

**SOCIAL MARKETING AND THE CORRUPTION CONUNDRUM IN MOROCCO:  
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS**

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## Abstract

The modern world is characterised by socio-economic disruptions, civil unrests, and weakening of many societal institutions, amongst many other challenges to our social fabric. Therefore, scholars are increasingly scouring a wide variety of conceptual prisms to seek explanations and possible solutions to those problems contemporaneously manifesting themselves. The pervading force of corruption, across the globe, remains a major concern among nations, multilateral agencies, such as Transparency International, and more profoundly in major business and public policy discourses. For many developing countries, especially those with weak institutions, high levels of corruption are causatively associated with high levels of poverty, poor economic performance and under-development.

Against this background, using the Kingdom of Morocco as a contextual base, this thesis explores the growing incidence of corruption, which has stunted the nation's positive development, as well as its triggers, antecedents and consequences. Whilst the literature is replete with treatments of corruption across time and space, such treatments have focused on social and macroeconomic underpinnings but largely lack rigorous marketing-framed explorations. Following on from this lacuna, this thesis situates the treatment of corruption in Morocco within the conceptual frame of social marketing — a demonstrably robust platform for analysing societal issues and, indeed, a validated behavioural intervention model.

A two-pronged data collection method was applied, based on the positivistic paradigm and involving a total of 1,000 respondents. Data analysis was accomplished through the use of logistic regression and propensity score matching techniques to remove socio-demographics biases. Findings based on micro-level data revealed salient socio-demographic and societal factors of corruption, such as gender-gap, in justifiability of corruption and corruption intention. Over twice as many men (20.5 per cent) stated that they could be tempted by corruption, whereas the rate for women was 8.4 per cent. In terms of social marketing campaigns, the evaluation shows that the campaign did manage to raise awareness among the public by about 60 per cent, it also changed perceptions about corruption with a modest but significant 8.2 per cent increase among population perceiving corruption as immoral. Similarly, respondents exposed to the campaign had a 20.8 per cent higher intention to change their proclivity towards corruption compared with the population not exposed to the campaign — with family influence reported as the main predictor of intention to change.

The uniqueness of this thesis lies in its pioneering and boundary spanning role, context-specific statistical treatment of data to achieve empirical substantiation and, at the same time, this thesis puts the markers in place for future studies. In this regard, the thesis is a significant contribution to the empirical literature whilst simultaneously opening up a number of policy trajectories for formulating and evaluating anti-corruption campaigns.

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## Chapter 1 Introduction

When President Jacob Zuma of South Africa was accused of corruption he demanded that the charges against him be dropped because corruption, according to him, was not a crime but merely a “Western paradigm” (News 24, 2014). For Western academics studying this phenomenon from afar, corruption might just be an interesting field of research; however, for the PhD student investigating corruption while living in countries where corruption is rampant — such as South Africa or, in this researcher’s case, Morocco — it quickly becomes obvious that, far from merely being a theoretical concept, corruption is a painful reality.

In Morocco, stories of corruption are ubiquitous and victims abound. To begin, one finds oneself listening to the tales of corruption from people one meets in everyday life: taxi drivers stopped by dishonest police officers, teachers who are asked to change the grades of well-connected students, a colleague who talks about a surgeon demanding 15,000 MAD (approximately 1,500 USD) from the family as they wait outside the operating theatre midway through a life-or-death surgery. It is not long before the research student begins to encounter such things in his or her own life. Soon one realises that there are very few ways around corruption. In Morocco, corruption makes everything a bit more expensive; it can slow things down — as when a driver is stopped by the police for no real reason, or when one has to wait interminably for a case to be settled in a court of law. It can also speed things up if one is waiting for a stamp on an official document or for a nurse in a hospital. A dramatic car crash and a dying baby nephew is all it took for this research student to grasp the terrible effects of corruption: the ambulance never arrived, as it only existed on paper, and the public hospital did not have any staff nor was it properly equipped, all because of corruption.

And when corruption is endemic, as it is in Morocco, it kills.

Even when corruption does not kill, there are still victims. Corruption threatens the social fabric of the nation. In Morocco, because of the far reaching effects of corruption, thousands of children in the impoverished Middle Atlas region face a future without education. Schools that have been paid for years ago have yet to be built and likely never will. School buses have vanished from the budget and sometimes teachers exist only as names on a government list. Although the government has increased funding for education, illiteracy remains high. Rampant corruption has funnelled money away from the public education sector and into private pockets.

In Morocco, women in a mostly male-dominated society are the primary victims of this disappearance of funding for education, with the female illiteracy rate still hovering over 50 per cent in rural areas. Yet women seem to have been entrusted with the development of the nation.

Notably, microcredit agencies favour women over men for their loans, which points to something significant — while women are trusted to be honest, men are thought to be corrupt or, at the very least, less likely to pay back their loan.

The spread of corruption has not gone unnoticed by the people of Morocco. Though it is thought of as something invasive to be put up with on an everyday basis, there was hope for change with the recent Arab Spring. Having started in Tunisia, to the east of Morocco, on December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the flame of the Arab Spring eventually reached the Kingdom of Morocco. Many Moroccans are generally wary about “things from the East” because of repeated, often violent, confrontations with Algeria on the issue of the Sahara as well as the Chergui, a warm, dry wind from the south eastern Sahara loaded with sand which damages crops. This time, however, it was a true hope that blew in from the East. People marched and chanted in the streets, demanding an end to corruption and tyranny. A new constitution was adopted on the basis of a referendum and the newly elected government responded to popular demand by launching a massive social marketing campaign against corruption.

The main aim of Morocco’s social marketing campaign was to educate people about corruption, but it was immediately and heavily criticized and judged inefficient by Transparency Maroc, the Moroccan branch of Transparency International. The campaign appears to have been designed without a proper scientific understanding of the issue, and no post-campaign impact assessment was carried out. Personal experience showed this research student that behind each corrupt act there has been an individual, yet neither personal stories nor a corruption index provide an adequate basis for modelling the driving forces behind the corrupt behaviour of individuals. The stories one hears first hand are anecdotal and unreliable, and perception indexes, such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, do not necessarily describe the reality of corruption at the level of the individual.

## **1.1 Background and Context**

Morocco is a country in North Africa which is comparable in size to the state of California. It has two neighbouring countries that it shares land borders with, Algeria to the east and Mauritania to the south, as well as two Spanish enclave cities, Ceuta and Melilla, in the north. The country is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Around 690 AD, Arab invaders in North Africa established control over the local Amazigh tribes. Muslim dynasties ruled the country from 788 AD onwards. The royal family that rules Morocco today, the Alaouite Dynasty, dates back from the 17th century. In

1860, the north of the country was occupied by Spain, and in 1912 the kingdom was made a French Protectorate until independence in 1956. In 1957, a constitutional monarchy was established by King Mohammed V, the grandfather of the current monarch, King Mohammed VI (CIA World Factbook, 2015).

With a population of 32 million, the country has two major ethnic groups, Arabs and Amazighs, which represent around 99.1 per cent of the total population. When they colonized the country, the French tactically attempted to play one ethnic group off against the other. This tactic was unsuccessful and the failure of it was mostly due to the strong religious beliefs that unite the country. Gellner and Micaud (1972) showed that Islam supersedes the ethnic divide between Berbers (an old, somewhat offensive term for Amazighs) and Arabs, and characterise Moroccan unity as being based on the idea of '*qua Maghrebin Muslim*' in opposition to '*qua Arab or Berber*'. This remains the case today: a 2012 survey by a mainstream Moroccan magazine, Tel-Quel, shows that 89 per cent of Moroccans feel that Islam guides their lives; with over 60 per cent praying five times a day and 39 per cent claiming to recite the Quran at home (Tel-Quel, 2012).

## 1.2 Demographics of Morocco

The population of Morocco was about 6 million in 1900. It has grown very rapidly over the twentieth century, the population growth rate was over 3 per cent per year in the 1950s and stabilized to around 1.25 per cent between 2004 and 2014, a growth rate equivalent to the world average. In 2014, Morocco officially has 33.8 million inhabitants with 54 per cent of the population being rural. There are about 97 men per 100 women nationwide and while there are around 103 men for every 100 women in rural Morocco, there are 99 men for every 100 women in cities. Regarding age distribution 33.1 per cent of Moroccans are under 15 years of age, 59.3 per cent are aged between 15 and 59 years and 7.6 per cent were 60 and over. Regarding education an older 2004 report (HCP, 2004) reveals that 41.6 per cent of the population aged 10 and over had never attended a public or private educational institution. For those who attended school 11.5 per cent of the population reported having attended preschool, 46.2 per cent attended primary schools and 22.6 per cent attended secondary school. In 2015 progress were made with a gross enrolment rate in primary education of 83 per cent overall and 71 per cent for girls in Morocco, against 99.1 per cent and 92.9 per cent in developing countries. For

middle and high schools rate were 39 per cent overall and 33 per cent for girls, against 48.8 per cent and 43.6 per cent in developing countries (HCP, 2016).

### 1.3 The Makhzen

During the French Protectorate, General Lyautey, the Military Governor of Morocco from 1912 to 1915, secured French domination by enhancing the role of the Moroccan ruling elites, otherwise known as the “Makhzen.” Moroccans have traditionally used the term “Makhzen” to describe Morocco’s ruling system. The Makhzen is a very ancient notion in Morocco, approximately coinciding with the beginning of the ancient feudal state, which preceded the French Protectorate. Today, the Makhzen refers to the king, the king’s relatives and the political and economic elites surrounding him (Catusse and Vairel, 2010).

Following the independence of Morocco, the rural elites who had sided with the French colonial powers were discredited. The bourgeoisie, which included most of the bureaucracy, were impatient to increase their political weight and modernize the country. The monarchy, however, quickly realised that relying on these elites was fundamental to side-tracking the national movement led by the bourgeoisie. Yet solidarity between this movement and traditional rural leaders prevented any modernization for many years. The stagnation of the kingdom in the fields of education, the economy and governance was near total (Leveau, 1985). In 1999, King Mohammed VI inherited the throne from his father Hassan II, who had forcibly repressed any political or social protest under his rule, which began in 1961. These years are often referred to as “*les années de plomb*”, or, “the years of lead” (Oufkir and Fitoussi, 2001).

### 1.4 Social and Political Unrest

After the year 2000 there was increased social and political unrest. Sit-ins, strikes, petitions, local occupations, non-payment of water bills and piracy of power lines were not only initiated by human rights associations, unions, left-wing political parties, and anti-globalization associations, but also by ordinary citizens. However, as Zaki (2008, p. 85) reported, these initiatives expressed “a greater sense of abandonment of the population by the central power than revolutionary aspirations”. While repressing these conflicts the government embarked on a series of reforms to modernize society. The slogan of Mohammed VI was: “A new concept of authority”, and this was embodied by the creation of the INDH (*L’Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain*) in 2005, which aimed at “ensuring a better distribution of the fruits of growth and to improve the living conditions of citizens” (INDH, 2015). Behind this initiative

there was a clear understanding that income inequality fed social discontent and hence socio-political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, as cited by Knight, 2013).

Corruption is indeed a source of social inequalities. In a corrupt country, the economy stagnates and can even regress, leading to increased levels of poverty and economic disparity between citizens (IMF, 2015). Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) demonstrate that corruption is most likely to benefit the wealthiest strata of the population at the expense of the poor. Using data from a cross-section of 37 countries, they show that a higher a corruption level is commonly linked to a higher GINI index. In China, for example, a survey showed that Chinese citizens identified corruption as the main danger to social stability (Broadhurst and Wang, 2014), and the Chinese government considered that fighting corruption was fundamental to the survival of the country.

As a result of the creation and implementation of the INDH by Morocco's new ruler some undeniable progress was made. Morocco's per capita GDP improved steadily from 1,000 USD in 1991 to around 3,100 USD in 2013 (World Bank, 2015), and the country's per capita GNI increased 92 per cent between 1980 and 2012. However, in terms of human development, the country is still struggling. According to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, in 2005 Morocco was ranked 124th out of 177 countries, in 2011 it ranked 130th out of 186 countries and two years later in 2013 no net progress was noted with the kingdom again ranking 130th out of 187 countries. The poverty level remained high, with nine per cent of the population below the poverty line (World Bank, 2011). Furthermore, in 2006 the illiteracy rate was as high as 38.5 per cent, with a rate of 46.8 per cent for women and 31.4 per cent for men. In rural areas this rate was much higher, with over 54.4 per cent of the population being illiterate and women being affected most of all (UNESCO, 2015).

While the country boasts that it is amongst the most progressive, moderate countries in the Arab world, the fact is that its rankings remain low, below Egypt for example, in terms of human development, gender equality and political freedom (LeVine, 2012). In particular, Morocco's score on the Corruption Perception Index climbed from 4.7 in 2000 (37th position) to 3.4 in 2011 (80th position) (Transparency International, 2012). In comparison, New Zealand, one of the least corrupt countries according to the Corruption Perception Index, has a score of 9.5, while neighbouring Algeria ranks 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco as its ranking declined even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le Monde, 2012). For Greffrath and Duvenhage (2014), the changes that have been implemented are largely cosmetic, since, despite having engaged the nation in a democratic process, the Makhzen still relies on policies of divide and rule, clientelism and a strong secret police.

## 1.5 Corruption and Clientelism in Morocco

Clientelism, defined as buying the vote of constituencies with gifts and favours (Fujiwara, and Wantchekon, 2013), is not a recent issue in Morocco. During the French Protectorate stability was mostly secured by maintaining a clientelistic relationship with the rural elites (Hissouf, 2016). Later the political parties which were instrumental in liberating the country from the French did not promote change, but remained entrenched in their old patron-client *modus operandi* (Liddle, 2010). The clientelistic system persisted under Hassan II, as his ambition was to strengthen his political and economic domination of the country. Hassan II's reign has often been described as “authoritarian, patrimonial, violent and repressive, clientelistic and subjecting society” (Catusse and Zaki, 2009, p. 76). For Michael and Nouaydi (2009, p. 356) corruption in Morocco is the result of this clientelistic system: “the most likely systemic cause of corruption in Morocco stems from the exercise of clientelistic and patronistic relationships — exercised by the Moroccan monarch — leading to the monopolistic division of rents”. Allegedly, King Mohammed VI and his entourage, the Makhzen, sit at the centre of a large nexus of people who give favours and opportunities for corruption in order to maintain political power and accumulate wealth (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). In a recent article, Ahmed Raïssouni — a Moroccan theologian and vice-president of the *Unicité et réforme mouvement* (Uniqueness and Reform Movement), the ideological foundation of the PJD (the Islamist Justice and Development Party) currently in power — declared that the separation of powers in Morocco is only theoretical and that “Corruption and the hidden state are the power in Morocco” (Telquel.ma, 2015a).

## 1.6 Islam and Corruption

The very popular and semi-legal (since it does not recognise the monarchy) Justice and Charity Association (al-Adl) has been highly critical of the Moroccan throne. Founded by Sheikh Abd al-Salam Yassine, the association's main aim is the Islamisation of Moroccan society. Sheikh Abd al-Salam fervently criticises the Palace for the many ills of the nation, and in particular corruption. (Dalmasso and Cavatorta, 2011). Under Islamic law corruption is a sin, as it is not compatible with Islamic principles because it threatens the equilibrium of society. (Egbewole and Ibrahim, 2015). The Qur'an states:

“But seek the abode of the hereafter in that which Allah has given you and neglect not your portion of the world, and be kind even as Allah has been kind to you and seek not corruption in the earth, Allah loves not corrupters” (Qur’an 28, verse 77).

However, although proscribed by Islam, corruption may be interpreted very differently. In Morocco, government institutions are perceived as slow, inefficient, arbitrary and hostile, and whenever a civil servant does his job properly, the citizen feels highly indebted (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). In such cases what is commonly deemed corruption is often the only way to express one’s appreciation. For some this is undoubtedly a form of corruption, but others feel that the civil servant may accept the gift as an expression of the good Islamic morality on which the community is built, and in this case the gift is considered to be *halal*, which means ‘lawful’ in Arabic (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). In Islam this custom of gift giving and reciprocity is an essential social mechanism on which a community is built (Kochuyt, 2009). The Supreme Judicial Authority in Saudi Arabia stipulates: “There is nothing wrong with accepting it (an amount of money as a gift), without you (the recipient) longing for that, and you can respond in kind if you are able to with an appropriate gift, or you can supplicate for him, because the Prophet, *sallallaahu alayhi wa sallam*, said: ‘Whoever does you a favour, respond in kind ...’” (Fataawa Al-Lajnah Al-Daa’imah, Islamweb, 2015).

### 1.7 The Arab Spring

Although the Arab Spring of 2011 did reach Morocco, with events from Tunisia and Egypt impacting Moroccan public opinion, the country remained fairly stable. Demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities. These were large, but nowhere near the scale of the protests that were taking place in Tunisia, for example. The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior counted fewer than 37,000 participants, although estimates from other sources were between 240,000 and 300,000 (Molina, 2011). There are a number of explanations for the relative stability of the country during this period.

First, the Moroccan monarchy had taken pre-emptive actions to reduce social discontent. Salaries were raised for civil servants, jobs were provided for unemployed graduates, benefits were granted to the unemployed, and free health care was expanded and became available to more citizens (Molina, 2011). The Palace had traditionally paid off its subjects by providing substantial subsidies for essential goods, such as bread, gas and electricity, but these were reduced in 2009 following the recommendation of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). In the midst of the uprising, however, the authorities elected to reinstate the subsidies (Zaid et al., 2014).

Second, protesters were made of various social groups, which ranged from uneducated rural Moroccans to students, professionals and religious groups who had unrelated interests, and it was therefore problematic for them to organize (Goldstone, 2011).

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the monarchy had cleverly relinquished some of its powers to the parliament over the ten years preceding the Arab Spring, unlike other regimes in the region, and had already undertaken a series of political and economic reforms, which had the effect of deflecting people's ire away from the king, so that demands were for legislative change rather than abdication (Goldstone, 2011). This was the primary reason for the continued stability of the country during this period (Gause and Gregory, 2011). The goals of these reforms were to decentralize and pluralize the decision centres of the regime, encourage the development and proliferation of associations on a level of technocracy, which favoured neutral expertise, and an apolitical approach to governance. Associations were perceived by the public as taking the relay of the government and gave the impression of a certain level of democratization of the country's political life. Sensitive matters such as corruption, public goods, local governance and the question of Amazigh rights and identity, were taken over by associations and technocrats, allowing public debate to take place and lessening some of the tensions in the country (Hibou, 2011).

## **1.8 Women and Microcredits as a Way Forward**

Mohammed VI, publicly known as 'M6', is often referred to as the "King of the Poor" (Schechla, 2015), and according to Nouredine Ayouch, a close ally of the king in charge of Shem's Publicité, the Palace's preferred advertising and PR agency, he is "a modern man who aspires always to further the cause of democracy... authentic and true, profoundly good to the core, obsessed by the eradication of poverty, free society, and liberty" (Gozlan, 2011, p. 103). Mohamed VI has thus actively pursued the approach of his father Hassan II, who in 1995 commissioned Ayouch to launch a microcredit agency, Al-Amana, specifically for women (Gozlan 2011). In April 1999, a law asserted the fundamental role of microcredit associations in the country's development and gave them official recognition (Catusse, 2009). Today there are twelve microfinance agencies in Morocco, of which Al-Amana is the most important, providing a total credit amount of 4.5 billion Moroccan dirhams (about 450 million USD in 2014) in 2012 (Kaufmann, 2013). It is estimated that in 2012 microcredit agencies served

1,278,000 customers, with 40 per cent of them located in rural areas (Kaufmann, 2013). Al-Amana is the Palace's key tool for promoting the economic and human development of Morocco. Moroccan microcredit agencies favour women, and this is mostly based on past experience. Women are believed to be more reliable and to have better repayment rates. For example, according to the Fédération Nationale des Associations de Microcrédit (the National Federation of Microcredit Associations, or F NAM), 96 per cent of the loans in 2003 by Zakoura — another leading microcredit association in Morocco — were made to women, and in 2008, 68 per cent of overall loans were to women (F NAM, 2010). However, this unwritten policy of favouring women was mostly based on a perception rather than any official statistics.

### 1.9 Morocco's New Government

Although the Palace had managed to control social dissent through networks of microcredit associations like Al-Amana, social issues, such as graduate student unemployment, the high cost of living and corruption contributed, to high social tensions that could not be subdued (Desrues, 2013a). Social media contributed to an increased public awareness of the issue of corruption. In 2007, a YouTube video posted by the “Targuist Sniper”, a Moroccan citizen from Al Hoceima, showed police asking for bribes from motorists, and was viewed well over a million times (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). One of the primary, most active opposition groups during the Arab Spring revolutions was *le mouvement du 20 février* (“Movement of the 20th of February” or M20F). Although the movement failed to gather wider support from the population due to the lack of heterogeneity of its base, which consisted primarily of young Moroccan in their late teens and early twenties (Desrues, 2013a). However, its main accusations against the regime of widespread and systemic corruption resonated with public opinion (Hibou, 2011). The scale of the unrest led Mohammed VI to grant increased civil rights. Constitutional reforms were also implemented (Goldstone, 2011). In March 2011, the Palace proposed a new constitution and in November, Moroccan citizens voted massively in favour of the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) (Bozonnet, 2015a). Both Islam and the monarchy form the basis of the PJD ideological platform. As the PJD does not preach *madawiyya* (return to Islamic values), *shumuliyya* (full submission to Islamic precepts in all sphere of life) or *al da'awa al nidaliyya* (revolutionary action towards an Islamised society) (Bouyahya, 2015), it stands for a 'legitimized Islam', (Amghar, 2007). It is not a revolutionary party aiming at social changes nor is it opposed to the Monarchy. It also considers that Morocco is a Muslim country which does not need to be Islamicised (Bouyahya, 2015).

The newly elected Prime Minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, made the fight against corruption one of his government's top priorities (Bozonnet, 2015a). However, at the same time, he made it clear that the campaign against corruption would not lead to a revolution. On July 25th, 2012 on Al Jazeera, Benkirane declared: "My policy against corruption, is as follows: 'God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God will take revenge from him'" (Morocco World News, 2012). The United Nations supported the new Moroccan regime in developing several programs to curb corruption (Fink and Hussmann, 2013). In 2011, the parliament approved a landmark law providing protection to informers and court witnesses (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2014). In 2012 the government, supported by the World Bank, launched one of the most ambitious and large-scale social marketing campaigns ever undertaken in the kingdom. This was launched nationwide and lasted for over a year (Le Monde, 2012).

