evidence, that there is no possibility to live with Greek Cypriots."[681]

However, the active campaign to separate municipalities started on 4th May 1958 by sending a letter to the Governor demanding the government to consider separate municipalities in any constitutional proposal. Also, Denktaş stated, "The creation of independent Turkish Cypriot municipalities is the start of the liberation struggle." Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites narrated this as a matter of rights. For example, *Halkın Sesi* announced:

> *Turks have decided to establish independent municipalities as it is our right to look after our streets and our work and to emancipate ourselves from Greek Cypriot pressure, to live freely, to be governed by our will, far from humiliation, not to be obliged to respect those who humiliate us every day for simple work.[682]*

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681 Fazıl Küçük, "Ayrı Belediyeler Konusu", *Halkın Sesi*, (13 July 1957) 1.

682 Kızılyürek, *Şiddet tarihinin,* 151.

On 16th June 1958, while violent incidents were happening across the island, Turkish Cypriot nationalists made a *fait accompli* and announced the establishment of the Nicosia Turkish Municipality. On 20th June, Limassol Turkish Municipality was created. On 1st July 1958, Famagusta Turkish Municipality was declared, and the mayors and municipal council members were appointed. In the KTKF 1957–1958 annual report, the situation was noted as such:

> *From the beginning of the incidents, municipalities lost interest in Turkish neighbourhoods and were unable to perform municipal work in Turkish neighbourhoods. We met with the relevant authorities in person and sent letters and telegraphs for the separation of the municipalities with all our efforts. Turkish members of the municipal council took relevant measures to continue the necessary services and declare de facto partition (Taksim). Finally, the long years of struggle have finalised in our favour. The foundations of the Turkish municipalities are in place. They completely consist of Turkish labour and Turkish civil servant cadres. From now on, the fait accompli Turkish Municipalities, official recognition is being considered in a new plan by the Government and the commissions set to work on it are already in place.[683]*

The separation of the municipalities took place as the level of violence were increasing further in the island. The separation of the municipalities on ethnic lines enabled Turkish Cypriot leadership to impose its agenda to fulfil nationalist interests.[684] In June 1958, also the British Cabinet discussed the developments in Cyprus. Underlining the deterioration of the internal security situation in Cyprus, Foreign Secretary emphasized: "Turkish Cypriots appeared to be deliberately attempting to create the impression that it was impossible for the

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[683] Milli Arşiv, File No 41, 1957-1958, *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu Faaliyet Raporu,* 8.

[684] Diana Markides, "The Issue of Separate Municipalities in Cyprus 1957–1963: An Overview", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1998): 200.

two communities in Cyprus to live together harmoniously." [685] It is obvious that the attempts of the TMT were acknowledged by Britain, nevertheless, the measures that were put in place were not enough to stop the aggressive Taksim policy of the Turkish Cypriots.

Later, on 15th August 1958, amended version of Macmillan Plan included the option of separate municipalities. Surridge, who was the president of the commission for separate municipalities, explained in his report: "separation of the municipalities is meaningless regarding good governance, however, politically, it is a must."[686] The separation of the municipalities made Turkish Cypriot side accept the Macmillan Plan, as they believed it could serve as a step to offer separate self-determination in the future.[687] However, Makarios accepted independence as compromise in September 1958 and altered the plans for the partition. Makarios's tactical move to abandon the idea of Enosis brought also the basis for the partition demand.

Despite recent developments undermined the possibility of partition, Turkish Cypriot nationalists had diverging views on the new development. Considering, Turkish Cypriots firstly demanded the continuation of the status quo; and if a change was to occur, they expected returning of the island back to Turkey. From late 1956 onwards, their demand turned into the partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. When Makarios responded positively to independence, just

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[685] *Cabinet Secretary's Notebooks: Cyprus,* CAB-195-15-60 (National Archieves December 17, 1956).

[686] Kızılyürek, *Şiddet Mevsiminin*, 148.

[687] Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi,* 143.

before the UN General Assembly, Turkish Cypriots were still insisting on the implementation of the Macmillan Plan unaware that the Makarios' position would bring a new dynamism to the process.

Turkish Cypriot newspapers announced Makarios' new position as a result of foul-play and trickery. Fazıl Küçük also considered the move as a "political manoeuvre," and added that this "will not make Turkish Cypriots change their position." Küçük also stated, "We believe that an independent Cyprus State means Enosis. An independent state which will be based on the majority can decide to unite with Greece anytime and any moment."[688] Also, Küçük explained the impossibility of establishing an independent state saying that:

> *People living here are not Cypriots. There are Turkish and Greek entities. Those are two communities that are completely different in all aspects of morals, customs, culture, nationality and religion. It is impossible to establish a government that brings such a community under one roof. Because without a doubt, in every meeting, the majority can accommodate and bring into force all the relevant laws in a few hours to disenfranchise all the rights from Turkish Cypriots. This will lead to the continuation of the tension and disagreements between the communities. For this reason, neither peace nor harmony can be established at any time in the country.[689]*

It is a fact that the creation of an independent Cypriot state, by acknowledging the existing territorial boundaries of Cyprus was the most effective way to resolve the highly polarized Taksim and Enosis demands. Küçük preferred to position itself on ethnic nationalism but the self-determination was to be applied on a territorial basis rather than an ethnic source. The problem was, neither Turkish Cypriot nor Greek Cypriot elites preferred to acknowledge the realities

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[688] "Makarios, Türk Temsilcinin Adaya Gelmesini Engelleyemez", *Bozkurt*, (1958, September 24), 4.

[689] Ibid.

that the colonialism had created. They preferred to silence the aspects of colonialism and preferred to understand the issue of self-determination purely ethnocentric perspective. However, Küçük was not alone in the way that he comprehends the problem. Also, the Turkish Foreign Minister's interview on Cyprus reflected similar points concerning independence. Considering that the interview took place during the UN General Assembly, it is plausible to claim that it reflected the official position of Turkey. In the interview, a journalist asked about the possibility of independence. Zorlu answered:

> *Independence is impossible. Because a) It is required to have a nation to grant independence. There is no such thing called Cyprus nation. There are Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who perceive themselves as part of Turkey and Greece. b) Another fundamental condition for independence is the real desire for independence by the people. Turks, who are one of the two communities living in Cyprus demand a unification with Turkey and Greek Cypriots desire a unification with Greece. c) Another important issue is about the economy. Cyprus does not have its resources to self-sustain. d) In a modern state, independence requires a significant portion of society that constitutes the population to respect the state's authority. However, Cyprus independence means domination of Greek Cypriots over Turkish Cypriots. What do you expect from a fragile state that even the British government is unable to satisfy the Greek Cypriot extremists? e) Geopolitics also prevent independence. Independent Cyprus cannot last long in a region where there is a constant conflict of interest. Communists can take advantage of the dispute between Greeks and Turks and use the island as a stepping stone for international communism.[690]*

Zorlu's statement is crucial because he also refers execution of national self-determination based on ethnic lines. Despite the hegemonic point of understanding on decolonisation goes beyond the ethnicities and the United Nations system already developed much civic understanding to self-determination Zorlu preferred not to acknowledge that. Much like Küçük,

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[690] "Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Bir Amerikan Gazetesine Beyanatı", *Bozkurt*, (1958, December 8) 4.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu preferred to suppress the fact that Cyprus problem is a colonial problem and regarded the problem as an international/regional problem. It aims to prioritize geopolitical concerns that involve the denial of the self-determination of the people living in the island.

Despite it is a colonial case that requires perceiving the people of Cyprus as a whole, his statement shows how the human rights discourses and particularly the self-determination interpreted from a nationalist perspective and become an obsolete tool. Turkish Cypriot press and political elite were mentioning their desire for partition following to Zorlu's announcement. At the same time, Turkey and Greece engaged in a new set of talks. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers were pushing the issue of human rights forward.

For example, in one newspaper, columnist Osman Türkay wrote an article titled, "We want our human rights to be recognized". He was framing partition as a right with all the narratives that are explained before. As he mentions partition in all aspects of life: "Turkish Cypriots demand to manage their trade, medical services, municipalities, in short, every aspect of life, separately".[691] However, changes were happening in rhetoric following to the UN General Assembly, as Greece and Turkey began to favour independence as a way of resolving the Cyprus Problem.

Political, psychological factors including ethnic nationalist propaganda, inter-ethnic violence, and existential concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community made partition a hegemonic discourse. However, TMT's way of suppressing the

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[691] Osman Türkay, "Haklarımızın Tanınmasını İsteriz", *Bozkurt* (1959, January 18) 2.

political will of the members of the Turkish Cypriot community to create a myth that aims to turn it into a legitimate claim did not work. It is possible to claim that the last decade of British colonialism and notably TMT's ruthless and violent campaign made the parties comprehend that there is a *Turkish Cypriot factor* in relation to the future of Cyprus. Taksim was not an authentic demand but more of a geopolitical desire of Turkey mixed with high politics of imperial ambitions. Unlike Enosis, it did not have a long legacy. Even the political recognition of Turkish Cypriots as an entity was a much more elitist concern nevertheless the way to independence enabled the recognition of of the Turkish Cypriot identity as a political community.

Following the negotiation at the UN level, a fine-tuning of the maximalist Taksim demand of Turkish Cypriot elites took place. The invention of the guaranteed - independence formula for Cyprus, enabled a new rhetoric that started to consider independence as an acceptable option. However, further interrogation of the Turkish Cypriots' responses to the Zurich and London agreements are necessary. Considering that the partition demand was evident, even following Makarios's statement for independence, the changing narratives can show the basis of the compromise.

