Tourism, Border Politics and the Fault Lines of Mobility

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Abstract

This chapter examines the contradictions that mark the intersections between the right to the freedom of movement and travel, and the right to tourism. While tourism is celebrated as an instrument of economic development, force for peace and a marker of global citizenship, the intensification of securitized bordering practices has accentuated severe inequalities between those deemed to lack the right credentials for travel and those whose mobility is defined as legitimate. The argument presented in this chapter repudiates the normative view of tourism as an apolitical phenomenon abstracted from the broader realm of mobility politics and structural determinants of immobility. In doing so it highlights a central paradox of international tourism whereby growing institutional support for the right to tourism coincides with and potentially, reinforces calls for the securitization of borders, both at home and at the destination, to be strongly enforced.

Introduction

International tourism has increasingly come to be regarded as a predominantly positive social and economic force that few states attempt to restrict and many have sought to embrace. Meanwhile, the right to travel within and across international borders which constitutes the prerequisite for enjoying the pleasures of being a tourist, has increasingly become the focus of academic debate (Breakey and Breakey, 2013; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2007). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and centralized state-planned economies throughout East Europe in conjunction with market reforms in China, the embrace of liberal capitalism and democracy was supposed to herald the dissolution of national borders as markets became increasingly integrated and citizens (re)claimed their right to the freedom of movement (see Fukuyama, 1989; Ohmae, 1990).

However, recent events associated with the upsurge of global migration and the securitisation of borders (see Jones, 2016), bear witness to the profound asymmetries that mark the mobility rights and empowerments of tourists and those deemed to lack the “right credentials for travel” (Kaur and Hutnyk, 1999, p.3). As unprecedented numbers of people seek to move across borders, forced to travel because of political persecution and conflict, environmental breakdown and/or economic collapse, many states together with a multitude of interlocking governing agencies have increasingly sought to (re)assert control over their
borders. The objective is to police, filter and restrict those mobilities conceived to be ‘illegitimate’ or problematic while ensuring that hindrances to the cross-border mobility of capital, goods, services and ‘legitimate’ travellers (i.e., tourists) remain minimal.

During the nineteenth century an estimated 50 million Europeans displaced by the rise of industrial capitalism and disruption of traditional agrarian economies, sought new lives and the possibility of a better livelihood principally in the newly colonised territories in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, something that few migrants could contemplate today (Wolf 1982, pp.363-364). Despite the widespread human suffering precipitated by a combination of conflict, poverty and environmental degradation throughout the Global South, migration and cross-border movement has been increasingly stifled and in some cases criminalized. Rich nations have sought to toughen their border management regimes via the application of sophisticated technologies of surveillance to track and police the movements of those deemed to lack the ‘legitimate’ credentials to travel and the out-sourcing the containment of migration to third states and off-shore detention centres (Davidson, 2016; Dell Femmine, 2017). Meanwhile, tourism continues to be avidly promoted as one of the world’s most dynamic industries capable of stimulating inclusive and sustainable growth and foster socio-economic development (UNWTO, 2017a).

This chapter develops ideas previously published in works by Bianchi and Stephenson (2013; 2014) to focus on the contradictions that mark the intersections between the right to the freedom of movement and travel, and the right to tourism. These rights are examined through the prism of bordering practices and discourses through which different modalities of travel are represented, valued and policed, and the unequal geographies of movement are made tangible. In doing so, the chapter points to a central paradox of international tourism. While tourism is celebrated as an instrument of economic development, peace and a marker of global citizenship, securitized border management regimes have accentuated disparities between those deemed to be lacking the ‘appropriate’ credentials for travel and those whose mobility is defined as ‘legitimate’. The argument presented in this chapter repudiates the normative view of tourism as an apolitical phenomenon, abstracted from the broader realm of mobility politics and structural determinants of immobility.
Citizenship, the state and the right to travel

The establishment of rights to the freedom of movement, travel and holiday-making is rooted in the development to industrial capitalism and shift to mass societies in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Marshall 1992). By the 1930s the right to a break from the ardours of labour and to participate in leisure activities was established through legislation enacted in a number of industrialised states in response to the collective bargaining efforts of sections of the labour force (Barton, 2005). However, it was not until the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 that the right to paid holidays, as a corollary of the right to leisure, was established as a universal human right. These rights were reinforced in a series of international labour conventions promulgated by the International Labour Organisation in Geneva in 1936 and 1970, while the inauguration of the International Bureau of Social Tourism in 1963 signalled growing support for extending the right to participate in leisure and holiday-making to disadvantaged social groups and not just to remunerated members of the workforce (see McCabe, Minnaert and Diekmann, 2011).