### **1.10 Social Marketing Campaign to Fight Corruption**

Social Marketing has increasingly been used to address a wide spectrum of social ills, including corruption. The World Bank has long favoured social marketing in its crusade against corruption, with over 600 anti-corruption campaigns funded since 1996 (Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna, 2012). Essentially, the efficacy of such a campaign is measured against the following main principles: first of all, the campaign must spread knowledge about the issue, educate the target group, inspire an attitude change and finally generate a long-term change in behaviour (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998). Another important requirement for campaign effectiveness is that the promoter of the campaign should be credible. Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) suggested that a newly elected government might benefit from higher trust and would be more likely to enjoy the legitimacy necessary to successfully run an anti-corruption campaign. Hence, in many respects, the newly elected Moroccan government seemed to have all the legitimacy required to successfully launch an anti-corruption campaign. The election turnout had been well over 70 per cent, and the Party of Justice and Democracy (PJD) headed by Benkirane had gained a substantial majority (Bozonnet, 2015a). When it embarked on the campaign, the government claimed that it wanted to "raise the society's awareness about the perils of this scourge [of corruption]", in the words of Abdelâdim El Guerrouj, the Minister Delegate for Public Service (Le Monde, 2012).

The social marketing campaign was launched on December 10th, 2012, and while publicly discussing the campaign, El Guerrouj explained that corruption was a cultural

phenomenon widely present in Moroccan society and that it should be eliminated in its earliest stages. A leading Moroccan sociologist, Samira Kassimi, also supported the idea that corruption had become part of Moroccan culture (Ali, 2012).

### 1.11 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

The Moroccan government sees microcredit as an essential instrument for the development of the kingdom, yet an important segment of the population, namely Moroccan men, is largely excluded from these programmes. Although there is no scientific evidence, Moroccan males are believed to be less reliable and more prone to corruption, hence most are barred from taking microcredit loans. Another intriguing aspect of corruption in Morocco is that — although 89 per cent of Moroccans stress that Islam guides their lives (Tel-Quel, 2012) and that Islam and Islamic teachings are said to be strong deterrents to corruption (Abdul Jabbar, 2013) — the score on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the Kingdom has never been so high. The expert-based perception surveys on which the Transparency International CPI scores are based do not necessarily reflect the views of the general population, and so a first set of research questions considers the socio-demographic aspect of corruption in Morocco. A second aspect of this research is concerned with the social marketing anti-corruption campaign that was carried out by the newly elected PJD administration. While anti-corruption campaigns are increasingly popular, their effectiveness has not always been proven (Sampson, 2010), and it is remarkable that although the Moroccan anti-corruption campaign was an expensive one-year long effort from December 2012 to December 2013, no research has been undertaken to measure its effectiveness. Once again the current work relies on micro-level data at the level of the Moroccan citizen to investigate how effectively the campaign managed to communicate with the target audience in terms of overall reach and the clarity and credibility of the message. Most importantly, the work focuses on estimating the extent to which the campaign was successful in generating a shift in attitudes and intentions toward corruption. Hence the research questions can be stated as follows:

- Do socio-demographics, personal and social values impact a Moroccan citizen's willingness to engage in corrupt practices?
- Is the bias of microcredit agencies toward lending policies that favour women justified?

- Was the social marketing anti-corruption campaign efficient in terms of reach, interest generated, comprehension of the message, credibility, recall and changes in attitudes and intentions?

### 1.11.1 Research Objectives

The research objectives of this work are fourfold:

1. To identify, based on micro-level data, the socio-demographics and cultural factors determining the corrupt intention of Moroccan citizens.
2. To substantiate the decisive role Moroccan women have in the kingdom's development.
3. To measure the efficiency of the anti-corruption social marketing campaign.
4. To provide evidence-based recommendations for future anti-corruption campaigns as well as potential alternate routes to combat corruption in the kingdom.

### 1.12 Scope of the Research

There are many forms of corruption: petty corruption, grand corruption and political corruption. Petty corruption involves low and mid-level civil servants who demand payments from ordinary citizens for accessing goods or public services. Grand corruption takes place in the higher strata of a government, and involves enacting policies or manipulating the running of the nation for the profit of a few individuals in power at the expense of the people. Behind political corruption there are government leaders who abuse their political authority to obtain and increase personal wealth and/or power at the expense of the nation. In Morocco these forms of corruption coexist. For example, the Moroccan political researcher Said Salim reported that the Palace had interfered regularly with the referendum for the adoption of the new constitution. Imams were instructed to persuade their constituencies in their sermons at the Friday prayers to cast a “yes” vote, and entire sections of the constitution were altered the night before the referendum (Al-Monitor, 2014). The PJD had made tackling corruption one of the main themes of their campaign, adopting slogans from the Arab Spring such as “to fight corruption and tyranny” (Salmi, 2015). However, the PJD is by no means a revolutionary party: it supports the monarchy, and its leaders would not dream of attacking the King or his advisers

(Bozonnet, 2015b). The newly elected government, led by the PJD, “quickly succumbed to corrupt lobbies and, instead of confrontation, preferred to take the easier route, adopting a demagogic populist rhetoric” (Al-Monitor, 2014). From this point of view, Prime Minister Benkirane’s fight against corruption was safely based on addressing petty corruption, targeting low-level government functionaries, rather than political or grand corruption, which would risk upsetting government officials and high-level business people. The government considered corruption to be a cultural phenomenon and trusted that educating citizens would be sufficient to address the problem. Hence this work will limit itself to understanding the tenants of petty corruption in Morocco and investigate how efficiently the government has managed to tackle it.

## Chapter 2 Literature Review

### 2.1 Corruption

In the 70s, giving gratuities, otherwise known as “gift giving”, was a standard way of conducting transactions for most US companies doing business overseas. Business often requires developing connections on a personal level and offering gifts was viewed as a standard way of nurturing these relationships (Chaudhuri, 2008). Bribery scandals became almost a daily fixture in the US national press, giving the impression that US corporations were bribing virtually all foreign governments and companies to facilitate business deals (Vanasco, 1999). In 1976, the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a series of hearings concerning illicit payments which revealed a staggering number of corporate malpractices. For example, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was reported to have paid bribes in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Colombia, Nigeria, Greece, South Africa, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Boulton, 1978). Mounting scandals affected US foreign policy and led the US government to adopt the “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” in 1977 (Guterman, 2015), which penalizes bribery by US companies in foreign states (Sampson, 2010). As a consequence of this act, both the US government and many US corporations became increasingly concerned that the act was putting US corporations at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-US businesses which could pay large bribes to secure contracts (Ivanov, 2007). In 1976, J. Jefferson Staats of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States stated that “if only United States corporations are prohibited from bribing foreign officials, the United States corporations are likely to lose their competitive advantage vis-a-vis foreign corporations” (Morgan, 1979, p. 361). Corruption, often in the form of bribery, had become a standard way of doing business and Lewis (2016) reported that US businesses were losing billions of dollars worth of contracts to foreign corporations and countries that had no qualms about paying expected bribes.

By the mid-90s, fighting corruption on a global scale had become an economic necessity for American businesses and the US government. The US embarked on a campaign to promote its anti-corruption agenda on the global stage (Pearson, 2001). The IMF and the World Bank soon followed suit and backed the US anti-corruption agenda. Although the global fight against corruption was clearly initiated to protect US businesses, the message was conveyed differently. James Wolfensohn, the World Bank President, declared in his pivotal speech to the World Bank in 1996 entitled “Cancer of Corruption” that the campaign against corruption originated from the people themselves: “In country after country, it is the people who are demanding action on this issue” (Ivanov, 2007, p. 31). In 1993, led by Peter Eigen, a former World Bank executive, Transparency International initiated the Corruption Perception

Index to increase awareness of the issue (Transparency International, 2016). The premise that it was the people who wanted corruption eradicated led to the idea that public involvement was essential. Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998, p.11), from the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, maintained that “anti-corruption campaigns could not succeed without public support”.

#### **2.1.1.1 World Bank and Transparency International Definitions**

Nowadays, the definition of corruption most frequently employed by anti-corruption practitioners is that of the World Bank (Kearns, 2015). For the World Bank, corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 2000). Transparency International, the leading non-governmental anti-corruption organization, definition broadens the concept of corruption by replacing “public office” by “entrusted power”, highlighting the fact that corruption could be found across society as a whole. For Transparency International, corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (TI, 2015). The World Bank definition, as well as many other established definitions — such as “the abuse of public power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance” (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 2); or “the misappropriation of a public office for personal profit” (Treisman, 2007, p.213) — are by and large derived from an economic perspective on corruption with little thought to other possible perspectives of definition.

#### **2.1.1.2 A Wide Spectrum of Definitions**

The reality is that corruption research falls under a wide spectrum of disciplines, including criminology, sociology, philosophy, public administration, economics, political science, history and psychology, and as a result, different theoretical standpoints are used (Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar (2010) identify eight different perspectives to define corruption: Weberian Ideal-typical, Structural Functionalist, Institutional Economics, Ecological, System Theoretical, Institutional Design, Criminological and Post-Positivist.

In the Weberian Ideal-Typical approach, corruption is rooted in a defective public service sector. As mentioned by Kerkhoff, “the more bureaucratic a society becomes, the less political corruption will occur because of the growing amount of and adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and (possibly) because of coinciding evolving ideas on neutrality, common good and public versus private interest” (2013, p.290).

The Structural Functionalist approach states that every societal occurrence has a purpose. For example, in South Africa the poorest people are more likely to be the victims of corruption and to bribe a corrupt official to get access to services such as the water supply or health services (Justesen and Bjørnskov, 2014).

In the Institutional Economics approach, corrupt officials are rational agents who try to maximize their utility (Lambsdorff, 2007). The individual is depicted as a rational person who considers engaging in corruption when the gains outweigh the disadvantages (De Graaf, 2007). As long as the gains which accrue from corruption exceed the costs, the person becomes corrupt (De Graaf, 2007). These costs can be separated into three types: the economic cost associated with the risk of being penalized or dismissed from employment if caught; the social cost resulting from society’s condemnation and rejection; and finally, the moral cost represented by the psychological stress generated by breaching one’s own moral convictions.

In the Ecological approach, the term ‘social-ecological-system’ refers to the interdependent relationship between people mediated through interaction with biophysical and non-human biological units (Anderies, Janssen and Ostrom, 2004). For example, investigations of police corruption have shown that police malpractice is significantly correlated to the neighbourhood setting in which the police operate (Lee et al., 2013).

In the System Theoretical perspective, abuse occurs when the boundaries between the judiciary and the political or economic system are loose (Graaf, Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). Scott (2013) shows that in Hong Kong civil service departments are highly independent, with each department establishing rules for the discretion allowed to employees.

From the Institutional Design point of view, corruption is based on the principle that any institution’s organization (or lack thereof) may favour certain forms of corrupt behaviour. In a society where the state is perceived as failing its citizens in terms of infrastructure, education, health and security, individuals are more likely to see corrupt behaviour as an option (Gambetta, 1993, Lambsdorff and Cornelius, 2000). Lee, Moore and Kim (2013) showed that disorganization in the police forces results in a lack of rigour in the appointment of officers, insufficient coaching or slack supervision, which makes it the key dynamic behind police corruption. In the same vein, businesses may consider corruption a *sine qua non* for a business to operate (Khanna et al., 2010 as cited by Godinez and Liu, 2015) or simply as a “lubricant”

when administrations are too slow or incompetent (Meon and Weill, 2010 as cited by Godinez and Liu, 2015).

Criminology is the scientific study of crime. Criminal law identifies four different methods of unlawfully obtaining the property or personal wealth of others, and for the criminologist corruption is one of these four methods (Zimring and Johnson, 2005). This perspective uses criminological theories to provide a causal explanation of corruption. Corruption is seen as the interaction of individual drive, opportunity and various forms of control at the level of the individual, the organization and the external environment (Huisman and Van de Walle, 2010).

The Post-Positivist perspective, finally, treats corruption as a social construct. For Sissener (2001), corruption can only be understood with reference to the social environment in which it takes place and so the meaning of corruption may differ from culture to culture, with some communities not seeing corruption as a social curse but rather as a mechanism to foster solidarity between the members of a group (Tänzler, Maras and Giannakopoulos, 2007).

### **2.1.2 Post-Positivist Approach to Corruption**

The various approaches to researching corruption described above have logically prescribed institutional reforms to tackle corruption. However, a growing body of evidence has repeatedly illustrated the ineffectiveness of such reforms (Barr and Serra, 2010, Fisman and Miguel, 2007). Recently, after having rigorously analysed various public sector reforms, Andrews observed a near systematic failure, and concluded that corruption is most often entrenched in a society's culture (Andrews, 2015).

In the Post-Positivist approach, corruption is socially constructed and is considered to be a malpractice only by those who see it as such within the context of a specific time and place (Graaf, von Maravić and Wagenaar, 2010). Dimant, Krieger and Redlin (2014) analysed migration flows in 207 countries and demonstrated that immigration originating from countries with a high level of corruption would tend to increase corruption in the receiving countries. The parking violation experiment by Fisman and Miguel (2007) illustrates this point. In an intriguing research paper, they found a strong correlation between the number of parking offences committed by foreign diplomats residing in New York and the corruption level in their country of origin. Diplomats from countries with higher corruption levels would tend to breach the law more often than diplomats from countries with low levels. However, when sanctions for parking violation were increased, parking offences fell by over 98 per cent. This experiment clearly showed that the root causes of corrupt behaviour on the part of diplomats were indeed

cultural, but that such behaviour could be reversed once an appropriate set of sanctions was imposed. Their behaviour resulted from the conflict between the intrinsic norms they had learned and imported from the culture of origin and the institutional social norms in the new environment. At the end of their experiment, Fisman and Miguel (2006) concluded that “norms related to corruption are apparently deeply ingrained” and questioned if sanctions could modify corruption intention over time.

Haller and Shore’s (2005) research on corruption in various countries around the globe — including India, Bolivia, Portugal, Russia, Romania and the US — shows the diversity of perceptions of corruption from culture to culture and Banuri and Eckel (2012a) have published an impressive list of research papers that found correlations between culture and corruption (Banuri and Eckel, 2012b, Barr and Serra, 2009, Barr and Serra, 2010, Cameron et al., 2009, Fisman and Miguel, 2007, Husted, 1999, Porta et al., 1997, Lambsdorff, 2006, Lipset and Lenz, 2000, Serra, 2006, Treisman, 2000, Uslaner, 2004), all of which points back to Andrews’ original observation: corruption is most often entrenched in a society’s culture.

#### **2.1.2.1 Culture and Corruption**

Culture encompasses a wide spectrum of concepts, and has been defined in conflicting ways. Sometimes it is defined as tangible elements such as trust, religiosity or institutional rules; sometimes as abstract factors, such as values, norms or morals (Banuri and Eckel, 2012a). Defining culture is by no means a simple task, as anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn showed in 1952 by compiling a list of 164 different definitions. Perhaps the earlier 1870 definition of the British anthropologist Tylor is the most suited of all as it provides the level of abstraction necessary for such a theoretical concept: “Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871: 1, as cited by Avruch, 1998, p. 6).

Swidler theorized that culture provides a “tool kit” or a “repertoire of habit” from which an individual may choose certain cultural elements to achieve certain adaptive “strategies of actions” (1986, p. 273). For example, in the culture of the hyper-repressive state of Burma, Kyi (1992, p. 11) suggests that fear lies at the heart of corruption. Of the four kinds of corruption or “a-gati” defined by the author, “bhaya-gati” — corruption due to fear (“bhaya” is the worst fear) — will “stifle and slowly destroy all sense of right and wrong”. Kyi (1992) identifies many fears – the fear of poverty, the fear of being surpassed, and the fear of being humiliated. In Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s police commissioner, identified a strong

relationship between fear of poverty and corruption (Werlin, 2005). Faull (2007) noted that corruption was prevalent in many police organizations around the world, and that fear of authority/police, which might normally deter a citizen from engaging in corrupt behaviour, may on the contrary foster corrupt actions (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2008).

There are indeed various forces — at times interrelated, at times competing — that determine an individual's disposition toward corruption: the demographics of each individual with his/her diversity of value systems, principles and morals, and the social forces outside the individual's own personal convictions. Social norms originate in the various groups to which an individual is affiliated, such as family, friends, colleagues, religious group or nation. Four main forms of normative control have been identified: Values, Social Capital, Civil Society and Civic Culture (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013), all of which are helpful in any Post-Positivist discussion concerning corruption.

### **2.1.3 Normative Controls and Corruption**

#### **2.1.3.1 Values**

Values are defined as dominant societal norms of universally accepted ethical principles such as justice and honesty. A number of studies posit the values of an individual as the locus of behaviour. For Kamakura and Novak (1992), value systems are an essential component of the consumer decision process. For Parks and Guay (2009), personal values are principles guiding individual behaviour. For Feather (1992), the motivation that one individual has to attain a specific goal is determined by his or her value system, which assigns value to the attractiveness of each goal. Individuals thus tend to have a ranking in their value system, and individual behaviour will be the result of competing personal values, with values that are considered more important than others dictating behaviour (Parks et al, 2009). For Feather (as cited by Eccles and Wigfield, 2002, p111), values are defined as a set of “general beliefs about what is desirable”. These values are the results of complex interactions between an individual's personal values, resulting from the individual's inner psychological needs, and his or her social values, which in turn result from the norms of society (Feather, 1992). In the case of corruption, one may use the concept of “selective moral disengagement”, a term first coined by Bandura (2002, p101).

The Theory of Moral Disengagement was developed primarily to explain political and military violence, although Bandura noted that individuals may also use moral disengagement “to further their own interests or for profit” (Bandura, 1990b, p. 43). In the Theory of Moral

Disengagement, an individual may engage in immoral acts by using cognitive mechanisms to turn off the moral values that would normally regulate his or her action. Moore (2008) proposed that when corruption is systemic, individuals would use moral disengagement to push aside their own ethical values and conform to the behaviour of the group, with the individual's personal responsibility and feeling of guilt being allayed by the de facto norm established by the group.

#### 2.1.3.2 Social Capital

Social Capital is the relationship that weaves society around common values, interests and goals (Callahan, 2005). An individual who violates society's common norms exposes himself or herself to various sanctions such as the feeling of guilt (internal sanction) or to legal consequences, exclusion from society or, to a lesser extent, negative gossip (external sanctions) (Dong, et al., 2012). According to Torgler (2006, p.5), "guilt arises when individuals realize that they have acted irresponsibly and in violation of an internalized rule or social standard". Honest behaviour, or "incorruption", is accepted as being a dominant norm in societies (Dong et al, 2012). Rothstein and Torsello (2014) also found that bribery in preindustrial societies is mostly condemned. Integrity becomes mutually enforced and individuals weigh the costs of straying from the norm (Zhang, 2015). Corrupt behaviour transgresses against the dominant social norm and brings shame and guilt to the perpetrator (Elster, 1989). However, Mishra (2006) noted that in some societies, corruption is widespread and has been tolerated over long periods, which may indicate that corruption has become a norm in and of itself while Rose-Ackerman demonstrated that most people would justify a corrupt act by citing the prevalence of corruption in the society (2008). And in a society where corruption is rife, corruption is not only socially correct, but a citizen who behaves honestly may feel as if he or she is the only "sucker" around (Persson, et al., 2013).

#### 2.1.3.3 Civic Culture

Civic Culture refers to the involvement of citizens through the media or social movements. In Morocco, the well-known "February 20th Movement" (M20F) could have forced the Palace into taking concrete action against corruption. However, M20F was rapidly neutralized and, therefore, failed to gather enough momentum to enforce change (Desrues, 2013a).

Regarding civic engagement through the media, the Palace’s infamous monitoring of most of the press, radio and television stations has lead Moroccans to become particularly sceptical of their national media (Cantrell, 2014). Although the press in Morocco is notoriously muzzled, social media in the Arab world — and in Morocco, particularly — have enjoyed relative freedom. It is well documented that social media was one of the main factors leading up to the 2011 Arab Spring (Howard et al., 2011, Ghannam, 2011, Wolfsfeld, Segeva and Sheaffer, 2013). A vast number of Moroccans were exposed to corruption on social media by the notorious Targuist Sniper — less well-known under the name of Agueznay Mounir — who became an instant celebrity by publishing several videos from July 2007 to 2013 demonstrating the corruption in his region. The Targuist Sniper hid along the road to film corrupt “gendarmes” or police officers demanding bribes from motorists. The video became major news, and while the police harassed the blogger (Al-Monitor, 2012) and the authorities sued the sniper for defamation (Telquel, 2015), the video remained online and was viewed well over a million times over the course of 2009 (Hibou and Tozy, 2009).




Figure 1 - Citizen engagement via social media; *The Targuist Sniper* (Youtube, 2015).

#### 2.1.3.4 Civil Society: Religion and Corruption

Civil Society is defined by the World Bank as “the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and

values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 2015).

Muslims consider bribery and corruption to be immoral acts. One hadith stipulates that benefits derived from sinful activities are unlawful: “the flesh that grows out of unlawful income has no place in the hereafter but hell” (Alhabshi, 2009). Similarly, in Sharia Law, corruption is considered *tazwir* (a crime against society). Furthermore, the Qur’an clearly condemns corruption. The Qur’an states: “And do not consume your property among yourselves wrongfully, nor seek access to judges by means of it in order that you may sinfully consume a portion of people’s wealth, while you know (what you do)” (al-Baqarah, 2:188).

Marquette (2010, p. 41), in a working paper entitled “Corruption, Religion and Moral Development”, considers religion a source of rules and a code of ethics to guide an individual in his or her everyday life, and since “fairness and honesty are basic to the teachings of many religions” (2010, p. 41), religious guidance should deter individuals from corrupt behaviour. Sommer, Bloom and Arikan (2013) claim that religion is a synonym for behavioural integrity and virtuousness, since it provides clear guidelines about what is good or what is evil behaviour. Forbes and Zampelli (1997), by analysing a sample from more than 30 countries, found that the higher the level of religiosity of participants, the higher the level of their morality with regard to paying taxes. For Flavin and Ledet (2008), religions in general, including polytheistic ones, require their adherents to abide by rules and guidance advancing moral conduct and the welfare of the community at the expense of personal gain and self-interest. In the same vein, Voert, Felling and Peters (1994) claimed that increased secularization would lead to individuals being more self-centred, more corrupt and much less fearful of social disapproval.