4.2.2 Compromise and Independence

During the UN General Assembly, Turkey and Greece agreed to take guaranteed independence as the basis for a solution to Cyprus Problem. This was a solution that can fulfil the higher political concerns of NATO. With the involvement other major powers like NATO, the USA and the United Kingdom, the Cyprus Problem came to an end with the signing of the two agreements,

with the first signed on 11th February 1959 in Zurich between Turkey and Greece and second on 19th February 1959 in London between all involved parties, that are to say: the United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece and the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

When the final meeting between Turkey and Greece was taking place, Turkish Cypriot newspapers were repeatedly mentioning their loyalty to Turkey regarding the outcome of the negotiations. Turkish Cypriots were raising the recognition of the separate municipalities as the primary condition to reach an agreement.[692] On the other hand, for Turkey and Greece, the issue of guarantees was becoming one of the main points of discussion. During the negotiations in Zurich, the Turkish delegation spokesperson announced the considerations in relation to guarantees and said that "We are insisting on a study inclined to establish grounds to guarantee the rights of Turkish Cypriots which will not put them under the domination of other community and enable their national identity to develop. We are trying to overcome disputes that can emanate from the principles and the details of these principles in practice. Those principles and their details have political, legal, military and security-related dimensions."[693] Once, Turkey and Greece agreed on the framework for the guaranteed independence in Zurich; Denktaş and Küçük made a common declaration emphasizing that, this means recognition of the communal existence of Turkish Cypriots as equal entities of Cyprus. On the other hand,

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[692] "Ortaklık Planının ilk adımı Belediyelerin tanınmasıyla atılacak", *Bozkurt*, (4 February 1958), 4.

[693] "Türk Cemaatinin Hakları Garanti Edilmedikçe Bir Uzlaşmaya Varılmayacak"*, Bozkurt*, (11 February 1959) 1.

the Turkish Foreign Minister's announcement emphasizing "agreement is not partition but a collaboration between Turkey and Greece" did not create any reaction among the nationalist Turkish Cypriot leaders.[694] However, the Turkish Cypriot press stated their concerns concerning Makarios participation in the Cyprus conference in London. Bozkurt newspaper announced that "In principle, we consider that it is not right to accept Makarios for such a meeting. We believe that someone else other than a priest, who is not guilty in the eyes of the people of Cyprus should represent the Greek Cypriots in such an important meeting."[695]

One of the crucial aspects that was welcomed by Turkish Cypriot leadership were on Treaty of Guarantee. Treaty of Guarantee which was signed on 16th August 1960 between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom was considered as the major victory for Turkish Cypriots. In fact dilution of sovereignty became the central aspect of the Turkish Cypriots' support for independence. Turkish Cypriot political elites emphasized that Turkey's right to unilateral intervention guaranteed the rights of the community and claimed that the outcome of the Zurich agreement meant a partition in administration.[696]

It is possible to claim that the decolonisation of Cyprus took place as a compromise between the two conflicting parties Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, the recognition of two areas over Cyprus, as Sovereign

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[694] "Gelecek Günlere Hazırlık", *Bozkurt*, (13 February 1959) 2.

[695] "Kıbrıs Anlaşmasının Yankıları" *Bozkurt*, (14 February 1959) 1.

[696] "Karanlığa Kurşun Sıkmayalım" *Bozkurt*, (16 February 1959) 1.

British Bases worth questioning as it does not mean that self-determination was applied properly. Furthermore, the dilution of sovereignty through the Treaty of Guarantee can raise the question whether the independence of Cyprus kept limited. Guaranteed independence as a solution was also limited to the external sovereignty of the newly founded Republic. The compromise was shown as a compromise between the Cypriot communities but in fact, primarily it addressed Britain and its allies' strategic concerns in the region.

Interestingly, after the Zurich and London Agreements, Turkish Cypriot nationalist discourse of Taksim suddenly disappeared in the press. Unlike, Enosis, Taksim was a tactical manoeuvre, and it did not take a lot of effort to suppress this demand, despite it costed many of the lives from either communities. The discourses of partition rapidly transformed into the glorification of Turkey's role in the guarantee system. In a short period, newspapers started to claim that those who mentioned Taksim were making blind claims and damaging the community by creating confusion.[697] Also, statements were replacing the failure of Taksim. Türkay stated that "Turkish Cypriots' spiritual pain on the ban of unification with our motherland compensated with substantial articles which guarantee their freedom and rights. The guarantees from Turkey will also provide an opportunity to have Turkish Military Forces over the island. It seems like guarantees can fill the hollowness in our souls."[698]

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[697] Ibid.

[698] Osman Türkay, "Bir İstifham Çözülüyor", *Bozkurt,* (26 February 1958) 2.

The new conditions offered in the Cyprus agreements banned both communities' nationalist aspirations. The Turkish Cypriot political elite sought ways to replace Taksim with the independence formula. Although, the fate of the Republic of Cyprus was bound to fail, during the last decade of the British administration in Cyprus, a significant transformation among Turkish Cypriots happened. The most notable issue was the development of their national identity and (with the backing of major powers) their ability to gain politically equal status for the discussions on the future of Cyprus.

It is possible to claim that, at the beginning Turkish Cypriots did not consider self-determination as a tool for their emancipation. In fact, excluding the last couple of years of the colonial period, Turkish Cypriots preferred to deny the self-determination rights since they were convinced that it could only serve for the majority population Greek Cypriots. As a discourse, their reference to the rights came forward in a nationalist context. Political elites' choice to differentiate themselves from Greek Cypriots and seeking for the recognition of their identity showed a clear example of the nationalist ideology at every layer of their policies. It is important to mention that even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots continued their campaign "From Turk to Turk" to strengthen the ethnic Turkish economic elite. Months after the parties signed the Republic of Cyprus, the British administration caught a ship named Elmas carrying weapons for TMT, which signified that the conflict was not over, and preparations for a new wave of violence was underway.[699]

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[699] Kızılyürek, *Kıbrısta Hınç ve Şiddet*, 263.

The peculiar developments of that period and the British colonial policies created a condition for the enhancement of the Turkish nationalism. It is a fact that in the absence of British colonialism still, the Turkish Cypriots would develop a national identity, nevertheless the influence of the rule and divide policies since the beginning of the colonialism created a very difficult situation for reconciliation of the communities; as Turkish Cypriot identity, primarily characterise itself as a reaction to Greek Cypriot Enosisist nationalism.

Ultimately, the self-determination of the people of Cyprus took place with a peculiar implementation. Neither the colonial boundaries of Cyprus respected in the creation of post-colonial state by offering sovereign bases to Britain. Furthermore, the independence formula that is based on Guarantee System represents a limitation of Cyprus's sovereignty. Considering those two aspects as the re-creation of some sort of colonial order with limited autonomy of the people would be seen as the denial of the universalist interpretations of the self-determination since the dichotomy of the imperialism and colonialism still casts its shadow in Cyprus. As the history of such a small island undergoes complex trajectory like this, it is necessary to focus on the reflections of those complexities to the current state of affairs from the lenses of Said's gravity of history.

Chapter 5 – Discussion: The Gravity of History and the Self-determination

The first chapter of this project portrays the early colonial history of Cyprus to provide a broader picture of British Colonialism in Cyprus. In the second chapter, the historical and legal transformation of the notion of self-determination explained in detail, including some of the relevant ICJ Opinions on handling conflicting claims of self-determination. In each case, there was a peculiar history on self-determination relevant to the historical developments. While the notion of self-determination was subject to different interpretations through the course of history, peculiar historical context in Cyprus created additional burdens to our understanding of self-determination as it developed solely on ethnic interpretation.

In the third and the fourth chapters, the last decade of British Colonialism in Cyprus analysed to better situate the conditions. The two chapters gave a glance of understanding to each respective community's demand for self-determination and the historical ruptures that defined self-determination discourses.

By introducing an ethnic lens in these two chapters, specifiers of self-determination demand in each community, as well as the conflicting aspects within the two narratives, observed. Through this perspective, the role of the gravity of history in the self-determination demands and the limits of the universality of right demands portrayed; showing the conflicting nationalisms as

well as the role of colonialism in Cyprus; turned right into a battle ground of the communities.

In this chapter, by borrowing Said's theoretical approach that was also mentioned in introduction, the narratives in the colonial context of Cyprus will be elaborated. The aim is to show how the historical narratives can constitute the building blocks of identities in conflict. In his book, Culture and Imperialism, Said offers two methodological approaches, first one is the *contrapuntal reading*; in which he shows the relationship between narratives set in the metropolitan centre (colonizer) and the periphery (colonized). It is the narratives of imperialism and resistance that shows how imperialism can re-invent itself. His remarkable methodological contribution Said shows an alternative way to read the context and the content. Even though he explained this point of understanding over the novels, the method influenced many scholars beyond the field of literature, such as law. While contrapuntal reading of law enables to interrogate the readings of the narratives by deconstructing methodology, he also retains the 'gravity of history' by allowing the intentionality of the authors to be contextualized. Said's work shows the relationship between texts, representations and policy choices[700] enabling interrogation of the discourse and its relationship with the political-historical context. In the case of Cyprus, Enosis and Taksim are the two grandiose discourses that carry the legacy of

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[700] John Strawson. "Reflections on Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Self Determination", *Penn State International Review* 20 (2001): 365-384.

colonialism, that was discussed in detail. In this section, I will try to demonstrate their significance in the post-colonial context.

5.2 Colonialism, Resistance and Human Rights

Colonialism was the product of the European imperialism and it supposed to end as post-World War II conditions promised new order. It was believed that in the new order the United Nations would play the role to bring equality to the people, particularly those in the colonies and self-determination was one of those tools. The self-determination landmarks the recognition of the successful end of European tutelage for those people in colonies. However, the successful end of European tutelage failed to bring an end to the inherited problems, mostly comes from systematic exploitation of rivalries of the native population by the colonialist for the expense of fulfilling imperialist ambitions. The anti-colonial resentment turned into post-colonial internal rivalries of the communities. During the colonial context, human rights were mostly referred to concerning the application of self-determination.

