

FROM MARGIN TO CENTRE? PRACTISING NEW FORMS OF EUROPEAN POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE'

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Introduction

From the early 2000s onwards, the 'Jungle', the name given by media and then inhabitants to a series of unofficial refugee camps around Calais, the nearest French port to the UK, saw the arrivals and departures of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants. In October 2016, the 'Jungle' came, in its most recent and obvious form, to an end. A UK-funded wall was constructed around the Calais port, and French authorities began registering all the residents in the camp, prior to its demolition. Many left before the camp was razed; others were transported to new locations around France, to await registration and processing as asylum seekers. A small number of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable residents, most with UK family connections, were sent to the UK. At the time of its closure, the 'Jungle' was home to approximately 8,000 people, by and large men; at its largest, it had housed around 10,000.

Refugees' formal and informal presence in Calais had a history first remarked on by the media in the 1990s. The Sangatte camp was opened in a former factory warehouse in 1999 to house 200 refugees living rough in the area, mostly from Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Run by the Red Cross, the camp was closed in 2002, by which time it housed

2,000 in squalid conditions, with smuggling activities fuelling considerable violence. Residence permits were issued by both France and the UK to ex-residents, among whom there was said to be no overwhelming desire to get to the UK; Calais was just the last place they had reached.

Refugees continued to arrive at this ‘last place’ to live informally in the woods around Calais. In 2009, their encampment, called the ‘jungle’ by French media, was cleared, and people moved to squat in smaller groups in the surrounding countryside or in the town. In late 2014, the French interior minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, supporting the mayor of Calais, responded to rising refugee numbers by opening the old *Jules Ferry* recreation centre on the edge of the town as a facility for women and children. The centre bordered an unused landfill area among sand dunes, known as *La Lande* (the marsh). Many recognised that this was no solution. Global conflicts forcing migration, incoherent international, European and national refugee policies, and local factors shaping refugee arrivals and conditions had not changed (Reinisch, 2015). As Jean-Pierre Alaux, a long-time activist with a refugee NGO presciently put it at the time: “The migrants are going to figure out that approximately 400 of them can be housed in this centre, and the others will build slums around it. It is doomed from the onset. In a few months, there will be so many people that Bernard Cazeneuve himself will close down this humanitarian hub” (Bouchard, 2014).

As Yvette Cooper wrote in the *Guardian* in January 2016 about the second ‘Jungle’ camp, “the most shocking thing about Calais is that it’s not even too big to solve” (Cooper, 2016). The 2014-2016 Calais ‘Jungle’ was nevertheless the largest unofficial European camp for forced migrants at the time. In 2015 alone, more than 1,000,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe (BBC, 2016). Many once again ended up in Calais. Now, a majority of this group had plans to reach the UK because of family associations, language, employment possibilities, or colonial history; because of their poor reception across the rest of Europe; and increasingly, because of French tolerance or facilitation of the inhumane situation within the ‘Jungle’ itself – the name ‘Jungle’ was taken up and used by many camp residents to emphasise appalling living conditions – and because of hostile treatment by some Calaisians and the French local administration and national state.

The new ‘Jungle’ was separated by several kilometres from the town centre, rendering residents’ use of urban services difficult. Besides, some Calais residents’ verbal and physical hostility increased the dangers of going there. Located on the unwanted landfill site, with possibly toxic infill, the site had initially been allocated to refugees as a place where they could stay indefinitely. From a police perspective, it was conveniently far – a two-hour walk – from the port and train station. For the many residents who walked to these destinations, this location involved nightly, exhausting trajectories, cutting and crossing numerous razor wire fences, to make risky attempts to board boats, cars, trucks, and trains to the UK, and, if unsuccessful, this required walking back to the camp in the early morning. The camp was also itself bordered by roads to the port which presented a small and dangerous chance of boarding trucks. Police secured this border, particularly at the motorway bridge (Inanloo and Haghooi, 2016), as well as the perimeters of the port and station, and deployed tear gas and batons liberally, resulting in many injuries. The ‘Jungle’ in this 2015-2016 form was an effect of the UK paying the French government to outsource its border controls to the Calais region, the local police, and the national riot police, the CRS, and to upgrade them significantly. The camp was thus permitted but policed by France in collaboration with and funded by the UK - an alliance with, by then, a two-decade history (Mould, 2017).

Today, around 700 people are estimated to be still living in Calais and its environs, attempting to reach the UK, now residing in worse conditions than in the camp: living in the open, with sporadic and insufficient access to shelter, food, water, warmth, and medical care (Refugee Rights Data Project, 2017). Paris has become another ‘Calais’, with informal settlements building up around the formal, small transit camp at La Chapelle, and there are similar settlements in nearby cities, for instance, Brussels. More broadly, barriers to movement have been strengthened in many other locations across Europe, producing poorly-served long-term unofficial encampments: for instance, in Ventimiglia on the Italian-French border; Lampedusa; the Greek islands of Chios, Samos, and Lesbos; the Greek-Macedonian border; in Athens; in Sicily; in Serbia; and – since the exporting of the EU border – also in Turkey.

In 2015-2016, however, the Calais 'Jungle' was unique in displaying extremely inadequate living conditions for large numbers of relatively long-term inhabitants in an informal European refugee camp. Many residents were rehoused in better conditions during and after the closure of the camp. All agreed that no one should have been left to live in the appalling conditions of this camp. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of discontent about the camp's closure. Despite the poor sanitary conditions, inadequate food, water, clothes, shelter, and medical provision, fights related to smugglers and resources, and constant police and 'third force' violence, the 'Jungle' developed powerful and positive meanings for many living there, including large numbers who worked as 'volunteers', that is, helping other camp residents.