In Great Britain, a major turning point in the rights to leisure and the freedom to roam came about as a result of the 1932 mass trespass of Kinder Scout organised by members of the British Workers Sports Federation. This campaign concerned the rights of ordinary working-class citizens to access the wild uplands of the Peak District that had been illegally enclosed by the landowner and was a vital step towards the ‘right to roam’ and to the later establishment of National Parks in Britain (Solnit, 2002, pp. 165-6). Although the advancement and protection of such rights can also be seen against the backdrop of attempts by the state and in industrialists to morally regulate working leisure time and facilitate the social reproduction of labour (Clark and Critcher, 1985, pp. 60-62), such struggles provided a counterpoint to the exploitative effects of industrial capitalism by granting workers periodic rest from their labours, as well as to the advancement of associated civil and political citizenship rights.

The colonial era marked the birth of travel as an engine of social, economic and cultural change, as newly colonized territories became progressively integrated into an expanding global economy and the emergence of a commercial travel industry began to eclipse an earlier era of ‘genteel’ travel undertaken by members of the European aristocracy and emergent bourgeoisie. During this period travel was framed by imperialism and patriarchal values (see Enloe, 2000, pp. 21-25). It was also deeply imbued with racialized tropes and marked by discriminatory practices in which colonized peoples were viewed through an Orientalist prism
and mobility was restricted to an elite minority or discouraged and suppressed altogether (Selwyn, T. 2017). While the inhabitants of Britain’s overseas colonial dominions and territories were initially granted the right to enter Britain “freely and without controls” (Hayter, 2004), travel for pleasure remained a privilege for the “European traveller of respectable appearance” (Lloyd, 2003, p. 116).

Notwithstanding variations in the scope and complexity of bureaucratic restrictions on travel across Europe, the right to leave and enter states remained relatively unhindered until the outbreak of the First World War. States then began to consolidate their monopoly over the “legitimate means of movement” through control over territorial borders and the issuance of passports (Torpey, 2000, p. 7). However, during the early nineteenth century, passports were often issued to nationals of one state by the authorities of another (Lloyd, 2003, p. 10). It was not until the issuance of passports had come firmly under the control of states that travel documents became associated with the political rights of national citizenship. The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 saw the pre-war era of the relative ease of travel come to an end, especially as governments across Europe and in the United States tightened restrictions on cross-border travel. Subsequently, laws were established requiring both foreigners and nationals to be in possession of a passport (and increasingly, visas) to enter and/or leave sovereign territory (Torpey, 2000, p. 111).

Upon their introduction during the early 20th century passports were initially seen to dehumanize the carrier. Today, they increasingly signify “a distinctly 21st-century identity crisis, becoming a highly sought after commodity, like real estate and fine art…. Depending on our country of origin, a passport may grant us extreme privilege or extreme distress (Pines, 2017). Although the function and scope of passport controls has changed considerably over the past century, the passport remains a necessary but by no means sufficient “instrument of individual international mobility” and a principal means by which “mobile individuals are identified, tracked, and regulated” (Salter, 2004, p. 72). Despite examples of ‘post-national’ passports (eg., the ‘Nansen Passport’ for stateless refugees 1922-1938), attempts to introduce a ‘world passport’ by peace campaigner Garry Davis (Davis, 1961) and the emergence of multilateral frameworks governing cross-border travel and passport-free travel areas (eg., Schengen Area), sovereign-territorial states continue to retain the ultimate authority when it comes to governing cross-border travel (see Hall, 2008). This was recently brought starkly into focus when Bulgaria (an EU state but non-Schengen) and Hungary (an EU and Schengen
member) resorted to building walls and fences and in some cases deploying armoured vehicles to deter the entrance of migrants and refugees (Statewatch Observatory, 2015).

