

# **On Not Being Able to Build: Thinking Space, Boundaries and the Other with Lacan's Discourse of the Capitalist**

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## **Introduction**

Lacanian psychoanalysis attempts to formalize the relationship between the subject and the external world. Some theorists privileged interiority in this relationship, arguing that Lacan's theory aims to show that the structure of the psyche and the world display the same pattern, namely, they both lack the principle of the organic whole<sup>1</sup>. Others prefer to emphasise the fact that space does things for the subject<sup>2</sup> which entails that space does things *instead, before or ahead* of the subject. If that is the case, we might ask: how do human achievements like Art or Architecture reflect not only inner states of being but also the mutual determination of the inside and the outside?

While Heideggerians would happily accept that building and dwelling are inherent to human beings and a manifestation of the Spirit, Lacanians would shift their focus to how the visible and the invisible mediate the absences and discontinuities that characterise both the subject and the order of representation, the Other. Rather than being timeless and transcendental, the Other is historically and socio-culturally determined<sup>3</sup>. In that sense, any individual attempt to build or dwell is necessarily contingent upon the epochal parameters from which it arises, and always in dialogue with the Other. Moreover, recent advances in Lacanian theory reflect the profound shifts in the psycho-social constitution of Western capitalist societies inviting us to re-examine the relationship between psychic interiority and material exteriority, especially as part of the ongoing dialogue between psychoanalysis and other disciplines.

It is generally accepted that capitalism is not just an economic system but a mode of symbolic and libidinal organisation which prioritises immediate and often trivial enjoyment, echoed in the countless injunctions to 'enjoy!' (a break, a treat, a new purchase complete with instructions of

how to make the most of the new object). More important, argues Bernard Stiegler, our reliance on such objects erodes the processes of sublimation, repression and identification central to identity and sociality. Commodity fetishism and the passive consumption of artefacts, then, result in a libidinal dis-economy<sup>4</sup> which priorities short-circuits of immediate satisfaction over the long circuits of desire characterised by delay, creativity, originality, and, equally, the capacity to imagine, plan, suffer setbacks and always start again. Capitalism, this argument continues, is dangerous not only because it affords quick (and inadequate) fixes to proliferating demands but because it obfuscates the inherently difficult relationship between the subject with the Other, often resulting in distress, suffering<sup>5</sup> and existential loneliness<sup>6</sup>.

Can individuals escape these deleterious effects of capitalism, and what does that have to do with spatiality and dwelling? Engaging in creative activity, I will argue below, *becoming* while building and inhabiting, might be one way of (re)imagining and (re)creating the long circuits of desire that can reverse some of the adverse effects of capitalism. Key to effecting such a change would be the separation of inadequate fixes from the (real) ontological crisis often experienced as an encounter with the (inner) void or emptiness. Below I develop this point with reference to Lacan's fifth discourse (discourse of the capitalist), which articulates the psychic effects of late capitalism with reference to language, spatiality and mastery. I illustrate this discussion with reference to Bernard Stiegler's autobiographical narrative *How I became a philosopher* (2009) and the animated film *Lego Movie*.

### The Discourse of the Capitalist

Lacanianians argue that capitalism is gradually replacing the Discourse of the Master with a new variant. When it comes to the way in which subjects locate themselves in the field of the Other, Lacan proposes four discourses<sup>7</sup>, or, four possible positions which a speaking subject may assume towards truth, the other, and knowledge. The first set of relationships between the four terms constitutes the *Discourse of the Master* and provides the basic matrix for the remaining three, namely, the *Discourse of the Knowledge* (or *Discourse of the University*), the *Discourse of the Hysteric*, and the *Discourse of the Analyst*.