Given the 'Jungle's' vigilant, often violent bordering, perhaps it was not surprising that despite its abject conditions, the camp operated for many residents as the only safe and productive space locally available to them (Africa et al., 2017). However, the positive meanings of the 'Jungle' also lay to a considerable extent in the forms of lived everyday citizenship that grew up there. By 'citizenship', we are referring here to practices of effective public engagement that, for us, can usefully be seen not in relation to nation states and their colonial histories – in which context they are clearly problematic for the field of forced migration and more broadly, for decolonial approaches (Smith and Rogers, 2016) – but through the decolonial lens of mobile resistances in and to coloniality (Joseph-Gabriel, 2015) and postcoloniality, and as part of the 'expansive project' of democracy (Mbembe, 2016). All politics, insofar as it involves acting with others, relies on some notion of citizenship but not all conceptions of citizenship are linked to place. The forms of politics and citizenship that we are concerned with here, while certainly emerging in the physical space of the 'Jungle', are not restricted to this space.

Arising, then, from the camp's unofficial status and the lack of local, national, or large NGO support for the residents; appalling camp conditions; intense external surveillance and aggression; and, most significantly, residents' own strong sense of sociality and solidarity, a

number of important forms of political practice developed within the camp. These practices operated particularly strongly before the evictions and demolitions in March 2016 but were re-established to some extent after that (Picquemat, 2016). Many such engagements had occurred in the Calais region before, for instance in the 'No Borders' protests in 2009 that brought together a network of mainly UK, French, and Belgian groups and individuals with refugees (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013). The active, 'mobile citizenly' politics of the prior 'Jungle' have also been recognised and analysed (Rygiel, 2011). However, the size, integration, and complexity of political practices within the 2014-2016 'Jungle' call for specific attention.

Several groups of actors contributed to these developments. First, many of the refugee residents had considerable employment and voluntary experience, as well as education, language abilities, and backgrounds in community or political work that enabled them to identify major problems, look for solutions, and build structures and processes that could implement those solutions. Second, the 'Jungle' attracted a large number of volunteers and small NGOs from France and the UK, as well as other European countries and countries outside Europe, who delivered and cooked food, built shelters, cleared rubbish, provided medical services and legal assistance, and engaged residents in educational, artistic, and community building activities. Third, many refugees worked alongside French, British, and other European volunteers and NGOs in these endeavours, and negotiated with them the ways in which the camp would run and how services would be delivered. For instance, varying sets of residents, NGOs, and volunteers came to collective agreements about the content and form of camp political resistances and interventions, such as resident-led silent protests, often by specific national groups, when refugees died on the road or rails while trying to get to the UK; the hunger strike by Iranian residents which was supported, with some criticisms, by NGOs, volunteers, and other resident groups in the camp; the refugee rights organisations' successful legal action, in collaboration with 250 residents, against local authorities' early 2016 plans to demolish parts of the camp serving social functions; and the protests within Calais town centre, often organised by No Borders, with significant camp resident participation.

Popular media often concentrated on reporting the inhuman circumstances of life in the ‘Jungle’, or later, on violent clashes between groups living there. Representations of refugees themselves were ‘bordered’ by silencing, collectivising, and de-contextualising within European media, as the refugees themselves were by European states (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017). However, reports from refugee residents (Africa et al., 2017) and volunteers alike, as well as our own notes and observations, suggest that ideas of deliberative democracy, freedom, equality, and human rights, seen Eurocentrically by many as core ‘European’ values, were pivotal in the camp’s political practices. These so-called ‘European’ values were at the same time often in dialogue within the camp with other, broader or more critical ideas about democracy and politics, as well as with religious and cultural understandings of community formation, charity, and kinship. Such dialogues could be seen as constructing a new form of ‘European’ politics – that is, politics within Europe – something similar, perhaps, to the reconstitution of ‘Mediterranean’ identities mapped out by Solera (2016) and the constant renegotiations of ‘becoming-Europe’ in the light of ongoing migration, suggested by Amin (2004).

This chapter discusses the operation of everyday political organisations and processes in the ‘Jungle’. It does not focus extensively on explicitly political discourses or actions within or about the camp,¹ but rather considers those instances in parallel with more quotidian examples of political talk and practice. In particular, it looks at four distinct, though often overlapping, kinds of politics that were apparent: (1) the use of ‘rights’ language and action in constituting the camp residents as political citizens; and then three forms of cooperative politics: (2) coalitions between residents and volunteers as a political practice; (3) the politics of commons operating alongside deliberative processes in the camp; and (4) associative spaces within the camp, which also developed a range of political practices reaching out from their initial, specific reimits.

Over two years after the closure of the camp, the chapter also asks whether these forms of political process that developed in the ‘Jungle’ are limited to the physical and temporal space of such environments, or whether they have potential to continue transforming the ‘citizenship’ and

democracies of forcibly displaced people in Europe, and of Europe itself, after the camp's closure. Do they, in bell hooks' (2000) phrase, describing intersectional feminism's potential to adopt perspectives on the edge as well as in the mainstream, open up the possibility of an extended political understanding more generally, in which the 'Jungle' and similar spaces could act critically and oppositionally (Said, 1984), but at the same time – given the inherent limits of such 'edge' strategies – in a doubled way, as new political 'centres' of thought and action?