The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed coordinated efforts by governments to facilitate the ease of international travel through the consideration of international standards for passport and via regimes, a move rejected by the Russians under Stalin (Gorsuch, 2013, p. 12). The post-war boom in mass tourism, precipitated by rising disposable incomes in Western liberal democracies and the falling costs of travel, meant that the regulation of international travel quickly shifted from being primarily concerned with customs formalities and cross-border traffic to one more closely related with economic growth and development. In addition to harnessing tourism to post-war modernization discourses and projects, the ideological power of tourism was soon to be invoked by international agencies (e.g., United Nations World Tourism Organisation and the International Institute for Peace through Tourism) in the service of peace and international understanding amongst nations.

**Tourism as a universal solvent of borders**

Since the emergence of the nation-state and the consolidation of their sovereign authority over borders and international mobility in the early 20th century, states have consistently struggled to reconcile support for the freedom of movement and control over their borders. Indeed, despite provisions in the UNDHR the right to the untrammeled freedom of movement has thus far failed “to achieve the status of a universally-recognized human right” (Adler 1985, p. 337). In recent years this tension has been aggravated by a number of factors not least the heightened risk from global terrorism and resurgent nationalisms. And yet, despite the explicit targeting of tourism by terrorist groups tourism itself and in particular the idea that tourism comprises an intrinsic force for peace (D’Amore, 1988), has often been regarded as a means of easing diplomatic tensions and a potential solvent of borders (see Kim and Prideaux, 2003).

The promotion of travel as an instrument of diplomacy and peaceful co-existence between states began to take shape in the mid-19th century. Such ideals found expression in the philanthropic foundations of Thomas Cook’s enterprise and was later reiterated in John Mason Cook’s proclamation that ‘Ours is a “business of peace” and “pleasure”’ (Brendon, 1991, p.189). Notwithstanding the inherent contradiction of associating tourism with peace whilst colonial territories were being subjugated and plundered for their resources and labour this view reflects the cosmopolitan liberalism of 19th century British radical liberals and free traders
who envisaged a world bound together through the “peaceful rivalry of trade” (Lowes Dickinson, cited in Brennan, 2001, p.79). The idea of tourism as a benevolent force gathered momentum in tandem with attempts by the League of Nations to construct a peaceful international order and the expansion of commercial travel during the interwar years. Meanwhile, in the United States, government and corporate support for international tourism became associated with high-minded ideals of world citizenship and peace at precisely the time when the US became deeply involved in post-war European recovery under the auspices of the Marshall Plan (1948-52) (Endy, 2004). In the Soviet Union although tourism had been heavily restricted under Stalin, under Krushchev (1953-1964) later set about promoting tourism as an instrument of mutual solidarity amongst communist nations and peaceful co-existence with the West (Gorsuch, 2013, p. 13).

Following the expansion of mass travel in the post-war period the United Nations declared 1967 to be the International Year of Tourism whose motto was “Tourism: Passport to Peace”. Shortly after that on 27 September 1970, a Special General Assembly of the International Union of Official Travel Organisations (IUOTO) (founded in The Hague in 1947) adopted the Statutes of what was to become the World Tourism Organization (WTO), based in Madrid since 1975, and incorporated into the United Nations as a specialized agency in 2003. The discourse of ‘tourism as peace’ has since become established in the diplomatic lexicon of policy-makers and tourism organizations worldwide. That is not to diminish the genuine efforts by governments, civil society and commercial operators to harness the potential of tourism to promote cultural dialogue, reconciliation and social justice (see Blanchard and Higgin-Desbiolles, 2013). Equally, however, such examples are often challenged by the intersection of tourism with the logics of militarism, war and territorial conquest (see Lisle 2016), as well the tendency for authoritarian governments to seek legitimacy and foreign exchange through tourism development (see Pack, 2006; Richter, 2000).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, long-standing plans by the European Community (soon to be European Union) to create a pan-European space of borderless travel were cemented in the mobility rights contained in the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and common travel area (Schengen Treaty 1995). Moreover, tourism was celebrated as one of the principal means through which Europeans could experience the benefits of EU citizenship. Nonetheless, the survival of the freedom of movement within the EU and the right of non-EU citizens to enter and travel throughout the common travel area have been threatened by the rise of populist
nationalist parties and growing hostility towards refugees and migrants from outside the EU and indeed towards minorities within.