Various NGOs, such as Christian Aid and Islamic Relief, endeavour to fight corruption (Marquette, 2012) and many developing countries have decided to involve religious leaders and institutions in their fight against corruption. Such decisions have the aim of exploiting the potential influence of religious models in order to influence the behaviour of devout citizens and encourage ethical conduct in societies (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007).

In Nigeria, to reduce the rate of corruption and regain the trust of its citizens, the government recruited Imams as civil servants. Likewise, some political leaders have issued multiple invitations to religious institutions to help them eradicate corruption. In South Africa, Du Plessis and Breed (2013) suggest the Church as a potential initiator of a great anti-corruption movement. For instance, the Zambian Vice President, Nevers Mumba, called for the support of the Church to help his government in its battle against corruption (Heywood, 2014). In Romania, Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Oancea (2009) showed that the Church, media and

schools have a positive impact on the reduction of corruption. As an explanation of this connection between initiatives by religious institutions and ethical behaviour, Sommer, Bloom and Arikan (2013) argue that the presence of religious ideas among citizens tends to increase their belief in the existence of a supernatural watcher who will reward them for good conduct and punish them for evil or unethical behaviour. Therefore, in societies where religious concepts are present, citizens are likely to have higher levels of moral behaviour.

The impact of religion on cultures of corruption is not just felt by those who prescribe to a religion. In fact, the presence of religious initiatives in the social environment has been shown to have an impact on both devout and secular citizens (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). Religion creates a norm by which non-religious citizens will also abide. Sommer, Bloom and Arikan (2013) showed that secular citizens tend to behave in accordance with the most common religious standards prevalent in the society, but of course one has to be careful about the political context in which religion evolves. Though scholars have shown that higher political and civic engagement is generally synonymous with reduced corruption (La Porta et al., 1999), this is not always the case. Hence in democratic countries religion will indeed contribute to a reduction of corruption, while in non-democratic countries, religion is often linked to increased corruption (Sommer, Bloom and Arikan, 2013).

Interestingly, La Porta, et al (1999) showed that hierarchical religions such as Catholicism, Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy are linked to higher levels of perceived corruption. In a hierarchical religion, such as Catholicism, challenges to church officials are not welcome and the hierarchical structure is generally maintained by a high level of secrecy. On the other hand, in an egalitarian religion, such as Protestantism, a culture of equality and transparency encourages the questioning and challenging of the clergy and thus, perhaps, a lower finding of perceived corruption. These findings are also supported by Paldam (1999), who demonstrates that the least corrupt countries are more likely to have a Protestant or Anglican religious context, while countries with Catholics, other Pre-Reform Christians, or Buddhists seem to suffer from a higher level of perceived corruption.

Husted (1999) used the "Power Distance Index" (PDI) as defined by Hofstede (1998) of 44 countries while controlling for other explanatory variables to show that a higher PDI leads to higher levels of corruption. "The power distance index measures the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 1998, p. 479). Another interesting finding is that more religiously divided countries have a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour than countries in which one religion is prevalent (Paldam, 2001). Finally, Marquette (2010)

observed that the most corrupt countries are also some of the most religious, and that religion is not by any means the fundamental factor influencing moral or corrupt behaviour.

This observation might well fit Morocco's image as both a religious and a corrupt society. In the kingdom, Islam, as a religion, is ever-present in the everyday Moroccan life. According to a recent report, 89 per cent of Moroccans claim that religion guides their lives: two-thirds pray five times a day and 39 per cent claim to read the Qur'an at home (Tel-Quel, 2012). Mustapha Ramid, the Minister for Justice and Liberty, appealed to the Islamic faith held by most Moroccans in an effort to curb corruption. In an interview with the Moroccan magazine *L'économiste* published on November 12th, 2012, he declared, "Avoid corruption, as it is *haram*" (*L'économiste*, 2012b). In Arabic, *haram* signifies all things proscribed as outlawed by the Qur'an (Al-Qaradawi, et al., 1985). However, abundant examples of posts in online forums in Morocco reveal the ambiguous nature of corruption for many Moroccans. The following question from Chanid, an online participant on Bladi.net, one of the most popular online communities in Morocco (Bladi.net, 2015), is a good example of the dilemma faced by Moroccans in their understanding of corruption with respect to religion:

"We all know that corruption is haram in Islam is that there are cases where it can be considered that this is not corruption? For example when considering my driving license, I made a small mistake which sentenced me to fail! So I decided to give money to the examiner for 'close your eyes' ... but he did not want is that it is corruption in this case? it is haram?" (Bladi.net, 2015, this passage is the original language of the online participant).

#### **2.1.4 Corruption and Development**

The World Bank considers corruption to be one of the major limitations to a country's development and, since 1996, the organization has funded over 600 anti-corruption campaigns (Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna, 2012). Like many developing countries, Morocco has long been relying on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost its development (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). The World Bank estimated that FDI as a percentage of GDP grew steadily from 2.5 per cent in 2011, to 2.9 per cent in 2012, 3.1 per cent in 2013 and finally to 3.3 per cent in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). FDI generally enables local companies to have access to foreign capital and technology, hence improving their productivity and overall competitiveness (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). However, in the case of a corrupt country, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) found that corruption would lead to a reduction in local and foreign investment,

impairing its economic development. Gray and Kaufman (1998) demonstrated that corruption not only reduces the flow of domestic and foreign investment but also leads to “inefficient economic outcomes”. Essentially, it siphons capital away from infrastructure and public service and undermines a country’s development (Robinson, 1998). Kwok and Tadesse (2006) showed that multinational enterprises will avoid investing in countries that are considered corrupt out of concern about the additional costs linked to corruption. More recently, Barassi and Zhou (2012) also demonstrated a negative correlation between the level of corruption and the flow of FDI.

Not surprisingly, the kingdom of Morocco wants to polish its image vis-à-vis the international community, primarily because Morocco’s economic development relies heavily on foreign direct investment. In 2008, Morocco was the second largest recipient of FDI flows in the FEMIP (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) region, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Gaza/the West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia (EIB, 2015). FDI represented nearly 3.3 per cent of the country’s 100 billion USD GDP in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). It is against this background that in 2011 Morocco ratified the UN convention against corruption (UN, 2015), and is a member of the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network (ACINET, 2014 as cited by Sutherland, 2015).

Following the 2008 financial crisis, FDI outflows to North Africa were drastically reduced, with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reporting a 50 per cent drop in FDI for the region. Interestingly though, Morocco suffers unflattering corruption perception scores year after year, it does not seem to lose its attractiveness to foreign investors. The kingdom has remained one of the ten best African countries for FDI investment and in 2015 was ranked the fifth best country on the continent for investment, just behind Egypt, Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique (Financial Time, 2015).

In most cases, corruption is seen as a deterrent to FDI; however, (2008) maintained that it is the type of corruption a business faces that matters when making decisions about investing in a transition economy. Cuervo-Cazurra distinguishes between “pervasive” corruption and “arbitrary” corruption. Pervasive corruption is defined as a type of corruption that is definite and generalized, while arbitrary corruption is a form of corruption that is uncertain. Analysing FDI data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and corruption data from the World Bank and the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), Cuervo-Cazurra found that foreign businesses seemed not to be deterred from investing in transition economies with a high level of “arbitrary” corruption such as Morocco, but shy away from countries with a high level of “pervasive” corruption. This possibly explains the case of Morocco, which by displaying on the international stage its determination to fight corruption,

reassures investors that organized corruption is being tackled, while Moroccan citizens continue to feel the effects of day-to-day arbitrary corruption.

### 2.1.5 Morocco's Fight Against Corruption

Until 1995, addressing the subject of corruption was considered taboo in Moroccan society. It was only in 1996 that “Maroc 2020”, a Moroccan advocacy group, broke the public reserve about the subject by organizing several public seminars on corruption. Since then, several notable actions and reforms have been made. In December 1998, a *Dahir* (royal decree) enforcing rules on public procurement was passed. Then in 1999, the World Bank worked alongside the Moroccan government to organize a high profile conference on corruption (Denoeux, 2000). In 2003 the UN Convention on the fight against corruption was signed and eventually ratified in May 2007. A money laundering law was also passed in 2007 while the draft law on wealth declaration was formally adopted by the Governing Council in February 2007. In November 2006, the Government adopted a decree establishing the Central Body for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC or *L'Instance Centrale de Prévention de la Corruption*) which had first been discussed in 2005 (Michael and Nouaydi, 2009). Meanwhile, a further element of the administrative reforms — initially launched in the early 2000s specifically to fight against “petty corruption” — came into effect to avoid uncontrolled contacts between officials and members of the public: A single window policy was adopted to replace the existing multi-service windows; some types of permit for small businesses were abolished; some public services were privatised; and, accompanied by great publicity, many known corrupt agents (such as police officers and judges) were fired. Eventually, to combat larger forms of corruption, regional investment centres were created and extra powers were given to the General Inspector of Finance (*Inspecteur général des finances*, or IGF) and the Court of Auditors (Hibou and Tozy, 2009). However, the efficiency of such measures remained limited and corruption scandals continued to surface regularly.

Clearly, Moroccan citizens felt there was a void between the rhetoric and the action, and Moroccans gradually lost faith in their government's ability or genuine willingness to fight corruption (Denoeux, 2000). In 2010, a two-year government anti-corruption plan was launched. The plan included 40 anti-graft measures to keep corruption in check. It also set up hotlines for the public to report acts of extortion by government officials. Yet despite all these actions and public announcements Moroccan citizens remained unconvinced, and the kingdom's ranking on global governance indicators declined steadily. For instance, Morocco's

Corruption Perception Index went from a score of 4.7 in 2000, or 37th place, to a score of 3.4 in 2011, or 80th position (Transparency International, 2011). By comparison, New Zealand, one of the least corrupt countries on the Corruption Perception Index, had a score of 9.5, and Algeria ranked 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco: its ranking declined even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le Monde, 2012). At the same time, Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer in 2010/2011 showed that barely 19 per cent of Moroccans believed that the kingdom's fight against corruption was effective.

## **2.2 Social Marketing**

Agencies, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the Asian Development Bank, often work at the socio-cultural level to address a wide range of issues. Social Marketing has been increasingly popular as an effective tool enabling broader social and cultural change to individual behaviour change (Nguyen and Rowley, 2015).

### **2.2.1 Defining Social Marketing**

Marketing has traditionally been associated with the business field and used as a profit-generating tool. However, it has also been used to address various social ailments and an increasing number of non-governmental associations, governments and other institutions have adopted it for non-profit objectives, giving birth to a practice called Social Marketing.

The sixties saw the first publications on marketing as applied to social issues. In 1965, Chandy, et al., from the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta, published a paper on the use of marketing to address family planning issues in India. However, the Indian government was later criticized by Martin (1968), who stated in his research paper, "The outlandish idea: how a marketing man would save India", that:

Selling birth control is as much a marketing job as selling any other consumer product. And where no manufacturer would contemplate developing and introducing a new product without a thorough understanding of the variables of the market, planners in the highest circles of Indian government have blithely gone ahead without understanding that marketing principles must determine the character of any campaign of voluntary control.

Simon (1968) also addressed family planning issues with marketing concepts in his paper entitled “A Huge Marketing Research Task: Birth Control”. But it was Kotler and Zaltman in 1971 who first coined the term “social marketing” in their article “Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change” (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971, as cited by Andreasen, 1994). Growing interest from Professor Philip Kotler and other scholars from Northwestern University in social marketing arose from the desire to expand and develop the study of marketing and incorporate a social component within the discipline (Eliotte, 1991). Brown (1986), as cited by Andreasen (1994) claimed that the rise of this new discipline was the expected result of a combination of various factors, such as an increased need for marketing from non-business organizations and recurrent criticisms of the negative impact of marketing on society.

The increasing number of publications in the field of social marketing reflects the growing interest of academics. Van Dao Truong, Professor at the Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, counted 1,423 articles published in peer-reviewed journals from 1998 to the end of August 2013 (2014). Truong also noted that Kotler and Zaltman’s definition of social marketing was one of the most cited definitions:

The design, implementation and control of programs calculated to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution and marketing research”. (Kotler and Zaltman, p. 5)

In 1994 Andreasen suggested that Social Marketing be defined as:

The application of commercial marketing technologies to analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of programs designed to influence the voluntary behaviour of target audiences in order to improve their personal welfare and that of society. (Andreasen, 1994, p. 110)

In Andreasen’s definition, the word “voluntary” should be highlighted. Behaviour change should be voluntary if it is to be lasting. Later, Andreasen (2002, p. 7) listed six criteria to identify a social marketing approach:

1. Behaviour-change is the benchmark used to design and evaluate interventions.
2. Projects consistently use audience research to (a) understand target audiences at the outset of interventions (i.e., formative

research), (b) routinely pre-test intervention elements before they are implemented, and (c) monitor interventions as they are rolled out.

3. There is careful segmentation of target audiences to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the use of scarce resources.

4. The central element of any influence strategy is creating attractive and motivational exchanges with target audiences.

5. The strategy attempts to use all four Ps of the traditional marketing mix; for example, it is not just advertising or communications.

That is, it creates attractive benefit packages (products) while minimizing costs (price) wherever possible, making the exchange convenient and easy (place) and communicating powerful messages through media relevant to—and preferred by—target audiences (promotion).

6. Careful attention is paid to the competition faced by the desired behaviour.

As Stead, Hastings and McDermott (2007) suggested, the fifth point of Andreasen's criteria should be underlined so that it states: "social marketing cannot be effective by enforcing or obliging people to do what social marketers want them to do" (Stead, Hastings and McDermott, 2007, p. 9). For a social marketing campaign to be effective, marketers should highlight the benefits of the intended behavioural change in order for the audience to accept the social marketing program (Stead, Hastings, and McDermott, 2007). Andreasen's definition was later criticized for focusing the endeavours of social marketers mostly on behaviour change while ignoring their duty to achieve a wider aim, namely the betterment of society (Gordon, 2011). Moreover, focusing solely on individual behaviour change may lessen the impact of a social marketing campaign since individual behaviour is the result of complex interactions between personal motivation and the social environment and context (Donovan and Henley, 2010). Hence for a campaign to be efficient, organizational changes should also be implemented (Farrell and Gordon, 2012). The current definition provided by the International Social Marketing Association, the European Social Marketing Associating and the Australian Associating of Social Marketing includes the notion of contributing to a "greater social good".

Social Marketing seeks to develop and integrate marketing concepts with other approaches to influence behaviours that benefit individuals and communities for the greater

social good. Social Marketing practice is guided by ethical principles. It seeks to integrate research, best practice, theory, audience and partnership insight, to inform the delivery of competition sensitive and segmented social change programmes that are effective, efficient, equitable and sustainable (Saunders, Barrington and Sridharan, 2015, p. 162).

In other words, social marketing utilises the same principles and techniques as business marketing, but differs in its ultimate goal. While business marketing seeks to maximize profit, social marketing aims at the betterment of the individual and society as a whole. Social marketing uses a combination of market research, customer insight, segmentation of the target audience, targeting and value exchanges in order to achieve attitude and behavioural changes and sustain positive behaviours (French and Gordon, 2015).

### 2.2.2 Social Marketing Objectives

Social marketing is not just a standard advertising campaign to raise the public awareness about one issue or another. Although it includes classic promotional instruments, social marketing also incorporates concepts and techniques from a wide range of scientific disciplines with the aim to understand, and ultimately influence, people's behaviour.

#### 2.2.2.1 Educate, Inform and Prevent

The World Bank and Transparency International identified mounting awareness of the devastating consequences of corruption as the first pillar in establishing a global anti-corruption norm (Lawson, 2009). Hence social marketing was promoted as an indispensable tool for “the creation of an atmosphere in public life that discourages fraud and corruption” (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 1). For Theobald and Williams (1999), the success of an anti-corruption campaign depends entirely on educating citizens about corruption and their willingness to cooperate. For Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998), a social marketing campaign should first aim at alerting citizens about the cost of corruption to the country and its citizens. For Khemani (2009), the main objectives of such a campaign are to educate, inform and prevent. In Nigeria, the objective of their campaign was to set their citizens against a complacent attitude towards corruption (Khemani, 2009). Likewise, Botswana conducted a campaign through the media using slogans declaring: “We blow the whistle on foul play”. This enabled the country to heighten society's awareness of corruption and gain public support against corrupt behaviour. Similarly, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong achieved remarkable results thanks to a mass media campaign to educate Hong Kong citizens on the subject of corruption (De Speville, 1999). This campaign allowed the Commission to influence

the public perception of corruption. Gradually, the campaign induced an attitude change toward corruption in the people of Hong Kong. Corruption was no longer perceived as normal behaviour, but as a crime. Teaching materials were also developed to educate Hong Kong youth about corruption, promote social disapproval of corrupt behaviour and increase the sense of morality of young people (Manion, 2004). In mainland China, moral education has been at the heart of most anti-corruption campaigns (He, 2000), extending beyond its usual remit to include shock and theatrical fear techniques to scare potential culprits and set an example to the population (Wedman, 2005).

#### 2.2.2.2 Attitude and Behaviour Change

One might argue that education and laws are enough to control individual behaviour. However, the efficacy of education as a means of altering individual behaviour was challenged by Rothschild (1999), who noted that it might only be effective when dealing with uninformed individuals who could potentially be motivated to change their behaviour once they had been informed about the issue. In the same way, use of the law is limited since its application is only suitable if knowledgeable individuals act upon it. Social marketing has proven its suitability for altering individual behaviour when education and laws alone may prove insufficient (Madill and Abele, 2007). An individual attitude is defined by the belief that a specific behaviour will lead to a specific outcome and an effective evaluation (like or dislike) of the outcome of that behaviour. Hence an individual will reflect on these two factors, i.e. his or her attitude toward a given behaviour, as well as the perceived social acceptability of this behaviour. Attitude and social norm are weighed separately. If the outcome seems beneficial, the individual may then intend to or actually adopt a particular behaviour. An individual may perform (or not perform) a specific behaviour solely because the social pressure overcomes his or her own negative (or positive) evaluation of such behaviour. On the other hand, he or she may decide to ignore peer pressure and perform a behaviour which he or she evaluates positively.

#### 2.2.2.3 Campaign Credibility

To gain citizen support and collaboration, the promoters of a campaign should have the necessary credibility in the eyes of the audience. In cases where an established government is generally considered corrupt, Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) recommend that the promoter of the campaign should be either an independent agency specializing in anti-corruption measures

or a newly elected government. In Botswana, the anti-corruption agency, the the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was perceived as biased, treating corruption cases associated with powerful politicians and organizations with undue leniency. As a result, the anti-corruption campaign was far from successful (Robin et al, 1999). Similarly, the anti-corruption campaign conducted by the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission was not able to achieve the expected results because the commission lost credibility (Otieno, 2005). If an anti-corruption campaign is not followed by concrete actions against perpetrators, the campaign might lose credibility and in turn cause increased public distrust in the government. As noted by Chubb and Vannicelli (1988), corruption scandals that are left unpunished lead to a further loss of legitimacy for the government. In Russia, anti-corruption campaigns have been manipulated and hijacked by politicians to discredit their opponents. Not only does the campaign lose all credibility, but citizen trust in their country's democratic process is broken (Coulloudon, 2002). As one of the early supporters of anti-corruption campaigns has admitted, global efforts to fight corruption have been ineffective if not counterproductive: "Today, the war on corruption is undermining democracy, helping the wrong leaders get elected, and distracting societies from facing urgent problems" (Naím, 2005 as cited by Ivanov, 2007, p. 40). According to Wedman (2005), with only one per cent of Chinese officials being investigated and only 0.5 per cent being convicted of corruption yearly, anti-corruption campaigns are unlikely to succeed. One may conclude by questioning the actual efficacy of anti-corruption social marketing campaigns altogether. Klitgaard, a leading scholar of corruption, and colleagues Abaroa and Parris (2000, p. 11) remark that "the history of anti-corruption campaigns around the world is not propitious".

### **2.2.3 Social Marketing Models**

Truong (2012) retrieved 1,423 social marketing articles published between 1998 and 2012 and out of these 1,423, 867 were retained which matched Andreasen's six social marketing criteria (Andreasen, 2002). However, from these 867 articles, none dealt with the subject of corruption. Research was mostly conducted on public health and global health epidemics (71.4 per cent of published articles). Other areas, such as public safety, environmental protection, tourism, leisure and civil society, were rarely investigated. A search of the literature shows that the use of social marketing to fight corruption has not been a popular research theme to date. One of the most salient articles to date was published in 1998 by Professor Gurpit Kindra, a marketing professor in the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ottawa who joined the World Bank in 1996 to focus on anti-corruption, good

governance and parliamentary development, and Rick Stapenhurst, a consultant and adviser to the World Bank, under the title: “Social marketing strategies to fight corruption”.

Although social marketing theories derive from a wide range of disciplines, such as health, sociology, political science, psychology and economics, only a quarter out of the 867 research articles analysed by Truong were substantiated adequately by theory (Truong, 2012). An earlier review of 497 articles in the health sector showed that amongst the theories employed most frequently were social cognitive theory, Health Believe model, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and Diffusion Innovation Theory (Glanz, Lewis and Rimer, 1997). Truong later confirmed these findings (Truong, 2012). The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) have both been applied to the analysis of corruption intention. Unethical behavioural intention in the medical profession was found to be accurately predicted by the Theory of Reasoned Action (Randall and Gibson, 1991). While Chang (1998) found that although both theories could predict an individual intention to copy software illegally, the theory of planned behaviour gave more accurate results in predicting unethical behaviour. The Theory of Planned Behaviour was also successfully applied to one of the most publicized cases of bankruptcy in modern history, that of Enron, the energy company (Kulik, O’Fallon and Salimath, 2008). The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991, Ajzen and Madden, 1986) or the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein, 1979) tend to present behaviour as the outcome of complex human interaction and social practice. TPB originated from the Theory of Reasoned Action. In TRA, intention is defined as the best predictor of behaviour. More specifically, an individual’s intention to perform a specific behaviour results from two components: his or her attitude toward this behaviour and his or her perception of what others think about this intended behaviour, i.e. the subjective norm, which refers to the pressure that society exercises on an individual to perform a specific behaviour or avoid it (Ajzen, 2002).

