

# **Enhancing community resilience: Assessing the role that black, Asian and minority ethnic law enforcement (LEA) staff associations and networks can play in the fight against radicalisation.**

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## **10.1 Introduction**

In the fight against radicalisation and countering violent extremism (CVE), an emerging approach, that of community resilience, is garnering plaudits in Europe (see European Commission 2015) and other parts of the world, for example, in Kenya (Van Metre 2016) and the USA (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Van Metre and Calder 2016; Weine et al. 2013; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2011). The push for community resilience as an approach to tackling radicalisation stems in part from (I) the recognition of the fact that many people who are similarly experiencing social, economic or political adversities; or those who support or accept the ideologies or religious doctrines that others have quoted to justify extremist violence are not, themselves, prone to violence, and (II) the belief that there are elements within communities ‘at risk’ that are counter violence whose energies can be harnessed to ensure peace. Accordingly, a public health approach to dealing with violence is gaining grounds that sees the problem as a disease, shifting the emphasis from traditional law enforcement *per se* to understanding the root causes of the problem and adopting a ‘progressive and holistic approach’ which emphasises support to communities ‘from the ground up’ and, establishing strong multi-agency relationships with key people in education, social services, child and adolescent mental health teams, to start to share information, work together on positive interventions and think long-term (HM Government 2018; WHO 2015).

Although not an entirely new way of dealing with social problems, what is strategic in the public health approach is the emphasis that is placed on

*“the full participation of communities to engender a sense of ownership of this problem and solutions [ ] to empower people and their communities to see violence not as an inevitable consequence of modern life but as a problem that can be understood and changed” (Mercy et al. 1993, p. 8).*

This approach in *collective efficacy* is believed to have the potential for greater impact and long-term sustainability (Weine et al. 2013; Sampson et al. 1997; Mercy et al. 1993)

This chapter examines the concept of community resilience in countering radicalisation and highlights the importance of the need for Europe to consider making more effective use of their minority ethnic law enforcement (LEA) officers in community engagement activities to enhance community resilience in the fight against radicalisation and other CVE activities that are specifically linked to minority ethnic groups and their communities. It is argued that building ‘social connection’ through the harnessing and enhancement of the role and participation of minority ethnic police officers in counter-terrorism activities can provide the much needed effective community engagement to build resilience through genuine culturally sensitive partnerships that are based on trust and confidence (see Ellis and Abdi 2017).

## **10.2 Defining Community Resilience**

The concept of *community* is a contested one with different meanings imposed by different disciplines; but, central to these different definitions of community is a sense of ‘belonging’ either (I) in a geographical sense, for example through a neighbourhood or, (II) socially, whereby people who hold the same interests, social leanings, sexualities, ideologies, religions or cultural values identify themselves as belonging to specific or recognisable *communities* that may transcend geographical or even international boundaries (Cooper 2008; Hillary 1955). *Community* is increasingly being recognised as a social phenomenon whereby particular social groups, ‘bound’ together by their histories, ‘race’ religions and cultures commonly refer to themselves as *communities* ‘undivided’ by geographical boundaries.

*Resilience* is an equally complex concept. From its roots in psychology and psychopathology, the term has grown and has become contextualised in many different ways by many disciplines including social policy, politics, engineering, youth studies, urban studies and medicine. Central to the definitions of resilience is the idea of having the ability or capacity to withstand adversity or disaster or having the ability to ‘bounce back’ after experiencing significant adversity or being able to function well ‘despite the odds’. In humans, resilience was primarily defined as an individual attribute conceptualised in terms of personal traits and capabilities to manipulate risk and protective factors in order to overcome adversity. The concept has developed over the years and is now commonly regarded not as an individual attribute but the outcome of a *process* of systematic interaction between the individual

and the wider socio-cultural or environmental influences (see Ungar 2008; 2011). There is now an overwhelming acceptance of the fact that resilience is culturally relative concept and that much depends on the quality of the interaction to achieve it (Ungar 2008; Ungar et al. 2005),