The pursuit of tourism: from a privilege to a (human) right

The association between tourism, peace and the democratization of mass societies was consolidated within the politico-legal foundations of the post-Second World War order. Henceforth, tourism was to become not merely a major force of mass consumption in Western industrial democracies, it was soon to be seen as akin to a human right. The universal right to tourism is a corollary of the rights to participate in leisure, holidays and the freedom of movement. This was set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as both the 1966 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Breakey and Breakey, 2013). Although the ethical and legal foundations governing the right to tourism as opposed to the right to the freedom of movement remains ambiguous and contested, there is a broad consensus regarding the position that “tourists must be allowed freedom of movement in the destination countries” (Nkyi and Hashimoto, 2015, p. 397).

The idea that international tourism represents a largely benign form of cross-border movement, premised upon consensual trade ties between market economies, continues to exert a powerful influence on government thinking worldwide. The United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) has consistently sought to strengthen support for the right to tourism as set out in the UNWTO’s (1999) Global Code of Ethics for Tourism and the Framework Convention on Tourism Ethics (2017), while the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) endeavours to limit attempts by governments to regulate or tax tourism activities by the latter. However, to privilege the right to tourism in the absence of the universal right to development, blurs if not effaces altogether an important politico-legal and ethical distinction between the freedom of movement and right to travel on the one hand and the right to tourism on the other. Moreover, the development of tourism often implies a claim on the territories and resources of destination communities as for example evinced by the eviction of coastal communities to make way for large-scale resort developments in Sihanoukville in Cambodia (Becker, 2016, pp.104-5). Furthermore this may deny these communities many of the rights enshrined in the UNDHR, including the rights to shelter and work and the rights to development itself.
Tourism is alone amongst industries in proclaiming its elevation to a human right. It is also the only ‘industry’ warranting its own specialist UN agency, bestowing upon it a political status over and above other forms of human mobility and commerce (Ferguson, 2007). While tourism is supported by a global authority dedicated to its continuous growth and expansion while other seemingly less desirable forms of mobility are increasingly regulated, controlled and restricted. As if to underline its inconsistent approach to human rights in the lead up to the 2013 UNWTO General Assembly, which was co-hosted by Zimbabwe and Zambia, the organisation nominated Zimbabwean premier and despot Robert Mugabe as an unofficial “leader for tourism”. This was despite Mugabe’s problematic human rights record and the collapse of the country’s tourism industry for which he was significantly responsible, while Mugabe himself was subject to an international travel ban (Smith, 2012)!

The tensions between development rights and the right to tourism were starkly revealed during the two-decade long campaign against travel to Burma (renamed ‘Myanmar’ by the military dictatorship in 1996), from the early 1990s until the release from house arrest of democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi in 2010 (see Bianchi and Stephenson, 2014: 201-205). While campaigners argued that the severity of human rights abuses directly associated with the construction of hotels and tourism infrastructure and the benefits accruing to the military as result warranted a boycott of organised tourism (Keefe and Wheat, 1995), travel to Burma was defended by an assortment of journalists, travel writers and commercial operators on the grounds of tourists’ right to pleasure as well as for more collectively spirited ideals including its alleged contribution to economic development and democratization (see Bianchi and Stephenson, 2014, pp. 201-205). Following the release of Suu Kyi in 2010 (who had supported the previous boycott), visitor arrivals steadily increased despite mounting international concern over the human rights atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State (see Long, 2017).1

Despite numerous challenges including political violence and instability in major destinations, stagnant real wages and increased income inequalities in many advanced economies demand for tourism continues apace with growth in international arrivals of 3.9 per cent between 2016 and 2017 (UNWTO, 2017b). This growth is further bolstered by precipitous growth in the demand for travel from China as well as a robust belief in not only the right to travel, but the right to tourism itself in many Western societies. However, the unquestioned right to pursue tourism remains controversial given that political support along with moves to
provide legal framework for tourism as a human right has emerged at a time when the right to the freedom of movement for non-tourist mobilities has increasingly come under attack.

**The securitization of travel and the attack on free movement**

The collapse of the Soviet Union was hailed by conservative commentators as proof of the worldwide embrace of free markets and liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989). Equally, freedom of movement and the right to travel became lodestars of democracy and symbols of citizens’ free will, as described here by journalist Dan Burstein commenting upon the aftermath of events in Berlin in 1989:

“A central demand of East Germany’s peaceful revolution was freedom of travel, symbolically epitomized by the right to walk freely across the city of Berlin. (cited in Goldstone, 2001, p. 80).