This chapter is informed by our experiences of teaching an accredited short university course in the Calais 'Jungle' between October 2015 and October 2016. In that time, we travelled to Calais on average every two weeks to teach, deliver art and photography workshops, and help students write their coursework and stories. The course, 'Life Stories', aimed to help refugees build capacity to tell and write their own stories, or the stories of other people, groups, or places; to introduce them to higher education systems in the UK and relevant other countries; and to encourage them to continue their education once their circumstances permitted (Squire, 2017). More than 60 students attended the course in Calais.² Many also engaged in further writing projects, including a co-authored book, *Voices from the Jungle* (Africa et al., 2017). Some produced films and participated in photography workshops – work that again, they have often continued.³

Our teaching was not linked to research, and no research interviews were conducted with our Calais students. Instead, this chapter draws on broadcast media reports and other publicly available information about the camp, as well as social media accounts, and published accounts and art by refugee residents themselves. The chapter is also based on our field notes about camp organisation, made while we were teaching, as well as personal reflections on the camp.

Politics of human rights, human rights as politics

Human rights are frequently at the core of political activism and citizenship struggles, of national and broader kinds, globally. As An'Naim (1999) states, whether human rights are considered to be culturally and

socially fitting to the context of the activism or not, the concept of political rights is necessary in creating the conditions for political participation and citizenship. For refugees in the ‘Jungle’, human rights presented themselves as paradoxical. Most had fled dire political situations, war, and persecution in countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, and Eritrea to seek safety in Europe. Arriving in Calais, they were incredulous that such a lack of rights and freedom could be found in the middle of Europe (Africa et al., 2017). Police violence and arbitrary arrests and detention, as well as hostility and violence from local people, a few of them allegedly connected to the police, were common experiences for ‘Jungle’ residents. For example, the *Independent* reported on 14 October 2016 that the French police were taking refugees’ shoes to prevent them from leaving the Jungle ahead of the registration and processing of all camp residents prior to demolition (Bulman, 2016). In April 2016, the *Independent* reported that 75% of Calais refugees had experienced police violence, a figure that tallies with anecdotal and written reports from our students (Africa et al., 2017; Yeung, 2016).

Postcolonial and decolonial critics of human rights frameworks have argued that human rights are a Western concept and thus cannot be applied directly in non-Western contexts (Clapham, 2007). Robins (2012) has shown how, in the context of post-conflict Nepal, a global human rights agenda that prioritises transitional justice over economic rights serves to maintain inequality and political marginalisation, instead of critically engaging with the structures that create these disempowerments. Human rights are prioritised in global discourses and serve the global political elites, leaving local political activists trying to fit their agendas into these discourses. Rights-based activism is defined by Hamm (2001) as activism that posits the achievement of human rights as the objective of development; it is prioritised by both funding bodies and political institutions. In this form of activism and development work, the immediate material and structural needs of the community may be considered secondary to the pursuit of human rights for their own sake.

These dilemmas of fitting human rights language into local contexts are usually presented around non-Western and particularly post-conflict situations, where rights, seen as either Western, or as a culture in themselves

(Cowan et al., 2001), constructed around the large international machinery of development and civil society, do not fit the local cultural and social constructions of what makes up a just society. But as Dembour and Kelly (2011) have noted, and as we have witnessed through our work in the ‘Jungle’, human rights do not seem to apply either to irregular migrants in the West – in Europe or in the United States. In the ‘Jungle’, residents suffered, in addition to the aforementioned police and third-party violence and intimidation, lack of adequate shelter and resources, inhumane sanitary conditions, inadequate access to health care, including mental health provisions, and lack of access to schools for children. Dembour and Kelly (2011) ask whether the lack of access to human rights of irregular migrants, such as the residents of Calais ‘Jungle’, is a question of implementation, or whether it is a question of how human rights have been defined. In their introduction, Dembour suggests that human rights have been co-opted by Western states in such a way to form a framework for regulation rather than protection, and that defining national citizenship, the exclusive right of states, remains the core of this regime of regulation and inequality (Dembour, 2011: 11).

Despite these obvious limitations and the constant human rights violations by the state, residents and volunteers in the ‘Jungle’ camp consistently used rights language when demanding further provisions and protection. For example, in 2015, MSF used health and environmental rights arguments to secure garbage disposal and water provision for the camp. During the French government demolition of over half the camp in March 2016, a local voluntary association led the legal fight to protect camp schools, libraries, and cultural venues by advancing arguments for sociocultural rights. Many of these structures were then marked by residents and volunteers in large script as *lieux de vie*, places of social sustenance, to preserve them from demolition. Children’s rights arguments were deployed by a wide variety of actors to promote minors’ resettlement and continued service provision for them in the camp. Rights to safety and security were effectively claimed by residents’ committees and voluntary associations in relation to elements of the local and national state, particularly the police and the fire brigade. More broadly, rights to full national citizenship were

asserted by some camp residents who developed educational provision as the basis of a secular republic, a kind of perfected mirror of the existing French state, at the lieu de vie of the *Ecole Laïque du Chemin des Dunes* (Chemin des Dunes Secular School) (Ducatteau, 2017). This proposal had some impact within French civil society, being widely transmitted by centre and left newspapers and broadcasters, and by some international media. However, it is important to note, as perhaps Dembour and Kelly (2011) would, that these rights-based initiatives had limited success. Legally-mandated provision of requirements for human life in the camp was always minimal and under threat; arrangements for child residents were honoured more in terms of their breach than their observance, with around 1,000 unaccompanied minors the last to be transported and housed after the camp's final demolition; and the increasingly loud claim of the *Ecole Laïque du Chemin des Dunes* and other camp organisations to constitute an alternative republic was said to be one reason why local and national actors thought the increasingly well-functioning, rights-regulated camp had to go.