Being free from the alien subjugation was the fundamental aspect of the human rights discourses nevertheless, once the native populations able to self-determine, emerging political elites of the newly independent states disregard the universal aspect of human rights. Some perceived the rights from a community-centric way, disregarding the multicultural context and deepen the inequalities resulting in further polarization. Violations of human rights turned into a statistical data, while nationalist agendas dominated the politics in the postcolonial territories.

Within boundaries of the new modern states, the conditions for peaceful co-existence for the constituting elements of the people did not materialize as it was naively believed. The rivalries that largely exploited by the former colonial experiences as the responsibility of the colonizer is withered away.

The multidimensional power relations defined the limits of emancipation too. The narrative of modern law assumes European conquest of the colonized world brought *advanced Western training* that enables the colonized people to be able to '*self-determine'* their future.

Nevertheless, the scope of application of self-determination was selective and the geopolitical factors had a determining influence. Through the law, European colonialism re-invented European-self in the colonies. The promise of elevating their political status through the conditions that were also put forward by the colonizers framed the road to emancipation, even though it can also be argued as a different form of submission. Even in those instances, the reference to West is loaded with a transcendental interpretation that aims to 'whiten' the territories that are inhabited by the 'others'.

Such Eurocentric and imperialist perspective continued in the decolonisation phase too. Modern governance technologies of the colonisers replaced with post-modern governance technologies of the principles that come from the institutions like United Nations and other relevant sources of disciplinary mechanisms that are established within the boundaries of capitalism like the IMF, World Bank and later the credit rating agencies and the multi-national corporations.

The process of elevating the political status of colonized to a self-determining subject of law did not happen the same way. In some territories, coloniser sought to sustain their attachment in direct or indirect ways. Continuing colonial interventions brought significant political and social impacts causing further polarisation. As colonialists were decisive to keep their influence in the territories, severe measures including the exploitation of ethnic rivalries took place, treaties were signed as a condition to enjoy the right of self-determination (Separation of Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, creation of sovereign base areas in Cyprus are only a few examples). The conditionality of decolonisation also created room for further instability (Guarantee Agreements in Cyprus) all causing further deepening the conflicts across the native communities in colonies.

The confluence of colonialism and European Enlightenment eventually granted the people in the colonies to be able to rule their territories, as if they were not able to perform self-rule before the Europeans arrived. Narratives on progression and training under the Western tutelage were constructed by the colonizer to be able to govern the distant territories of the European empires through the discourse of law. While the imperialist legacy continues to set the conditions, the colonial reaction accumulated in the narratives of nationalism.

In the colonial period, nationalism was a reaction to colonialists, however, narratives of nationalism also constructed the identity of the colonized. The emerging nationalism(s) pushed some of the colonized territories into internal nationalist disputes. The struggle for emancipation replaced by nationalist glorification. The emancipatory aspect of nationalism which started as a

resistance against colonisers eventually disappeared. The governing elites gradually re-aligned their stance with the hegemonic order and reshaped their position according to what power relations dictate. Foreign yokes, replaced with the natives, while the colonial experience that was based on injustice largely remained unquestioned. The reaction of over-exploited, underserved and underrepresented communities in the postcolonial states found themselves with nationalist and governments with authoritarian tendencies limiting their emancipation as much as the former colonial masters. The post-colonial transformation led to the rise of secessionist nationalisms and brought authoritarian responses and dictatorships.

While the political transformation created new resentments within the post-colonial states, the West were busy with drafting new human rights reports focusing on the situation of the former colonies, while the colonial legacy has kept silent and the colonial responsibility in the conflicts largely ignored. The gravity of history over the discourse of colonized in the postcolonial setting remained untold.

The end of the colonialism celebrated and considered as one of the greatest victories of human rights. Human rights landmarked 20th century; started to play much central role after World War II. Political ideologies that were dividing the World, united under the banner of human rights even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. There were much debated about human rights whether it is universal or it should have been understood in a relativist way.[701] After the

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[701] Shveta Dhaliwal, "Cultural Relativism: Relevance to Universal and Regional Human Rights Monitoring", *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 72 (2011), p635-640.

collapse of the Eastern bloc, the West became the champion of human rights. As Douzinas puts it "Human rights are trumpeted as the noblest creation of our philosophy and jurisprudence and as the best proof of the universal aspirations of our modernity"[702] The colonial responsibility disappeared and the continuing colonial conflicts now treated as internal matters of the relevant state. Critical debates on human rights continued for a long time.[703] From these debates, some conclusions are possible to draw. Those are:

Firstly, history suggests that human beings have been categorized as superior (West / white etc..) and inferior (Eastern / black etc…) for a long time. In Culture and Imperialism, Said refers to Cicero and explains that even back in the Roman Empire, "the domain over which Rome enjoyed the legal right to enforce the law over the *Barbarians*"[704] was exemplary showcasing the divide of "us" and "them" mentality.

Western imperialism has a centuries-old legacy and it did not disappear when the end of colonialism approved by the UN General Assembly. Imperialism recreates itself with different modes of operation in multiple ways and human rights can be used to materialize the similar goal. The rulers and their subjects (ruled) consider themselves as the be-holders of human rights while the 'others' in different contexts are considered as lesser human. Economic, social, racial

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[702] Costas Douzinas, *The End of Human Rights*, (London: Hart Publishing, 2000).

[703] Upendra Baxi, *The Future of Human Rights,* (New Delhi: London, 2002); Costas Douzinas *The End of Human Rights, (*London: Hard Publishing, 2000); Conor Gearty, *Can human rights survive?* : The Hamlyn Lectures 2005, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) are only very few of many.

[704] Said, *Culture and Imperialism,* 346.

divisions and the ability of the people to be able to enjoy their rights curtails based on those divides. Even in the advanced democracies in the West, the experiences of refugees, undocumented migrants or discriminative practices like the creation of gay-free neighbourhoods in some European cities, Black Lives Matters demonstrations in the United States are the obvious manifestations that the 'human' element of human rights is largely selective.

At the same time, human rights work as a tool to discipline the territory from distance; human rights rankings, reports by international organisations or the indexes can create a legitimate benchmark to keep the states in alignment at a particular policy. The ruling elite in those territories respond to those and for the deprived groups had the opportunity to rely on the human rights to defend their fundamental needs. From this perspective, human rights also work as a tool for resistance particularly for those excluded or experiencing a difficult life under the despotic regimes.

Human rights are paradoxical.[705] The important dimension is, the main reference to a human does not have a fixed meaning. In essence, the subject of human rights has contextual boundaries, based on its relationship with the ruler and certainly, it lacks the true sense of universality. The universality of human rights has limits and liberal individualist interpretations are not sufficient. However, this deficiency is not the only problem. Also, the community-centric interpretations of human rights can boost secessionist nationalisms that can trigger conflicts.

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[705] Costas Douzinas, "The paradoxes of human rights", *Constellations* 20 (2013), 51-67.

Cyprus is an exemplary case. When Greek Cypriots decided to reach their nationalist aspiration of Enosis, they tried to fight against anyone that opposes to it. On the other hand, in 1974 Turkish troops attacked Greek Cypriots claiming that they are willing to protect the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Both acts had a dimension that can be explained within the human rights, however, the outcomes were catastrophic. Enosis considered as a transcendental desire by a group of Greek Cypriots, while a group of Turkish Cypriots perceive it as their end. The opposing ethnic nationalisms also interprets the rights differently. Without a truly universal mediation, it is difficult to encounter with reality. It is important to acknowledge that both community-centric interpretations of human rights were a patchwork of a particular desire. The important take away from here is the human condition, in general, does not have a superior essence, it is a dynamic process that defines itself repeatedly. The self-evident decisions that were made, carries the weight of the history, power and poorly defined strategies on narrowly judged assumptions that again shaped after the experience of conflicting nationalisms, colonialism and imperialism(s). Universalising the community-centric ethno-nationalist interpretations of human rights fails to provide a universal remedy but can only exacerbate conflicts.

Finally, the human rights that are being universalized carry the elements of imperialist interpretation of world order like the claims on the *export of law*. Within the boundaries of liberal individualism, it is hard to expect any emancipatory role in that. Nevertheless, it does not mean that one has to reject human rights. It is possible to facilitate human rights in an emancipatory way.

Self-evident fundamental rights that go beyond the nationalist interpretations can strengthen the most vulnerable groups that suffer due to global inequality. It largely depends on the ability to liberate the self from the established identity and by imagining a social identity that carries the elements of justice. The idea of justice can come from a radical re-interpretation of law and the rights in the way that it can create grounds for solidarity and resistance.

5.3 Cyprus and Gravity of History

This project portrayed the discourses around self-determination demands in Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities during the British rule. Through an analysis of key moments during the British period specifically, showing the role of two conflicting demands; Taksim and Enosis. The historical evidence shows the nature of those struggles were entirely ethno-community-centric. The interpretation of a self-determination demand that was inclusive of ethnicities only raised in the early days of the Cyprus Communist Party (KKK) nevertheless it wasn't a dominant demand. Also, as it was explained when KKK realized that their demand does not have correspondence eventually their view transformed and following to the early years of the foundation of AKEL, Enosis became official position. The political discourses of the two communities in Cyprus had never met in the same narrative and they lacked pan-Cyprus interpretation in the colonial period.

The legacy of Ottoman Empire, as well as the British Administration in Cyprus, played a powerful role in their identity politics and it led elites of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to construct positions in opposition to each other. Greek Cypriots had a different experience of Ottoman Rule than the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman rule and their experience appeared to be

decisive in the island's future starting from the British Colonial period. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot elite politically portrayed themselves as the vanguards of the wider Turkish interests. Mostly, the Turkish Cypriot elite facilitates the legitimation of the British Colonial interests in Cyprus. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots who wanted to act independently from British Rule faced with suppression.