Michael Ungar defined resilience as the product of strategic and positive relationship between the individual and resource providers, (for example, state services, welfare support agencies, NGOs, LEAs etc) to enable a community to overcome an adversity (Ungar 2011). In this relationship, the individual must demonstrate capabilities in terms of having skills, abilities or willingness to want to overcome the defined adversity; and, the resource providers must provide resources to meet these needs or desires. What is important is that the resources must be provided in a culturally meaningful way so that the individual will naturally 'navigate' towards them. Most important in this resource-focused relationship is that what is finally decided as the requirements to 'bounce back' recover from or overcome the adversity are 'negotiated' and agreed. In this definition of resilience, therefore, the individual is 'empowered', supported and encouraged to achieve a desired goal. For an extended discussion of community resilience, see Chapter 9.

The key ideas in Ungar's (2011) definition are: (I) the existence of particular relevant individual skills and capabilities – a definitive or genuine desire to want to overcome an adversity or social problem (II) the existence of resource providers who are able to provide resources (support) not in a generic terms but in a manner that is culturally meaningful to the recipient, (III) the ability of individuals to navigate to these resources. This implies that the individuals are aware that these resources are there, accept them as desirable resources and are able to 'navigate' towards them willingly and without fear of discrimination; and (IV) what is finally agreed must be negotiated in a manner that is fair and culturally acceptable. Because the process is negotiated and agreed, the chances of resilience occurring are high.

This chapter adopts Ungar's (2011) concept of resilience and applies it to communities. Community resilience is the ability of a community to 'bounce back' from a position of adversity or overcome a significant crisis or problem; that ability being the outcome of a *process* in which community capabilities are harnessed and supported by the provision of outside resources designed to enable the community to recover from adversity or rebuild itself. The chapter concurs with the view that resilience will not occur where resources to support community ability to recover are

not presented in a culturally acceptable manner and, more importantly, not negotiated bottom-up but 'imposed' top-down. The willingness to 'want to bounce back' must be present and the resources to support this must be culturally meaningful. This definition of community resilience rejects the notion that resilience is the individual and specific attribute of a community. No community can be by itself resilient, however coherent, strong or determined the community is to overcome its problems. Resilience is not simply about self-discipline or self-determination; the concept is used in this chapter to refer to situations where the adversity to be confronted requires significant efforts beyond what the community, by itself, can handle; for example, tackling violent extremism or a significant physical disaster.

It is important that the ability or willingness to recover (capabilities) is identifiable and recognised or even measurable, and the resources provided must not override but support these community competences such that the community feels valued, empowered and enabled through effective partnership and participation to work towards rebuilding their communities. The community 'navigates' to these resources not because (I) they are there (II) they are provided by government agencies or through outside organisations that are known for particular relevant skills or expertise in dealing with the relevant problems; or (III) they are provided by those who claim to have worked with comparable communities in the past (e.g. NGOs or Third Sector organisations, civil rights organisations etc with a 'track record' of similar work). 'Navigation' will only take place where the community has trust and confidence in the resource providers who, on their part, must also have the necessary cultural knowledge and competence. Trust and confidence in an organisation can emerge from the fact that the organisation has shown genuine interest in past community affairs, for example, on issues that involve the community's welfare or safety to the point that they are valued and respected by the community.

### **10.2.1 Community capabilities**

The capacity or capability of communities in the context of resilience can be defined in terms of social capital or community competence, including having a sense of commitment to the community (see Ellis and Abdi 2017). Social capital is defined by Heywood as "the levels of trust and sense of social connectedness that help to promote stability, cohesion and prosperity; what turns the 'I' into 'we'" (cited in Newman et al, p.379). Norris et al. (2008, p.139) articulate that social capital consists

of three social psychological elements as follows: *sense of community*, *place attachments* and *citizen participation*. *Sense of community* refers to the way in which communities share concerns and values and is bound by a high level of interest in community issues coupled with engrained sense of community service and respect (Sonn and Fisher 1998). *Place attachment* is linked to a sense of community and infers an emotional connection to a neighbourhood. For Perkins et al. (2002), place attachments are integral to need for communities to regenerate and therefore critical to community resilience. *Citizen participation* is the engagement of community members within support groups or formal organisations and support networks. In addition to this social connectedness, there must be optimism, hope and positive social intelligence; namely, being able to identify and define the community's needs in practical terms and make meaningful demands on needed resources.

Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2013) also identified community leadership as a key requirement of community resilience – a leadership that is authentic and grassroots; one that has credibility because it comes from within the community and truly represents its uniqueness and aspirations. However, the definition of community leadership has to be strategic as different groups within a community may identify with different leaders or leadership structures. Most important, perhaps, is the ability of a community to organise themselves, and work together to identify and prioritise goals in a realistic and achievable manner (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Ganor and Ben-Lavy 2013; Norris et al 2008).

The fact that a community has these attributes does not mean that it is resilient. It simply means that it has the ingredients (capabilities) within it that can enable it to address problems or 'bounce back' from a position of adversity. Communities will need support to build social bonding and a strong social identity through effective partnership and engagement with resource providers or agencies with skills and competences to bolster individual and community identity, alleviate fears and misconceptions, encourage social bridging and promote inclusion and positive attitudes (Al Raffie 2013; Spalek 2013; Weine 2012; Schanzer et al. 2010). Studies undertaken by Ellis et al. (2014; 2016) indicate that social bridging can be associated with less openness to violence. What is important in this relationship is the cultural competence of the resource providers. There is a basic requirement of understanding and appreciation of cultural nuances and/or religious practices many of which cannot be gained by simply reading a book or research reports written by 'outsiders'.

Furthermore, provisions must aim at being as inclusive as possible; including underrepresented populations as well as those in the majority (Gaynor and Ben-Lavy 2013). As indicated above, trust and confidence in the service providers are also very crucial to community resilience. Also, see Chap 9.

### **10.2.2. Cultural Competence**

It is the position of this chapter that the ability of external resource providers to provide community resources that are adequate enough to build community resilience to counter radicalisation will depend very much on their cultural competence. Organisations or agencies that claim to have ‘professional’ knowledge but are not culturally aware are most likely to engage badly and the process of negotiation will be weak as trust and confidence of the community will be lacking. Cultural competence includes having cultural knowledge and understanding of the life experiences of the different ethnicities, religions and faiths in the community and also of lifestyles, for example, minority ethnic youth cultures. Cultural competence is more effective if based on cultural affiliations (for example, where the providers are of the same ethnicity or religion) but, in addition, there must be an existing relationship whereby the provider had, in the past, shown genuine interest in the affairs of the community though help and support given during past crisis situations.

### **10.3 Engaging communities to foster resilience against radicalisation:**

Fostering community resilience as a form of disaster readiness has been adopted in the UK where the emphasis is on

*‘informing engaging and empowering communities’ with specific reference to ‘not creating or identifying a whole new community network or a one off response to a recovery from an incident, but rather an ongoing process of using and enhancing existing relationships to better improve the emergency preparedness of an area’ (Cabinet Office 2016, p.8).*

In its Inquiry into Radicalisation, the UK Home Affairs Select Committee (HM Government, 2017 HC 135) recommended the importance of building a resilience programme aimed at enabling

*young people better develop critical skills required to be conscious of manipulation and grooming and to actively question information they receive –*

*both offline and online. It is only when they are equipped with these skills that they will be able to develop the resilience and tenacity necessary to deal with the complex issues of faith, identity. (HM Government 2017 HC135, p.39)*

Positively, the Select Committee recognised the importance of external factors in building community resilience and therefore specifically recommended that programmes to build community resilience to counter radicalisation must be developed in conjunction with community organisations, policing bodies and education experts (For UK Government response to the Select Committee report, see HM Government, 2017).

The UK Government's response to the Select Committee recommendation on resilience was the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) which introduced (in section 26), as part of the state *Prevent* agenda, a general duty, known as the 'prevent duty', on specified public bodies enjoining them to have, in the exercise of their duties, due regard to the need to prevent people from being radicalised or drawn into terrorism. These specific public bodies include local authorities, criminal justice agencies, health and social care providers, childcare and educational institutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2017 Cm 955:16).