#### **2.2.4 Morocco’s Social Marketing Campaign Against Corruption**

In November, 2011, following the Palace’s decision to reform the constitution and grant extended rights to the Moroccan people, the citizens of the kingdom voted a new government into power. The PJD (Party for Justice and Democracy), which had based its campaign on promoting social justice, addressing corruption and strengthening the democratic agenda, won 107 out of 395 seats in parliament (BBC News, 2015). The King — as stipulated under the new constitution adopted in July 2011 — had no choice but to nominate the prime minister from the winning party. In December, 2011, a survey conducted throughout Morocco

with a sample of 1,000 people aged 18 and over asked Moroccans what the main objectives of the new government should be. Fighting corruption unambiguously came first (62 per cent of respondents), followed by healthcare with 59 per cent then education with 51 per cent (Actuel.ma, 2015). The new Prime Minister, Abdelillah Benkirane, and his government embarked on a series of campaigns to address the issue of corruption. The United Nations International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and the new administration teamed up to launch a series of measures to curtail corruption (al-Dahdah and Brillaud, 2008). The most recent government action against corruption took place in 2012, when a nationwide social marketing campaign was launched (Le Monde, 2012). This campaign was in fact the very first social marketing campaign against corruption to be launched in Morocco. El Guerrouj, the Minister in charge of the campaign, claimed that educating citizens was the chief objective of this campaign and that, therefore, it would be built around broadcasting public information clips nationwide in the media. El Guerrouj stipulated that the purpose of the campaign was to “educate Moroccans” about the perils of this “plague” (Le Monde, 2012).

The national education program for the fight against corruption and its prevention had two phases. The first phase, launched on December 10, 2012, lasted one year. It aimed at presenting and explaining corruption to the public. This stage of the campaign included TV announcements, radio spots, the distribution of stickers and pins and the display of posters in government and public institutions. The second stage lasted for four weeks beginning in March 2013 and included public debates about corruption (L'économiste, 2012). During this period, clips were broadcast 356 times in both French and Arabic on national television. The campaign also appeared on billboards and posters in public offices with the slogan: “Beware of Corruption” (ويكلم الرشوة من) with 75 billboards displayed in Morocco’s major cities and on the main roads around the country at a total cost of around 2.5 million MAD (around 280,000 USD at Dec 2013 rates, unofficial and estimated) (Nazih, 2012). In addition, in order to be able to target a large proportion of the population, the campaign’s billboards presented a straightforward message in using a red ‘forbidden’ sign above the sentence “Beware of Corruption” (Figure 2):



*Figure 2 - Anti-Corruption campaign billboard*

The newly elected government had won the election with a large majority and seemed to enjoy the necessary credibility to address the issue of corruption. A December, 2011 survey showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens had “some” or “complete” trust in the Prime Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which he was elected (Actuel.ma, 2015). However, critics were quick to comment that the “Beware of Corruption” was too simplistic a message and would be ineffective or possibly even counterproductive. Abdessamad Saddouq, the Secretary General of Transparency in Morocco, characterised the anti-corruption campaign as being “an insult to the citizens’ intelligence” (Nazih, 2012); he also stated that “this is a wrong and inappropriate response to corruption. The approach can only be credible if it is based on something concrete, namely prevention strategy” (Nazih, 2012). Abdeslam Abouddrar, president of the Moroccan Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption, stated that the campaign had not been launched at the right time and that “awareness should either accompany or follow a strategy that defines the roles and responsibilities, and not the opposite. Otherwise, the results will be neither effective nor successful” (Nazih, 2012). Nazih also quoted a Moroccan citizen as saying, “Corruption cannot be fought with slogans. I know a nurse in a public hospital who takes 20 dirhams per patient, but a large poster saying ‘No to corruption’ hangs over her head!” (Nazih, 2012). To date, there has not been a follow up to the campaign and no measure of the effectiveness of the campaign was undertaken.

## Chapter 3      Research Framework & Methodology

### 3.1 Introduction

Deleuze and Guattari, to signify the volatile nature of concepts in philosophy and science, wrote: “Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator’s signature” (1994, p. 5).

The main purpose of this research is to explore the cultural and socio-demographic aspects of corruption in Morocco, as well as the extent to which the anti-corruption campaign has been successful at altering citizen attitude and intention toward corruption. This chapter will articulate the research design implemented in this research. Toward this objective the proposed research frameworks follows Creswell’s (2013) research design guidelines. In the first part, this chapter presents the philosophical assumptions underlying the research or research paradigm; a second part is centred around the methodologies, or the strategy of inquiry; and finally the methods of data collection and analysis will be discussed. Thus, the sub-topics that are examined in this chapter are:

- The proposed knowledge claim or research paradigm.
- The methodology or strategy of inquiry.
- The data collection methods and analysis procedure.

### 3.2 Research Paradigm

In his book, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, one of the most referenced scholastic books of all time (Bird, 2004), Thomas Samuel Kuhn refers to paradigms as the understanding of scientific advancements taking into account the intellectual frameworks in which scientists operate. It must be said, however, that Kuhn, who had been a pioneer in bringing this term into the realm of social science, had given the term “paradigm” no less than twenty-one different definitions, (Guba, 1990). For Rumelhard (2005), paradigms are set of ideas or designs which form a conceptual framework within which one may think, imagine, plan experiments, interpret and elaborate theories from the results. The underlying idea is that reality and knowledge are socially constructed (Berger, Luckmann, 1966). In other words,

one's perceptions of the world is not based on events themselves but are shaped by the political, economic, social, and cultural context in which one evolves. By setting research boundaries, in Kuhn's words, a "paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable" (Kuhn, 2012, p.24). Thus the research paradigm sets the framework, or the boundaries within which the reality is to be explored and as such impact the research methods (Crotty, 1998).

### 3.3 Philosophical Underpinning of Paradigms

The first step for any researcher must include a definition of what constitutes knowledge, or perhaps more specifically, what constitutes "ontology". Ontology deals with the subjectivity of reality, with the understanding that knowledge is perception-based and socially-constructed and hence may vary from individual to individual. As coined by Heron, "Worlds and people are what we meet, but the meeting is shaped by our own terms of reference" (Heron, 1996, p. 11).

In the second step, the researcher must assess how well she or he knows the issue. This assessment is best summarized using the term: "epistemology". Epistemology the study of knowledge and is concerned with what it means to say one "knows" or does "not know" something. However, epistemology also examines the question of how much knowledge a person can retain.

In the third step, the researcher must question the underpinning values on which research the research is based, or "axiology". The assumption is that any "value", such as a human value like "ethics", needs to be included in the scope of the research since the social scientist is dealing with human beings.

The fourth step of the research process deals with how the researcher writes about his or her research, or "rhetoric". For example, a qualitative research approach rejects quantitative references while a quantitative approach prefers an impersonal style.

Finally, the methodological assumption, or the process with which the research is carried out, needs to be considered. This is best considered using referencing the term: "methodology."

Guba (1990) argues that the answers given to the ontological (what is the nature of reality), epistemological (what is the nature between the knower and the known) and methodological (how should the researchers uncover knowledge) questions form a set of belief systems or paradigms guiding the researchers endeavour. Although Guba (1990) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that ontology, epistemology and methodology are the three defining characteristics of a research paradigm, Heron and Reason (1997) contend that axiology must also be included within this set. This places the human dimension of research at the core of

their argument for the inclusion of the axiological question: “what is intrinsically worthwhile, what it is about the human condition that is valuable as an end in itself?” (Heron and Reason, 1997, p. 10).

### **3.4 Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research Paradigms**

Traditionally, Quantitative and Qualitative research paradigms have set the main boundaries within which social science has operated. The researcher operating under the Quantitative Paradigm (also termed Positivist Philosophy) believes that social science should be objective and that it is possible for the participant to be shielded from the researcher’s biases and emotions (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Advocates of the Quantitative Paradigm believe that social science should operate on the same ground as hard sciences, such as physics, with the aim to establish reproducible social models and laws (Maxwell and Delaney, 2004). On the other hand, social scientists, operating under the realm of the Qualitative Paradigm, reject Positivism as they believe that it is impossible to separate the observer from the participants or that the knower and the known cannot be estranged because reality is a creation from the knower. (Guba, 1990). The Qualitative scientist would argue the superiority of Constructivism, Idealism, Relativism, Humanism, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism as philosophical viewpoints (Schwandt, 2000). The traditional consensus is that there is an irreconcilable divide between the Quantitative and the Qualitative Paradigm (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004) contend that the Mixed Methods Paradigm can ease the hermetic boundaries between both Quantitative and Qualitative paradigms. Mixed methods combines the use of both Qualitative and Quantitative research methods in answering research questions, (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2013).

### **3.5 Post-Positivism, Constructivism, Advocacy/Participatory, and Pragmatism**

Post-Positivism takes its root in the Positivist knowledge claim and, although it follows a scientific method, it maintains that one cannot construct a precise mathematical model of reality and that absolute truth does not exist. In the Post-Positivist approach, causes may determine a particular outcome, and Post-Positivists will attempt to mathematically model a certain reality through careful observation and measurement of the world. Yet Post-Positivists are also aware that their model is only a partial representation of this reality.

Constructivism, on the other hand, relies on the participant view of the world and

importantly takes into account the participants own context and social setting. The researcher establishes a set of broad, open-ended questions in which the participant can describe her or his own perception of a given issue.

The Advocacy / Participatory approach focuses on marginalised individuals or groups. At the heart of the Advocacy / Participatory research rests the believe that the outcome of the research should include an actionable program to help these marginalised individuals.

In Pragmatism, researchers draw freely from both Quantitative and Qualitative hypotheses. Pragmatism allows for the Mixed Methods researcher the possibility to consider different worldviews and utilize various forms of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013).

Table 1 summarizes these different approaches:

<b>Research Paradigms</b>	
<b>Post-Positivism</b> Determination, Experimental observation and measurement, reductivism, Theory confirmation	<b>Constructivism</b> Context-based research (Social and historical), Theory generation
<b>Participatory</b> Social change oriented and collaborative	<b>Pragmatism</b> Problem-based, and context oriented

*Table 1 - Research Paradigms, Source: Adapted From Creswell, (2013, P. 6)*

### 3.6 Methodologies

Although one should not automatically associate quantitative approaches with Post-Positivism and Qualitative approaches with Constructivism (Morgan, 2013), there are basic strategies for enquiries associated with the Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods research approaches (Creswell, 2013).

Strategies associated with a Quantitative research approach include surveys and experiments. Experimental designs include correlation tests, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) or Propensity Score Matching, used for experimental and non-experimental designs, such as a Propensity Score Matching Technique (Dehejia, and Wahba, 2002).

Strategies associated with a Qualitative research approach can include Ethnographic Research wherein the researcher observes the issue in its natural context. Notably, a recent study by the World Bank (2006) found that less than two per cent of the research on corruption involved an ethnographic component. This is not surprising given the hidden nature of corruption. The core base of Ethnographic Research implies building a relationship of trust

between the researcher and the participant. Toward this objective, the researcher is immersed into the daily life of the group(s) and network(s) of persons under study, (Torsello, 2011). This is indeed a time consuming, challenging task and Melhuu, et al. (2010) have reported few successes using Ethnographic Research in a corruption study.

Other strategies associated with a Qualitative research approach include Grounded Theory, phenomenological research or narrative research (Creswell, 2013). The Grounded Theory approach relies on the collection and sampling of case studies representative of various perceptions amongst different social groups. Precupetu (2007) argues that case studies can reveal various aspects of corruption; however, the essential difficulty in using this technique is the difficulty in such a method does not allow for broader generalizations. In the Phenomenological Approach, the researcher attempts to understand the issue by forging a strong relationship with a limited number of participants (Creswell, 2013). While the Narrative Approach focuses on studying a few stories from the participants. The outcome is a combination of points of view from both the participants and researcher(s). Ren (2012) has used Narrative Inquiry to assess corruption in the academic sector in China. Ren used qualitative selective interviews, which are effective at providing insight about the issue and clearly show the complexity of the problem. However, due to the limited number of interviews, one must remain circumspect toward the policy agenda suggested by Ren.

### **3.7 The Case for Quantitative Paradigms in Corruption Research**

A Qualitative Approach based on Ethnographic Research could indeed be an ideal assessment of corruption as this would provide first-hand observations of corrupt deals by impartial witnesses (Andvig et al., 2001). Problematically, such observations are rare and could not provide a true measure of corruption as in most cases, in the public service setting, observers are not allowed. Alternatively, Qualitative Research, based on the analysis of case studies, mostly via court convictions, could be used as a gauge for corruption. However, in a country where a high level of corruption is accepted, convictions are rare and consequently the accuracy of such a measure is also questionable (Rosenfeld et al., 2014). Gloppen (2013) noted that a large proportion of surveys — such as the Afrobarometer (2010); the Latinobarometer (2010); the Eurobarometer (2011); TI (2011); GCR (2012); and the World Justice Project (2012) — reported that corruption in courts of law was extensive. Another issue with the former measurement method is that it may simply reflect the effectiveness of the judiciary system, or perhaps the police's over-zealousness to please the administration rather than the actual number of corruption cases (Goel and Nelson, 1998). Media reporting on corruption

could also be an indicator of the level of corruption within a country, however, again such a measure could be subject to multiple biases, including the level of freedom enjoyed by the press or the fact that larger corruption cases pointing to high level officials may be ignored and small fish corruption cases over-reported (Andvig et al., 2001).

In Morocco, the freedom of the press is notoriously poor. According to Reporters Without Borders (*Reporters Sans Frontières*, or RSF for short) in 2013 the kingdom was ranked 136th out of 179 countries, behind Zimbabwe (133th) and far behind Finland, which tops the list of countries with the highest level of press freedom. In 2015, Morocco's ranking did not improve much with the country placing 130th out of 180 surveyed countries (RSF, 2015). In Morocco, the Royal Palace controls the majority of radio and television stations and journalists who do not self-censor risk both heavy fines and/or incarceration (Cantrell, 2014). For example, on September 17th, 2013, Ali Anouzla, director of the news site Lakome.com, was arrested for his association with a blog posting a video entitled: Morocco, "Kingdom of Corruption and Despotism" (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and, in one of the latest government attempts to muzzle the press, Hicham Mansouri, the Director of Programmes at the NGO Moroccan Association for Investigative Journalism, was jailed for ten months starting March 30th, 2015 and fined 20,000 MAD (about 2,000 USD at the time of the fine) for helping to report on corruption by politicians. Hence, measuring corruption through the mere observation (ethnographies) of corrupt acts through a qualitative research of court cases and/or media coverage of corruption cases (Grounded Theory) may prove unsuitable at providing a representative sample of corrupt behaviour (Andvig et al. , 2001).

Until the mid-90s, Quantitative approaches to measure corruption were rarely used. Mauro pioneered the use of perception-based measures to assess corruption (Mauro, 1995 as cited by León, Araña and de León, 2013). Mauro based his corruption index on the survey of journalists, businesspeople and country experts about their suggestive evaluation of corruption regarding doing business in a given country (Mauro, 1995 as cited by León, Araña, and de León 2013).

### 3.8 Research Hypotheses

The underpinning of Post-Positivism is that reality can never be established with certainty (Creswell, 2003) and that the evidence claimed in research are very likely fallible. Consequently, the researcher will not try to validate a hypothesis, which would presume that

the outcome of the research would lead to establishing a perfect rule. On the contrary, in the Post-Positivist approach, the research questions are stated in term of null hypotheses, that is, hypotheses which the Post-Positivist researcher will attempt to refute or nullify (Scherbaum and Shockley, 2015) hence implying that other realities might exist outside of the hypotheses. The null hypotheses of this research are thus:

H0: There is no correlation between socio-demographics, personal and social values and a Moroccan citizen's corrupt intention.

H0: There is no correlation between the campaign reach, interest, message comprehension, credibility and recall and Moroccan attitude and intention toward corruption.

### **3.9 Data Collection Methods: Expert-Based Surveys Versus Micro-Level Surveys**

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is based on a survey of experts and according to Transparency International: "The index cannot capture the individual frustration of this reality, but it does capture the informed views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in countries around the world" (2016). The CPI has become a norm to measure corruption, yet many questions remain about the accuracy of this index in terms of describing citizen's everyday reality.

#### **3.9.1 Expert Perception-Based Surveys**

Expert Perception-Based Surveys have rapidly become a preferred tool of assessing corruption (Treisman, 2007). Today, Transparency International's "Corruption Perception Index" is one of the best-known and most widely used indexes to measure corruption (León, Araña, and de León 2013). The index is based on surveying the level of corruption perceived either by experts or high or middle-level business managers of international or local corporations (Andvig et al. (2001). "The index reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated" (TI, 2015). However, recent findings have questioned as to what extent the perceptions of experts reflect the view of the common citizen (Lee and Guven, 2013). For example, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010), using a common survey in eight sub-Saharan countries that targeted both

the general population and experts, discovered that experts would systematically overestimate the weight of petty corruption. Treisman (2007) explains this discrepancy by the fact that micro-level data based on experience could be noisier and unreliable. Treisman also hypothesizes that micro-level data may reflect inferences made by experts and accepted beliefs about corruption rather than actual observation by respondents. To date, research investigating micro-level corruption using interviews and questionnaires has been infrequent (Alam, 1989; Dong, Dulleck and Torgler, 2012 and more recently Lee and Guven, 2013). Data from questionnaires, however, needs to be treated with caution, especially when answers to sensitive questions are solicited (Catania et al., 1990, as cited by Oloo, et al., 2012). Researchers have argued that since such questionnaires are self-reported and based on hypothetical situations and choices, an individual who has committed an act of corruption may lessen his or her guilt by answering in the questionnaire that corruption is hardly justifiable (Dong, Dulleck and Torgler, 2012). Others may overplay their degree of compliance with the law (Torgler and Valev, 2006). In the same vein, the Theory of Social Desirability suggests that interviewees will tend to avoid socially unacceptable responses or will tend to provide answers which he or she perceives to be matching the value system of the interviewer (Benstead, 2013). For example, in Morocco male respondents were more likely to report more gender egalitarian opinions with a female interviewer than with a male interviewer. In a recent study in Morocco, using data from a representative survey of eight hundred participants, Benstead shows that observable interviewers with traits such as gender and dress, clearly effect the answers of the respondents (2014). Religious respondents will tend to give a more religious answer to a question of religion to female interviewers wearing hijabs and noticeably less religious answers to male interviewers they perceive to be wearing a more Western-style of attire (Benstead, 2014). However, Reinikka and Svensson (2006) showed that properly designed surveys can provide robust micro-level data on corruption.

### **3.9.2 Micro-Level Survey: Establishing the Variables Impacting Corruption**

As argued previously, there are various forces — at times interrelated, at times competing — that determine an individual's disposition toward corruption. The forces include the demographics of each individual with his or her diversity of value systems, as well as the principles, morals, and social forces outside of the individual's personal convictions. Social norms originate from the various groups with which an individual is affiliated, such as his or her family, friends, colleagues, religious group or nation. Such factors shall be tested independently using a micro-level survey.

The table below (Table 2) provides a biographical summary from the previous literature review of the research of the factors impacting corrupt intention.

<b>Correlated factors to corruption</b>	<b>Reference</b>	<b>Brief description of findings</b>
<b>Poverty / No alternative to life</b>	Kyi (1992)	Fear of poverty linked to corruption intention
	Hakeem (2012)	High poverty level increase corruption
	Atoyebi and Mobolaji (2004)	As Above
	Werlin (2005)	Fear of poverty linked to corruption intention (Nigeria)
	Chapra (2008)	Providing basic need to reduce corruption
	Lakshmi and Sinha (2012)	Fear of poverty increase corrupt intention
<b>Insecurity for the future / unemployment / low career expectation</b>	Vorster (2012)	Unemployment linked to corruption in South Africa
	Ionescu (2012)	Low career expectation in police departments as a cause for corruption
<b>Everybody does it</b>	Marquette (2012)	Population chose moral disengagement
	Adeyemi (2012)	Corruption is endemic (Nigeria)
<b>Trust in the government</b>	Uslaner (2004)	The higher the corruption the lesser the trust in the government
	Hu and Shi (2013)	Negative impact of corruption on government trust
	Becker, et al. (2014)	Trust in the state reduces corruption in courts and police Habsburg
	Aladwani (2016)	Perceived corruption lead to failure of e-government project.
	Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012)	Higher level of corruption reduces trust in the government (for higher educated citizen)
<b>Help a friend</b>	Pekdemir and Turan (2015)	Corruption to help a friend
	Schwartz (2015)	Help friend to secure position
	Ledeneva (2014)	Moral norm: help friend over corruption
	Smith (2012)	Help a friend not corruption

<b>Normal to accept / give gift</b>	Marquette (2012)	Corruption defined as gift
	Greaves (2001)	Gift as corruption to strengthen business ties
	Chaudhuri (2008)	As above
<b>Household perception / Income inequality / unfairness society</b>		Shame of poverty as a cause of corruption
<b>Wages</b>	Laws, Outlook, and Bookmark (1997)	Low wages as a cause of corruption
	Le, De Haan, and Dietzenbacher (2013)	Higher wage reduce corruption at low-income levels
	Vorster (2012)	Low wages and unemployment linked to corruption in South Africa
	Gong and Wu (2012)	Increasing wages not proven to decrease corruption in China
	Ali (2008)	Low wages increase corruption
<b>Living Abroad</b>	Tyburski (2014)	Remittance and experiences living abroad impact corruption
	Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2014)	Immigration from high level corruption origin countries increases corruption in receiving country -- 207 countries analysed
<b>Authorities</b>	Alford (2012)	Increase enforcement to reduce petty corruption
	Rosenfeld, et al. (2014)	When corruption is endemic, condemnation are rare
	Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008)	Corrupt police reduces fear of officers and increases corruption
	Faull (2007)	Corruption is prevalent in many police forces around the world
	Gloppen (2013)	Corrupt courts lead to an increase in corrupt intention
<b>Personal Convictions</b>	Marquette (2012)	Population moral disengagement
	Chapra (2008)	
	Levine (2005)	Shame and social condemnation

	Lambsdorff, Graf and Cornelius (2000)	Cost of breaching own moral values
<b>Influence of Family</b>	Hellstén and Larbi (2006)	Corruption as a necessity to help family
	Lakshmi and Sinha (2012)	Family member are the only one trusted and favoured (India)
<b>Religion</b>	Vorster (2012)	Religion to help reduce corruption
	Marquette (2012)	Little impact on corrupt behaviour (India and Nigeria)
	Chapra (2008)	
	Singgih (2012)	Propose religion as a way to alleviate corruption
	Paldam (2001)	Religiously-divided countries have a lower propensity to corruption than countries where one religion is prevalent
	L'economiste (2012b)	Corruption is “Haram” – Mustapha Ramid Justice and liberty Minister.
<b>Media Scandals</b>	Mo (2013)	Public exposure to reduce corruption (China)
	Ferraz and Finan (2012)	Media exposure reduces corruption
	Camaj (2012)	High level of media freedom link to lower corruption
	Balán (2011)	Reducing corruption through media scandals -- Argentina and Chile
	Hibou and Tozy (2009)	Social media to expose corruption in Morocco
<b>Training / education</b>	Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012)	Higher level of education linked to increased awareness of corruption
	Warning and Dürrenberger (2015)	Level of education is negatively impacted by higher level of corruption

*Table 2 - Biographical summary of the factors impacting corrupt intention*

### 3.10 Instrumentation: The Survey

The first survey in this study tackles two objectives. The first objective is to measure the arguments used by Moroccan citizens to justify corruption — taking into account

respondent socio-demographics. The second objective is to measure factors that may deter respondents from engaging in corrupt acts. The initial investigation into corruption in Morocco tested which possible values may motivate or deter an individual towards or away from corrupt behaviour. A questionnaire was constructed to measure both Moroccan beliefs about corruption as well as their perception of the various norms that respondents may or may not have used to justify their intentions towards corruption. In order to increase the reliability of the questionnaire and secure more honest answers from the respondents, the questionnaire minimized direct queries regarding personal participation in corruption (Torgler and Valev, 2006). The first part is intended to test the respondent's personal beliefs about corruption, with respondents being asked to rate on a five point Likert scale various possible justifications for engaging in a corrupt action. The question was stated as follows: "According to your personal opinion, what justifies corruption?" The respondents were given a list of factors to rate on a five point Likert scale where "1" signifies that corruption can "never be justified" and "5" signifies that corruption can "always be justified". The factors tested were: perceived poverty, household perception (that is, feeling that one's household is poorer relative to one's neighbour), no alternative to afford life expenses, insecurity for the future, "everybody is doing it", no trust in the government, low career advancement prospects, helping a friend, unfairness in society and lastly "it is normal to accept someone's gift". Once the respondent's beliefs concerning corruption were tested, the respondents were then given a choice of questions and asked if they would personally be willing to accept a bribe from someone or if they would try to bribe an official.