Following the Second World War, the language of human rights and particularly self-determination became much decisive. The self-determination demand that primarily came from Greek Cypriots fuelled the rival nationalisms in Cyprus. As each community formulated their discourses with an ethnic lens; each side effectively came to be vetoing other's nationalist project. The lack of consensus between the two parties enables the application of the self-determination right to be defined based on a consensus built by Britain, Turkey and Greece in the late 1950s.

It is the contention of this project that focuses on the Cyprus Problem from an ethnic lens can only reproduce the problem. The ethnic narratives were manipulated severely since Cyprus became part of the British Colonial Administration and the hegemonic actors of both communities established their power based on their relationship with the Colonial Administration. While the Greek Cypriot elite gradually distanced themselves from the Colonial Administration, Turkish Cypriot elite kept its full loyalty nearly in the entire colonial period. The way that the communities form and sustain their relationship with colonial administration defined the future of the island. Also,

the priorities of wider Western concerns, Imperial interests, regional balances played a role in the final decision at the end of colonialism.

All those shows that the colonial period in Cyprus holds the central elements of the Cyprus conflict. However international actors, who are seeking for the solution of the Cyprus Problem largely ignore the colonial roots of the problem. In general, application of the self-determination to the people of Cyprus considered as the solution and colonial responsibility disappeared. To have a novel understanding, it is crucial for the actors facilitating the Cyprus problem to acknowledge the gravity of history.

From this respect, the decolonisation of Cyprus happened based on the priorities of the regional actors. The proposed solution to the decolonization of Cyprus was guaranteed independence and unlike the articulated demands, the formula primarily banned the two main political discourses (Enosis and Taksim) through the Treaty of Guarantee.

Even though Enosis and Taksim discourses conflict, the Treaty that put in place brought self-determination on a lose-lose outcome. Also, the independence that was endowed by Britain; prioritized guaranteeing its colonial interests than the provision of a working constitution.[706] In the project, the suppressed dimension of the history brought forward, together with an understanding of the legal framework on self-determination demand.

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[706] Vasilis Fouskas & Alex Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post Imperial Constitution*, (London: Pluto Press 2009) 18.

From this point of view, it is important to approach the problem by liberating the perceptions on the geopolitical priorities, because the deep peace in the island can only come by acknowledging the silenced part of the history. From this respect, it is important to understand and redefine the two dominant discourses:

5.3.1 Enosis

In the whole project, Enosis demand had been analysed in detail. First of all, Enosis was a strong political demand among Greek Cypriots during the entire colonial period. Even though some of the Greek Cypriot elite considered independence as a stepping stone to Enosis, the developments later show that it will not be easy to materialize. Following the Greek colonels' coup against Makarios in 1974 enabled Turkey to act unilaterally and following to the two military operations occupied 33% of the island. The outcome was the division of the island on ethnic boundaries, significant human rights violations and annihilation of any possibility of Enosis.

Despite, the Enosis desire is not dominating the political sphere for the Greek Cypriots, the narrative of Enosis represents a significant weight in the national identity. The split between Makarios and Grivas was largely based on their perceptions on the future of Cyprus. Makarios's shift to independence and Grivas's insistence on Enosis brought forward historical enmity between different groups in the Greek Cypriot community. However, at the very core, Enosis carries the elements of resistance against colonialism and it is a major element in the nationalist narratives. Also, the linkage between the religion, nation and motherland rhetoric has correspondence in the development of the national identity in the Greek Cypriots, as a result, Enosis is a part of this discourse. The failure to materialize Enosis also carries a romantic element of

victimhood. As a result, it is possible to claim that the independence of Cyprus is based on this romantic element of victimhood than the glorious element of a major achievement.

As EOKA -the main organisation that staged the resistance against Britain for Enosis - failed to achieve its goal; the narratives mostly represented them as the victims. As a result, the resentment sustained its legacy and mostly found their "big other" as Turkish Cypriots who were responsible for the failure. At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus brought EOKA and EOKA fighters forward as the elements who played a role in the independence. However, as a republic based on the cooperation of the two ethnic communities and it is difficult to cooperate while creating myths and heroes that feeds the resentment at the same time. Also, keeping in mind that the Greek Cypriot political enjoyed exploiting the ethno-nationalist feelings through the fight given by the EOKA, needs to be taken account. One of the alternative ways to overcome such problems would be through establishing reliable institutions like *Truth Commissions* that would redefine the way that enables a better understanding of the colonial narratives openly and honestly. However, as far as this dimension is ignored and the colonial responsibility is not brought forward in the reconciliation attempts, creation of an environment of trust would be overwhelmingly difficult.

Also, the selectiveness in the political memory of EOKA and the narratives on Enosis by the Greek Cypriot elites is a paradoxical situation. The Independent Republic with guarantees is the anti-thesis of Enosis. The Treaty of Guarantees that are signed while establishing the Republic of Cyprus primarily bans the

Enosis. So retrospectively, the inconsistency of anti-colonial cause versus Treaty of Guarantee deserves particular interrogation. The understanding that Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejecting the Guarantee System even today must be understood within this particular historical point as well as its shadow over the crippling effects on the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

Today, for the Greek Cypriot point of understanding the Treaty of Guarantees represents more than one drawback. As it was mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it is the Treaty that bans Enosis. Secondly following to the Greek Junta's coup in July 1974, the Treaty enabled Turkey to trigger a relevant article in the agreement to initiate military operation in Cyprus that caused Greek Cypriot community experience a devastating shock including, losing territorially one-third of the island as well as 1,5 million acres of the immovable property remained in Turkish Cypriot control.

Treaty of Guarantee offered a geopolitical balance between Greece, the UK and Turkey at the expense of the Greek Cypriots' elements of national pride (enosis) which later brought much devastating national humiliation (occupation of the northern part of the island). Now the crippled sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, over those arrangements the represents a combination of reactions that constitutes one of the determining points of views for the future negotiations. It has to be taken into the account that the Enosis demand and the narratives established around the Enosis in the colonial period still lingers in different forms in the right discourses. Keeping those points in mind, references of "anachronistic" to the Guarantee System by the Greek Cypriot

and Greek representatives in the Cyprus settlement negotiations are remarkable ways to observe the gravity of history.

However, colonial responsibility is not over with the Treaty of the establishment. Also, discussed in the second chapter, the dimension of the British sovereign bases arguably represents a violation of the proper application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. As it is already mentioned, the existence of *condominium* over the island of Cyprus is entirely inconsistent with the principle of *uti possidetis*. The continuity of the colonial presence in Cyprus but handling the problem as a post-colonial inter-communal problem is just another ignorance over the attempts for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.

Finally, the elevation of the Turkish Cypriots as the constituent elements of the Greek Cypriot community is one of the most remarkable aspects of the Cyprus Problem for the Enosis nationalists in Cyprus. Still, the Greek Cypriot community leadership faces a recognizable level of difficulty to respond to political equality of the Turkish Cypriot community. Considering the colonial narratives were largely focused Turkish Cypriots as the primary supporter of the colonial project and sort of a safeguard of the British Colonial interests than it is obvious for the Greek Cypriots to question the genuine interest of the Turkish Cypriots to work together for the common good of the island. In addition to the problem of trust, in which Turkish Cypriots was part of the auxiliary forces fighting against Enosis in the colonial period, also there is the problem of Eurocentric narcissism that is embedded in the Greek / Greek Cypriot national identity. As Ancient Greece considered as the foundation of the European ideals; equality of the former glories to the rather '*Eastern*' Turkish identity bears

the different levels of stereotypes that continues today. It is also interesting that Cyprus, an island that located in the heart of the Middle East with a colonial legacy like rest of the Middle East is also considered the outer frontier of Europe equally supports the similar narcissistic interpretation. This goes to the heart of the earlier discussion on human rights; that the human subject of the human rights is not fixed and superiority and inferiority ambivalence remains.

In 1931 an uprising for Enosis occured and British colonialism in Cyprus turned into a despotic regime that operated without a constitution. The Second World War caused a lot of human suffering, but also new ideas emerged. By January 1950 Cyprus Church held a referendum on Enosis and particularly starting that point onward, the demand for the unification of Cyprus with Greece gained different levels of militancy. In those years, Greek Cypriots categorically opposed to the colonialism and sought different means to influence the political agenda that includes the armed resistance. The suppression of the demands of the Greek Cypriots eventually brought the problem in Cyprus into much complex.

Today, the formal negotiations on Cyprus problem do not bring any outcome, however, it must be emphasized that one of the reasons of the lacking consensus is few of the points that raised above; that includes lack of understanding on the British Colonial period in Cyprus and lack of engagement of the former Colonial powers to their responsibility on the resolution of the problem. Fundamentally, the status quo does not bring an end to the problem; however, due to its dormancy, it keeps regional relations at a particular level. This brings a heavy cost, at an individual level in which thousands of Greek

Cypriot internally displaced people unable to access their homes or cannot enjoy their property rights, freedom of movement being curtailed and fundamentally part of the island is being kept under the foreign control.

5.3.2 Taksim

Taksim demand was the most significant demand of the Turkish Cypriot community during the colonial history of Cyprus. Taksim demand was not as articulated as Enosis, nevertheless, it became unexpectedly hegemonic in the Turkish Cypriot community. Mainly that achieved through violent methods against a) Greek Cypriot nationalists b) Turkish Cypriot leftists and c) Colonial Administration.

As it is discussed in a detail in the previous chapter, before Taksim demand; Turkish Cypriots came up with different positions in terms of their reactions to Enosis, however anti-colonial element in their nationalist rhetoric was not defined until 1958. The friction between Enosis nationalists versus Turkish loyalists was the defining the political dynamics for the British Administration in Cyprus and that's how it was able to exploit ethnic nationalisms to develop a case to sustain the continuation of the colonialism in Cyprus. However, it is also very interesting that the Turkish Cypriot elite never brought forward international legal arguments that interest the future of Cyprus. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite chooses to take the denialist position, on some of the fundamental points including the self-determination.