Lacan combines economics, politics and linguistics in the conceptualization of the *Discourse of the Master* which reads as follows: the master (or master-signifier S1) puts the slave (S2) to work in order to produce a surplus (*object a*, or enjoyment) which he himself appropriates. In socio-political terms the master's power is self-authorized and derived from his own speech tautologically, grounding his authority in his word ('I am what I say') without any further justification. In terms of language, Lacan aligns the position of the Master to the operation of the psychoanalytic Master Signifier. The Master Signifier gives one a place in the symbolic order (think, for example, of one's first name as a place-holder of one's position in the family). Despite the inherent arbitrariness of the Master, this *Discourse* 'is the founding gesture of every social link'<sup>8</sup>, providing a gravitational point which organizes a field of meaning around it. The remaining three discourses are produced by rotating the four terms of the Master Discourse so that knowledge (S2), the subject (\$) and surplus enjoyment (a) can successively occupy the position S1, questioning the Master, as it were, in different ways. The *Discourse of the Hysteric*, for instance, questions the Master by asking 'Why am I what you are saying I am?', horrified at being reduced to an object of the Master's desire or wondering about her position in relation to the Other's desire ('why do I have this mandate?', 'why am I who you say I am?')<sup>9</sup>.

One of the functions of the *Discourse of the Master* is to install castration. For Lacan castration is the important operation which marks the loss of bodily jouissance (pre-linguistic bodily enjoyment) upon entry into language and the symbolic order. Castration determines the subject 'from the outside', replacing "real being" (as an idealized but decidedly fictional interiority) with a signifier<sup>10</sup>. To put it differently, the fact that jouissance stems from the body and the signifier from the Other (language, symbolic order) implies that the subject can only ever get its enjoyment from the Other, in the form of the Other's enjoyment. The division between subject and jouissance (and its object, known as *object a*) now becomes both a division *within* the subject and a division *between* subject and Other<sup>11</sup>.

Žižek casts this transposition in spatial terms when he highlights the difference between the object of desire and the object of the drive in the passage from a lost object to loss itself as an object. Žižek writes: 'Lack is *spatial*, designating a void *within a space*, while the *hole is more radical* – it designates the point at which this spatial order breaks down (as in the 'black hole' in

physics)<sup>12</sup>. Verhaeghe, on the other hand, draws attention to the regulatory role of the symbolic apparatus and the ‘cunning’ transition that replaces the impossibility of jouissance (always already lost) with a prohibition of enjoyment (castration). Regulation via prohibition provokes the mobilization of an order of appearances, a semblance, so to speak, which ensures that everything works (‘ça marche’). Social bonds are created in these maneuvers.

While the operation of the Master ensures that everything works, humans are often ‘besieged by an ontological crisis’<sup>13</sup>. This kind of crisis is not only immanent but humanity’s condition of possibility, precisely because it is ontological. It pertains to the realization that ‘the so-called “objective world” on which we dwell is the result of what we might describe as an “under the table” deal we strike with the “paternal metaphor” [Other, symbolic order] at some unspecified moment during the formation of our subjectivity’<sup>14</sup>. As already said, the crisis is usually resolved by the acceptance of lack and prohibition. At the same time, and ideally again, the subject also comes to terms with the fact that the Other is not omnipotent and does not pull the strings of one’s existence. Coming to terms with the contingency of the Other is an important step towards subjective freedom.

Today’s tragedy, Lacanian theorists argue, is that capitalism does not address this ontological crisis but ‘papers over the cracks’ with an offer of objects. Prohibition and lack are often cast aside (foreclosed), leaving subjects exposed to a short-circuit between mastery (S1) as a superegoic command to enjoy and various objects vying to replace the *object a*. Thus, Vighi notes, a critical historisation of the *object a* has taken place where the pervasive commodification of the latter turns it into a master-signifier, effecting ‘the closure of the capitalist order’<sup>15</sup>. What one then finds at the core of psychic organization is not more or better enjoyment but a cruel master demanding increasing compliance to flat and anodyne forms of enjoyment, promoted by the generic command ‘enjoy’<sup>16</sup>.