The second part of the survey assesses the potential deterrents to corruption. Again, using a five point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to identify the factors that were most likely to deter someone from a corrupt act with 1 signifying that the factor was "never a deterrent" and 5 signifying that it was a "likely deterrent". The factors proposed were: higher wages, influence of living abroad, fear of the authorities, personal and moral conviction, influence of family and friends, influence of religion, media scandals, and training employees. The last part measured some demographic variables of the respondents: level of education, age, monthly income, family status, household size, occupation, gender, marital status and work sector. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix I.

### **3.11 Data Collection and Sampling**

#### **3.11.1 The Pilot Study**

Initially, the questionnaire was distributed to thirty participants in and around the city of Azrou, a middle-sized town (estimated population: 47,000) in the Middle Atlas region of Morocco. The first attempt to distribute the questionnaire by a male non-Moroccan pollster resulted in a non-response rate of over 95 per cent. When approached with the questionnaire, the potential respondents would enquire about the subject and when informed that it was about corruption, they would emphatically decline answering the survey. Some even refused to touch the questionnaire fearing that fingerprints might be collected. Two female pollsters were engaged and trained to distribute the questionnaire. This action resulted in a more acceptable response rate.

### 3.11.2 Language Issues

The Language Issue in Morocco is complex. The officially recognized languages of the country are Modern Standard Arabic and Amazigh. However, the most spoken language is Darija (or Moroccan Arabic) — a combination of Arabic, French and Spanish. Darija is spoken by about two-thirds of the Moroccan population, though problematically it is not a unified language and there are a number of significant variants of Darija that exist throughout the country (Hall, 2015). A large percentage of the population (around 40 to 45 percent) does communicate in one of the Amazigh (Berber) languages, but there are three incredibly diverse strains of Amazigh in use and a third of those speakers communicate exclusively in their strain of Amazigh (Ajbaili, 2011) and do not use Darija at all. Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), though used sometimes in official documents, is rarely spoken.

For this questionnaire, French was chosen for a number of reasons. First, French is widely spoken, understood and is one of the two written languages used in official documents, with the other being MSA (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Second, though Darija is increasingly being used on billboards, TV, and social media, there is no standard writing system for it. Currently it is being written in a mix of characters from the Arabic and Latin alphabets (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Lastly, the interviewers, like many people in Morocco, are more fluent in French than in Modern Standard Arabic, both of the interviewers having studied in a Moroccan university where the main language of instruction is French.

The two female pollsters who were assigned the task of distributing the survey are both fluent in French, but being natives of the Middle Atlas region, they also speak Darija and Amazigh fluently. In rural communities, the illiteracy rate for women averages 70 per cent (Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2012). Hence, the pollsters were often asked to translate and explain the questionnaire and record responses on behalf of the respondents in

rural areas who could not read or write. The same procedure had to be carried out for respondents whose languages were only Darija or Amazigh. Distribution of the questionnaire to university students was not difficult as Moroccan universities use French as the main language of instruction.

### 3.11.3 Dress Code Issues

Regarding the dress of the interviewers, as discussed previously, Benstead (2014) has rigorously demonstrated the impact of an interviewer's dress on a respondent's answers concerning religious questions, with respondents adapting their answer to suit the interviewer's appearance. Less religious answers were given to western style dressed interviewers and more religious answers were given to interviewers wearing the hijab (Benstead, 2014). Boulanouar's (2010 as cited by Bachleda, Hamelin and Benachour, 2014) research about the clothing of Moroccan women shows the existence of four main styles sported by Moroccan women in public:

- Western style: tight fitting garments (Jeans, t-shirts, skirts) without headscarf
- Western style clothing with a headscarf / Hijab.
- Slack fitting clothes without headscarf (i.e. clothes that do not profile the body with a headscarf)
- Loose fitting outfits with a headscarf / Hijab.

In our case, both interviewers were female. One did not wear a headscarf while the other wore the hijab / headscarf. Having the interviewer dress differently at the stages of giving the questionnaire could possibly lessen the impact of the interviewer's appearance on respondent answers. Since corruption is considered "haram", or "forbidden", by Islam (L'economiste, 2015b) pious respondents may be more inclined to reject corruption more strongly in their answer than less religious respondents.

A first batch of 30 questionnaires was printed and tested with the participation of students and non-students in the local region of Ifrane. Problematic questions were then reworded in French until they became completely unambiguous. Back translation, as

recommended by Brislin (1980), was used at a later stage to guarantee the accuracy of the English version of the questionnaire, for inclusion in this thesis.

#### 3.11.4 Data Collection

Over 400 questionnaires were printed in November, 2012 over a period of four weeks. The objective was to have a response rate of at least 50 per cent. The total number of respondents was 200 (including those who completed the questionnaire partially) — thus we achieved exactly a 50 per cent response rate. One of the pollsters was wearing the hijab (see picture 1 of Itto Bouzzaoui, pollster from Azrou) while the other was not wearing the hijab, however, no significant difference was recorded in the data collected by the two pollsters. The Non-Probability Intercept Quota Sampling Method was used. The pollsters were given directives to gather a minimum sample size of 200 respondents with the aim of gathering answers from an equal proportion of men and women living in urban and rural locations.

The questionnaires were distributed in the large cities of Marrakech and Rabat, as well as in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small towns, such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and Azrou, so that the number of respondents in rural areas matches the number of respondents in urban areas. Marrakech and Rabat are two major Moroccan cities (Rabat is the capital of Morocco and Marrakesh is one of the major tourist destinations) with respective populations of around 600,000 and 900,000 inhabitants. Azrou, Ifrane and Aïn Leuh are smaller rural towns of the Middle Atlas region with populations of approximately 47,000, 15,000 and 5,800 inhabitants in 2015 respectively.



*Figure 3 - Pollster Itto Bouzzaoui (Left) in Azrou, Middle Atlas, Morocco, August 2013*

### **3.12 Data Analysis**

Enumerative statistics or descriptive statistics are conducted to provide details about the sample for this study as well as respondent mean scores regarding corruption intention and mean score for each factor put forward by respondents to justify corruption. Analytical statistics test potential causal relationship between corruption intention and respondents socio-demographic characteristics, as well a causal relationship between the factors used to justify corruption and corruption intention. Logistic regression analysis provides answers on potential causality, but is also useful to forecast an outcome and predict trends. For example, logistic regression on the data collected will show that there is a correlation between gender and corruption intention (causality), that men who feel that there is a high level of injustice in society are more likely to engage in corruption (forecasting an outcome) and finally that the higher the wage for a male respondent the less likely it is that he will engage in corruption (trend forecasting).

#### **3.12.1 Questionnaire Reliability**

The reliability of the questionnaire was tested through computing the value of Cronbach's alpha for the totality of the variables included in the study for a sample of 200

respondents. The Cronbach's alpha test is frequently used in this context as it provides a reasonably good measure of the reliability of a questionnaire (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). A questionnaire is deemed reliable if it generates consistent and stable response even if the questions are replaced with similar questions. The alpha coefficient values range from zero to one — the higher the value, the more reliable the scale. Churchill's benchmark for Cronbach's alpha stipulates that a value of 0.6 or above provides satisfactory proof of questionnaire reliability (Churchill, 1979). Cronbach's alpha values were found to be 0.8489 for the "Justifiability of Corruption" part of the questionnaire and 0.6250 for the "Deterrent Factors of Corruption" part. This confirms the reliability of the questionnaire used for this study.

### 3.13 Mathematical Models

In the Positivist Approach, mathematical models are revered since they are considered as unbiased and detached from the influences of human interactions. Mathematical models support the positivistic idea that reality follows strict patterns and can be described with accuracy. The Post-Positivist researcher, on the other hand, is aware that there is nothing such as an absolute truth and that the computation of data will not lead to the discovery of an overall 'truth'. Post-Positivism is often suspicious of mathematical models and qualitative research methods are favoured; yet the Quantitative Approach has remained an important tool to Post-Positivism. A Quantitative Approach provides explicit information about an issue and mathematical modelling is essential to uncover whether or not an issue is numerically significant. It also aids in the discovery of potential patterns of behaviour across a variety of cases (Ryan, 2016).

#### 3.13.1 Justifiability of Corruption

The first model presented in figure 4, tests respondent perceptions about the justifiability of corruption along certain societal factors: *Poverty; No Alternative; Insecurity; Everybody Does It; No Trust in the Government; No Career Expectation; Help a Friend; Unfair Society; It Is Normal to Accept a Gift*, and *Household Perception (worse off than)*. Because a Pearson's correlation matrix showed a strong correlation between poverty and high cost of living we considered poverty to be a main independent variable. We then expressed as an odds ratio the probability to accept corruption, with P as the dependent variable = intention to be corrupt:

$$\text{Log}(P/1-P) = \delta + \delta 1 (\text{poverty}) + \delta 2 (\text{no alternative}) + \delta 3 (\text{insecurity}) + \delta 4 (\text{everybody does it}) + \delta 5 (\text{no trust in the government}) + \delta 6 (\text{low career}) + \delta 7 (\text{help a friend}) + \delta 8 (\text{unfairness society}) + \delta 9 (\text{normal to accept gift}) + \delta 10 (\text{household perception}) + \varepsilon$$




Figure 4 - Structural model for the justifiability of corruption

### 3.13.2 Deterrent Factors

In the third model (figure 5), respondent perceptions about deterrent factors are analysed. The factors considered were: *Higher Wages; Impact of Living Abroad; Personal Conviction/Moral. Influence of Family; Influence of Religion; Fear of a Media Scandal and Training.* The value P in this model is the probability of rejecting corruption. Here, either P = 0 (decide to accept, meaning participate in corruption) or P = 1 (decide to reject corruption). The dependent variable this time is P, intention to reject corruption (i.e. the respondent has the intention to reject corruption: yes = 1, no = 0). Expressed in odds ratio:

$$\text{Log}(P/1-P) = \Psi + \gamma_1(\text{Higher Wages}) + \gamma_2(\text{Living Abroad}) + \gamma_3(\text{Fear of Authorities}) + \gamma_4(\text{Personal Convictions}) + \gamma_5(\text{Influence of Family}) + \gamma_6(\text{Influence of Religion}) + \gamma_7(\text{Media Scandals}) + \gamma_8(\text{Training}) + \varepsilon$$




Figure 5 - Structural model for corruption's deterrent factors

### 3.13.3 Demographic Factors

In the model below (figure 6), the relationship between socio-demographics and the “acceptance” of bribery-corruption is analysed; that is, the respondent’s willingness to involve themselves in a corrupt act or participate in such an act if offered is shown. The socio-demographic factors we considered were: *Level of Education; Age; Monthly Income; Family Status; Household Number; Gender; Marital Status* and *Sector of Work*. We wrote an equation for a prospective relationship between demographic factors and the intention toward corruption. Expressed as an odds ratio, P1 is the dependent variable that can take two given values (0 = not willing to accept corruption, or 1= willing to accept corruption),  $\beta_1$  is a coefficient characterizing the influence of age,  $\beta_2$  is a coefficient characterizing the influence of income,  $\beta_3$  is a coefficient characterizing the influence of household size,  $\beta_4$  is a coefficient

characterizing the influence of education,  $\beta_5$  is a coefficient characterizing the influence of gender and  $\epsilon$  is a constant:

$$\text{Log}(P1/1-P1) = \beta + \beta_1 (\text{age}) + \beta_2 (\text{income}) + \beta_3 (\text{household number}) + \beta_4 (\text{education}) + \beta_5(\text{gender}) + \epsilon$$




Figure 6 - Structural model for corruption intention vs. demographic factors

### 3.14 Gathering the Data and Changing Objective

This first study was conducted in November, 2012, over a four-week period. The initial plan was to then launch a wider scale survey targeting a higher number of respondents to increase the accuracy of the findings with the margin of error decreasing with higher sample size (Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins, 2001). Based on these results, social marketing strategies to address the issue would have been explored. However, on December 10th, 2012, the Moroccan government launched a year-long nationwide anti-corruption social awareness campaign. At this point, there was indeed the need to understand the impact of the campaign on Moroccan citizens and how the campaign would change their attitude and behaviour towards corruption. Therefore, the following questionnaire was designed to measure the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on Moroccan citizens.

### 3.15 Assessing the Efficiency of the Moroccan Anti-Corruption Campaign

### 3.15.1 Research Framework

Central to an anti-corruption social marketing campaign is the alteration of people's values, attitude and behaviour. Changing people's attitudes is of foremost importance, as attitude is a key driver of behaviour. For Crano and Prislin (2006), as cited by Bailey and Spicer (2007, p. 1464), an attitude represents an "evaluative integration of cognitions and affects experienced in relation to an object". Attitudes are the "evaluative judgments that integrate and summarize these cognitive/affective reactions". In other words, an attitude towards a given behaviour results from the combination of both an individual's belief about a given behaviour and an affective (like or dislike) evaluation of the outcome of it. The Theory of Attitude Change by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) posits that a change of attitude can only be met through a particular learning process. In the Message Learning Approach, an individual is first exposed to a given message then the message is, perhaps, being considered and found interesting or not by the individual. If the message is considered interesting, the person will try to understand its meaning and at last may or may not assimilate the message. These steps, as defined by Hovland, et al. (1953), are: exposure, consideration, interest, understanding and acquisition. In the same vein, Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) describe a very similar learning process dubbed: The Information Processing Approach. However, altering attitude is not a sufficient condition for altering an individual behaviour as attitude is only one of many factors determining behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975). Bandura (2002) for example, showed that an individual may disengage himself from his or her moral values and adopt a behaviour in line with the prevailing norm.

Nwankwo (2014) uses the image of the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari (1994) to demonstrate that the cause of corruption in Africa is the personalization of the state power by the its civil servants. This work postulates that the corrupt civil servant, just like Deleuze and Guattari's (1987, p.7) rhizome, "ceaselessly established connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles", or in other words, and as hypothesized in this work, an employee continuously navigates between his civil servant role, personal values and social norms.

To verify this hypothesis, the research focuses on two mainstream theories of human behaviour: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1985, 1991; Ajzen and Madden 1986) and the Theories of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Both theories tend to present behaviour as the outcome of complex human interaction and social practice. Fishbein and Ajzen, (1980, p.55) postulate that an individual's behaviour is determined by his or her intention to perform a particular action. Behavioural intention is the result of the

combination of distinctive factors: an individual attitude toward the behaviour and the subjective norm with respect to this potential act. Fishbein and Ajzen posit that the attitude toward the behaviour is “a person’s general feeling of favourableness or unfavourableness for that behaviour” and that subjective norm is an individual’s “perception that most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the behaviour in question” (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980, p. 55). The TPB originated from the Theory of Reasoned Action. In the Theory of Reasoned Action, intention is defined as the best predictor for behaviour. More specifically, an individual’s intention to perform a specific behaviour results from two components: his or her attitude toward this behaviour and his or her perception of what others think about this intended behaviour, i.e. the subjective norm. An individual attitude is defined by the belief that a specific behaviour would lead to a specific outcome and an effective evaluation (like or dislike) of the outcome of that behaviour. Subjective norm refers to the pressure that society exercises on an individual to perform a specific behaviour or avoid it (Ajzen, 2002). Hence an individual will reflect on a multiplicity of factors, his or her attitude toward a given behaviour, as well as the social norms relative to his or her behaviour.

TRA has been applied fruitfully to forecast a large number of behavioural intentions (Hale, Householder and Greene, 2002), and, to a lesser extent, to predict unethical behaviour. Chang (2013) used both TRA and TPB theories to predict unethical behaviour. Kulik, O’Fallon, and Salimath (2008) used TRB to analyse the cause behind Enron’s high-profile corruption scandal and Corral-Verdugo and Frías-Armenta (2006) refer to both theories in their research on unsociable behaviour and water preservation. Randal and Gibson (1991) used the TPB to assess ethical decision making amongst medical practitioners; they found that attitude was the main driving force behind the intention to report a corrupt colleague and that subjective norm played a lesser role. The addition of the perceived behaviour control did not increase the accuracy of the model, namely because reporting a colleague was under perceived as a purely personal decision. On the other hand, Chang (1991) showed that the TPB gave better results than the TRA in predicting the copying of pirated software and hypothesized that, in the case of corruption or computer hacking, more resources were needed and that an individual could not act independently.

In the present study however, the respondents were questioned anonymously about their intention to engage in corruption. From this construct, the respondent’s answer is clearly entirely under his or her control; hence in such situations where people have entire volitional control over a given behaviour the perceived control behaviour construct becomes irrelevant (Ajzen, 1988).

### 3.15.2 Questionnaire Design

The campaign efficiency was measured along four main axes: exposure, interest, understanding and recall. A 'yes' or 'no' answer to the question "Have you seen the campaign?" measured the respondent exposure. If a 'yes' answer was given, a series of questions was asked that measured to what extent the participants felt the campaign was easy to understand, interesting, and memorable. Each point was measured on a five point Likert scale, where one signified 'strongly disagree', two 'slightly disagree', three 'neither agree nor disagree', four 'slightly agree' and five 'strongly agree'. The operational construct for the questionnaire measuring the campaign efficiency is given in Appendix 1.

The questionnaire also measured the weight of social norms and to what extent the respondents valued the opinion of their family, their friends, and respected the authority of the state (police / judiciary) or religious authorities (imams). Each item was measured on a five point Likert scale.

Fishbein's multi-attribute model was used to measure respondent attitude towards corruption. Attitude toward behaviour is the product of an individual's belief (B) that a given behaviour will generate definite consequence, and an affective appraisal of the outcomes (E) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Both constructs (affect and belief) were measured on a five point Likert scale and the details are presented in Chapter 5.

Respondents were finally asked to rate their reluctance or willingness to resist corrupt behaviour (intention towards corruption) on a five point Likert scale as a result of seeing the anti-corruption social marketing campaign.

### 3.15.3 Sampling and Data Collection

In Hong Kong, the fight against corruption was successful mostly due to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) focus on educating and moralizing the younger generation (Manion, 2004). A quota sampling technique was used in an attempt to have a picture of the effect of the campaign on the Moroccan population according to age but also gender since a large gender difference was recorded in terms of "Justifiability of

Corruption” with the previous questionnaire. Hence, the Moroccan population was divided into exclusive subcategories of age and gender. The sampling frame involved building a list of all the subcategories and weighting each group according to the formula weight of subcategory  $i = \text{size of subcategory } i / \text{overall population}$ . The sample size for each is given by: sample size per subcategory  $i = n * W(i)$ , where "n" represents overall sample size. In this case, the proposed sample size (n) is 800 respondents. The number of Moroccan per age group and gender, the subcategory weigh, target sample size as well as the collected sample size for each subcategory for a sample size of 800 is provided in table 3 and the following table provide detail results from this study.

A thousand questionnaires were printed and distributed by the two female pollsters in the cities of Marrakech, Fez, Meknes, Casablanca, Tangiers and Rabat, as well as an equal proportion in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small villages such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and Azrou. The same procedure to gather data for the first questionnaire was used when the respondents were illiterate or speakers of Darija or Berber only. The questionnaire was also uploaded online using *surveymonkey.com* and *kwiksurveys.com*. No discrepancy was recorded between the data collected online and offline. Out of a thousand questionnaires, 792 (77 of which were online) were fully completed or partly completed.

Age Group	Male (in thousands)	Female (in thousands)	Target Sample Size Male	Target Sample Size Female
<b>Total</b>	16, 371	16, 579	400	400
Less than 20 years old	5,956	5,730	145	138
Between 20 and 29 years old	3,092	3,058	75	73
Between 30 and 39 years old	2,446	2,609	59	62
Between 40 and 49 years old	1,838	2,017	45	48
Above 50 years old	3,039	3,163	74	76

Table 3- Moroccan population by age group (HCP, 2013) and associated target sample size

There is a noticeable discrepancy between the targeted quota for each subcategory and the data collected. Table 4 shows the sample size for each category. Moreover, findings from the previous survey uncovered other factors such as education level, income or age that may have an impact on the campaign efficiency. To remedy this issue, a statistical technique, Propensity Score Matching, was used.

Age	Less than 20	20-29	30-39	40-49	Above 50	Total
Male	81	200	114	35	7	437
Female	89	163	73	24	0	349
<b>Total</b>	170	363	187	59	7	786

*Table 4 - Actual sample size per age collected for this study*

### 3.15.4 Data Analysis

Both descriptive statistics and analytical statistics are used to analyse the data. Descriptive statistics or enumerative statistics provide information on our sample, in addition to summaries about the measures of respondent beliefs concerning corruption, attitude, and intention, as well as a measure about the percentage of respondents having been exposed to the campaign, and the percentage of respondents finding the campaign interesting, credible, efficient or memorable. Analytical statistics, on the other hand, shall provide causal relationship between exposure to the campaign and respondent change in belief, change in attitude and intention toward corruption.