In 1958, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite initiated a militant stance to materialize the division of the island. As it is explained in the previous chapter, they tried to make two political points: 1) Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots

cannot live together by engaging into provocative activities and 2) they tried to distance themselves from the Greek Cypriots by setting up parallel structures. However, particularly the first point became the decisive policy of the Turkish Cypriot nationalists towards the end of the colonialism. They continued their stance after the decolonisation to create enabling conditions for partition in the island.

The political choices of Turkish Cypriots from the perspective of Said's definition of imperialism shows that, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elements preferred to collaborate with the imperialists rather than developing an anti-imperial nationalist project. As the British Colonialism was dominant in the area, Turkish Cypriots nationalist elite choose to remain loyal to Britain. Following to the Second World War and when the British Imperialism in the region was started to vane, Turkey emerged as the regional actor to preserve the Western interests. As a result, Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite developed its alliance with Turkey. Certainly, the national kinship becomes decisive. Turkish Cypriots nationalist sensitivities were exploited to create a barrier against Greek Cypriots demand for Enosis.

A number of campaigns took place to transform the national identity upfront in the Turkish Cypriots. The nationalist politics targeting the Turkish Cypriots targeted to eliminate elements of hybridity in Turkish Cypriots' identity so that political reconciliation of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriots can be avoided.

Interventions happened when there were independent attempts that put Turkish Cypriots' loyalty to Colonial Administration in question. Suppression of non-

loyalist Turkish Cypriot Legislative Council members before 1931 Uprising or dullness on the murders of the leftist Turkish Cypriots by the TMT in 1957 must be seen from these lenses. Colonial Administration in Cyprus supported the loyalist segment of the Turkish nationalists and largely benefitted by keeping them as the safety valve against Greek nationalist demands.

Also, following to the decolonisation, Turkish Cypriot elite continued to suppress independent groups that oriented away from the wider Turkish nationalists' interests. Among many of the incidents, the murder of the two journalists Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan is noteworthy from this aspect. Those two lawyers, publishing a newspaper called Cumhuriyet (Republic); which was the only newspaper in Turkish language supporting the independent status of Cyprus. The two authors of the newspapers murdered by the TMT. It is also interesting that the two prominent figures were murdered right before they claimed that they are going to share some information about provocative attempts to disintegrate Cypriot communities and the responsible groups which were indicating TMT.[707] Following to that, among many announcements, Makarios's statement is worth to mention in which he said: "These abominable murderers and those who encourage these murders are the Black Forces and the tyrants whose aim is to prevent the creation of a spirit of cooperation and relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. There is no doubt that the reasons for these horrible murders are entirely political and the aim is to frighten and destroy our Turkish citizens, who favour cooperation and harmonious

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[707] Osman Türk, *"Ayhan Mustafa Hikmet'in Cumhuriyet Gazetesinde Yayınlanan Köşe Yazıları (16 ağustos 1960 - 23 Nisan 1962)"* (Nicosia: Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi, 2009) 115.

coexistence between Greeks and Turks."[708] Also, in 1965, another Turkish Cypriot prominent leftist and member of the Communist AKEL party Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu and Kostas Misiaulis were murdered and the incident done by the TMT. While Turkish Cypriot elite blamed Greeks for the murder, the newspapers in the Greek language, on the other hand, narrated that the incident is just another example of the Turkish provocation.[709] In addition to the violent interventions, also there were other interventions by Turkey, targeting the genuine Turkish Cypriot figures during the period of decolonization to the de facto division of the island in 1974. Those were most visible in the vice-president elections (Politically the highest level that a Turkish Cypriot can attain in the post-colonial constitution of Cyprus). If an opponent tries to run against the candidates that are supported by Ankara they were pressurized to drop from the race. Both Mehmet Zeka Bey (1968 elections) and Mithat Berberoğlu (1973 elections) experienced similar kind of pressures from Turkey not to run.[710] All measures that were implemented were consistent with the Said's imperialism and its interventions to Cyprus through the Turkish Cypriot community demonstrating that the desire of Turkey for the partition of the island continued. Those references in history shows, unlike British Colonialism, was partially over at least in theory, ethnically Turkish Cypriots experienced the new form of imperial policies and nationalist Turkish Cypriot elites continued to legitimize it.

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[708] Ibid, 124-125.

[709] "Bu Cinayetle Herhangi bir Türkün Methaldar Olabileceği Tahayyül Edilemez", *Bozkurt,* (1965, April 15), 1-4.

[710] Kizilyürek, Kıbrıs'ta Hınç ve Şiddet, 456-457.

However, Turkish imperial policies through the Turkish Cypriots were manipulated by the negative experiences from the British Colonial Rule. The experience of being part of a constituent element of an independent state was not fully enjoyed by the Turkish Cypriots, because following to the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus 1960, Makarios proposed constitutional amendments that were vetoed by the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Dr Fazil Kucuk. The proposals were considered as an attempt to dilute Turkish Cypriots' political significance over the Republic of Cyprus. The ethnic polarisation quickly turned into violent campaigns by the end of 1963. However, it was obvious that the sides were equally prepared to put forward their alternative agendas.

For Turkish Cypriots, it was the time to seize the opportunity and they re-introduce Taksim. The partitionist steps emerged shortly, by abandoning the posts in the Republic of Cyprus as starting a separatist nationalism. The decisive step did not provide any opportunity to enable Turkish Cypriots to develop loyalty to the Republic of Cyprus because by force they were locked in ghettos. While the Greek Cypriots did not call the Turkish Cypriots back to the government also Turkish Cypriots did not show any desire to take their posts in the Republic of Cyprus. Through the provocation that was started in 1963, Turkish Cypriot leadership started to reproduce the same myth that the Turks and Greeks cannot live together. Despite the narrative was a continuation from the colonial discourse, following to the decolonisation Taksim considered as an inter-communal problem. The relationship with colonialism was once again ignored.

This analysis shows that Taksim demand in the colonial period was not only a nationalist desire for political determination but also it was a bargaining chip for Turkish Cypriots' political status. Through Taksim demand Turkish Cypriots ensure their political rights and to avoid becoming an insignificant minority group with limited rights in Cyprus. Despite the Turkish Cypriots were much less in size in comparison to the Greek Cypriots, the Taksim propaganda enabled them to become a constituent element that can take the defining role for the future of the island. The role of British Imperialist plans to keep its influence over the island played a role in that outcome.[711]

In 1964, when the first UN mission deployed to Cyprus,[712] it was clear that decolonisation alone cannot produce a meaningful remedy for the damage done by the colonial experience and by deploying first batch of the foreign troops under for peace-keeping; eventual recolonisation of Cyprus -apart from the remaining legacy of colonialism British Sovereign Bases- had started. Nevertheless, as of decolonization, the conflict that was inherited from British colonialism became an internal dispute between the parties of the Republic of Cyprus. Also, there was no reference was given in the relevant UN Resolutions on the conflicted colonial legacy in Cyprus. Furthermore, the conditions of 1964 enabled imperial masters to sustain their geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean while the subjects of the independent state started to fight against each other.

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[711] Fouskas & Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post Imperial,* 19.

[712] James Ker Lindsay, "The UN force in Cyprus after the 2004 reunification referendum", *Interenational Peacekeeping* 13 (2006): 410.

The most important aspect of the UN Security Council Resolution that constitutes the strongest barrier against partition of the island was the UN Resolution Number 186 that assumed the sovereign as the Republic of Cyprus.[713] The resolution, at least legally, prevents the partition of Cyprus even all the incidents that happened after including the coup (15th July 1974) and the occupation (20th July 1974 – 14th August 1974).[714] The resolution referred "people of Cyprus as a whole" indicating that the developments do not bear any room for re-interpretation of the source of sovereignty and interpreted the island of Cyprus based on a universal sense of people. Despite the UNSC's point of understanding, Turkish Cypriots did not come to a reconciliatory position.

On 20th July and 14th August 1974, guarantees, which represented fundamental compromise between the parties on the way for independence whilst limiting the Cypriots sovereignty over their territory, allowed Turkey to act unilaterally with military means over Cyprus. Turkey named the military interventions as *Happy Peace Keeping Operations,* however, the results were the occupation of the Northern part of the island Certainly, for the Greek Cypriots the incidents Turkey's military acts in 1974 was neither "happy" nor "peace" but it was "invasion and occupation".

The military incidents that happened in 1974, created new conditions with the division of the island. The called to respect thee sovereignty, independence and

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[713] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution S/RES/186, The Cyprus Question (1964), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f20ac.html [accessed 4 December 2020].

[714] Fouskas & Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post Imperial*, p24.

territorial integrity of Cyprus[715] and later formally disapproved the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus[716] and shortly after negotiations for the reunification of the island started.[717] However, the Turkish Cypriot side tried to advance its pro-Taksim agenda by framing 1974 as a new beginning. Also, the discourse altered and Turkish Cypriot elite started to refer two people in Cyprus despite the UNSC and the corpus of work in the international law does not refer to the creation of "people" by force.

It is clear that 1974 military intervention of Turkey was the advancement of the Taksim and it was an imperialist attempt to control the territory of a foreign state by force, by justifying the presence of ethnic Turkish Cypriots in the island. The gradual advancement of the demand for partition (Taksim) started in 1956 and de facto achieved by 1974. Considering Turkish Cypriots had almost invisible political significance in the 1940s and two decades they advanced to a founding element of the Republic of Cyprus and following to the catastrophic events of 1974, the settlement talks started with a reference on bi-zonality that also includes provisions like having absolute majority in the sectors under the Turkish Cypriot control in their constituent state creates several question marks over a number of human rights including freedom of movement.