The way in which rights language was evoked in relation to the conditions in the 'Jungle' camp resonates with what Miller (2010) calls rights-framed activism. Framing is a theory that suggests that actors choose between different frames to look at a particular issue and choose the most appropriate language and strategies to address it in different political platforms. Frames do not need to fit together and are not necessarily based on the ideology of the organisation, but can be used strategically, as with the language of 'rights' (Mbali, 2013; Robins, 2012) to address a certain audience or to discuss sensitive issues that might not be open for discussion outside of that reference point. An organisation could thus strategically opt for a human rights approach in one campaign, without committing to the principles of that frame in their wider activism, or assuming that the rights approach would be a necessary or sufficient element of their politics.

Another way to think about the use of rights in political activism is by understanding rights language as a form of translation. According to Merry, human rights "need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning" or "remade in the vernacular"

(2006:1). This approach accords closely with Homi Bhabha's (2000) argument that a fundamental right, necessary though not sufficient, is the 'right to narrate'.

The rights claims in relation to the 'Jungle' were made locally and directly to the relevant authorities, as well as by using international channels to put further pressure on the local authorities. These translations of needs into norms - together with the complex media strategies used to communicate them - were often created in co-operations between residents, and between volunteers and camp residents. Such co-operations are the second object of this chapter.

Cooperative politics: Coalitions, commons, and associations

The cooperative political strategies pursued in the 'Jungle' and explored in this section are not less strategic than those examined above. They, too, may be pursued in concert with each other, and/or alongside rights strategies. What distinguishes them from the rights practices discussed above, however, is first, that their principles of operation relate to recognised practices of action between the cooperative partners, which instantiate their political aims, unlike rights strategies which may or may not foreground rights-framed means of pursuing rights as aims. Second, and relatedly, these cooperative practices have varying aims. While in the case of the 'Jungle' in 2014-2016, such practices' aims were overwhelmingly politically progressive, they are not universally and fully so by definition, although it seems likely that consistently cooperative practices are never completely consonant with far-right or totalitarian political aims. This potential variability, conflict, openness, and pragmatism in cooperative political trajectories is explored below (Derrida, 1996; Mbembe, 2016; Mouffe, 1996). We start by examining strategies of coalition, involving explicit combination and some degree of unification, albeit temporary.

A *coalitional* politics made of strategic alliances was built in the 'Jungle' between residents and voluntary associations both for delivering services and advocacy purposes. These coalitions were often highly effective in improving service delivery, such as in distributing goods, construction, mounting arts

and educational projects, and gathering data. Longer-term objectives and strategies, however, were more complex and problematic. The constraints of such coalitional citizenship emerged very strongly in situations of high resident mobility, variable volunteer investment, and large imbalances of economic, social, and symbolic capitals between the partners.

In one much-debated conflict, the ‘organic democracy’ (Dewey, 1916) of the camp residents’ committee, which at the start of 2016 was said to be functioning well to resolve tensions within the camp and to some degree to negotiate with local political actors, broke down. Some of its external volunteer allies and attenders did not accede to the committee’s call to stop what it described as degrading, inefficient, and often unjust line-based goods distributions, which had become the ongoing practice of some small NGOs. Other NGOs had transferred to ticket-based systems operating through dispersed distribution points staffed by camp residents, which could reach in-need recipients not able to queue. In this circumstance, both coalition partners, resident committee members, who were at this point also criticised for not fully representing camp residents in terms of age, gender, educational background, nationality, or views, and some volunteers – who were at this time said to be assuming the ability to ‘speak for’ refugees from their own positions of privilege and ignorance, and to be assuming the authority to judge refugees’ self-governance – failed to resolve the issue within their coalitional framework. Among residents themselves, another breakdown threatened: committee members’ solidarity with mainly Iranian resident hunger strikers (Marlowe, 2016) started to fracture as the hunger strikers weakened, though that solidarity was maintained publicly till the hunger strike’s end. The exigencies of such moments ceded to other crises, and the issues receded in significance, allowing renewed coalitional activity. But such merely successional resolutions of difficulties still point to the limits of this model of political citizenship. Different socioeconomic interests – those of people dispossessed of economic, social, and symbolic capitals, as well as national citizenship, by forced migration, versus those privileged if precaritized by European citizenships, and different conceptual framings – contradictory models of social help, and different,

organic and representational, models of democracy – cannot be resolved within the explicitly laid down conditions that a coalition requires. It is notable that accounts of coalitional politics in refugee and migrant contexts tend to focus on situations of greater stability - for example, longstanding immigrant US faith communities as coalitional services providers (Ebaugh and Pipes, 2001), or relatively settled migrants and refugees within Europe (Agustin and Jorgensen, 2016). Perhaps in these circumstances, the kinds of ‘transversal’ dialogues about difference that feminists have made integral to coalitional politics (Cockburn, 2015) have greater potential.

The carryover of coalitional political processes after the camp’s demolition was difficult, as people dispersed to different geographical and social locations – the latter both exacerbating and clarifying power differences between, for instance, camp residents who became UK asylum seekers living in small towns in the north of England with €40 a week plus accommodation, other asylum seekers supported by family members or friends, and UK volunteers who returned to relatively high levels of disposable income. At the same time, some coalitions between resident and non-resident volunteers who had worked together to provide physical and psychosocial support continue, in the case for instance of the Hopetowns network,⁴ which aims to provide similar support for refugees in the UK.