Generally, the UK *Prevent* agenda is structured on the realization of the need to utilize or enhance community resilience through the involvement of a variety of agencies in the tackling of radicalization in communities where the potential for radicalisation is believed to be high (HM Government 2008; 2011). *Prevent* has been criticised on a number of fronts (See Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013). One of the key criticisms is that the decisions on the resources that are needed in targeted communities to booster resilience in order to counter radicalisation are not negotiated with communities but imposed by central government or local authorities on the basis of official understanding or 'expert' views on the causes of radicalisation. Community competence in terms of community willingness to tackle radicalisation is often not recognised as these are communities that should not be trusted (Kundnani 2007). Instead, engagement with 'suspect communities' has been mainly through their professed community and faith leaders. However, the bulk of *Prevent* work, for example, with 'vulnerable' youths is often done without these leaders but

‘professionally’ by agencies who operate within their own defined professional knowledge of ‘youth issues’.

A positive point in favour of *Prevent* is the recognition of the need to see radicalisation as a ‘health issue’ and to encourage the participation of a variety of agencies or organisations to work alongside law enforcement and security agencies in order to build community resilience where it is believed that opportunities to embrace violent extremist ideologies are high and therefore, radicalisation is an issue. It has not been made clear, however, how the ‘mix’ of agencies is reached for particular communities (presumably, *Prevent* activities in communities will vary depending on the assessment of ‘needs’) and the nature and extent of community involvement in the process is not adequately documented. As it is not always clear how much of *Prevent* inputs have been negotiated with the communities, the issue of navigation on the part of communities is problematic. If ‘navigation’ had taken place (judged in terms of ‘participation’ by communities in *Prevent* activities) it is often not clear how much of the ‘navigation’ is voluntary in which case community empowerment is also problematic. Most importantly, it is often not clear whether the skills and capabilities within the communities have been properly assessed or utilised. Instead, decisions are often made in terms of perceived needs of target groups (young people) and what research has revealed on the causes and routes to radicalisation. Thus the agencies/service providers become the custodians of what radicalisation is (not what the communities think that it is) and the solutions are ‘professionally’ defined.

A great omission in the *Prevent* approach to tackling radicalisation, however, is the assumption that communities acknowledge the legitimacy of the agencies/service providers that have been chosen or that they recognise and accept them. In *Prevent*, professionalism seems to override the need for cultural competency, trust and confidence. More important is the fact that the role of LEAs in *Prevent* is not well defined. Service providers/agencies working on *Prevent* activities in a community are likely to be seen as working for the police or the government. This ‘dual role’, which is not unknown, to communities, has led, to *Prevent* activities being seen by some communities as government’s ‘snooping’ exercises (Kundnani 2007; 2014; Spalek 2013; Lambert 2011).

Nevertheless, LEAs and security agencies are central to counter-radicalisation and CVE activities in EU and other countries. What is important is how this significant role is defined. In the UK as in most EU countries, the role of LEAs in



building community resilience to counter radicalisation is not clearly stated but loosely defined in various forms, under the general umbrella of *community policing* or police-community engagement. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) do not normally have specific community resilience agendas to counter radicalisation. It is doubtful whether communities expect LEAs to be helpful in re-building communities and offering social support, for example, to young people who are prone to being radicalised. LEAs have historically been seen as agents of governments and therefore cannot be seen as helping those who harbour revolutionary or anti-state views.

#### **10.4 ‘Race’ and Criminal Justice**

There has been a longstanding push on diversity in the UK Criminal Justice System (CJS) which is underpinned by the notion that the CJS should reflect the community it serves (McPherson 1999; Scarman 1981). This is on the basis that a diverse workforce is thought to be better able to understand the issues and needs facing diverse communities and therefore able to improve BAME trust and confidence in the CJS (OCJR 2005a; Confidence Unit 2003; Bowling and Philips 2002). It is felt that this will have a knock on effect on encouraging people to report crime, come forward as victims and witnesses, stay with the prosecution process and participate as jurors (OCJR 2005b). Most importantly, in relation to BAME communities, a diverse workforce is perceived as creating the perception of fairness in the CJS through the involvement of BAME staff (HM Government 2007; Home Office 2005). For a discussion on how judicial systems might contribute to counter-radicalisation efforts, see Cap 8.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 and more specifically after the 7/7 London terrorist attacks, the need to draw up an ethnically diversified CJS, particularly in the police, have gained grounds in UK Government narratives on tackling radicalisation and the perceived proneness to violent extremisms particularly in Muslim communities (Johnson 2016; Spalek 2013; Lambert 2011; Kundnani 2007; 2014; Innes 2006). As a result, the majority of CJS agencies in the UK have developed and to a lesser extent sustained various forms of governance arrangements with diverse communities and in particular Muslim communities aimed at improving confidence, fairness and professional standards (Lammy 2017; Myhill 2012; Braithwaite 2009; Taylor 2003). Whereas the UK government acknowledges the contributions that BAME staff of CJS