In the modern era, democratic and despotic states alike have resorted to restrictions on the rights of departure and entry of certain citizens and non-citizens, for both ideological and practical reasons. Although they were hated symbols of Tsarist class oppression shortly after the installation of the new Bolshevik regime in 1917, they were promptly restored (Dowty, 1987, p. 69). Between 1947 and 1953, the Soviet Union imposed draconian restrictions on outbound travel and its citizens advised to avoid “dangerous ‘border zones’” (Gorsuch, 2013: 26). Meanwhile, in a move contested by representatives of the travel industry, during the 1950s the United States government abrogated the travel rights of US Communist Party members, including the confiscation of their passports in contravention of the US Constitution’s provisions on freedom of assembly and speech (Torpey, 2000, p. 171).

Modern states have always sought to impose their authority at the frontier. However, a central paradox of modern travel concerns the simultaneous desire of the citizens of wealthy states to travel freely with a minimum of hindrance while extending their support for their borders at home to be strongly enforced. The increased geo-strategic significance of borders and in the governance of mobility reflects seismic changes in the global political economy and geopolitics that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. While the period 1989-2001 was marked by the opening of borders and the increasing ease of cross-border travel between 2001 and 2012 some thirty barriers have been added to the thirteen that had survived the Cold War, compared to the nineteen that were built between 1945 and 1991 (Vallet and David, 2012: 113).
In contrast to the previous epoch of state-managed capitalism and international trade, globalization and the rise of a multipolar geopolitical order has been accompanied by new modes of neoliberal border governance whose principal concern is to align the imperatives of border security with minimal disruption to the conditions necessary for the continued accumulation of capital and indeed, the movement of tourists (Prokkola, 2012). Considering that international tourism generates US$1.5 trillion in global export earnings (UNWTO, 2017b), and that the openness of international borders is crucial for its continued growth and expansion (see WEF, 2017, p. 4), tourism is uniquely positioned within and shaped by the tensions that may exist between the forces of free trade on the one hand and tighter border security on the other.

Nearly 30 years since the removal of one of the most symbolic of barriers to the freedom of movement, the Berlin Wall, a combination of factors have conspired to reinforce the expansion of borders and proliferation of restrictive bordering practices, accentuating the divergent experiences and rights of international mobility. Although tourism had been subject to the threat of international air piracy since the early 1970s, by the 1980s and into the 1990s tourists became ‘legitimate’ targets by various paramilitary-terrorist organisations. Frequent attacks against tourists in North Africa, East Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia presents a significant challenge to policies devoted to open borders and free movement that are, in principle, the pillars of liberal free market democracies and a prerequisite for international tourism to continue to expand and grow. Although by no means the sole cause, the terror attacks on US territory of 11th September 2001 subsequently provided a powerful impetus for the strengthening of border security apparatuses and forensic policing of cross-border flows.

The heightened threat to travellers and tourists from various localized and global terrorist groups has provided the pretext for drafting draconian anti-terror legislation and accelerated provisions for restrictions on travel and the securitization of key tourism installations. While the segregation of tourism enclaves from impoverished local communities has long been a feature of international mass tourism, increasingly international tourism intersects with a complex and variable matrix of securitization and border governance strategies (Lyon, 2003; Salter, 2004). Moreover, these border governance strategies have been projected beyond the frontiers of states through a combination of the rescaling of state authority, out-sourcing of border controls and the use of pre-emptive bordering practices. These measures have been further enhanced through the use of new digital surveillance technologies and biometrics to track, identify and sort mobilities along a spectrum of risk and desirability (Vaughn-Williams,
The opaque ties between different branches of the state and a range of private security agencies, militias and ordinary citizens have also multiplied (Robin, 2017), with the resulting escalation in the disciplining of ‘illegal’ border crossings and policing of borders.

The barriers to international cross-border travel are neither simply financial nor are they strictly formal-legal constraints derived from the rights of citizenship. While the country of origin and political citizenship rights of travellers exert a major influence on the individual’s right to travel, as evidenced by the highly unequal country rankings in the annual Henley & Partners (2018) Passport Index, a new era of uncertainty marked by a resurgent populist nationalism and geopolitical realignments has further accentuated the pervasiveness and severity of (re)bordering practices in which differential mobility rights are becoming more marked and borders are becoming less porous.