Another model of politics that can be distinguished from the above is a politics of ‘commons’, perhaps better articulated in relation to the camp in the more contextualised terms of religious conventions of sanctuary, and/or anti-colonial articulations of deliberative democracy (see for instance Mbeki, 1999 and Shoukri, 2011). Such common frameworks were often developed between residents, sometimes, again through the residents’ committee, but also in collective educational and cultural endeavours, and in religious settings. These articulations worked to allow joint, but not necessarily fully or explicitly deliberated action across, for instance, different political and religious views and national and cultural backgrounds, in favour of commonly held goals, for example in order to resolve internal camp conflicts between national groups over resources, and to negotiate with social service agencies, the police, and the local authority in the Calais

region. More simply, some such commonings supported collective living arrangements that worked across the (already fairly loosely held) national and language affiliations that structured the camp geography. For instance, group living spaces set up by Darfuri Sudanese refugees also worked as common spaces, including Black African Muslim refugees from other countries. Large tents and containers provided by the prefecture after the first demolitions became occupied by groups of friends from divergent national and religious backgrounds who looked out for each other, going to ‘try’ (to cross to the UK) together, for example (Africa et al., 2017). Against frequent criticisms of the politics of commons as vague, fetishistic, even nostalgic fantasy, and despite not having available the intensity of digital migrant commons (Trimikliniotis et al., 2014), or, generally, the basic conditions of life that would allow the imagining of a new European commons (Amin, 2004), these were highly practical and mobile imaginings and livings of collectivity, though they could indeed be inattentive to differences between subjects and their resources, and inadequate to the external challenges of state and other forces (Berlant, 2016; De Angelis, 2017). For these reasons, the practices of ‘commoning’ citizenship also proved fragile, in relation to external actors to whom residents had differential powers of access – such as smugglers, asylum lawyers, and voluntary associations – and in relation to refugee residents’ overall different resource levels – for instance, national and class differences in mobilisable capitals available to them. In addition, age differences and language groups cut across apparent national and cross-national commons. And even more than in the coalitional model, in which gender was widely discussed, though women’s integration was little performed, the masculinities of the ‘Jungle’ commons tended to go unquestioned.

Such commoning political practices were again hard to maintain in the aftermath of the camp’s demolition, when resource differences between residents accentuated and links attenuated; although it may be that online commoning provided some continuity of this kind. In the UK, groups of asylum seekers housed together in many instances also continued practices of commoning, particularly around buying and cooking food on very

limited incomes, not just across national or ethnic groupings, but where sufficient commonality of language and food taste allowed this. Support events bringing together ex-Calais residents and volunteers now in the UK to make and eat food⁵ could be said also to derive from a ‘commoning’ politics of sociality.

Finally, another form of political citizenship emerged from some specific camp institutions that gathered people around them *associatively*, both physically and socially - particularly schools, food distribution points, places of worship, art and legal services, and shops. The burgeoning associative politics of lieux de vie micro-neighbourhoods within the ‘Jungle’, based precisely in *places* rather than functions of living, intersected and coexisted with the cooperative practices previously discussed.

Such associative practices might seem, when considered separately, a weaker, more minimal politics, driven by metonymy rather than the stronger, metaphorical conceptual framings of coalitional, commoning, or indeed ‘rights’-based political practices in the camp. The resituating of the youth service provision in an available space closer to Jungle Books Library, for example, later generated additional service provision across the two organisations; while the resituating of the Ecole Laique Du Chemin des Dunes was driven from the start by the aim of meeting the rights requirements of child and family as well as adult residents, and the proximity of family residences to the new location.

The camp’s associative political practices could perhaps be seen as underpinned by *minimal* forms of coalition and commoning, based on the general assumptions about human connection and similarity, without explicit elaboration of either, that simple place links signify: who people were, and where they were. However, given such minimal articulations, it seems useful to treat associative political practices as distinct.

One example of such associative practices is how collaborative efforts between refugees and volunteers who had established the Jungle Books Library, close to and battenning onto the stability of the early-built Eritrean church, then extended more widely, link by link, place by place: first, by creating a larger room for meeting and conversation; next, by building

a children's space close to the library; after that, by setting up a radio station which recorded camp events alongside mainstream media, made programmes broadcast across the camp, and was often staffed by children; subsequently, by housing hunger strikers within the children's space; later, by supporting a mobile information and wifi hub, housed in an old horse trailer; and finally, by opening a free café for children that also functioned as a protective and legal advice space for them. Throughout this time, the library also became associatively differentiated within its existing spaces, by intension rather than extension: it served as the core of a small amount of safe housing and sometimes as housing itself; as a place for food and clothing distribution; and as a place to relay legal information - early submissions of data on children with a right to UK family reunification and adults with histories of working for UK military forces with a right to settle there - were made here, as well as a centre of education.

The diversification of functions via associative extension or intension was not unique to the functionally relatively open space marked out by the library. Schools in the camp, distribution centres, and restaurants, all at times operated similarly. For example, the Ecole Laïque du Chemin des Dunes, which started as a small wooden classroom, was rebuilt in late 2015 to include a large adult classroom, a children's classroom and playground, a meeting room which also showed movies, a clinic used by volunteer nurses, and small shelters that housed volunteers. While this constellation of buildings and functions had clear rights justifications, it also generated associatively, with no explicit rights warranting other activities within the spaces, such as a poetry and writing group, and musical events; it hosted visiting academics from Lille University for whom it served as the recruitment centre for an access course that in 2016-2017 educated 80 ex-Jungle residents. During the October 2016 demolitions, when most of the rest of the camp had been burned down, it was used as an emergency shelter for unaccompanied minors for whom no other provision had yet been made.