The change of attitude was measured as a function the respondent’s exposure, interest, understanding, and trust levels in the campaign. Intention change was measured as a function of both the respondent attitude toward corruption as well as the norms to which a respondent may abide by. Figure 7 illustrates the model used in this research.




Figure 7 - Structural model of corruption intention (TRA model)

### 3.15.5 Mathematical Model

The respondent's attitude was defined by Ajzen and Fishbein, (1975) as such:

A is the corruption attitude score,  $B_i$  is the cognitive evaluation about the significance of corruption and  $E_i$  is the emotional weight (like or dislike) towards the associated belief.

Wilkie and Pessemier (1973) evidenced that a condition for an attitude score to be meaningful is that the number of attributes tested should be exhaustive (Wilkie and Pessemier, 1973). The cognitive map about corruption was established from the literature review and confirmed in a focus group.

The beliefs are listed below, belief were measured on a Likert scale (1 min, 5 max), while affect was measured on a 6 point (-3 to +3) Likert scale.

B1= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering money, E1 = Affective Evaluation  
B1

B2= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean a gift, E2 = Affective Evaluation of B2

B3= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering a service, E3 = Affective  
Evaluation of B3

B4= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting money, E4 = Affective  
Evaluation of B4

B5= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a gift, E5 = Affective Evaluation  
of B5

B6= Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a service, E6 = Affective Evaluation of B6

B7= Cognitive evaluation: corruption can be considered as authorized, E7 = Affective Evaluation set to +1

B8= Cognitive evaluation: corruption is unlawful, E8 = Affective Evaluation set to -1

B9= Cognitive evaluation: corruption denotes an immoral action, E9 = Affective Evaluation -1

NB: When the affective evaluation of one or more of the statement in B1 to B7 is positive (score from 1 to +3), the attitude score increases, meaning that the respondents have a more lenient attitude toward corruption, whereas a respondent will be less tolerant toward corruption if the affective evaluation of one or more of the beliefs in B1 to B7 is negative or decreases.

The null hypothesis  $H_{0\text{Campaign}}$ , “corruption intention is not altered by the efficacy of the campaign”, can be expressed as:

$$\text{Intention} = \varepsilon + \beta_1 \text{exposure} + \beta_2 \text{interest} + \beta_3 \text{comprehension} + \beta_4 \text{recall} + \beta_5 \text{credibility}$$

The null hypothesis,  $H_{0\text{intention}}$ , attitude towards corruption and social norm do not impact corruption intent is described by the relation:

$$\text{Intention} = \varepsilon + \beta_1 \text{Attitude} + \beta_2 \text{Social Norm}$$

### 3.15.6 Propensity Score Matching

Causal inferences can only be made with a random selection of subjects as well as a random allocation of the treatment. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is a statistical technique initially designed to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment based on non-random samples, as is the case in this research. PSM was originally introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). They stated that, while it is possible to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment by comparing the effect of the treatment on two probability samples, one treated sample and one untreated sample, this is not possible if the samples are non-probability samples. In the former case,

direct comparison will lead to uncertain results because subjects from the treated group may differ substantially from subjects from the untreated group, and, therefore, the observed difference in outcomes may either be due to the treatment or dissimilarities in the subject's characteristics themselves. Hence, to obtain meaningful results, both groups, treated and untreated, should be similar in term of all variables that may affect the outcome — except, of course, for the recipient of the treatment itself. The PSM technique makes this comparison possible by identifying, matching and comparing outcomes for groups of individuals with identical characteristics within both groups, treated and untreated (Peikes, Moreno and Orzo, 2008). Propensity Score Matching has been used in multiple fields of research, originally in pharmacology, but also in online banking, finance, human resource management, and migration studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).

In this study, PSM was used to remove the effect of confounding variables when comparing the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on a non-probability sample. Once each respondent had a calculated *predicted* probability of being exposed to the campaign, other respondents within the sample with similar characteristics and probabilities — based on whether or not they had seen the campaign — were identified and the difference in answers to questions from the questionnaire were compared.

## Chapter 4      Corruption in Morocco: Data Presentation and Analysis

### 4.1 Data Presentation

Over 400 questionnaires were used and yielded a 50 per cent response rate. The ages of the respondents ranged from 18-65. Of the total, 4.5 per cent were 18-21; 31 per cent were 21-30; 28.5 per cent were 31-40; 20.5 per cent were 41-50; and 7.5 per cent were 51-65. In terms of education level, 23.5 per cent of the sample reportedly had a high school diploma; 19.5 per cent had a two-year college degree; 33 per cent had a bachelor's degree; 14 per cent had a master's degree; and 6 per cent had a doctorate degree. The sample had a somewhat higher level of education than the Moroccan population as a whole given the estimate of the US Agency for International Development that only 53 per cent of Moroccan middle school students continue to high school, and less than 15 per cent of first grade students graduate from high school (USAID, 2015).

In regard to monthly income level, 18 per cent of respondents earned less than 150 USD per month; 18 per cent earned between 151 USD and 300 USD per month; 9.5 per cent earned between 701 USD and 900 USD per month; and 13 per cent earned 1,300 USD or more per month. When asked about the number of individuals in the household, 62 per cent reported living in a household of 3 to 5 people and 24 per cent in a household of more than 6 people. When asked to compare their household level of income, 24 per cent said their households were better off than most households; 60 per cent said their households were slightly better off than most households; and none said their households were much worse off than their neighbours.

### 4.2 Findings: Descriptive Statistics

#### 4.2.1 Definition of Corruption

When asked to choose one or more definitions for corruption, 174 of 200 respondents defined it as *accepting money*, while a slightly smaller number (161) defined it as *giving money*. The definitions *accepting a service* and *providing a service* also were chosen to define corruption, but by a much smaller proportion of respondents, 78 and 79 of 200, respectively. The table 5 below shows no significant gender difference in the definition of corruption.

How do you define corruption	Male Freq.	Female Freq.	% Male	% Female
Accept money	98	76	25.6	27.0
Accept service	51	27	13.3	9.6
Accept gift	45	41	11.7	14.6
Give money	93	68	24.3	24.2
Give gift	45	41	11.7	14.6
Provide service	51	28	13.3	10.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5 - Respondent definition of corruption

#### 4.2.2 Who Is Corrupt?

Out of the 200 respondents who answered this question 100 chose to tick the “I don’t know”, and some showed obvious signs of anxiety in refusing to answer. Of the 100 who responded, nearly half (48 per cent) perceived police officers as being the most corrupt, followed by municipal civil servants (14 per cent), customs officials (nine per cent), doctors and nurses (nine per cent). Those who respondents perceived to be least likely to be corrupt were teachers and professors (one per cent). Out of 200 respondents, 199 answered the question about having been solicited for a bribe. 60 male respondents (51.7 per cent) and 39 female respondents (47 per cent) admitted having been solicited for a bribe. However only four respondents — two males and two females — said they had reported this demand for a bribe to a non-governmental organization like *Agence Marocaine des Droit de l’Homme* (AMDH), a local NGO involved in the fight against corruption.

Respondents who were solicited for a bribe			
	Number of Male / %	Number of Female / %	Total
Yes	60 / 51.7%	39 / 47.0%	99

No	53 / 45.6%	41 / 49.4%	94
Do not know	3 / 2.7%	3 / 3.6%	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>199</b>

Table 6 - Respondents who were solicited for a bribe

#### 4.2.3 Gender Versus Corruption Intention

Respondents were asked to rate their corruption intention on a binary scale: zero for respondents not considering corruption at all, and one for respondents potentially considering corruption. The overall corruption intention was low for both genders, but lower for women. In fact, over twice as many men (20.5 per cent) stated that they could be tempted by corruption, whereas the rate for women was 8.4 per cent. The mean for males was 0.20 while the mean for females was 0.08 (see Table 1). An ANOVA test confirmed that the difference in means was statistically significant with  $F(1, 1.98) = 5.50$ ,  $p$  value = 0.0200. A similar gender difference was seen in response to questions about accepting corruption, with 74.2 per cent of males and 25.8 per cent of females reporting that they would accept a bribe. (Table 7).

<b>Corruption Intention</b>			
Gender	Mean (0 = no intention, 1 = could consider corruption)	Standard Deviation	Number of respondents
Male	0.205	0.405	117
Female	0.084	0.279	83
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.155</b>	<b>0.362</b>	<b>200</b>

Table 7 - Corruption intention by gender

A test of the relationship between corruption intention and the socio-economic factors (Table 8) showed significance in the model overall ( $p$  value = 0.0336 < 0.05), that is, at least one of the variables (level of education, age, gender, or household number) was significantly related to corruption intention. Level of education and gender were most significantly

correlated to corruption intention, but inversely. Thus, as the education level of a respondent increases, his or her intention to accept corruption decreases (by 24.7 per cent). Regarding gender, based on the binary variable we created (0 = Male, 1= Female), we found a negative correlation between gender and the intention to accept corruption. The probability for a female respondent to consider corruption is 63.2 per cent less than of a male respondent.

<b>Corruption Intention</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>P&gt; z </b>	<b>%</b>
Level of Education	-0.283	0.037	-24.7
Age	-0.071	0.714	-6.9
Gender	0.999	0.033	-63.2
Household Number	-0.005	0.987	-0.5

*Table 8 - Corruption intentions by socio-demographic factor*

#### 4.2.4 Causes of and Justifications for Corruption

Out of the various factors proposed to respondents as a justification of corruption — poverty, no alternative for meeting life’s expenses, insecurity and the general unfairness of society (Table 9) — the factors that respondents most frequently identified as justification for corruption were: *helping a friend* and *accepting a gift*. Although we found no significant gender difference for *helping a friend*, men, more than women, rated *accepting a gift* as a justification ( $F(1,195) = 3.92$ ,  $p$  value = 0.0491). The factor least cited as justification for corruption was: *everyone does it*. Men, more than women, however, rated this as a justification ( $F(1,198) = 5.01$   $p$  value = 0.0264).

<b>Justification for corruption</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
	1 does not justify at all, 5 completely justifies corruption	
<b>Poverty</b>		
Male	2.402	0.156

Female	2.209	0.1709
<b>High cost of living</b>		
Male	2.556	0.154
Female	2.320	0.170
<b>Insecurity for the future</b>		
Male	2.052	0.131
Female	1.876	0.143
<b>Everybody does it</b>		
Male	2.034	0.144
Female	1.641	0.132
<b>No trust in the government</b>		
Male	2.556	0.152
Female	2.320	0.173
<b>Low career advancement prospects</b>		
Male	2.443	0.148
Female	2.111	0.156
<b>Help a friend</b>		
Male	2.982	0.162
Female	2.802	0.194
<b>Injustice in society</b>		
Male	2.504	0.148
Female	2.160	0.166
<b>Normal to accept a gift</b>		
Male	2.765	0.157

Female	2.308	0.178
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Table 9 - Justifiability of corruption

### 4.3 Findings: Analytical Statistics

#### 4.3.1 Justification of Corruption

The second model studied the relationship between societal factors and the tendency toward corruption. Using logistic regression, we independently tested the correlation between corruption and gender. For men, the overall model was significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.0017 and Pseudo R2 = 0.2544), indicating with 95 per cent confidence that at least one of the independent variables contributed to predicting corruption intention. In this case, *injustice in society* was the only significant factor and was positively correlated to corruption intention. Men who rated society as unfair had a 15.6 per cent higher probability of contemplating corruption than those who did not (Table 10).

<b>Corruption Intention (Male) Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.0017, Pseudo R2 = 0.2544, n =110 observation</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>
Poverty	0.198	0.216	0.358
Insecurity for the future	0.046	0.273	0.864
Everybody does it	0.080	0.213	0.706
No trust in the government	-0.391	0.231	0.091
Low career advancement prospects	0.275	0.229	0.23
Help a friend	0.126	0.203	0.536
Injustice in society	0.579	0.241	0.016
Normal to accept a gift	0.098	0.190	0.607
Household perception	-0.508	0.489	0.299
Cons	-3.708	1.276	0.004

Table 10 - Factors impacting corruption intention for men

Note: Only Injustice in Society ( $P > z < 0.05$ ) was found to impact corruption intention for male respondents.

For women (Table 11), the overall model was significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.017), indicating with 95 per cent confidence that at least one of the independent variables contributed to predicting corruption intention (see Table 5). For women, *accepting a gift* and *household perception* were factors correlated to corruption intention. Women who believed that accepting a gift is a cultural norm and women who felt that their household is less well off had a greater corruption intention, by 507.2 per cent and 97.5 per cent ( $P > z < 0.05$ ), respectively.

<b>Corruption intention (Female) Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.017, Pseudo R2 = 0.437, n = 72 observations</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>
Poverty	-1.024	0.630	0.104
Insecurity for the future	0.301	0.758	0.691
Everybody does it	-0.559	0.791	0.479
No trust in the government	0.180	0.578	0.755
Low career advancement prospects	-0.314	0.600	0.6
Help a friend	-0.471	0.400	0.239
Injustice in society	0.099	0.439	0.822
Normal to accept a gift	1.803	0.754	0.017
Household perception	-3.690	1.691	0.029
Cons	2.759	2.305	0.231

Table 11 - Factors impacting corruption intention for women

#### 4.3.2 Deterrent Factors

The third model tested correlation between deterrent factors such as higher wages, living abroad, fear of authority, personal conviction, influence of family/ religion, fear of scandals, training and intention not to be corrupt. For women, the model was not significant (Intention with Prob>Chi2 = 0.226), while for men the overall model was statistically significant at a p value of Prob > chi2 = 0.0001 (Table 6). Thus, at least one of the independent variables contributed to the prediction of the intention to be corrupt at the 95 per cent confidence level. Only three variables were found to have a significant impact on the intention not to participate in corruption (p value of less than 0.05). These variables were *Higher Wages* (p value < 0.05), *The Influence of Religion* and *Training of Employees*. In regard to higher wages, the positive sign of the standardized coefficient indicates that when there is a one-unit

increase in standard deviation in higher wages, the intention to reject corruption increases by 31.4 per cent (holding constant the effect of the other variables). In regard to *Influence of Religion* and *Training of Employees*, the negative sign of the standardized coefficient of this variable implies that a one-unit increase in standard deviation in influence of religion or training of employees decreases the intention to reject corruption (Table 12).

<b>Intention (Male)</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>
Higher wages	0.541	0.229	0.018
Living abroad	0.051	0.211	0.809
Fear of authority	0.247	0.199	0.215
Personal convictions	-0.412	0.320	0.198
Influence of family	0.445	0.277	0.108
Influence of religion	-0.877	0.278	0.002
Media scandals	-0.364	0.209	0.082
Training	-0.593	0.231	0.01
Cons	2.096	1.852	0.258

*Table 12 - Deterrent factors impacting male corruption intention*

*Note: The variables Higher Wages, Influence of Religion and Training of Employees ( $P > z < 0.05$ ) were found to impact corruption intention for male respondents.*

## Chapter 5      Corruption in Morocco: A Synthesis of Findings and Discussion

The null hypotheses were rejected as statistically significant correlations were found among the socio-demographic classification, personal and social values, as well as corrupt intention of Moroccan citizens. The results pointed to an important gender gap with regards to beliefs and intentions related to corruption that substantiates the privileging of women over men by Moroccan micro-financing agencies. This gender gap in corruption supports the notion that gender equality — in addition to education and development — is a key factor to combating corruption in a country plagued by social problems. Statistical analysis revealed an acute gender difference in regard to corruption intention, with 74.2 per cent of males and only 25.8 per cent of females reporting that they would be tempted by corruption under certain circumstances. Similarly, 61 per cent of the respondents who said they would offer a corrupt opportunity were men. In the same way, our findings reveal a gender gap in the perceived causes of corruption: Men are more likely to consider corruption if they deem society as unfair while women are most likely to consider corruption as an exchange of gifts.

One explanation for these results can be found in Moroccan society. In Morocco, women's sphere of influence is within the private space while men dominate the public space (Sadiqi, 2008). Women also constitute the least educated segment of the Moroccan population. In 2002, official statistics put the illiteracy rate among Moroccan women overall at 60 per cent, with 48 per cent in urban areas and 95 per cent in rural areas, and by 2011, that number had decreased to 56 per cent of women above 15 years of age testing illiterate (Direction des Statistiques, 2012). Because the greater literacy of men gives them greater awareness of societal issues, corruption is often seen among Moroccan men as a way to remedy social inequalities. Conversely, for women — who generally manage the family's resources through offering and/or accepting gifts in exchange for services rendered — acts of corruption are seen as a way to remedy the lack of state services. Offering gifts (and the correlating need for reciprocity) are the most common practices in societies composed largely of communitarian solidarity networks. Such solidarity networks of family or extended family are a necessity when citizens tend not to trust the state to provide basic services.

In Morocco the state provides only weak support for local needs. In 2011, Morocco ranked 130 of 186 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) and the poverty level remained high, with 9 per cent of the population below the poverty line (WHO, 2011). Furthermore, in the 1990s only 70 percent of the Moroccan population had access to some sort

of health care (WHO, 2011) and although progress was made in 2011, a quarter of the population still resides more than ten kilometres away from a rudimentary health facility. The illiteracy rate in rural areas is also high at an average of around 50 per cent. In 2006, the national illiteracy rate was estimated at 38.5 per cent, with a rate of 46.8 per cent for women in urban areas, and 54.4 per cent for women in rural areas. For men the rate was 31.4 per cent in rural areas and 27.2 per cent in urban areas (UNESCO, 2015). Needless to say, there is an overall lack of state-funded infrastructure in both healthcare and education (AFDB, 2013).

Furthermore, as of today, Morocco remains a largely patriarchal society. Since the introduction of a new family law reform (مدونة الأسرة, or “moudawanat al-usra”) in 2004, women have had more legal rights in theory (Eisenberg, 2011). Because the previous *moudawanat al-usra* followed the traditional Maliki Sunni law (in which women were considered legal minors throughout their lives), until the passing of the new *moudawana al-usra* in 2004, Moroccan women could not legalize contracts without male consent and were subject to discriminatory practices in marriage, divorce, and child custody (Eisenberg, 2011). Traditionally, Moroccan women are the nucleus of the family. They take care of most personal matters relating to marriage, household spending, child health and schooling. Meanwhile, men have authority in public spaces (Sadiqi, 2008). In a country that struggles to provide the necessary funding for services — particularly housing, health and education (Sadiqi, 2008) — women must rely almost solely on solidarity networks to provide for their family. The chronic lack of infrastructure and government presence has led to a large trust deficit, or a sense of abandonment, among Moroccan citizens in regards to their view of the government (Truex, 2011). In this societal context, women have little choice but to find help within traditional solidarity networks, such as the extended family, and within these networks, exchanges of gifts are the norm.

Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) showed the damaging effect of corruption on institutional trust and found it correlated to the level of education. In a corrupt society, more educated citizens tend to be better at gauging the levels of corruption at work, consequently increasing their scepticism toward their government. Findings from this work showed that the more educated respondents were, whether men or women, the less likely they were to take part in corruption. If development and corruption are indeed correlated, education and gender equality are the key catalysts to reform.

Problematically, corruption also affects student perspectives concerning education. Warning and Dürrenberger (2015), using data from 170 countries, show that there is a negative correlation between corruption and years of schooling. In countries with a high level of corruption, young people develop the notion that getting a job is not strictly correlated to

academic performance and tend to drop out of academia early. Thus, in countries with high levels of corruption, students tend to spend less time at school.

This study is a first attempt to find an answer to Morocco's development challenges. In a male dominated society, microcredit loans to women lead to women having greater control of household resources, with more of those resources diverted to children, food, healthcare, and education. Higher levels of education would reduce corruption. However, one must underline the necessity of uprooting corruption from within the education system itself as a precondition for more education. In a corrupt educational system, children are led to believe that bribing is the only way to succeed and they often lose faith and drop out of school (Rumyantseva, 2015). Perhaps more importantly, a decreased gender gap in education would activate a positive feedback loop, in which the presence of women in political, social, and economic life would be largely increased for the betterment of society as a whole.

This study suggests that education and development are the key factors to combat corruption in a country plagued by social ailments. Furthermore, because women in Morocco are at the centre of extended family structures and bear the weight of a deficient social system, they have a crucial role to play in development. Our findings corroborate the idea that women are less tempted by corruption than men and seem to also justify the preference microcredit organizations have shown in choosing women as lenders. One might question the causes underlying our results. Are the gender differences seen in our findings attributable to women's greater sense of moral behaviour? Or is it that, perhaps, because Moroccan women have less access to corrupt opportunities than men based on the limited roles in society that are available to them, they are less likely to engage in acts of corruption? Or is it more that Moroccan women remain subdued in a male-dominated society and are thus more fearful of the possible consequences that could stem from engaging in acts of corruption? Further research is needed to answer these questions.

## Chapter 6 Measuring the Efficiency of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in Morocco: Data Presentation and Analysis

The vast majority of the surveyed population (52 per cent) described their monthly earnings as 150 USD or fewer; a modest sum of money to subsist on for such an amount of time. The other 48 percent reported the following: 19.6 per cent earned between 151 - 300 USD, 6.9 per cent earned between 301 - 500 USD, 5.9 per cent earned between 501 - 700 USD, 7.6 per cent earned between 701 - 900 USD, 2.5 per cent earned between 901 - 1,100 USD while only two per cent reported they earned between 1,101 - 1,300 USD. 4.2 per cent of the public who were approached responded in the questionnaire that their earnings amounted to an excess of 1,300 USD. 11.3 per cent of those questioned claimed single status; 70 per cent described themselves as married; 11.3 per cent were single; and divorcees, widows and widowers made the 18.7 per cent remainder. Regarding gender 437 respondents were male (55.5 per cent) and 350 respondents were female (44.5 per cent). Respondent level of education: 0.7 per cent admitted having no education, two per cent attended Koranic school, 14.8 per cent went to primary school, 24.7 per cent attended secondary school, 30.5 per cent completed two years of University (DEUG Diploma), 21.1 per cent had earned a bachelors degree, 4.3 per cent were at Master level or equivalent, and two per cent reported being at PhD level. Regarding age, 170 respondents (or 21.5 per cent) were below the age of 21, 366 (or 46.4 per cent) were between 21 and 30 years old, 187 (or 23.7 per cent) were between 31 and 40 years old, and 59 respondents (7.5 per cent) were between 41 and 50 years old and 0.9 per cent or seven respondents were older than 50.