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[715] UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution S/RES/353, Resolution 353 (1974), available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93470?ln=en

[716] UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution S/RES/360, Resoluion 360 (1974), available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/360.

[717] UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution S/Res/365, (1974) availabel at : https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/84/PDF/NR028984.pdf?OpenElement.

The gains of the Turkish Cypriot community must be explored further from the angle of the power games in the region rather than their legitimate rights. In the heart of those power games that was sponsored by Turkey, lies Taksim demand. Several positions that are repeated by the Turkish Cypriot side are technically crafted ways to create a political structure that enables the most possible loose relations between the two communities.

Throughout this project, selective moments of the history of Cyprus have been narrated. The asymmetry of the development of national identities of the communities has been illustrated and the colonial origins of the frictions between the communities underlined. The consequences of the asymmetry of the development of the national identities explored. Among those, the contrasting nationalist projects were the main defining factor. The denial of the other community and group rights that are associated with the communities played an important role in this outcome.

The persistence of the Cyprus problem is entwined with the paradoxes of international law. As Susan Marks says the whole problems with most accounts of self-determination is that the right "revolves around the relationship between people and territory and the establishment of sovereignty."[718] She suggests that this view has constrained the development of more imaginative articulations of self-determination which are grounded in conceptions of democracy and autonomy. As we have seen in the 1950s the dynamics of international politics prevented such possibilities. The Cold War and the anti-colonial wave

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[718] Susan Marks, *The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 112.

combined to produce crude results and eventually an elliptical doctrine – but one very much fits Marks' description.

The self-determination is a paradoxical concept and the current situation in Cyprus is exemplary in terms of community-centric ethno nationalist interpretations of the self-determination demand. The resistance that comes from the nationalist ambitions to reject the proposals that are put forward in-line with the international law in order not to be categorized as defeated. Sources of those deadlocks must be also looked upon in the colonial history of Cyprus.

In the 21st Century, the relationship between colonialism and the right of self-determination appears anachronistic.[719] The traumatised memory paralyzes the parties to engage in a constructive dialogue. Each party holds to its own narrative. As time passes, the problem became more complicated. The indeterminacy of international law provides each party with a weapon as it is turned into a tool for the parties to repeat their positions and it only helps reproduction of the past traumas and concerns.

Today, the UN takes the role of finding a comprehensive solution framework for the Cyprus conflict but there is no optimism regarding the settlement of the problem, which can bring deep peace to the communities living on the island. While both the state and non-state actors tend to explain the failure on the conflicted the nature of the Cypriot communities. However, as a concluding remark for this chapter, it would be sufficient a paragraph from Christine Chinkin

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[719] Koskenniemi, *National Self Determination*, 265.

expresses the inherent problem of the self-determination which essentially shows us the paradoxes of the notion:

> *the ideology of human rights, notably the collective right of self-determination, has been the motivating factor for wars of nationalism and liberation against forms of domination – apartheid, racism, colonialism and foreign occupation. Some groups reject constraints upon the pursuit of their right to self-determination and resort to terrorist attacks and human rights abuses against civilian populations. The escalation of violence and state repression of those challenging the authority of those holding power within the state again illustrate the fragility of human rights guarantees in these situations. Another aspect is the protection of the human rights of refugees who flee from such situations. It is legitimately asked whether the law is for the protection of states against the incursions of peoples across their borders, or the protection of those peoples against further violations.[720]*

At this critical point, it is important to emphasize the gravity of history as a fundamental point that requires much-engaged attention. In this project, the selective moments were brought forward to draw the stronger linkages between the history of colonialism and law and the current reflections. The discourses that are produced during the colonial period still weights Cyprus context. Nevertheless, daily politics has several other priorities that ignore the role of the colonial narratives in the emergence and the evolution of the conflict.

Today, the conflict may be seen much like dormant, it does not mean that the communities encountered with the histories of the conflict and come clean about it. On the contrary, the dormant situation of the conflict can be fragile once it's status subject to change. For this reason, the social and political cost of the colonial intervention in Cyprus requires an engaged dialogue and understanding rather than an engineered process of the expertise.

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[720] Cjristine Chinkin. "International law and human rights" in *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal,* Ed. Tony Evans, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 108.

The bargaining positions that were set exacerbates the conflict and deepens its impacts in the daily lives of the people. Suppressing the memories of the violence of a particular period fails to provide a constructive framework for settlement and the public continue to follow the same discourse reproduces the conflict.

5.4 Cyprus Problem Today

Focus on the last attempt on the solution of the Cyprus problem, it could be even easier to acknowledge the conflict-nourishing potential of international law and human rights. The latest attempt for the solution of the Cyprus problem started with a joint statement issued jointly by the Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu and the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiadis on 11 February 2014.[721] The statement consisted of seven articles referring to the fundamental aspects that the parties agreed for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Following to the 2015 elections, Eroğlu replaced with Mustafa Akıncı which led to the intensification of the talks. The negotiations started with big hopes on 12th May 2015. 26 months after, on 19th July 2017, UN Special adviser Espen Barth Eide said that the negotiations concluded as a "collective failure".[722] This was a few days after the Cyprus Summit that took place in Crans Montana in Switzerland.

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[721] Public Information Office. (2014, February 11). *Joint Declaration by the G/C leader, Mr Nicos Anastasiades, and the T/C leader, Mr Dervis Eroglu, on the re-launching of talks on the Cyprus problem (11 February 2014).* Retrieved from https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-declaration-by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-nicos-anastasiades,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-dervis-eroglu,-on-the-re-launching-of-talks-on-the-cyprus-problem-(11-february-2014).html
[722] UN News Centre (2017, July 17), *Not the time for 'blame game' urges UN Special Advisor on Cyprus,* accessed 12.11.2021 https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/561822-not-time-blame-game-un-special-advisor-cyprus.

In these 26 months where the parties had an intensive period of exchanging of views followed a methodology that has been tried several times. Until they reach a point where they can call for a summit, the UN-facilitated the talks between the parties and divided the problem into six sub-chapters. The six chapters of the negotiations, *Economy, EU Affairs, Property, Territory, Power Sharing and Guarantees,* were studied by the negotiating parties comprehensively within the framework of international covenants, EU principles, the Universal Human Rights Declaration, the UN Charter and so on. Based on the considerations of each community, negotiating parties and UN bureaucrats bridged opposing opinions and attitudes, ensuring that a fair balance of demands was met. However, at the very end, a few issues in almost every chapter remained unbridged, which could only be solved with political determination.

The main framework necessary for a solution was known to all who participated in the conference, including the areas in which each community would have to compromise with the other, but the decision to put the knowledge of the framework into practice could not overcome the lack of trust, confidence, and the problems arising from collective memory and trauma of either community as well as deeply rooted nationalist sensitivities.

When the Cypriot leaders called the Cyprus conference also the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Nikos Kotzias and Alan Duncan as Minister for Europe representing the UK participated as well as the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. The high-level meeting did not produce any tangibl result. UN Secretary-General

provided a framework for the give and take the process to make the sides to reach a comprehensive agreement on the topics that were not bridged. Following to the end of the negotiations, it was clear that one of the fundamental problems were related with the chapter on Security and Guarantees whereas the Turkish Cypriot side was willing for the continuation of the guarantee system with some modifications while Greek Cypriot side was willing for the end of the guarantee system. As it is already mentioned, the guarantee system was based on an additional treaty that was signed between Turkey, Greece and UK with Cyprus upon the independence in 1960 to allow parties to act unilaterally to prevent the partition or unification of Cyprus.[723] In other words, it was a measure brought forward to prevent Enosis or Taksim. It is the same treaty that allowed Turkey to intervene to Cyprus in 1974. As it is explained in the previous sections the source of the failure was the failure of the inability of the interlocutors and the parties to develop a substantive understanding of colonialism and its wider impacts in the Cypriot communities.

While the details of the Treaty of Guarantee is out of the context of this project, the incidents that explained in the project actually created the conditions for the creation of that treaty. Nevertheless, while the parties failed to meet all of objectives listed in the treaty it is also politically stigmatized. The stigma over the Treaty of Guarantee is one of the fundamental issues linked with the self-determination of people of Cyprus in which demonstrate the role of the gravity

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[723] Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 11 21, 2017, Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/treaty-concerning-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus.en.mfa

of history and the paradoxical side of the human rights discourses that can nourish the conflict. According to Turkish Cypriot official political line, demanding the continuation of the guarantees (with some modifications) is necessary because it offers a remedy for the security concerns. While for the Greek Cypriot official position guarantees are anachronistic. It offers a blueprint for Turkey to occupy Cyprus. According to Greek Cypriot official position guarantees are anachronistic as well as it undermines the self-determination rights of the Cypriots as a whole.[724]

The second topic that failed to address on the other hand was the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot community. The political equality of the communities included to have rotating presidency (albeit Turkish Cypriots President will serve shorter); equitable division of the ministerial position (4 Turkish Cypriot / 7 Greek Cypriot) and effective participation to the decision-making process which will require at least one of the Turkish Cypriot members vote positively in the ministerial level and at the institutions that will work under the reunified republic. The Greek Cypriot side shows the signs of compromise in the number of Turkish Cypriot ministers, in the rotating presidency there were reservations, nevertheless, this was widely seen as a negotiation position. However, for the effective participation of the communities to the decision-making processes Greek Cypriot side had concerns. According to Greek Cypriot point of understanding, this meant giving veto power for every decision to the

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[724] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (24 January, 2017), *Nicos Anastasiadis – Speech Made to Assembly,* accessed 12 November 2021, http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/speeches/speech-xml2html-en.asp?speechID=264.

Turkish Cypriot side. The problem was seen as the re-invention of the vote powers of vice-president in the Republic of Cyprus as widely regarded as ineffective. Furthermore, it is considered as giving a right for the minority to rule over the majority.[725] Despite, the conflicting perspectives were reconcilable as the Secretary-General came up with a framework that confines those disagreements, certainly the sensitivities around political equality have the reflections of the narratives from the colonial period. The gravity of ethnic nationalism over the modern multi-ethnic governance paralyze the attempts for the resolution of the conflict once more.