Smaller patterns of association also developed. The short course, and photo and other workshops we taught were distributed to communal spaces across the camp, including the Jungle Books Library, the Ecole Laïque du

Chemin des Dunes, *l'École des Arts et Métiers* (The School of Arts and Crafts), the Darfuri School, and other educational organisations established by residents – and so it became associatively linked to other possibilities, particularly around education (Lounasmaa, 2016). Our last workshop on university opportunities across Europe, delivered as a series of small group discussions across most of the above camp sites, and some others, in October 2016, was probably the most valued additional intervention we made. Course teachers and students also became involved with collecting information for Safe Passage, the organisation facilitating family, as well as referring residents to other services across and outside the camp and supporting some students' writing and filmmaking activities. A small-scale, intermittent, dispersed initiative of the kind with which we were involved had little chance of becoming fully embedded in the coalitional or commoning politics of the 'Jungle', but at times it did deploy strategically the language of refugees' 'right' to higher education. However, its strongest framings of citizenship were, perhaps inevitably, associative.

Such associative politics joined spatial, sometimes only occasional, neighbours as friends – the term 'friend' indeed being used and preferred, as a broad signifier of association rather than extreme closeness, to describe links between residents, between external volunteers, and between those two groups (although more familial terms were also sometimes used). These extended 'friendship' networks were similar to the 'weak' ties which have been widely shown, across the global south and north, to promote health, wellbeing, and social cohesion, including for refugees (Wells, 2011). In themselves, such weak associations can be transitory and contradictory. They may, though, generate 'bridging' social capital – rather than the bonding social capital produced by closer links, including those of commoning and coalitional practices – which can support their positive effects. However, such capitalisations cannot be said themselves to maintain and extend this form of politics. It seems, rather, to be the diversity, fluidity, and contradictions of 'weak'-associative political practices that have allowed them, after the camp's demolition, to 'migrate' to new political contexts and be sustained there: their heterogeneity and improvisational character lets them change.

Such habits of associative practices seem, then, to have been especially likely to carry over into post-Calais contexts; the citizenships they generated have spread. For instance, the Hopetowns network forged by refugees and volunteers in the UK to support asylum-seekers isolated by the country's dispersal system, originally drawing on camp coalitions, became a more open and associational site of political practice, considering how to ally with people who are homeless, and working particularly now through language education in sites where this appears as a demand, not only from refugees. The broadening of food-based organisations to improvise responses to other needs show how groups based on a commoning politics of food can also start to articulate politics more associatively. Another example is the French online post-demolition network Info CAO Refugees, sharing information and solutions for the dispersed residents of the 'Jungle', working across ex-residents and volunteers, French and British, to consider issues of housing, food, education, legal services, and community relations. The 'Phone Credit for Refugees' group's development from provision within the camp to provision for those flung out of it, to much broader, now-global provision, with concomitant changing patterns of priority and validation, and growing webs of links to, for instance, safeguarding and youth provision, is an ongoing associative practice emblematised even in its fundraising, which deploys the associative powers of social media platforms to generate chains of posts to friends, and friends of friends (Phone Credit for Refugees, no date). The Refugee Buddy Network's name itself instantiates such associative politics. Our own educational networks from the Life Stories courses have been sustained, and have helped generate new education initiatives within the UK, supported by prior students, as well as providing continuing support for ex-residents seeking other education, finding accommodation, and pursuing legal cases, and for public campaigns.

It seems then that associative political practices can develop frames of citizenship with some autonomy from immediate political forces. Even when such forces prevent these politics operating in their first contexts, they can move to, survive in, and appear in others. They thus display some of the creativity and adaptability often now described as 'horizontal democracy'⁶ in relation to the Occupy movement (Maeckelbergh, 2011) for

instance, but they are much more tied to diverse materialities of political engagement, and to attempts to reform specific structures of power, than that movement. As a counter, we could relate these associative political engagements to Paul Hirst's (1994) associative democracy, suggested for perhaps more conventional settings of economic and social governance. Such an approach would allow us to see camp and post-camp structures of individuals, voluntary groupings, and small NGOs as working in loose alliance - not to expand democracy from state centrism, as in Hirst's examples, but rather to build such expanded democracy from the ground up, in situations and for people for whom there is none, that is, in a space where no formal politics obtains except for the very considerable bordering power of the state. Such associational politics does not so much doubly speak from the margin to occupy and reconstitute the centre, as it turns about that axis to create a multidimensional space for conflict and dialogue.

The future of new forms of 'European' politics

Thus far, we have argued that the politics of the camp can be understood as emerging from the experience of the denial of human rights for the camp residents. To the extent that this politics is itself articulated in the language of human rights, it can be thought of as a 'strategic framing' (Miller 2010) or 'translation' of particular needs into norms (Mbali, 2013; Robins, 2012). The insistence that the language of human rights be translated into the vernacular is not simply an issue of cross-cultural communication but a central tenant of cultural justice relating to the 'right to narrate'. To claim a right, or protest its deprivation, it must be meaningful and relate to the experience of the person claiming the right.