and other agencies could play in tackling radicalisation through effective community engagement, there have been no strategic guidelines on how this can be done.

However, previous research in several areas of the criminal justice system has shown that minority ethnic peoples' confidence in the system is more likely to be high where criminal justice practitioners that they interact with are from the same ethnic groups (see Calverley et al. 2004). Compared with the other UK criminal justice agencies (e.g the British probation service), it is yet to be ascertained whether or not the involvement of BAME police officers has had any impact on crime prevention in the UK despite the efforts that have been made to increase recruitment of BAME officers since the 1981 Scarman report was published. Although general public surveys have been carried out that, including members of BAME communities, that showed general public satisfaction in policing, (Clancy et al, 2001; Green et al, 2004), the findings have not been linked to the ethnic composition of police officers nor to the specific activities of BAME officers.

#### **10,5 UK Minority Ethnic Police Officers involvement in counter radicalisation.**

In a report in 2006, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (OHCNM) noted that in some countries there was an absence of institutional mechanisms to support the interaction and co-operation between police and persons belonging to national minorities. This, it claimed was

*“the result of lack of appropriate training for operation in a multi-ethnic society, an often mono-ethnic composition of the police service and discriminatory practices, police have generated negative reactions among national minority communities in a number of situations and even become a conflict catalyst”* (OHCNM 2006, p.1).

The report argued that good policing in multi-ethnic societies is dependent on:

*“the establishment of a relationship of trust and confidence, built on regular communication and practical co-operation, between the police and the minorities. All parties benefit from such a relationship. The minorities benefit from policing which is more sensitive to their concerns and more responsive to their requirements for personal protection and access to justice. The police benefit from greater effectiveness, since good communication and co-*

*operation are keys to effective policing in any community. The state benefits both from the integration of minorities and from the greater effectiveness of its policing” (OHCNM 2006, p.3) (see also Macpherson 1999; Scarman 1981).*

It has long been recognised that minority police officers can play a significant role in building bridges with black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities and by so doing play a key role in crime prevention generally. This view has also been extended to counter-terrorism specifically. In a significant study in London, Basia Spalek found that Muslim police officers who were members of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), a counter-terrorism policing unit formed in the aftermath of 9/11 by members of the Metropolitan Police special branch, were instrumental in building bridges with members of Muslim communities, and developing trusting relationships (see Spalek 2010). Whereas these officers brought ‘cultural and religious understanding’ to the MCU, the success of their engagement with these communities depended much on their religious credibility in the community and community trust and respect. Gaining trust and confidence is a key issue especially as those who are most likely to embrace violent Islamic doctrines and bent on radicalising others are likely to see police officers as enemies of Islam and Muslim police officers involved in counterterrorist community policing as hypocrites. This problem is likely to be more acute in communities where anti-police or anti-state sentiments are already high.

Spalek (2010) also highlighted the dilemma of the Muslim officers who were engaged in counter-terrorism in Muslim communities in terms of whether, as Muslims, they had trust and confidence in the aims and objectives of the counter terrorism operations that they were being asked to engage in and the fear of reprisals if they were not trusted by members of the community. Most important was the question of whether these Muslim police officers felt that they had other skills or 'resources' that could usefully be drawn upon when building trust with Muslim communities other than the simple fact that they were Muslims. Given the opportunity, would minority police officers have taken a different approach to community counter-terrorism? Spalek (2010) concluded (at p. 809) that Muslim police officers can play an important role in community-based counter-terrorism policing but the involvement of Muslim police officers is still a complex issue.