Aforementioned deadlock brought an end to the Conference on Cyprus. While UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres invited the parties to debate further on the given framework for a later conference however both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot leadership preferred to engage in blame games. The parties took the blame game as a way to create new discourses on the importance of the future of the guarantee system. While both sides tried justifying the position within the international law either of the sides initiated a nationalistic language which damaged the public opinion on a future solution. Each party tried to formulate their position by defining their parameters on the community-centric perspective while it represents the lacking engagement with the colonial history effectively as the UN's experts on Cyprus realized that they had utterly failed too. As the outcome also undermines the UN's position in Cyprus, as it is widely seen as a failed mission.

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[725] Ibid.

At this critical point, the UN seems acknowledged some of its mistakes. On 14th June 2018 report of the Secretary-General assessed the situation following to the failure of the talks. Also, he made it clear between the differing interpretations on a framework that he suggested reaching to a settlement.[726] Also, the report emphasized that:

> the settlement process has not historically featured formal channels or initiatives seeking input from or consultation with the public, such as those employed in other peace processes. I believe that if negotiations are resumed, the involvement and contribution of civil society, especially women's groups and young people, would need to be strengthened to ensure that their voices are heard and that they become instrumental in gathering and mobilizing greater support for the peace process in society at large. In this regard, concerning existing bicommunal dialogues among sectors of society and groups, I urge the leaders to consider supporting those initiatives to help to garner and mobilize public support for and involvement in the peace process.[727]

Also, the UN Secretary-General Antonia Guterres's remarks related to the participation of the woman in civil society and taking account the gender aspect of the conflict resolution attempts introduces new dynamics for the future. Quite parallel with the vast literature[728] on the gender aspect in the international law

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[726] United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/2018/610, *Progress toward a settlement in Cyprus* . Report of Secretary General (2018, June 14), Retrieved from http://www.uncyprustalks.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-14-SG-GO-Report-S-2018-610.pdf.

[727] İbid, p5.

[728] Kristin Lund "Reflections from the First Female Force Commander in UN History: Opening Doors in the Cyprus Peace Operation", *GPS Policy Brief*, 1 (2020), Oslo: PRIO ; Marie Linn Reklev, "Developing and Implementing Gender Policies in the OSCE: Challenges and opportunities", GPS Policy Brief, 4 (2018) Oslo: PRIO; Soumita Basu, Paul Kirby, and Laura J. Shepherd, "Women, Peace and Security: A Critical Cartography" In *New Directions in Women, Peace and Security*, ed. Soumita Basu, Paul Kirby, and Laura J. Shepherd, (Bristol: Bristol University Press 2020); Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, "The Futures Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda." *International Affairs* 92 (2016) : 373–392; Maria Martín de Almagro, "Producing Participants: Gender, Race, Class, and Women, Peace and

and conflict resolution, it is also important that the Secretary-General mentioned: "evidence from peace processes from around the globe has confirmed that the meaningful participation of women deepens peacebuilding efforts measurably and leads to a more sustainable peace."[729]

It is still unclear whether by facilitating new approaches in international law can resolve the Cyprus conflict. However, the traditional approaches have been tested for decades and they are not only failed but they also helped the parties to create a language that can fit into the international legal jargon and can also nourish the conflict. If that is the case, the given situation allows us to conclude the importance of introducing alternative interpretations to replace the existing language that can nourish the conflict and to take the gravity of history in the centre of the attempts for the solution.

Conclusion

This project suggests taking a broader view on the roots of the conflict in Cyprus to understand how to view the reconciliation of a national conflict. The project contributes to debates surrounding the notion of the universality as the universal notions are considered as an anchor for conflict resolution.[730] Broadly

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Security." *Global Society* 32 (2018): 395–414. Swarna Rajagopalan, "The 1325 Resolutions: From Thought to Action." In *Openings for Peace: UNSCR 1325, Women and Security in India*, ed. Asha Hans and Swarna Rajagopalan. (New Delhi: Sage, 2016)

[729] İbid, p6.

[730] Nasia Hedjigeoegiou, "Promoting reconciliation and protecting human rights: an unexplored relationship", in *Injustice, Memory and Faith in Human Rights*, ed. Kalliopi Chainoglou, Barry Collins, Michael Phillips and John Strawson (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 106-121.

speaking, any reference to 'universal' suggests that the notion carries all aspects of human experiences. On the other hand, cultural and national identities reflect to real life experiences of the people. Universal and communal experiences frequently collide. By selectively analysing the critical points during the British colonial period in Cyprus, this thesis provides much profound role of the conflict over the national identities and how demonstrate how the specific communities can appropriate universal notions by departing from an ethnic lens. National identity represents the crystallised version of the experiences of a nationally divided territory. By narrating the selected moments in history, the analysis demonstrates the role of 'the gravity of history', which plays a role in defining the boundaries and limitations of the universal.

The traumatised and suppressed dimensions of national identity have limited interpretations of the universal. In other words, nationalist sensitivities are the essential determinants that set the boundaries of the comprehension of a universal notion and uncompromising areas and values represents the potential to fuel the conflict in ethnically divided societies. It is fundamental for these parties to confront the past through continuous dialogue to overcome the traumas of the national identity. This way, it may become possible to create a new post-nationalist identity that can include 'the other'. However, it is not possible to claim a genuinely universal notion that would deliver a resolution of a conflict where parties can fully agree with one another by silencing these traumatised dimensions of their national identity.

The project depicts the contrast between universality and nationalism. The gravity of history on the other hand contains the dilemma of universalists

notions like the human rights. The trajectory of such a dilemma is explained by focusing on the selected moments. Showcasing the contradiction between the universal and the national. Furthermore, within the scope of this research the notion of self-determination studied in detail. The principle of self-determination and its evolution represents remarkable aspects, because this research provides new perspectives that the decolonisation of Cyprus and the application of the self-determination is not properly executed. The two remedies were developed to overcome Cyprus issue towards the decolonisation included providing a sovereign base to Britain in Cyprus and the signing Treaty of Guarantee which effectively dilutes the sovereignty of Cyprus from the beginning. Retrospectively those two dimensions show that the geostrategic consideration of the Britain enabled it to extend its colonial presence after the decolonisation. After decades long inter-ethnic problems and the failure to bring a solution also postponed the core problem of the discussions, neither the gravity of history taken into account seriously.

Underestimated dimension of the history, in particular the colonial history, had overwhelming reflections over the attempts in the failure of addressing the Cyprus Problem. It is a fact that there are different dimensions of the failure of the UN's attempts for a resolution in Cyprus. However, this project brings together number of deeply rooted dimensions over the failure and provides a solid case that mostly it emerges from the silenced aspect of the British colonial period. It is possible to claim that the UN does not sufficiently consider the impact of colonialism on the conflict in Cyprus. As far as, UN continue to silence those aspects, it is possible to claim that the failure will be self-evident.

Moreover, the UN distances the conflict from colonialism and turns it into the problem of the unbridged interests of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, as if they had emerged out of the blue. What is more, the UN's approach to the conflict issue entirely as a legal matter and limits its wider reflections. If the UN were to continue this stance on the issue, their impact on the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus remains limited.

For decades, the UN set its goal as peace-keeping rather than peace-building in Cyprus, assuming that peace-making contributes to the eventual goal of peace-building. Within this framework, the UN peace-keeping mission in Cyprus involves the facilitation of meetings between community leaders in a structured manner. Since 1964, the efforts for peace-making consist of the Good Offices Mission of the UN Secretary-General that facilitates the talks, the Special Representative of the UNSG who leads the talk, a handful of international experts on conflict resolution, international law and politics who try to develop alternatives, and a garrison of UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) who patrol the green-line. However, the failure of the peace-making attempts in Cyprus brings much controversy to the reputation of the UN. Each failed peace-making attempt led by the UN deteriorates the environment for peace-building and reduces the level of trust and eagerness to cooperate across the communities. Each failure creates an understanding that Cyprus may be divided, despite the list of UNSC resolutions that define the Republic of Cyprus as the sovereign state that represents the territorially entire island. Furthermore, each failed attempt triggers nationalists who disagree with the principles for a mutually agreeable solution by raising the traumatised

nationalist aspirations of the partition of the island or for the union of Cyprus with Greece.

The UN chooses to repress the legacy of British colonialism in Cyprus. In every effort to resolve the Cyprus Problem, the UN focuses on post-colonial dimensions. The level of expertise of the UN teams facilitating the negotiations can be outstanding, although the fact remains that the most evident problem is the ignorance of the gravity of history. The choice to silence historical dimensions does not mean that the UN is following a hideous scenario or is ignorant of history, as the UN experts consider the historicity of the conflict as a subject of importance, not as a determining element in the political decisions made by either Cypriot community. The history and collective memories of the communities are the accumulation of fundamental elements of communal experiences that draw the boundaries of the universal. In Cyprus, Taksim or Enosis are mostly considered as the archaic rhetoric of the past, and for the most part, the UN believes to have the power to introduce positive notions without considering the significance of the gravity of history. Without stressing on the aspect of the British colonial legacy, providing alternative ways of approaching the problem is the failure of the UN's philosophical grounds.

A similar way of not acknowledging the legacy of British colonialism and silencing these legacies is widely shared by those belonging to the pro-solution camp in both communities of Cyprus. For the pro-solution groups, the advocacy for a solution to the Cyprus Problem mostly remains in the positive remarks of those who are in support of a reunification of the island. Notions like Taksim and Enosis are silenced within the pro-solution camp, either to be politically correct

or to appear to be sensitive towards the other community. However, the same notions have penetrated the universal notions in Cyprus' case. This introduces a particular way of approaching and understanding the issues surrounding the Cyprus Problem. As a result, the discourses of Taksim and Enosis have reproduced in various other forms. At this critical point, resolving the Cyprus Problem relies on how the interlocutors for the solution understand the significance of the two conflicting nationalisms and their political projects. In other words, it is essential to take into account the legacy of British colonialism before addressing the sensitivities around the problem.