We have also suggested that camp residents' needs and demands generated cooperative processes that could be understood as coalitional; commoning; and associational. If the first is the typical political process of interest-brokering in order to create a coalition, the second relates to forms of organisation emerging from shared resources. The third associational processes relate to the creation of forms resembling civil society organisations in democratic states.

We found the most compelling evidence for the recovery of the right to narrate in the creation of associational forms in the camp that not only sought to secure the welfare of camp residents but also to make a shared life possible. These associational forms made possible elements of civic participation and citizenship generally unavailable to migrants as members of transitory communities in camps. They augmented agency. And even though this agency is dwarfed by the bordering power of the state, it nonetheless begins the work of translating abstract norm into lived reality. Through the creation of a school with differentiated space for adult and child learners, the organisation of volunteers and so on, the right to an education and to family life is given meaning and transformed from an ethical imperative devolving from, for the most part, those with agency to a politics for camp members recovering their agency. This is why the closure of the camp was such a brutal act, forcibly dispersing the people gathered there and erasing the schools, cafes, and libraries that gave its residents the semblance of a human flourishing life.

We return now to the broader questions raised in the introduction about the significance of this experience and what it might mean for European politics – the practice of politics in Europe – today. The camp has now gone but as indicated above, there seem to be ways in which the forms of politics that began to flourish there live on and have survived the physical destruction of the camp. This *survivance* is not restricted to the inspiration that the camp's history provides for citizens or inhabitants of European states. Rather, the repertoires of practice innovated in the camp themselves continue. Do they potentially question and ultimately extend the conceptions of 'citizenship' in Europe and perhaps elsewhere?

What was striking for us as volunteers, teachers, and researchers was the degree of self-organisation in the camp and the range of different forms of politics that were beginning to flourish there. This activity and heterogeneity problematised traditional distinctions between active citizen and passive recipient of humanitarian aid. As we encountered inhabitants of the camp they were active, engaged and, in many cases, co-producers of the services that they utilised. Excluded from the rights and the protections of

citizenship of European states, they nonetheless manifested and practiced many of the most broadly recognised attributes of ‘citizenship’. Camp residents were not simply interned in the camp, they were, to a certain degree, citizens of the camp capable of exerting a degree of control over their lives. As members of associations that they themselves created, their ability to act was both amplified and diversified. Their creativity and productivity stood in stark relief to the spasmodic and faltering response of the EU and its member states to the refugee ‘crisis’, the all-too predictable response of national governments fearful of the backlash from disaffected voters, and the conflicted local state.

The politics of the camp was exemplary in multiple ways: as an example of what is possible in the most unpromising of situations – unpromising because of the very real need and vulnerability of camp residents and because of the bordering activity of the state; as a repertoire of practice that does not simply reproduce the existing regulatory frameworks; and in the creative and imaginative ways in which camp residents framed their protests and met their needs, drawing on the most slender bank of resources. The setting up of a library led to the creation of meeting rooms, differentiated spaces for young and old, wifi hotspots, and so on. Such creativity, it might be objected, is necessitated by the prior absence of facilities and infrastructure usually to be found in developed states. Yet still, the ingenuity with which residents of the camp self-organised to meet their needs bears resemblance to, and could provide strategies for, the way settled populations respond to, say, the decline of the universal welfare state in the European polities (Hirst, 2013; Mbembe, 2016).⁷

The politics of the camp is therefore exemplary in three ways: as an inspiration and resource for settled citizens of European states that mobilize around their experience of the camp to help resettle refugees and migrants and oppose governments and policies hostile to them; as a resource for refugees and migrants themselves for whom direct or indirect experience of the camp’s political processes progressed or kickstarted their continuing political development; but just as importantly, as a generally though still differentially accessible repertoire of practices that extends what citizenship can be.

It would be a mistake to romanticise the politics of the camp or to demonise the responses of government. Not only would this ignore the instances in which politics broke down along national, racial, gender, or indeed political lines in the camp, for instance, but also the many laudable initiatives at local, national, and supranational levels in France, the UK, and elsewhere. Throughout the European ‘refugee crisis’ and across Europe, civil society in particular has attempted to respond in ways that outstrip the responses of states. There have been progressive responses by national governments, most notably of Germany and Sweden, in accepting hundreds of thousands of migrants in 2015/6. The EU has also responded positively by attempting to ensure that the burden of resettling refugees is shared amongst member states – though this sharing has not been extensively implemented (European Commission, 2017). It is also important to note the ways in which civil society actors have used supranational government to hold national governments to account. The appeal by civil society groups such as Safe Passage to the Dublin Accord to ensure that children in the camp could be reunited with their family is a case in point; it has driven UK government policy, for example (though that policy has again not been fully implemented - Safe Passage, 2017). To describe the politics of the camp as exemplary is not to oversimplify or ignore the many positive responses from European civil society, states, and the EU itself.

It is, then, neither a romanticisation nor an oversimplification to speak of the exemplarity of the politics of the camp. But the attempt to delimit the space of the political and restrict the practice of citizenship through the constitutive power of the sovereign state is perhaps especially likely to give rise, outside these limits, to an expanded and resistant conception of democracy and citizenship with ties and obligations that transcend those owed to co-national citizens. The existence of such spaces – in this case within the literal space of the Calais camp, in post-Calais places, and in other similar camps and refugee spaces, within the body-politic of European democratic states - gives lie to the claim that the rights of states harmonize effortlessly with the safeguarding of human rights for individuals. Not only can the rights of national citizens coexist alongside the complete absence of rights for migrants, but it is an open question as to whether the former is to

some extent predicated on – and therefore complicit with – the withholding of rights from the latter. The suggestion, then, is that the example provided by the camp is the basis for an extended concept of citizenship, moving beyond the ties and obligations that define national citizenship to a more plural, mobile, and decolonised conception.