The difference between the Discourse of the Capitalist and the Discourse of the Master is visually represented in the direction of the vectors connecting the four terms in each diagram<sup>17</sup>:

INSERT FIGURE HERE

While the other four discourses allow lack, mastery, knowledge and truth to interact and produce different formations, marked by the direction of the arrows, the Discourse of the Capitalist limits these movements. Capitalism, therefore, produces a turn which does not displace the existing elements but the structural places and their mutual relations. As a torsion of the Discourse of the Master, the Discourse of the Capitalist claims to establish the missing link between subject and object, rejects the split that marks the place of truth (unconscious), promotes the subject's self-sufficiency (via consumption), denounces the epistemological status of knowledge and masks the ontological crisis by foreclosure of negativity and the wisdom of the markets<sup>18</sup>.

Of course it is perfectly possible that individuals may live happily in such a milieu, eagerly consuming what is constantly on offer and never encountering a crisis like the one described above. But it is equally possible that they may experience boredom, a feeling of emptiness (kenosis, as Stiegler calls it) or lack of purpose. For some theorists, political apathy, disenchantment and the wider disengagement from creative cultural activities are already pervasive social effects of this malaise. On an individual level, suffering, as mentioned above, or anxiety and a diffuse threat that seems to be coming *from the outside* might well be pointing to a Real threat (not yet represented or symbolized) *from the inside*.

In thinking space and spatial relations Lacan started with the assumption that architecture is organised around emptiness in the same way that the drives circle the *object a*<sup>19</sup>. However, it is not clear if we are to take this point literally or how to resolve the tension between enclosing emptiness and encircling an originary lost object which relates directly to how Lacan understands human subjectivity<sup>20</sup>. This paper considers how spatial activity and the ability (or inability) to design and build, literally or metaphorically, might offer a useful insight into contemporary formations of the *inside and the outside* pertinent, in equal measure, to the ontological characteristics inherent in subjectivity, the psychic conditions of contemporary Western capitalism and the dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Architecture.

We shall now turn to the two examples we highlighted above, Bernard Stiegler's autobiographical narrative *How I became a philosopher* (2009) which recounts his time in prison as a young man, and the hero of the *Lego Movie*, Emmett, a happy construction worker who does not have any creative ideas and can only assemble objects by following instructions issued by others<sup>21</sup>. What the two characters have in common is an initial sense of disconnectedness with the world around them and a feeling of being nothing, a true dread of living. The crucial question of course is how an individual undergoing such an experience, exacerbated by lack of creative means and cultural impoverishment, is supposed to find the psychic resources to both recover a sense of being and to address the effects of capitalism. Lacanians locate this delicate operation in the temporal and spatial negotiation of the inside and the outside. In the two examples, the former offers an insightful account of the creation of a *milieu*, a space for being, the latter of objects and the capacity to tolerate destruction. Both address the all-important relationship with the Other and the re-opening of a modicum of difference which allows us to say that, even in its deadliest form, capitalism is as assemblage of logics which can be dismantled.<sup>22</sup>

Emmett is a happy little man. He wakes up bright and cheerful every day wishing good morning to all the objects in his house, but appears to have no real friends. One day Emmett falls through the cracks of the building site (the capitalist edifice) in which he works. A strangeness coming from outside indicates that all is not well inside. The projection of strangeness outwards veils anxiety, a sense of being in the vicinity of 'that which is not'<sup>23</sup>. Anxiety, argues Vighi, makes subjectivity vacillate insofar as it threatens to deprive it of the framework through which a seemingly transparent and seamless relation to reality is established<sup>24</sup>. Emmett lands several levels below, into a world he did not know existed. The little worker will have to respond to this challenge by finding his place in this 'different' world, a move that eventually result in the re-animation of becoming.

After this massive eruption of the Real, Emmett is approached by a resistance group who inform him that Lord Business intends to destroy the Lego world with his mighty weapon, *The*

*Kragle*. The latter, as we will eventually learn, is a tube of 'Krazy Glue' with which Lord Business plans to glue all the pieces into a fixed design. At the beginning, however, the mysterious contracted signifier (Kra-gl-e) represents the omnipotence of the Other which threatens to obliterate the subject. The resistance fighters also tell Emmett that he is the one who will stop Lord Business. Confused Emmett replies: 'I never have any ideas', a statement which says 'no' to both skill and knowledge, behind which lies the ontological fear of being truly *nothing*.