### 6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Campaign Awareness

#### 6.1.1. Exposure

The majority (68.3 per cent) of the respondents reported having seen the anti-corruption social marketing campaign slogans or clips on television or radio; leaving quite a high segment of individuals (31.7 per cent) who did not seem to notice the campaign.

#### 6.1.2 Comprehension

Most respondents answered that they understood the campaign's aims and objectives very well with 41.6 per cent responding positively to this, a further 18.9 per cent maintained

that they understood the messages. The second largest percentage group (19.3 per cent) did not understand the message at all, 10.2 per cent claimed that they did not understand and a sizeable proportion (9.9 per cent) was undecided. See the Table below (Table 13) for an illustration of this (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>I understood the message</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>%</b>
Not at all	152	19.29
Did not understand	81	10.28
Undecided	78	9.9
Yes	149	18.91
Very much so	328	41.62
<b>Total</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>100</b>

*Table 13 - Message comprehension*

### 6.1.3 Interest

Over 39 per cent of the respondents did not find the campaign interesting and slightly less found the campaign of interest (36 per cent). A significant percentage (23.9 per cent) did not wish to take sides (Table 14, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>I found the campaign interesting</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>%</b>
Not at all interesting	176	22.34
Not interesting	140	17.77
Neutral	188	23.86
Somewhat	117	14.85
Very interesting	167	21.19
<b>Total</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>100</b>

*Table 14 - Respondents who found the campaign interesting*

#### 6.1.4 Perception of the Campaign Effectiveness

There was a highly cynical view of the campaign's effectiveness with a relatively low percentage of respondents considering the campaign effective in any way at all (around 30 per cent). A large segment, which comprised 29 per cent of those questioned, was neutral. The largest group remained pessimistic with 40 per cent of the respondents deeming the campaign inefficient or completely inefficient (Table 15, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>I think the campaign is effective</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>%</b>
Not at all effective	186	23.6
Not effective	129	16.37
Neutral	229	29.06
Effective	99	12.56
Very Effective	145	18.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>100</b>

*Table 15 - Respondent perception about the campaign efficiency*

#### 6.1.5 Recall

35.4 per cent of the public as surveyed using the questionnaire reported some recollection of the content of the anti-corruption campaign, however quite a striking majority had little or no recollection of it (43 per cent). There was also a large segment (21.7 per cent) of the population that was unsure whether they could remember the content of it or not (Table 16, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>I remember the campaign</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>%</b>
Not at all	210	26.65
Do not remember	129	16.37
Not sure	170	21.57

Somewhat	125	15.86
Very well	154	19.54
Total	788	100

Table 16 - Respondent recall of the campaign

### 6.1.6 Credibility of the Campaign's Promoter

Here, the percentage of those proclaiming full trust in the campaign promoters, and hence, by extension, the government, proved very low with 17.7 per cent espousing this view. 12.6 per cent agreed that the campaign providers were credible; while 24.5 per cent felt uncertain. The highest percentage group was those with no faith in the credibility of the government whatsoever (29.7 per cent) while those with a minimal perception of government credibility represented 15.6 per cent of the surveyed total, overall 45.3 per cent of respondents stated not to trust the government (Table 17, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>I trust the government</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>%</b>
No trust at all	234	29.55
No trust	124	15.66
Not sure	194	24.49
Trust somewhat	100	12.63
Completely trust	140	17.68
Total	794	100

Table 17 - Credibility of the campaign promoter (trust in the government)

### 6.1.7 Change in Beliefs Towards Corruption

To gain a better picture of what people's views were of corruption in light of the anti-corruption campaign, a questionnaire was used to elicit definitions of corruption as viewed by the Moroccan public. Respondents were asked to define their feelings about corruption in the form of a concurrence (5) or disagreement (1) (on a five-point Likert scale) to a statement concerning corruption.

An ANOVA test was carried out in order to produce a number that would infer whether or not the views of those who had seen the anti-corruption campaign differed significantly from those who had not (comparing the mean standard deviation of the two aforementioned groups). Responses with high P values exhibit no statistically significant difference in attitude between those exposed and unexposed. Table 17 (Hamelin, N. Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) demonstrates that there is no significant difference in responses to questions, except where respondents were asked about the status of corruption as an *immoral* or *illegal* act. Those who were exposed to the campaign also showed quite markedly that they considered corruption *gift-giving*. As expected to some degree, corruption was defined by both groups (not exposed/exposed) as *giving/receiving money, a gift or service*. (Table 18)

<b>What is the meaning of corruption?</b> (1 Totally disagree to 5 Totally agree)	<b>Average (Did not see the campaign) / Stddev.</b>	<b>Average (Seen the campaign) / Stddev</b>	<b>ANOVA test and P<sub>value</sub></b>
Giving a gift is normal	3.33 / 1.61	3.52 / 1.46	P=0.093, insignificant difference
Accepting money	3.13 / 1.56	3.13 / 1.60	P=0.982, insignificant
Providing a service	3.14 / 1.51	3.18 / 1.57	p=0.613, insignificant
Receiving a gift	3.13 / 1.53	3.18 / 1.60	P=0.607, insignificant
Paying money to someone	3.21 / 1.58	3.18 / 1.63	P=0.911, insignificant
Offering a gift	2.92 / 1.58	3.20 / 1.58	P= 0.022, F (1, 786) = 5.30
Offering a Service	3.03 / 1.53	3.26 / 1.58	P=0.068, insignificant
Corruption is lawful	2.38 / 1.42	2.45 / 1.52	P=0.553, insignificant
Corruption is prohibited	3.00 / 1.57	3.43 / 1.54	P=0.0001, F (1, 790) = 14.13
Corruption is amoral	3.08 / 1.538	3.48 / 1.53	P=0.0059, F (1, 788) = 11.87

Table 18 - Change in beliefs toward corruption versus exposure to the campaign

### 6.1.8 Change in Attitude Score

The Fishbein model as stated above was used to calculate an *attitude score* for corruption. A high attitude score indicates a person/group with a more tolerant perception of corruption, while a low score demonstrates that an individual (or several) believe that corruption is something negative. The average attitude score for those not exposed to the campaign (232 respondents) was -7.19 and those exposed to the anti-corruption publicity was -11.13 for the remaining 496 individuals; therefore, attitudes of those who saw the anti-corruption publicity campaign were affected by the information and subsequently demonstrated a lower tolerance of corruption (reduction of *attitude score* by 3.94, or 2.98 per cent). The standard error for this information was 2.49 and t-statistics were -1.58.

### 6.1.9 Change in Intention

An ANOVA test was also carried out to evaluate the difference between those exposed/unexposed with regard to their willingness to change corrupt behaviour (Table 8). It appears from the results that those exposed to the campaign showed more willingness to change, with a significantly higher mean score from respondents:  $F(1, 786) = 84.02, p = 0.0000$ . See Table 19 (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) below:

<b>Respondents intention to change behaviour toward corruption</b>	<b>Occurrence</b>	<b>Average score (out of 5)</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Did not see the campaign	245	2.316	1.308
Saw the campaign	543	3.300	1.430
Total	788	3.000	1.465

Table 19 - Intention to change corrupt behaviour versus campaign exposure

## 6.2 Analytical Statistics

### 6.2.1 Attitude Toward Corruption Versus Campaign Awareness and Credibility

The attitude scores obtained previously (section 8.7) can be considered as a continuous variable since it varies between -69 to + 63 (Mauer and Pierce, 1998). Setting prob the p value

to 0.05 (i.e. with a 95 per cent confidence level), a significant relationship between the final attitude score and the campaign’s awareness and credibility was found.

The questions pertaining to comprehension of the message and recall (p values 0.006 and 0.052 respectively) produce a significant negative correlation with the attitude score. Hence respondent increased understanding of the campaign leads to a lesser attitude score (higher rejection of corruption). Campaign provider’s credibility (p=0.000) was found to be positively correlated to the attitude score.

Thus an increased trust in the government appears to produce a higher attitude score (higher tolerance toward a corruption). An R<sup>2</sup> was calculated at 10.68 per cent to account for the variability of responses around the mean (Table 20, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

Hence the following relationship is established:

$$\text{Attitude toward corruption} = -2.413 (\text{Understood the campaign}) - 2.110 (\text{Remember the campaign}) + 2.749 (\text{Trust the government}).$$

<b>Attitude score (n=787 respondents, Prob F &gt; 0) with -69 &lt;= score &lt;= + 63</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>P&gt; t </b>
Saw the campaign	3.237	2.863	0.259 – not significant
Campaign is interesting	-1.093	1.079	0.311– not significant
Understood the campaign	-2.413	0.852	0.005 – Significant
Remember the campaign	-2.110	1.066	0.048- Significant
Trust the government	2.749	0.652	0- Significant

Table 20 - Regression of Corruption attitude score versus campaign efficiency

Government trust and attitude score findings were further corroborated by an ANOVA analysis. There was a significant effect of government trust on attitude score at the p < 0.05 level with [F(4, 787) = 7.99, p = 0]. Respondents with *no trust* or *no trust at all* in their government have low corruption attitude scores (i.e. higher aversion toward corruption) while respondents who *trust* or *completely trust* their government are less hostile toward corruption. See Table 21 (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) below:

<b>Trust in the government</b>	<b>Mean of Attitude score</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>
No Trust at all	-16.995	33.192	234

No Trust	-12.322	19.445	124
Do not know	-1.5051	31.326	194
Trust	-5.05	28.018	100
Absolute Trust	-4.95	37.442	140
Total	-8.832	31.727	792

Table 21 - Attitude score versus level of trust in the government

## 6.2.2 Validity of the Model

To ensure the regression displayed in the results is valid the conditions of linearity, normality and homoscedasticity have to be respected. Absence of multicollinearity should also be tested.

### 6.2.2.1 Linearity

There must be a linear relationship between predictors and outcome variables. To test linearity is to chart with residual plot; this also flags nonlinearity within the surveyed data. Acprplot command in STATA was used for the questions pertaining to *exposure*, *comprehension*, *interest*, *credibility* and *recall*; using `lowesslsopts (bwidth (1))` options to produce lowess smoothing. Throughout graphs 1-4 the fitted lines show that linearity has been achieved.

### 6.2.2.2 Normality

To fulfil the criterion of normality, one expects errors to be distributed normally. This normality can be affirmed by drawing a kernel density plot from the results with the normal option and setting the normal density alongside it. A standardized normal probability can also be plotted (P-P). It could be seen in the following 2 graphs (figures 8 and 9, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) that there is a small deviation from the normal density/probability but that the residuals are sufficiently close to normal distribution to fulfil the above criterion.




Figure 8 - Normality test




Figure 9 - Normal probability plot

### 6.2.2.3 Homoscedasticity

Homoscedasticity of residuals (or homogeneity of variance) should be constant to assure that error variance is regular. The opposite phenomenon is known as heteroscedasticity, which would imply that the results lacked significance. Residuals against fitted values were plotted to test the significance of the data and results collected and there is a distinguishable pattern, which indicates that homoscedasticity has been achieved (Figure 10). These results were supported by further Breusch-Pagan tests which produced a p value of Prob chi2 = 0.5025; further evidence using the null hypothesis that there is homogeneity across the spread of data.




Figure 10 - Residuals against fitted values

#### 6.2.2.4 Multicollinearity

To assure that there was no multicollinearity – where variables appear a linear combination of one-another – A *variance inflation factor command* or VIF was run. The test produced a VIF value of 1.61 (of a possible 10); proving that there was no multicollinearity.

As can be seen from the reports above, these diagnostics were run successfully to ensure reliability of the models previously hypothesized. Provided the chosen predictors are deemed valid by a set of tests, the model valid can be considered valid. The command Link test was run to test the multicollinearity. Table 22 (Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) shows that the variable *\_hat* is significant whereas *\_hatsq* is insignificant ( $p_{\text{-value}} = 0.606$ ), hence the validity of the model. Subsequently one can conclude that meaningful predictors were used for the model and that there is no error of specificity:

<i>Number of Observations: 785</i>					
Attitude	coefficient	Std. Err.	t	P <sub>value</sub>	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	0.8296325	.3720872	2.23	0.02611	0.0992258 1.56008
_hatsq	-0.0102975	.0200867	0.51	0.6045	-0.049744 0.0291228
_cons	-0.2462392	1.922002	0.13	0.887	-4.019142 3.526445

*Table 22 - Model validity test using linktest command in stata*

### 6.3 Impact of Campaign Awareness on Behavioural Intention

The relationship was tested using logistic regression and a value of Prob> chi2= 0.0001 was found i.e. at 95 per cent certainty showing that willingness to change corrupt behaviour is correlated to campaign awareness (Table 22). The main significant factors having an impact on intention are respondents interest in the campaign, respondent comprehension of the campaign and respondent recall of the campaign; the more a respondent remembers, understands and is interested in the campaign, the higher his or her resolve to change behaviour. Interest increased intention to change corrupt behaviour by 73.2 per cent, comprehension by 26.8 per cent and recall by 102.0 per cent (Table 23). McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 resulted in a percentage of 51.4 per cent, further explaining the variability of response data around the mean.

<b>Intention to change behaviour (783 observations, Prob&gt; chi2 = 0)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>
Exposure	-0.23623	-21	0.177
Interest	0.54038	71.7	0
Comprehension	0.27753	32	0
Recall	0.70262	101.9	0
Credibility	0.00286	0.3	0.953

*Table 23 - Impact of campaign awareness and credibility on respondents 'corrupt intention*

A non-significant Brant test run with the same statistical software shows that the parallel regression assumption has not been violated (Table 24), subsequently proving the validity of the model.

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	19.45	0.194	15
Exposed	8.43	0.038	3
Interest	3.13	0.372	3
Comprehension	0.56	0.905	3
Recall	2.34	0.504	3
Trust in gov.	2.21	0.53	3

Table 24 - Brant test for intention to change versus campaign efficiency

### 6.3.1 TRA: Impact of Attitude and Social Norms on Corrupt Intention

The regression results show that with a 95 per cent confidence level intention to change corrupt behaviour is significantly correlated to attitude and social norm. With *family opinion* having the strongest impact on changing corrupt behaviour. While *attitude toward corruption* had a significant, but lesser, impact on behaviour change. This demonstrates that social norms play a role in the dislike of corruption — the more concerned an individual is of social norms (specifically *family opinion*) the greater the individual will wish to change corrupt behaviour. When all other variables are held constant within the model, the importance of *family opinion* for a respondent increases by 1 unit and intention to change corrupt behaviour increases by 26.1 per cent. Regarding *attitude toward corruption*, the lower the score, the higher the respondent's intent is to change corrupt behaviour (0.6 per cent per unit). See Table 25 (Hamelin. N. Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss , 2014) below:

Intention to change behaviour (n=782 respondents, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)	Coefficient	Percentage	P> z
Attitude toward corruption	-0.006	-0.6	0.005
Value opinion of family	0.231	26.1	0

Value opinion of friend	0.071	7.5	0.21
Value opinion of imam	0.062	6.4	0.197
Fear police	0.002	0.3	0.959

Table 25 - Intention to change behaviour versus attitude and social norms

When the Brant test was run, a significant result ( $p > \chi^2 = 0$ ) was uncovered- thus violating the assumption of parallel regression. What this demonstrated was that the model may be lacking some predictors to reflect the relationship between every pair of outcome groups. (Table 26).

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	53.14	0	15
Attitude toward corruption	9.14	0.028	3
Value opinion of family	3.99	0.263	3
Value opinion of friend	15.91	0.001	3
Value opinion of imam	5.43	0.143	3
Fear police	4.01	0.261	3

Table 26 - Brant test for intention to change behaviour versus Attitude and Social Norms

### 6.3.2 Effect of Socio-Demographics on Intention to Change Behaviour

Socio-demographic data was also taken into account to assess the possible effect the campaign might have on intention to alter one's corrupt behaviour. With a 95 per cent certainty the model was found to be significant and the dependent variables most strongly affecting the respondents wishes to alter behaviour were *gender*, *education* and *income* (Table 26). It emerged that women displayed a lower probability of intention to change corrupt behaviour than men by 34.3 per cent, while those who had a higher level of education also expressed a lower probability of a change (15.7 per cent). Those of lower-level incomes also reported a lower likelihood that they would change corrupt behaviour by 8.9 per cent. The McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 coefficient was measured at 13.3 per cent (Table 27, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>Intention to change behaviour, number of respondents = 724</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>	<b>%</b>
Exposed	1.245	0	247.4
Gender	-0.419	0.002	-34.3
Education	-0.171	0.001	-15.7
Age	0.056	0.471	5.8
Income	-0.093	0.011	-8.9
Household number	-0.054	0.591	-5.3

*Table 27 - Regression of intention to change behaviour versus exposure and socio-demographic factors*

## 6.4 Propensity Score Matching Methods

Regression analysis do not account for the possibility of bias, as the measured difference in outcome between respondents who have seen the campaign and those who have not seen the campaign may depend on individualities that impacted whether or not an individual was exposed to the campaign rather than being due to the effect of the campaign, per se. By carrying the propensity score analysis one can gain a picture of the overall effect of the campaign without the socio-demographic element.

### 6.4.1 Justifying the Use of Propensity Score Matching

What can be seen below (Figure 11, 12, 13 and 14, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014) illustrates that the campaign was more likely to be seen by those from the 21-30 age category, those of a higher level of education, males and those under below the 1500 Moroccan dirhams (MAD) monthly poverty threshold.




Figure 11 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of gender




Figure 12 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of education




Figure 13 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of age




Figure 14 - Respondent exposure to the campaign as a function of income

Those who were exposed versus those unexposed can be further compared using logistic regression. At 95 per cent significance the revealed that Moroccan women ( $p < 0.1$ ) and higher wages respondents ( $p < 0.1$ ) had a lesser exposure to the anti-corruption message, and this by a significant degree (Table 28, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>Exposed (Number of respondents = 724), Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.004</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>
Gender	0.274	0.164	0.096
Education	-0.056	0.065	0.389
Age	0.165	0.098	0.094
Income	-0.139	0.043	0.001
Household number	-0.017	0.121	0.886
Constant	-0.010	0.568	0.985

Table 28 - Regression results for Exposure to the campaign versus respondent demographics

### 6.5 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Results

Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was used in an attempt to remove the effect of the said confounding variables above. Once each respondent had a calculated *predicted* probability of being exposed to the campaign, other respondents within the sample with similar probabilities — based on whether or not they had seen the campaign — were identified and the difference on answers to questions presented in the questionnaire were compared.

Propensity scores were estimated and the balancing property test was found acceptable for all the dependent variables. The result of the PSM analysis is provided by the *average Treatment effect on the treated* or the ATT score. In this study the “Treatment” is indeed the exposure to the anti-corruption mass-media campaign.

#### 6.5.1 Nearest Score Matching (NN): Intention to Change Behaviour

Next (Table 30), both respondents who have seen the campaign and those who reported not having seen the campaign and who received (near) identical propensity scores from the intersected region between lowest and highest propensity score for each group of respondents were matched using nearest score matching (NN).

As discovered previously, respondents exposed to the campaign emerged with a higher intention to change behaviour: 3.30 versus 2.26 or 20.8 per cent more resolved to change behaviour than those who did not see it. The significant t-statistic of 6.1 clearly demonstrates this (Table 29, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss (2014):

Variable	Respondent Demographics	Have seen the campaign (494 respondents)	Have not seen the campaign (230 respondents)	Difference between have seen and have not seen	Standard Error	T-statistics
Intention to alter behaviour (1 not at all to 5 very much so)	Not matched	3.303	2.331	0.971	0.110	8.83
Intention to alter behaviour (1 not at all to 5 very much so)	Matched with ATT	3.303	2.262	1.040	0.170	6.105

Table 29 - Measurement of respondent alteration in intention to change behaviour using NNPSM method

### 6.5.2 Respondent Alteration in Attitude Score

In the same vein, the nearest neighbour propensity score produced an ATT of -9.605. The mean attitude change derived from this was -12.70 or  $-12.6/132 = -9.6$  per cent. The model also proved significant with  $t = -2.32$  (Table 29, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

	Respondent Demographics	Have seen the campaign (495 respondents)	Have not seen the campaign (233 respondents)	Difference between have seen and have not seen	Standard Error	T-statistics
Corruption attitude score	Not matched	-11.139	-7.198	-3.940	2.496	-1.579
Corruption attitude score	Matched with ATT	-11.139	-1.534	-9.604	4.134	-2.318

Table 30 - Measurement of Attitude scores alteration using NN PSM method

### 6.5.3 Respondent Alteration of Beliefs

What also emerged using propensity score matching was that the part of the sample who saw the campaign did espouse the view more strongly that corruption was *unlawful* (+0.421 or +8.39 per cent). The significance level here was 1.88. There was also a marginal increase in the understanding that corruption was an *amoral* behaviour (0.411, or an 8.19 per cent increase; significance level: 1.94). There was no noteworthy difference between exposed/unexposed respondents when questioned whether corruption was *authorized* or not (Tables 31, 32 and 33, Hamelin, Nwankwo, Filali Moulay Idriss, 2014).

<b>Belief:</b>	<b>Respondent Demographics</b>	<b>Have seen the campaign (493 respondents)</b>	<b>Have not seen the campaign (231 respondents)</b>	<b>Difference between Have seen and Have not seen</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>T-statistics</b>
Corruption is unlawful	Not matched	3.414	2.995	0.419	0.125	3.339
Corruption is unlawful	Matched with ATT	3.414	2.991	0.423	0.225	1.879

Table 31 - Measurement of respondent alteration in Belief: "corruption is unlawful" using NN PSM method.