It is also important that it is ‘citizenship’ that is extended, rather than the more general and more abstract concept of the acting subject. The rights and obligations of citizens have usually been restricted in traditional liberal thought to the relations of individuals in and to the bounded society. This restriction generates the opposition between the reciprocal rights and obligations of citizens and the non-reciprocal, supererogatory actions of individuals acting essentially *for* others who lack the power to act for themselves. But this opposition is not what is being proposed here. At a minimum, the exemplary character of the politics of the camp problematises any understanding of practical agency along these lines. The burgeoning civic, associationalist, and political life of the ‘Jungle’ repudiates the accepted definition of camp residents as mute and passive recipients of aid and puts pressure, in turn, on any restricted understanding of ‘citizenship’ in these circumstances.

Finally, it is this capacity to extend our conception of citizenship that represents an opportunity for the politics of the periphery both to react back on and alter the politics of the centre, and to give volume to that flat conceptual plane. By acting *with* rather than *for* refugees, the opportunity presents itself to extend our understanding of ourselves – whether national citizens, European citizens, or those without state citizenship – as political actors. Instead of seeing ourselves as settled citizens of a bounded state, we come instead to view ourselves as members of an open polity, constantly mobile, in the process of reinterpreting ourselves and what it means to be a ‘citizen’ of such a state. It further follows from this fluidity that who ‘we’ are is not fixed but is itself constantly open to being extended, re-thought, and re-interpreted.

This process by which the conception of citizenship comes to be extended does not impute a universal significance to the experience of the camp and the politics practised there. It does, however, undermine the

claim to universality for the conception of citizenship operative in European democracies, and for most of the modifications of that concept – opposing its gendering, its classed character, its age limitations, for instance – that are proposed. The extension of the concept of citizenship is on one level just that; the extension to non-citizens, to those excluded from the rights and privileges of citizenship. At another level, however, it is the extension of what citizenship might be; what it might involve. The forms of citizenship appearing within the ‘Jungle’ and persisting thereafter come much closer to the expanded, continuing pursuit of questions about democracy, and the decolonial repossessions mobilised from within, that have been proposed, in very different contexts, by Mbembe (2016) and Joseph-Gabriel (2015), as well as the renegotiations of ‘Mediterranean’ citizenship (Amin, 2004; Solano, 2016) – not as central versus marginal, but as ‘becoming-European’, or as at a crossroads.

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Notes

- 1 It would be possible and interesting, here, to consider the politics of No Borders and other humanitarian-focused organisations, in relation to the quite disparate political views of residents; or the relations between secular and non-secular NGOs and the residents. Even more specifically, it would be valuable to consider the relations between activists and ‘humanitarian’ volunteers, as well as between those from different backgrounds (national, religious) and relations between different types of volunteering, more or less professionalised. Such discussion is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter (but see McGee and Pelham, 2017). We are also strongly aware that the prior political persecution of many residents meant that they were necessarily going to operate politically in implicit ways. We have paid attention to these implicitly ‘political’ expressions by camp residents, rather than their silences about overtly political issues.
- 2 For the work developed in Calais, including Life Stories, please see the Educating without borders website <https://educatingwithoutborders.wordpress.com/> and the University for all ‘Life Stories’ page within it: <https://educatingwithoutborders.wordpress.com/university-for-all-2/#>. This course has since continued in collaboration with the OLIve Erasmus+ open learning initiative for people from refugee backgrounds, now in

process at UEL, the University of Vienna, and CEU; as well as within the Greater Manchester Refugee Support Network, UNITE, the youth group NOMAD, and at other upcoming venues. For OLIVE, please see: <https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/social-sciences/olive>

- 3 Please see the Educating without borders Displaces page for photography <https://educatingwithoutborders.wordpress.com/displaces-a-project-by-gideon-mendel-and-calais-jungle-residents/> and ‘The Bridge’ for an example of film. Later work includes a further Displaces ‘Beautiful Swarm’ project (<https://displacesblog.wordpress.com/>) and a number of videos (for instance, ‘Who opens a school...’ <http://loudminority.co.uk/?portfolio=who-opens-a-school> by Bhavesh Hindocha of Loud Minority, and Majid Adin’s ‘Rocket Man’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtVBCG6ThDk>).
- 4 Hopetowns is a refugee-lead informal group providing two-way support for volunteers and refugees from the ‘Jungle’ camps and elsewhere, and which communicates through social media <https://www.facebook.com/hopetownsUK/> (Accessed 23 July 2018).
- 5 See for example Stories and Supper <https://www.storiesandsupper.co.uk/> (accessed 23 July 2018) and Welcome Cinema and Kitchen <http://welcomepresents.com/> (accessed 23 July 2018).
- 6 This is something Coe and Vandegrift (2014) have described in other contexts as a form of practical utopianism. This framing is also close to the ‘prophetic pragmatism’ Cornell West (1989) lays out. See also work on horizontal and transversal politics: Maeckelbergh (2012); Massey, 1999).
- 7 Here we are deploying Mbembe’s emphasis on repair or reparative, creative skills, in low-resourced African contexts (2016) as well as Hirst’s (2013) emphasis on the value of ‘associative’ organisations and structures.