Emmett illustrates his ignorance when asked to replace the broken axle of the chariot on which he, Master Vitruvius and others rebels escape the police by 'attaching a wheel to something that spins'. Seeing no other way to respond to the perilous situation, he attaches his own head to the wheel. In a very Lacanian way, Emmett becomes 'it', the *objet a* (lynchpin) in the scene, the absence of which would mean death for everyone. This is a stupid action but action nevertheless, as opposed to a refusal to engage with the anxiety of nothingness. On the symbolic level, Emmett now shows he is willing to commit the materiality of his body, his only asset, to the budding social relations with the rebels, as well as to risk losing something, that pound of flesh (castration) that will enable him to enter the symbolic network in the new world.

The first taste of achieving something important (escaping unscathed) is followed by a series of destructive failures as Emmet and friends drive through different Lego worlds (e.g. wild West sets, train bridges) which disintegrate as they pass through. Permanent destruction, an effect of the death drive, and the inability to sustain the order of representation, assume a nightmarish dimension. Everything is ruined and nothing has yet been built. Endless destruction is halted long enough for Vitruvius and Emmet to visit the latter's mind, a flat expanse of Lego sparsely inhabited by a few floating objects. This insight is perched precariously between the comic representation of stupidity (an empty mind) and a pure space yet to be inhabited. Is this the void that must be filled and inhabited or the comic depiction of an 'innocent' mind not yet cluttered by consumer objects? Stiegler would call the double potential of such a space 'pharmacological', both curative and destructive, depending on the use one makes of it<sup>25</sup>.

In Stiegler's narrative, the young prisoner experiences serious dissociation from his surroundings in the long and empty months of confinement. After tolerating loneliness and ignorance (lack of formal education) for some time, he awakens to a different world when he discovers philosophy. Acquainting himself with the philosophical canon allows Stiegler to address his 'forgetting' – ignorance rather than repressed knowledge – whilst (re)building a substantial intellectual (noetic) reservoir out of the 'forgotten' (ignored) one<sup>26</sup>. Engaging with the Other, not yet knowing but already *doing* something (learning), inaugurates duration and time, carrying the promise of a future moment in which the young philosopher will not only be able to demonstrate learning but also the ability to explain and provide interpretation (*hermeneia*).

Let us rejoin Emmett and friends again as they are chased by their enemies, boarding a submarine which soon begins to disintegrate. Once again, Emmet is asked to produce something immediately but, still afraid to trust his creativity, he wants to be told what to do. Master Vitruvius intones 'embrace it', giving not instructions but a response that requires further interpretation. A semblance of creative potential is installed and works not because Emmett is magically enabled to build but because his effort is underlined by the 'hidden truth' – the elusive answer to 'who am I and why am I doing this?' – which motivates a subject's actions<sup>27</sup>. Eventually, Emmet fashions a plain design but good enough to save those onboard. From then on he is able to build and invent. He even asks for pen and paper to make some plans. Of course he will fail again and again, and his capture will lead to a direct confrontation with Lord Business, but not before the 'stupid' little man has acquired a modicum of faith in his creative skills.

Something important is accomplished in the process, namely, the separation of *a thing* (a poor but effective design) from *nothing* (total inability to create as dread of living). More important, '*it*' proceeds from an active engagement with the community (rebels and old Master-builders), with whom bonds of inter-dependence are being established. Surely Emmet cannot create accomplished and inspired designs but he can produce originals, as opposed to pre-designed objects by following instructions. These objects are mediocre, yet 'good enough' as object-



relations analysts would call them, addressed to whom it may concern (Other) and accepted-tolerated for what they are. Emmet is finally able to establish a dialogue with the Other, or what Stiegler calls a dialogical activation of the libidinal potential<sup>28</sup>. This developing relationship both mediates both the fearful encounter with the ontological void and breaks the spell of the mass-produced instructions-based objects.