Although there has been a steady relaxation in restrictive passport and visa regimes – the percentage of the world’s population needing a visa prior to travel fell from 77 to 58 per cent between 2008 and 2016 (WEF, 2017: 4) – advanced economies and in particular European destinations, continue to be some of the most restrictive as compared to emerging economies (UNWTO, 2016 12-13). From the use of racialized passenger profiling to compile ‘No Fly’ lists (Klein, 2007: 304; Souid, 2010), together with consistent and arbitrary denial of travel rights for travellers of predominantly Arab/Muslim origin (Ansari, 2016; Stephenson and Ali, 2010), there is mounting evidence of selective travel restrictions and discriminatory profiling imposed on the mobility of non-white and other minority citizens. Although the Canadian state has consistently prided itself on its multi-cultural approach to domestic and immigration policies, since 9/11 it has to some extent mirrored US policy intensifying the securitization and surveillance of its borders, which “rests on assumptions about race and risk” (Torabian and Mair, 2017: 29). These authors observe that ‘smart’ travel programmes, such as NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection, and Free and Secure Trade, work towards securitizing, constricting and regulating mobility. They further suggest that individuals whom do not have “mobility capital” (2017: 28) to access technologies to facilitate travel can potentially determine the level of access to Canada.

More recently, discrimination has become increasingly overt. This is exemplified by the recent executive orders enacted by US President Trump in January 2017, which suspended travel to the US by citizens from seven (later six – Iraq was removed from the executive order issued in March 2017) Arab-Muslim states. Despite numerous judicial challenges, including
the significant economic contribution of tourists from Muslim countries to the US economy (estimated to be US$18.4 billion in 2014) (Hyde, 2016), together with warnings from leading tourism executives regarding the threat of a “lost decade of travel” (Ting, 2017), the ban remains in place and was reinforced by a Supreme Court ruling (McCarthy and Laughland, 2017). Following the ban, there have also been reports of the removal of Arab/Muslim travellers from frequent flyer and trusted traveller loyalty schemes (eg. Global Entry) in the United States (Sheivachman, 2017). While such moves do not amount to an abrogation of the legal right to travel, they are discriminatory and indicate that access to such symbolically important schemes are potentially restricted to only those deemed to conform to state-sponsored narratives of legitimacy. Moreover, despite the US government’s increased fear concerning the travel and tourism mobilities of suspected terrorists, it is ironic that travel advisories in a number of countries, including Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Ireland, have started to warn citizens intending to visit or who are visiting the US to be aware of crime associated with the possession of firearms (Vora, 2017).

Politically motivated interventions compromising and restricting the mobility of those deemed lacking the necessary credentials for ‘legitimate’ travel are not limited to the United States, nor indeed Western capitalist democracies. Such interventions nevertheless continue to be framed by the climate of perpetual insecurity and dehumanizing discourses that are particularly marked in the world’s wealthiest and powerful states preoccupied with the threat of global terrorism and the “migration crisis” (Jones, 2016). However, other factors continue to play a role, including the desire to enforce secure and controlled leisure environments for tourists, illustrated by the proliferation of fortified resort complexes and islands (see Hodgetts, 2017). That is not to say that real threats and security concerns do not exist. However, while tolerance of pervasive data-veillance technologies increased because of the heightened fear of terrorism, there is a danger that discriminatory racialized biases are embedded within the technologies and practices of border governance and securitized travel. One such innovation involves the use of facial recognition software. This technology has the potential to fully displace the use of the passport and manual processing so that travelling through borders can be seen as being seamless, less invasive and swift (Hunt 2017). Despite the perceived merits of the operational functionality of facial recognition, there have been concerns that algorithms produced by predominantly white software engineers discriminates against people of colour (Breland, 2017). Legitimate travel by minority ethnic and religious communities can thus be hindered by such prejudices and amplified through greater the substitution of technological for
traditional manual bordering procedures, together with the rise of Islamophobia (Stephenson and Ali, 2010), further undermining the democratic politics of mobility.