As the communities learn extremely ideologized forms of history and the leaders of the communities established their legitimacy based on those narratives, it becomes harder for the interlocutors to reach a mutual point of departure, without understanding the historical significance of specific positions. The monolithic understanding of each community's history contradicts that of the other. Interlocutors are not equipped to counteract the leaders' rejection of the alternative ways of understanding history, which may challenge their legitimacy. One of the most remarkable issues that emerged in recent attempts of a settlement happened just before the summit in Crans-Montana. Turkish Cypriots' reacted to a decision made in the Greek Cypriot parliament regarding a regulation related to the "celebration of the referendum that took place in 1950 for Enosis in schools." The constructive environment deteriorated and parties have been unable to re-establish a similar environment after the incident. In that instance, the UN experts became obsolete. As a result, leaders choose to play the nationalist blame game rather than engaging in a

transparent and constructive dialogue to ease the issue. This crisis greatly delegitimized the climate of trust portrayed by the negotiating parties and showed the significance of the gravity of history.

Also, in 2020 following to the Turkish Cypriot leadership elections, the newly elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot community brought forward a "new proposal" of sovereign equality instead of political equality. The ideas that brought forward by Turkish Cypriot Ersin Tatar is nothing different than former demand for Taksim, partition. Even though, so-called brand-new ideas are mostly part of a public relation campaign that aims to demonstrate that there are new realities in the ground, the resurgence of the same partitionist rhetoric only serves to deepen of the status-quo in Cyprus. That means Greek Cypriot side to enjoy the benefits of recognized state while the Turkish Cypriots residing in the territories that are occupied by Turkey, facing assimilationist risks and their political future is uncertain at its best.

The conflicting nationalist points of understanding cannot be separated from the interpretation of fundamental rights. Each unresolved point to this day, in each phase of the negotiations, portrays each community leader advocating the rights and interests of their community. The gravity of history influences their choices, narratives and discourses. The leaders of both communities interpret the issue of rights from a community-centric perspective rather than the universalist understanding of the UN. In moments of crisis, universalist attempts were regarded as obsolete by the communities in question.

Similarly, the latest attempts of parties to resolve the conflict during the Crans-Montana Summit in July 2017 showed that all of the technical issues in all

negotiation chapters (governance and power-sharing, property, economy, security and guarantees, territorial adjustment, EU affairs), as well as many other substantive areas, had been resolved. What remained unresolved in each main chapter were the components pertaining to rights that were interpreted controversially. This leads parties to abstain from a universal point of understanding and stick to a community-centric interpretation. All polarising issues are heavily influenced by the nationalist rhetoric where one can find traces of separatist Turkish Cypriot views or nationalist Greek Cypriot views.

Without the need to raise the nationalist desires of Taksim or Enosis directly, the parties adjust their positions accordingly, resulting in a difficult situation where each side, as well as the interlocutors, are unable to find alternative ways to converge. Each community interprets aspects of the conflict through the lenses of nationalism. If universalist interpretations were to fit their expectation, they could selectively fine-tune their rhetoric on the universalist point of understanding, while the other party chose to justify community-centric understanding by narrating the exceptional case of the Cyprus Problem. In this case, the UN efforts to resolve the conflict through the same methodology only helps reproduce nationalist discourses. By preferring to sustain the same methodology of conflict resolution, the UN engages in a very delicate formulation of gains and losses within the framework of game theory. In other words, during critical instances, the interlocutors choose to act as the accountants balancing gains and losses of each side to convince community leaders on the viability of a comprehensive solution instead of providing political leverage. Nevertheless, the pseudo-mathematics of a solution do not help

leaders from escaping the irresistible pressure coming from nationalists who chant the persuasive rhetoric of the past. Once the leaders find themselves in a deadlock situation requiring them to take a risk, they choose to abstain from it. In those instances, community leaders need to consider the bolder decision that can change the status quo, although it being the riskier option. Determination for ending the conflict requires high political risk that cannot be taken by an individual or a group of experts supporting the process. However, as the agreed principle of resolving the Cyprus Problem is a leader-led process, it is impossible to move forward without the leaders' determination. Here, the colonial mindset behind the leader-led process is evident as well. This non-inclusive, man-led process followed since 1968 methodology blatantly ignores the changing social dynamics on the island. Since the beginning of the first set of negotiations, leaders monopolize the whole discussion during negotiations at a very personal level, making it impossible for the other actors, such as political parties, unions or the NGOs, to make constructive inputs and socialize the risk of the decision that can lead to a change in the status quo.

The leader-led process cannot create fertile grounds of trust as it does not facilitate a mutual understanding of different aspects of the conflict resolution process. However, some factors make leaders perceive steps that can bring a solution to the problem at a risk. The other alternative is to be able to go beyond ethnic nationalisms. Of course, in a context of widespread nationalism, it is difficult to envision such a case. It is a reality that nationalism is an ideology that comes in different shapes and can influence in different ways. It is common to see pro-solution groups neither being able to construct post-nationalist rhetoric

nor able to deconstruct the nationalist rhetoric to provide an alternative understanding of the issue. As a result, grassroots are unable to offer a constructive alternative that can pressure the leaders due to the exclusionary practice of the leader-led process. It is quite evident that the pro-solution actors or the grassroots organisations are unable to pressurize leaders as the knowledge of the actual situation of settlement talks solely remain with the leaders, and the meaningful exchange of information does not happen. What is also lacking is the establishment of non-formal spaces for dialogue for minimizing misinformation, as well as the spoilers who prefer to cause damage to the negotiation environment. The principle of *nothing is agreed until everything is agreed* strengthens the status quo. As a result, the talks were concluded without the expected outcome causing most regarding them as a waste of time and resources with a zero-sum game. The low level of trust between the communities also allowed leaders to walk away from the settlement talks without facing any responsibility.

It is evident once again that the gravity of history plays a decisive role in the non-resolution of the conflict. The conflicted parties formulate ideas for a solution that still represent the founding dichotomy of Taksim and Enosis. Those perspective translated differently in each community. For the Turkish Cypriots, it refers to the creation of enabling environment for Taksim and its legitimate grounds. On the other hand, for the Greek Cypriots, it means ensuring the hegemonic power of the majority at every level of governance. That's why it is not surprising that each time when the negotiations fail, the leaders alter their

position and drift apart from the set UN parameters including the political equality of the communities.

The colonial experiences of the Cypriot communities limit their ability to envisage rights universally. The lack of engagement with the history in a critical perspective creates a burden, a fear factor that the political environment does not allow to take the issues forward. Considering other actors' awareness of not engaging in radical democratic shifts, they cannot ask and do not expect from the Cypriot leaders to politically radicalize their position.

Following the Crans-Montana Summit in July 2017, a UN report on the talks referred to their outcome as a "collective failure".[731] Following the report, the parties continued to blame one another for the responsibility of the failure by interpreting the result from a community-centric point of understanding, reviving the nationalist feelings and making pro-solution or pan-Cypriot discourses obsolete.

Two Cypriot communities remain more distant from each other than before the start of the peace process. The methodology followed for the settlement of the conflict proved to be ineffective once more, which the UN admitted to it being so. This explicitly depicts the methodological problems associated with the conflict resolution attempts in Cyprus. At this point, it is necessary to revise the leader-led process to a much inclusive process.

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[731] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good* (Nicosia: Office of UNSG Special Adviser, 2017) accessed 10 November 2021, http://www.uncyprustalks.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017-09-28-SG-GO-Report-S-2017-814.pdf.

Providing spaces for much engaged and various levels of non-formal dialogue in addition to alternative ways of communication with a mandate between sides is crucial. Ensuring trust between the parties by implementing meaningful confidence-building measures either unilaterally or mutually can also create new experiences, which may create an alternative collective experience that would influence the identity formation processes.

Rather than understanding solution as a single package that can be agreed once both sides agree on everything, it is possible to consider adopting gradual approaches so that parties can solve issues while experiencing meaningful collaboration. This way, the parties in conflict can engage in peace-building within an authentic environment where they can experiment with the federalist way of power-sharing and acquire new experiences that broaden their scope. Thus, new experiences can lead to a community-centric understanding at a relatively more universal level. This interpretation would go beyond mainstream interpretations of the universal, which can provide a post-nationalist understanding and create a genuinely universal environment that can serve as a better condition for peace-building and conflict resolution.

To sum up, this study fills a significant gap in two ways. Primarily, it brings together the notion of *gravity of history* and the universality of enhancing contradictions at a theoretical level, which would serve critical legal scholarship. More so, it is also a substantive analysis of the self-determination discourses in Cyprus during the colonial period. The elaborated incidents within this thesis demonstrate the role of colonialism in the conflict. Secondly, it interrogates the development of the notion of self-determination from a political demand to a

legal principle. During this analysis the importance of the notion of *uti possidetis* highlighted to show that the self-determination is not a principle of the nation but there is also a territorial dimension. In most of the cases, the role of this notion might be silenced and emerges episodically, as it was seen in the previous discussion. In the case of Cyprus, unfortunately, the significance of this principle, in the debates of self-determination still largely underestimated, as the political elite sustains the ethnic interpretation of the notion. As a result, currently the island is divided into two ethnic sectors and a British Sovereign Base area, which, alone constitute a challenge based on proper application of self-determination principle in Cyprus. That may put Cyprus into a a unique place. However, the scars division of the Island, the long ethnic enmity and the presence of the sovereign bases frame the current attempts at resolution. The colonial past has given way to the postcolonial present.

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