Soon afterwards Emmet will face Lord Business and will succeed in persuading him not to immobilise the world with the Kragle. The lesson is simple: libidinal relations need to remain supple and flexible, not frozen in stasis (glued together). Emmet will show Lord Business that the way to achieve mastery is not to glue everything together in a fixed shape but to trust one's ability to design and build new objects. In the end it becomes clear that it was not just Emmet who was afraid of creative enjoyment (*jouissance* inscribed in the symbolic order) but the capitalist Master (Lord Business) who could not re-mobilise his own (creative) desire and was only relying on maintaining a fixed order at all costs. The child as 'father of man' can teach him that much. In the meantime, Emmett has realised that the Other he feared (the Other who pulls the strings) was just as vulnerable (contingent and inconsistent) as himself.

In prison the young Stiegler connects with his own 'old masters' (Aristotle, Marx, Saussure, Wittgenstein), redefining the balance between what comes 'from the outside' as *structured knowledge* and the 'inside' (as fragmented unconscious *savoir*). A transformation takes place, described in distinctly Lacanian terms: 'I found first an absence of world, this "learnèd lack", which, as such (a lack) is rather a *fault* [défaut] and a *necessity* [il faut], that which *gives* and *gives place*, rather than what "lacks place"<sup>29</sup>. This, I would argue, is the difference between the spatial lack upon which desire is predicated and the inherent ontological void ('black hole') encircled by the drive. Added to that, the transformation of this (ontological) holey absence, the true lack of being, into "learnèd lack" is a manifestation of the exchange at the heart of the structural shift vital to the Symbolic process.

While Lacanians directly privilege the subject's coming to terms with lack and the contingency of the Other as a way of making sense of the world and, perhaps, capitalism, Stiegler seems to imply that a conscious effort of reestablishing a relationship with the Other in the form of

knowledge-learning might today be necessary in order to compensate for the more serious effects of ignorance, forgetting, lack of engagement and depletion of one's creative potential. This (re)-enchantment or (re)investment of the Other effects a re-organisation of the inner world. In that sense, the inherent human condition offers a way out of the predicament of capitalism as a stagnating abstract order. Something new arises with the possibility of representation, when the difference between nothing and no-thing comes into being as the noetic distance 'between what is dead and what has not been born, i.e. the aporia of that which, by expressing itself as 'nothing', makes this 'nothing' exist, which would otherwise be inconceivable – makes it palpable, brings it forth'<sup>30</sup>.

This transformation allows the young prisoner to gradually re-build his position in the world from the ruins of representation: 'I am woven out of remains', he muses. Aren't these remains the residues of objects (object a) emerging in the light of systematic new knowledge? One re-creates the world from what ex-sists, ruins and fragments (unconscious), putting them into new and different formulations. In doing so one discovers the big Other as contingency rather than unbearable lack or overbearing master(y). The reactivation of the world via the intermediary of ideality, notes Stiegler, also reconstitutes the world in its exteriority<sup>31</sup>. By the same token, the new and created 'milieu' is, in my view, a variant of building social, or intellectual affinities that alleviate and eventually address disengagement and loneliness – the predicament of the imprisoned man – as the ontological condition exacerbated by capitalism. It is this process of exteriorisation and building that, in Moëbian fashion<sup>32</sup>, re-configures the inside as well. Stiegler refers to this as 'building' and 'being building', or, the constitution of the world in its absence<sup>33</sup> through signifying practices which are able to 'hold' while being transformed and always in processes. Being building acquires further noetic permanence as representation. *Being building and brick building* constitute signifying practices of creative intent which frame and are framed by, hold and are held by, absence, the dread of living (void, nothing) which must be transformed into an emptiness (no-thing) ready to be encompassed and contained.