Nevertheless, the number of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) police officers engaged in community counter-terrorism work in the UK is extremely low.

The apparent paucity of BAME police officers and particularly Muslim officers and staff in counter radicalisation was noted in the House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee on Leadership and Standards in the Police (2013) with the recommendation that

*police forces must recognise that diversity is more than simply ticking a political correctness box: true representation is critical for public acceptance and knowledge of communities and different mind-sets can bring real operational advantage as well as everyday improvements in relation to the public. (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2013, p. 31)*

Two years later, at the oral evidence session presented to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Counter-Terrorism, following the case of three girls who were believed to have travelled to Syria to join ISIL (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), the issue of the underrepresentation of BAME police officers in counter-terrorism activities, especially in the context of *Prevent*, was also raised. The Committee made reference to former Metropolitan Police Chief Superintendent Dal Babu's comments in the press that “the lack of Muslim staff in the ranks of the Prevent scheme is hampering efforts to stop vulnerable young people, particularly women, from travelling to Syria to join Islamic State.” (The London Evening Standard 2015:1).

The Committee agreed to the need to increase police diversity in counter-terrorism, especially in the area of *prevent*; referring, again, to Dai babu's comment in the press that “If you are going to fight terrorism effectively then your key operatives need to reflect the people that you are dealing with and that is not happening here” (cited in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, p. 7) Low numbers and not being in position of strategic command imply that very little is known about black, Asian and minority ethnic officers real contributions to the UK's counter radicalisation *Prevent* programme.

### **10.6 The UK Black and Muslim Police Associations and networks**

The UK National Black Police Association (NBPA) was formed in 1998 as a result of pressures within British police forces for a fairer deal for BAME police officers and staff and for race to be taken seriously in the work of British police forces. The aims of the association are:

*to seek to improve the working environment of Black staff by protecting the rights of those employed within the Police Service and to enhance racial harmony and the quality of service to the Black community of the United Kingdom, thereby assisting the Police Service in delivering a fair and equitable service to all sections of the community" (see <http://www.nbpa.co.uk/>).*

The organisation's objectives are:

1. To advise, consult and intervene on matters of racism nationally, which could have negative effects on communities.
2. To work towards improving relationships between the Police and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities within the United Kingdom.
3. To influence the direction of policies nationally and in line with equality issues and anti-discrimination.
4. To work towards improving the recruitment, retention and progression of officers and police staff members within the police service.

The organisation currently has 13,000 members including uniformed police officers, police community safety officers (PCSOs) and other police civilian staff.

There is evidence that the BPA and the Muslim Police Association's (MPA) have been working with UK's BAME communities in various ways to build trust and confidence in the police and prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. For example, the Metropolitan arm of the National Black Police Association (the MBPA) has been active in London in the Met's efforts to engage with BAMEs in the inner cities. What is significant is that 'engagement' has not been strictly in the context of law enforcement but also by showing interest in these communities through, for example, the initiation of positive activities for young people or being present whenever there was a crisis, to show solidarity and provide support and safeguarding to those in need. For example:

- In the case of the murdered schoolboy, Damilola Taylor (2000), the BPA played a significant role in sourcing officers to engage with the local black community in Peckham, South East London; this helped to secure the eventual

conviction of the perpetrators of the crime.

- In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire in London (14<sup>th</sup> of June 2017), the Met BPA organized its members to undertake voluntary patrols in the area to provide support to the community as part of the disaster relief effort.
- In the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, in the Caribbean and the Bahamas (30<sup>th</sup> of August -13<sup>th</sup> of September 2017) the Met BPA organized its members to ensure that they were part of the UK disaster relief effort to the affected countries.

This approach of being involved and showing interest in the problems of BAME communities, strengthens trust and confidence and builds the foundation for effective engagement, when the organisation then shows up in other areas, such as helping to counter radicalisation. Engagement based on having specific 'expertise' and/or track record of 'relevant' work - for example, by agencies or faith-based groups and institutions that have worked with BAME communities and groups is likely to be less effective especially where these organisations show up as 'crisis managers' not friends of the community. These agencies may command respect because they are 'known' or have been named by governments, trust and confidence in them may be an issue. Unfortunately, the majority of agencies involved in community based CVE work belong to this category.