Conclusion: tourism, bordering and the democratic politics of mobility

The post-Cold War era, marked by economic globalization and accelerated technological innovation gave rise to an upsurge in cross-border trade and deepening market integration not witnessed since the early twentieth century. The integration of the global economy and strengthening of global inter-governmental cooperation throughout the 1990s and early 2000s also led to some loosening of the restrictions on the freedom of movement and ease of cross-border travel. However, despite visa liberalization in many countries (the impetus for which is overwhelmingly commercial), the creation of common travel areas (eg., Schengen) and the growth of multilateral visa regimes, mobility rights and patterns of cross-border movement are becoming increasingly restrictive, differentiated and unequal.

Moreover, while international tourism continues to grow apace, fuelled by the middle classes of emergent economies and increasing efforts by the institutions of tourism governance to institutionalize the right to tourism, the mobility of the millions of impoverished peoples seeking to improve their life-chances through emigration or refugees fleeing conflict, is increasingly policed, restricted and criminalized altogether. However, this chapter has argued that the right to tourism (in contrast to the right to the freedom of movement) cannot justly be advanced in word where the universal right to development is far from being realized and the mobility of millions of the world’s citizens deemed problematic or ‘illegitimate’.

In a world of severe socio-economic inequalities and differential life-chances premised on geography the fact remains that the most rational and logical way to improve one’s life chances is to move from poor countries in the Global South towards the more prosperous regions located overwhelmingly in the northern hemisphere (Therborn 2017, p. 76). However, such possibilities are increasingly beyond the scope of most of the inhabitants of the Global South. Even then the unhindered passage by non-White minority ethnic and religious travellers in possession of the requisite travel documentation is by no means guaranteed.

Meanwhile the proliferation of borders together with the widespread and pervasive use and deployment of data-veillance technologies continues unabated in the name of ‘security’. This serves to reinforce a climate of perpetual danger and erode trust between strangers and to fuel
anxieties directed at the mobility of those seen to be dangerous and risky ‘Others’. This has the paradoxical effect of accentuating anxieties amongst those travelers who are often the target of such fears (Ali, 2017). Notwithstanding the existence of complex and nuanced intersections between tourist, migrant and refugee mobilities (see Lenz, 2007: McVeigh, 2015), dominant political and media discourse continues to systematically differentiate between the ‘rightful’ business of holidaymaking undertaken by tourists and the less desirable movements of others deemed risky and/or undesirable.

Paradoxically, in a world of increased digital connectivity and hyper-mobility the material pathways of travel and cross-border mobility have become increasingly regulated, managed and often restricted altogether for those without the ‘right’ credentials for ‘legitimate’ travel. Citizens and tourists themselves are moreover deeply implicated in largely invisible practices of surveillance and data-mining through the geo-locational tracking and ubiquitous connectivity of mobile smart technologies, which are used for everything from booking holidays to taking photographs and continuous online social interaction. The intersection of such technologies and security has taken a step further with the recent announcement by the US government that the social media accounts of all prospective visa applicants will potentially be vetted (Reuters, 2018). This has significant implications for the right to travel for not just ‘high risk’ travelers but to anyone whose views might fall foul of government policy.

The increased adoption of digitally enabled security devices whereby one’s eligibility to travel is based on pre-clearance of the individual rather than the political status of one’s country of origin, have been hailed by some as a sign of moves towards a new era of frictionless travel (WEF, 2017: p.5). Such techno-utopian strategies carry with them the potential for discriminatory bias and lack of transparency given the corporate concentration of power in the digital technology sector and commercial value of personal data, with the risk of further reinforcing a world of differential and unequal mobility rights. The failure to consider tourism as a political phenomenon that is deeply implicated in the various rights-based struggles over the freedom of movement will only serve to further differentiate the citizenship status of tourists from those whose mobility credentials carry less currency. This will only serve to further fuel the contemporary assault on the democratic and universal right to the freedom of movement and travel and ultimately undermine the rights to development for all.
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Raoul & Marcus are the authors of *Tourism and Citizenship: Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities in the Global Order* (Routledge, 2014).
The Rohingya Muslims are officially classified as ‘illegal immigrants’ in Myanmar and are denied basic citizenship rights. Classed as foreigners within Myanmar they require a special permit from the authorities in order to travel both within the country or abroad (Jones, 2016: 63).