Conclusion

Spatiality directly links psychic interiority and exteriority to one another<sup>34</sup>. Creativity as building without instructions or being in dialogue with the Other allows for interiority and exteriority to bring forth one another whilst drawing their strength from what was 'not there' in the first place. This, I would argue, is the way in which the Freudian unconscious inhabits every living scene. Holm argues that when it comes to space, Lacan is the opposite of Piranesi. The latter uses the ruins to reveal lost worlds, the former is picking up stones to restore an illusion of meaning.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, Lacan finds meaning in the ruins (past), but, I would argue, in the logic of interiority and exteriority, not behind the stones. The Lacanian ruins are the site of active negotiation and movement. To put it differently, they do not constitute a site of (Heideggerian) dwelling but a *point of passage* characterised by repetition, traversal and interpretation.

Psychoanalysis is primarily a process of interpretation. The effects of the discourse of capitalism, a split off duplication of the discourse of the Master minus the lines of interaction between its four terms, create challenges which Psychoanalysis might do well to continue investigating with the help of the Creative Arts. Could Architecture be considered as interpretation to the extent that it inscribes jouissance in the field of the Other, providing a structured and balanced view between loss and transformation, transformation and gain? Lacanians often dwell too much on jouissance and Thanatos (the death drive), forgetting the creative and synthetic powers of Eros. Likewise, in the Arts, by training our gazes to the *object a* we tend to forget the synthetic power of Eros<sup>36</sup> ever so important for understanding the creative processes.

The dimension of futurity is important in this endeavor. Every act of being-building is a gesture addressed to the future and 'to whom it may concern'. A pro-tension which anticipates both structure and jouissance. Every good-enough structure (object) is a pro-tension which calls one to imagine/pro-tend a certain arrangement of form which will eventually be completed and which, in the meantime, speaks to the Other. The point at which an artist releases and loses 'it' (the created object) to the public eye she declares her hand, so to speak, and invests it to the semblance of acceptance. Similarly, imagination as pro-tension is important, not the intrusive meconnaissance of the Lacanian Mirror-stage but the ability to think ahead *with* the Other. This ability to hold the future in one's mind invites us to rethink the origins of thought and the

function of symbolic forms from Husserl's *Origins of Geometry* to Lacan and beyond, especially if the problem today is not the exteriorisation of thought, as an ideal manifestation of the Spirit, but 'prosthetic interiorisation', that is, the way in which mass culture colonises and possibly impoverishes the unconscious<sup>37</sup>.

Being building is forward looking and creative. It is a bit like the gradual transformation of a drawing or a plan to a building. One cannot dwell on any of the (previous) stages if one is *to build*. Loss and transformation can only appear if one looks backwards. There is always a parallax at play, with movement, not dwelling, as its main feature. Thus, the distinction between enclosing and encircling the void belies a fundamental non-choice, which becomes evident when each register is seen in isolation, in stasis. In that sense, one could extend Holm's view to say that Lacan as the opposite of Piranesi did not simply stitch the Freudian Thing onto the image but animated it as well. And it is in the context of this forward looking and complex creative process that we could begin to see capitalism as stagnation, to the extent that it exacerbates fixity, kills imagination and ignores the perils of the death drive: *thou shall not inhabit the void* (nor should you be empty of ideas, vacuous, a void). Architecture abides by that principle but also knows how to circumvent the prohibition of jouissance whilst abiding by it.

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<sup>1</sup> Zejlka Matijasevic, "Lacan: ustrajnost dijalektike" [Lacan: The Persistence of the Dialectic], <https://www.academia.edu/12662265> (accessed October 20, 2019).

<sup>2</sup> Steve Pile, *The Body and the City: Psychoanalysis, Space and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Fabio Vighi, "Ontology of Crisis and Lacan's Discourse of the Capitalist," *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* 20, no. 1 (2015): 1-19.

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<sup>4</sup> Bernard Stiegler, "Pharmacology of Desire: Drive-based Capitalism and Libidinal Dis-economy," *New Formations*, 72, (2011): 51.

<sup>5</sup> Stijn Vanheule, "Capitalist Discourse, Subjectivity and Lacanian Psychoanalysis," *Frontiers in Psychology*, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01948> (accessed October 20, 2019).