Communities have never had a say in who is selected to help them solve their problems, especially crime and violence problems. Needless to mention is the fact that no negotiation is done to ensure that what is being provided by the agencies are acceptable to the communities concerned. It is no wonder that communities have complained about the relevance of *CVE/Prevent* activities and negative perceptions have prevailed especially in Muslim communities about the overall intention of *Prevent* - to demonise Muslim communities (Kundnani 2007). It is reasonable to assume that 'navigation' to the resources provided by these agencies will be poor; hence, resilience is not happening in these communities even though there are elements within these communities who are genuinely committed to tackling radicalisation.

The position taken in this chapter is that the role of BAME LEA practitioners should be explored as a mechanism to boost community resilience. They are a

valuable form of social capital. Our on-going work with the National Black and Asian Police Association has highlighted that the ‘added value’ that they bring into British policing is being under-utilised. We believe that they could do more in terms of engagement with Muslim communities and, possibly, contribute significantly in the fight against radicalisation; their cultural competences and having an engagement approach that is directed at building the trust and confidence of the community becomes useful when they are seen as being involved in counter-terrorism activities.

### 10.7. Discussion

Resilience is a social interactive process the outcome of which is often associated with the successful adaption to or recovery from adversity’ (Pfefferbaum et al. 2015; Pfefferbaum et al. 2005; 2014). The term is used in the context of being in a position of adversity from which the individual is required to ‘bounce back’, recover or experience improved health or social conditions. Resilience is not an individual attribute but the end product of a course in which individual attributes or capabilities are harnessed through the provision of resources in a manner that makes perfect sense, sensible or culturally meaningful so that the individual will feel empowered and will naturally navigate to these resources and it is in this process that resilience occurs (see Ungar 2008; 2011).



**Fig One: Building Community Resilience to tackle radicalisation**

It is argued in this chapter that resilience is not an inherent attribute of a community; it is a *process* of strategic interaction between the community and resource providers/agencies in a culturally sensitive and mutually agreed use of resources to build the necessary platform (resilience) to tackle the adversity or problem. Community resilience in the context of tackling radicalisation is the process whereby community capabilities are harnessed through a process of engagement and negotiation with resource providers; it is based on trust and confidence and the cultural competency of the service providers. It is argued that communities will naturally 'navigate' to these resources and will see them as empowering if their cultural relevance is made clear. Figure one explains this process, diagrammatically.

Community resilience, therefore, is an acknowledgement that communities have competences or capabilities that can be harnessed to address an adversity (e.g. radicalisation) and that resources to help the communities are acceptable to the communities and have been negotiated so that both the communities and resource providers are partners in the joint effort of tackling radicalisation.

In this chapter, staff associations within the British Police, namely the Black Police Associations and the Asian and Muslim Police Association, were used as examples of LEA groups that work within a law enforcement/CVE agenda but have developed effective engagement with BAME communities in London and other parts of the UK by showing interest in BAME communities and supporting them in times of crisis. In addition, these LEA officers have the cultural competence that is crucial to counter-terrorism efforts. Unfortunately, however, the skills of these officers are not being harnessed by the UK police. In spite of the acknowledgement that BAME officers are disproportionately underrepresented in counter-terrorism duties, (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), no efforts have yet been made to rectify this.

Whereas some studies have highlighted some of the problems that may occur where Muslim police officers are utilised in *Prevent* duties in Muslim communities (Spalek 2010), the Metropolitan Police's effort highlighted in that study is a recognition of the fact that a *Prevent* /counter-terrorism activity in Muslim communities that includes only white officers will have a very limited chance of success.



There are no quick solutions to radicalisation. Developing community resilience to tackle radicalisation will take time, sustained resources and effort. However, there is a very real potential that focusing on making communities resilient to radicalisation, through engagement, partnership, harnessing community competences and providing culturally sensitive resources, could restore community confidence in state approaches to radicalisation because of the very simple fact that communities are at the heart of the solution.

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