<sup>6</sup> Frédéric Declercq, "Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences for Libidinal Enjoyment and Social Bonds". *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, no. 11 (2006): 77

<sup>7</sup> Slavoj Žižek, "Four Discourses, Four Subjects", in *Cogito and the Unconscious*, ed. S. Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 80.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>10</sup> Alenka Zupančič, "When surplus enjoyment meets surplus," *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Reflections on Seminar XVII*. 155-178. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 163.

<sup>11</sup> In Lacanian psychoanalysis the (human) subject comes into being upon entering language and the Symbolic order (Other), that is, the complex network of psychosocial relationships. Upon entering language everything we do and say is mediated by and represented through language. The immediacy of bodily experience and the pre-linguistic oneness with the mother are lost forever. What is lost is *jouissance*. The subject is therefore said to be effectively *separated* from this prior state of being and *alienated* in language/Symbolic order. *Desire* is the effect of separation and alienation (and loss of *jouissance*). This means that while specific desires can be satisfied, Desire as such can never be met as it stems from something irretrievably lost, removed. Thus, the subject can always seek to satisfy their Desire in the only domain available, in the Other, but remains forever divided and/or incomplete. In this context, *castration* is the 'coming to terms' with the loss of *jouissance*, rather than try to circumvent or deny it in different ways. For a detailed account see Paul Verhaeghe, "Enjoyment and impossibility:

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Lacan's revision of the Oedipus Complex," in *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Reflections on Seminar XVII*. (Durham: (Duke University Press, 2006), 38.

<sup>12</sup> Slavoj Žižek, "Object *a* and its social links," in *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Reflections on Seminar XVII* (Duke University Press, 2006), 117, emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup> Vighi, "Ontology of Crisis and Lacan's Discourse of the Capitalist," 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 10

<sup>17</sup> Diagram based on Lacan 1972, p. 40. See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre XIX, Ou pire*. (Paris: Seuil).

<sup>18</sup> Samo Tomšič, 2015. *The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan* (London, New York: Verso, 2015). See pages 219-229.

<sup>19</sup> Lorens Holm, "What Lacan said re: architecture," *Critical Quarterly* 42 no. 2 (2000).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 33. See also fn 11.

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed discussion of the role of psychoanalysis in Bernard Stiegler's work see Angie Voela, and Louis Rothschild, "Creative Failure: Stiegler, Psychoanalysis and the Promise of a Life Worth Living." *New Formations*, 95 (2018): 54-69.

<sup>22</sup> Jason Glynos, "Capitalism and the act: from content to form and back again," in *Lacan, Discourse, Event: New Psychoanalytic Approaches to Textual Indeterminacy*, edited by. Ian Parker and Davod Pavón-Cuellar, (London: Routledge 2014), 158.

<sup>23</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Anxiety, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X*. (London, Polity Press, 2004).

<sup>24</sup> Vighi, "Ontology of Crisis and Lacan's Discourse of the Capitalist," 11.

<sup>25</sup> Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology* (London, Polity Press, 2013), 48.



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<sup>26</sup> Stiegler, *Acting Out*, 14.

<sup>27</sup> Vanheule, "Capitalist Discourse, Subjectivity and Lacanian Psychoanalysis."

<sup>28</sup> Stiegler, "Pharmacology of Desire: Drive-based Capitalism and Libidinal Dis-economy," 156.

<sup>29</sup> Bernard Stiegler, *Acting Out* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 23.

<sup>30</sup> Andre Green, *The Work of the Negative* (London: Free Association Books 1999), 16.

<sup>31</sup> Stiegler, *Acting Out*, 18.

<sup>32</sup> Holm, "What Lacan said re: architecture," 58.

<sup>33</sup> Stiegler, *Acting Out*, 26.

<sup>34</sup> Ellie Ragland, Ellie 2006, "The hysteric's truth," in *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Reflections on Seminar XVII* (Durham: Duke University Press 2006), 78.

<sup>35</sup> Holm, "What Lacan said re: architecture," 58.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Geoffrey Bennington, *Lyotard: Writing the Event* (Manchester: Manchester University Press and Columbia University Press, 1988), and Laplanche, Jean. *Life and death in psychoanalysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

<sup>37</sup> Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*.