<b>Belief:</b>	<b>Respondent Demographics</b>	<b>Have seen the campaign (495 respondents)</b>	<b>Have not seen the campaign (233 respondents)</b>	<b>Difference between Have seen and Have not seen</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>T-statistics</b>
Corruption is amoral	Not matched	3.435	3.086	0.349	0.122	2.839
Corruption is amoral	Matched with ATT	3.435	3.020	0.415	0.214	1.939

Table 32 - Measurement of respondent alteration in belief: "corruption is immoral" score using NN PSM method

Belief	Respondent Demographics	Have seen the campaign (494 respondents)	Have not seen the campaign (232 respondents)	Difference between Have seen and Have not seen	Standard error	T-statistics
Corruption is Authorized	Not matched	2.365	2.329	0.036	0.117	0.309
Corruption is Authorized	Matched with ATT	2.365	2.220	0.145	0.183	0.788

Table 33 - Measurement of respondent alteration of beliefs: “corruption is authorized” score using NN PSM method

## 6.6 Summary

Descriptive data analysis regarding the campaign effectiveness shows that over 68 per cent of the respondents reported seeing the campaign, with the vast majority claiming that they had understood the campaign message reasonably well. However, a vast majority of the sample considered that the campaign was both uninteresting and ineffective in curbing corruption. In the same vein, most respondents reported either being unsure about granting trust or having no trust in the campaign promoters whatsoever. A predominant part of the sample also stated that they could not remember the content of the campaign. Regarding the alteration in beliefs about corruption, the campaign seems to have slightly increased the belief that corruption is illegal, immoral and a gift-giving phenomenon. Regarding the attitude score, the results also presented a decrease in *attitude score* toward corruption toward a less favourable evaluation of corruption. In the same vein; inclination towards a corrupt intention was lessened for the respondents who were exposed to the campaign.

Regarding the analytical statistics, the null hypothesis H0 stated previously “There is no correlation between the campaign reach, interest, message comprehension, credibility and recall and Moroccan attitude and intention toward corruption” has been rejected. The results of the regressions show that respondents with a higher level of trust in the government are more likely to have a higher acceptance of corruption. On the other hand, the higher the comprehension, the higher the recall of the campaign; and the higher the credibility of the campaign, the less the respondents had a favourable attitude towards corruption. Intention to

change behaviour, to become less corrupt, was found to be positively impacted by the respondent interest, comprehension and recall of the campaign. When it comes to socio-demographic factors, it was found that intention for one to change behaviour toward corruption is increased if the respondent is male rather than female, is less educated rather than more educated, and have a lower income rather than higher income.

Regarding the Theory of Reasoned Action, social norms (and in particular, the *opinion of the family*) seem to have the most positive impact on an individual intention to alter his or her corrupt behaviour with *attitude toward corruption* having a comparatively lower impact. In other words, the more a person values the opinion of his or her family, the more his or her intention to become less corrupt. Opinions of friends or religious authorities had no significant impact.

Finally, using Propensity Score Matching, groups with identical socio-demographics were created. The effect of the campaign was measured by comparing the difference in attitude score, intention to change behaviour and beliefs between groups with identical socio-demographics. The results show that exposure to the campaign has significantly increased the sample intention to change behaviour by 20.8 per cent, and decrease a respondent's positive attitude toward corruption by -9.6 per cent and increase the respondent belief that corruption is illegal by +8.4 per cent and immoral by +8.2 per cent.

## **Chapter 7 Measuring the Efficiency of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in Morocco: Synthesis of Findings and Discussion**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter analyses and contemplates the findings from the descriptive and analytical statistics of Chapter 6: “Measuring the Efficiency of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in Morocco; Data Presentation and Analysis”. The first section examines the results of the anti-corruption campaign in terms of effectiveness; while the second section provides an evaluation of the links between citizen trust in the campaign provider and the campaign effectiveness in terms of alteration of corrupt attitude and intention. The third section evaluates the campaign’s impact on Moroccan perceptions — has the campaign managed to convince Moroccans about corruption is immoral, illegal or even authorized? Finally, this chapter considers the results from the Theory of Reasoned Action constructs and examines the importance of the family unit on corrupt intention.

### **7.2 Campaign Effectiveness**

#### **7.2.1 Reach and Perceived Effectiveness**

Undoubtedly, the reach of the campaign was a success with over 60 per cent of the respondents corroborating their exposure to the campaign. However, most respondents rated the campaign as ineffective, with 29 per cent of those questioned rating the campaign as neither effective nor ineffective, and the majority, 40 per cent of the respondents, evaluated the campaign as either “inefficient” or “completely inefficient”. Lang (2006) defines Public Service Advertising (PSA) perceived effectiveness as the construct of claim strength and emotional content. Claim is the verbal content of the message (in this case “Beware of Corruption”), while “claim strength” refers to the perceived effectiveness assessments of a verbal claim. Claim strength or the effectiveness of the message has been shown to be linked to the message itself. As an example, the message: “marijuana is a gateway drug”, was rated highly ineffective while the message: “your parents will be disappointed in you”, was rated as highly effective (Yzer, et al., 2003 as cited by Lang, 2006). Lang concluded that stronger claims lead to higher effectiveness perception score than weaker claims (Lang, 2006). The strength of a claim is defined by the degree of mental elaboration allocated by the message’s recipient when considering a message. In line with the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion of Petty and Caccioppo (2012), “strong” claims are messages that are more carefully

considered by the recipient, while “weak” claims are messages considered only superficially by the recipient. Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign message has indeed been poorly rated. Abdessamad Saddouq, the Secretary General of Transparency International Morocco, qualified the anti-corruption campaign as being an affront to Moroccan citizens. “The content is poor,” he said, and “It is an insult to the intelligence of Moroccans” (L’economiste, 2012a). Lang (2006) also posits that the emotional content of a PSA message plays a central role in a campaign’s perceived effectiveness. For example, a high intensity emotional message with a weak message claim has often resulted in a boomerang effect, with the recipients actually engaging more in the activity that the message was warning against them doing (Lang, 2006). That is to say, when recipients received the weak message: “marijuana is a gateway drug”, there was a boomerang effect of more people smoking marijuana. Lang’s recommendation for optimum perceived effectiveness is to associate a strong claim with an arousing positive or negative emotional content.

### 7.2.2 Campaign Effectiveness and Government Credibility

In summary, the simplicity of the campaign’s message: “Beware of Corruption”, provides a first understanding for Moroccans poor rating of the campaign effectiveness. Government credibility is undoubtedly another significant factor impacting the perceived effectiveness of the campaign. Although a survey undertaken by the magazine *Actuel* in December, 2011 showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens have “somewhat” or “complete” trust in the Prime Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which he was elected (Actuel.ma, 2015), data from this research offers a more critical picture. An astonishing 45 per cent of the eight hundred respondents questioned affirmed having “no faith” or “no faith whatsoever” in their government — to which one should also consider the 24 per cent of respondents who chose not to voice their opinion. Further analysis using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test showed that government credibility and the public’s negative attitude toward corruption are negatively linked [ $F(4, 787) = 7.99, p = 0$ ]. In other words, respondents with a lower level of faith in the government tend to be less tolerant towards corruption while a higher level of acceptance toward corruption is linked to a higher level of government trust.

These findings should be paralleled with the findings of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) who analysed crime patterns in the United States of America. They used a model of social interaction to show that crime is contagious and that individuals are more inclined to commit crime in an environment where the level of criminality is high. In a more recent study in Denmark, researchers Damm and Dustmann (2014) found that migrants placed

in an environment with a high majority of youth offenders would be more likely to be convicted in later life than migrants placed in lower crime environments. Dong, et al. (2012) used the Theory of Contagion (or Pro-Social Behaviour) to show that the perception that others might be corrupt leads to a more sympathetic attitude towards corrupt behaviour. “Thus, a person’s willingness to be corrupt depends on the pro-social behaviour of other citizens. The more that others are perceived to be corrupt, the higher the willingness to be corrupt” (Dong et al, 2012). In the same vein, Otieno (2005) reported a similar pattern in Botswana and Kenya where the lack of public confidence in the integrity of the campaign promoter resulted in the failure of the anti-corruption campaigns for both countries. This is very much the case with Morocco where, according to a survey by Transparency International, 67 per cent of the Moroccan population perceive political parties as corrupt and 73 per cent believed that public officials and civil servants were corrupt (Transparency International, 2016). Abdessamad Saddouq also pointed out that the campaign “intuits that citizens are the sole persons responsible for corruption and petty corruption,” (L’economiste, 2012a). Effectively, in the middle of the campaign (June 2012), the government launched an investigation into documents that purportedly accused the former finance minister and the national treasurer of granting large salary bonuses to one another. The investigation was soon stalled and the enquiry launched by Justice Minister Mustapha Ramid was discarded (Bellaoualli, 2014). Hence, by ignoring high-level corruption at the levels of government and business while solely targeting minor, or “petty”, corruption, the government’s credibility in its fight against corruption was further diminished.

### 7.3 Campaign Design, Recall and Attitude Change

Reach and Perceived Effectiveness are only preliminary gauges to measure the effectiveness of a social marketing campaign. The effectiveness of a campaign should be measured against the goals of that campaign — in this case, an alteration of attitude and behaviour toward corruption. This study showed that exposure to the campaign led to a decrease in the respondent tolerance of corruption. Using propensity score matching, attitude scores decreased from -1.534 out of 132 for the unexposed to -11.139 out of 132 for the exposed, that is a 9.6 per cent decrease in tolerance of corruption. Of course, attitude change is not a straightforward process. The route to attitude change passes through the following stages: Exposure, Interest, Comprehension and Retention (Hovland, 1953). Although 60.0 per cent of our sample confirmed they felt they had a good understanding of the campaign, only 30.1 per cent of the respondents thought the campaign was interesting. Regarding comprehension, most

respondents (60.3 per cent) claimed they understood the message “well” or “very well”, yet next to a third of the sample (29.6 per cent) declared they did not understand the message. Finally, fewer than 25 per cent reported they could remember the campaign — with a majority of respondents (over 65 per cent) saying they could not remember the message or were unsure whether or not they could recall it.

Clearly, the anti-corruption campaign failed to generate interest and maintain retention among Moroccan citizens. There are several possible reasons for this. The Memory-Based Information Processing Theory postulates that recall is an essential initial step for behavioural change to take place, since recall leads to potential attitude change and subsequently attitude change may lead to a behavioural change (Choi and Lee, 2013). In a seminal paper titled: “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion” (or ELM), Petty and Cacioppo (2012) maintained that the degree of mental processing of the message is linked to the recipient’s level of persuasion and, consequently, linked to attitude change. The authors distinguish two routes to persuasion: the central route (which reflects a deeper processing of the message leading to a long lasting attitude change) and a peripheral route (where the message is only superficially processed and leads to a transient attitude change). In the same vein, the low level of recall reported — with only one quarter of the respondents recalling the campaign’s message — can be attributed to the manner in which the audience processes the message. Craik and Lockhart (1972) posit that there are levels of message processing corresponding to various strengths of memorizing the message. Shallow processing generates temporary memory traces that are susceptible to rapid decay. On the other hand, messages that are more methodically processed produce more stable memory traces and ultimately increased message recall. Till and Baack, Wilson and Till, (2005) demonstrated the importance of campaign inventiveness and creativity to improve persuasion and unaided recall. Smith, Chen and Yang (2008) ran a set of experiments testing advertisement creativity and found that a low level of creativity in an advertisement would engender a lower degree of processing and audience response in terms of brand awareness and brand liking. In the same vein, emotional and/or creative advertising leads to increasingly positive attitudes toward both commercials and brands (Janssens and Pelsmacker, 2005). Recent studies in neuroscience confirm the importance of emotion in advertising. Aslanbay (2012), for example, demonstrates that effective advertising tends to embed a rational message within an emotional envelope. Similarly, LeBlanc, McConnell, and Monteiro (2014) illustrate how emotions show positive, strong correlation to attention, decision-making and memory.

The unemotional, naive visual design of Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign — portraying a hand giving banknotes to another, with a red illegal sign overlaid and the slogan:

“Beware of Corruption”, written across — may very well have contributed to the low level of interest, recall and modest attitude change reported in this study.

#### 7.4 Campaign Impact on Beliefs About Corruption

Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign resulted in predominantly poor outcomes regarding the change in citizen belief towards corruption. Propensity Score Matching showed that respondent beliefs about corruption being authorized or not authorized remained unchanged, with a significant portion of the sample (20.15 per cent) reporting they did not know if corruption was or was not authorized. Furthermore, a staggering 23 per cent of the respondents felt that corruption was authorized.

The belief that corruption is an illegitimate act was not significantly improved either. On average, the score of the respondents, concerning the illegal nature of corruption, increased from 2.99 to 3.41 out of 5, or a meagre 8.4 per cent increase. Although the percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “agreed entirely” with the fact that corruption was illegal was measured at 38.6 per cent for those unexposed and at 50 per cent for those exposed. The percentage of respondents who completely disagreed that corruption was illegal remained discouragingly high with 23.9 per cent for those not exposed to the campaign to 18.5 per cent for those exposed. These findings may be explained in two ways. The first explanation is, because the level of processing required by the campaign was simply too low as posited by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), it was insufficient in persuading a sufficiently large proportion of our sample that corruption could be anything but a crime. The second is that these findings supported the idea that corruption in Morocco might have indeed become a prevailing norm and, for many, corruption was not considered as an unlawful act. Mishra (2006) hypothesized that when corruption is widespread in a society, it becomes the norm. Corrupt behaviour is then vindicated by blaming the prevalence of corruption in the society (Rose-Ackerman 2001).

The campaign seemed to fare better in changing our sample’s perception regarding the relation between morality and corruption. Respondents who disagreed or completely disagreed with the affirmation that corruption was immoral was recorded at 42.7 per cent for those not exposed and at 28.6 per cent for those exposed. Those who agreed or agreed entirely that corruption was immoral rose from 42.7 per cent for those not exposed to 51.6 per cent for those exposed. The campaign seemed to have a positive impact in awakening people to the immorality of corruption. On average, respondent score of perceiving corruption as immoral rose from 3.02 to 3.43, a modest, but significant, 8.2 per cent increase.

Levine (2005) analyses the psychic meaning of corruption and reveals that corruption cannot be linked to a breakdown in morality, but rather a failure of the individual to disengage from its “rapacious self”. Levine then posits that there is a psychic opposition between a conscious understanding of morality and an unconscious motivation where others are the source of what is needed. For Levine, an immoral corrupt act can be perceived as both a potential for social condemnation but also as a fast track to better economic standing and thus social acceptance (Levine 2005). If we consider the argument of Bayley (1966) — that the corruption in developing countries is often a necessary means for a poorly paid civil servant to reassert his or her social standing in a traditional society — and Skalli (2001), who investigated the issue of poverty in Morocco and has broadened the term “poverty” to include “social exclusion”, we can find how a corrupt individual might thus be unable to perceive him or herself as such because in these spheres corruption is not seen as an immoral act but rather a means to gain economic advantage and consequently social acceptance. This has been demonstrated by Shah (2009), who showed that in Jharkhand, India corruption was motivated not only by private gain but also a “moral economy”, that is, the wish to graduate into an elevated social class or gain social influence. With the concept that corruption can be seen on a broader level in rampantly corrupt countries as another way in which to climb the socioeconomic ladder, one can see how Morocco’s anti-corruption campaign may have provided the necessary awakening to a sense of morality.

## **7.5 Behavioural Change and Social Norm**

The impact of the campaign on the intention to change corrupt behaviour was recorded and higher than expected. Intention to change behaviour went from 2.26 out of 5 for those unexposed to 3.30 out of 5 for those who had been exposed to the campaign, a 20.8 per cent increase in respondent intention to change his or her intentions for the better. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) stipulates that intention results from the influence of an individual attitude toward the outcome of a given behaviour and the perception of what others, the “social norm”, think about this intended behaviour.

The results of the regression in this chapter show that both the attitudes and the opinion of the family have a significant impact on intention to change behaviour. Attitude was found to be a significant, although marginal, predictor of intention. A less tolerant attitude to corruption leads to an increased intention to change behaviour. The main predictor of intention change was reported to be the influence of the family. Family is the strongest normative force as the findings show. A respondent’s willingness to change behaviour with respect to corruption is

raised by around 27 per cent for respondents who have a superior consideration of the judgment of their family. Other aspects of social norms — such as judgment of friends or the imam, fear of the rule or public shaming via media exposure — failed to record any correlation with the change of intention towards corruption.

Law enforcement may intuitively appear to be a good deterrent to corruption. Fisman and Miguel (2007) showed that the higher the fine, the less unethical the behaviour manifested; however, this theory is invalid when the law enforcers are themselves corrupt. A corrupt police officer, by corrupt acts such as lowering the payment of the fine, dilutes the dissuasion of violating the law (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001). This is very much corroborated by a recent survey from Transparency International Morocco that found that 79 per cent of the respondents perceived the police forces as corrupt, with 64 per cent of the respondents confessing bribing the police during the last 12 months. In the same vein, when it comes to the judiciary system, 70 per cent of the sample considered the system corrupt and 41 per cent of them admitted having paid a bribe to a member of the judiciary during the last 12 months (Transparency International, 2013).

There may be various reasons why religious authority is not perceived as a deterrent to corruption. Although Islam condemns corruption (Qur'an 2:188), it remains highly hierarchical, alongside other religions, such as Eastern Orthodoxy or Catholicism, and as such has been found to be linked to a higher level of perceived corruption (La Porta et al, 1999). Also, specific to Morocco, religious authorities operate under the strict control of the government. Following the terrorist attacks of 2003 in Casablanca, imams across the breadth of the country were required to have their Friday sermon approved by the Ministry of the Interior. Imams are thus under government control and, as such, suffer from the same low level of credibility as the government (Hamelin, et al., 2010).

The Theory of Reasoned Action revealed that family opinion was the chief predictor of a respondent's intention to change corrupt behaviour while other social norms were found to be uncorrelated. As in many other African countries, Moroccan social norms revolve around one main value: shame. For Sayer, "shame" is defined as: "An important mechanism in the production of social order, for through it people internalize expectations, norms, and ideals and discipline and punish themselves," (Sayer, 2005 as cited by Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, and Smith-Crowe, 2014). For De Sardan (1999), "shame is a key traditional tool for social control in Africa," (p. 46). The feeling of shame results from the condemnation of others, however, the disapproval of others is resented more strongly when it takes place within the family circle as it is considered more important than other social groups. Outside of the family unit, corruption is perceived as a necessary evil to handle a muddled administrative system.

## 7.6 Summary

The campaign's lack of creativity led to low interest and recall from the respondents. This in turn led to a low level of elaboration or mental processing from the audience; hence the campaign failed to persuade a sizeable percentage of the audience that corruption was illegal. Campaign efficiency was also weakened by the low trust respondents noted for their government, the campaign provider. However, the campaign did manage to convince the majority of respondents that corruption was immoral. When corruption is widespread, it infiltrates and merges into the culture. Corruption becomes a *modus operandi* and — as fear of poverty and social exclusion dominate — fear of reprobation no longer acts as a deterrent to corrupt practices; instead, these corrupt practices become the social norm as they offer a shortcut to economic security and social acceptance. Due to religious affairs being under government control and police forces being perceived as highly corrupt, neither were found to have had an impact on reducing corrupt intention. Finally, the Theory of Reasoned Action proved to be an acute predictor of corrupt intention and family opinion was found to have the highest impact as a deterrent to corruption.

## **Chapter 8      Fighting Corruption in Morocco: Conclusion, Recommendations and Limitations**

### **8.1 Conclusion on the Social Marketing Campaign**

Owing to an approximate 50 per cent illiteracy rate in the kingdom, there was no doubt that the anti-corruption campaign had to be made straightforward and accessible to the masses. However, this simplicity came at the expense of generating interest and persuading a huge swathe of the population. Those who thought corruption was illegal and authorized were affirmed in their beliefs, just as those who thought that corruption was acceptable. Having said this, a vast majority of citizens accepted that corruption was immoral; the campaign did manage to awaken and strengthen the moral cords of some as exposure to the campaign led to an increase in the percentage of citizens convinced of the immorality of the act of corruption. However, one might question the government's understanding of the causes of corruption and how it decided to address it. The government was correct in its initial assertions: the "scourge" of corruption has become part of the cultural fabric of the nation. But had the promoter of the campaign examined the issue of corruption a step further, they would have also discovered the general public's true perception of the problem: corruption is extremely widespread at every level of society — from the paltry bribe taken from the local civil servant to large-scale corruption in businesses and at the government level. The average Moroccan citizen has no more faith in the under-privileged civil servant than they do in the high-ranking government official. Although the new government was elected on an anti-corruption agenda, Moroccans still perceive this government as corrupt. Trust in the campaign provider is a major element in the success of a social marketing campaign, and clearly in the case of Morocco, trust was all but present as the campaign provider was the government.

### **8.2 Contribution to Policy and Practice:**

#### **8.2.1 Tackling Corruption through Empowering Women and Education**

This study implies that gender and education are key factors to combat corruption in a country afflicted by social ills. From the first survey measuring the justifiability of corruption and corrupt intention, a socio-demographic map of corruption was constructed. Analysis of the data showed that Moroccan men have a much higher inclination towards corruption than women. Understanding the deep-rooted gender roles in Moroccan society can shed some light on these differences. The *moudawana al-usra*, the new family law introduced in 2004, has in fact largely failed to advance the status of women in Moroccan society (Elliott, 2009). Though women have had more legal rights in theory, there has been little real progress on the ground. Women, for the most part, are still unaware of their new rights and little progress has been made for society to consider “women as autonomous and individual human beings with intrinsic rights not contingent upon first fulfilling their customary obligations” (Elliott, 2014, p. 1). The realm of women continues to be the more secluded family home, while men deal with the outside world, away from the family nucleus. Lack of an efficient government-led infrastructure has resulted in a spirit of mutual support between families where women consider corruption as a system of gift-giving in exchange of mutual assistance. Meanwhile, for Moroccan men, paying their way to navigate around the hurdles of a heavily corrupt administration has become a norm. For the one accepting bribes, corruption is a way to augment a meagre salary and gain social acceptance in a society which is perceived by most as being unfair. Moroccan society is still utterly unfair to women (Timmerman, Clerck, Hemmerechts and Willems, 2014). Women between fifteen and twenty-four years old in the countryside are over four times more likely to be illiterate than a man in city. With women, the illiteracy rate skyrockets from 29.4 percent in the cities to a staggering 60.5 per cent in the countryside. Between 2004, when the *moudawana al-usra* took effect, and 2011 there has been little improvement. The gender gap has persisted and, in some places, even increased. When it comes to employment, the gender gap is even more disturbing with an unemployment rate reaching 81 per cent for women age over the age of fifteen in cities and an absurd 94 per cent in rural areas. In comparison, the unemployment rate for men is 24 per cent and 37 per cent respectively (Boutayeb, Boutayeb, and Lamlili, 2012). Women’s empowerment and education have been shown to be determining factors against corruption, yet the Moroccan state has made little progress in social fairness and as long as women remain an underprivileged class in a male dominated society, corruption will not be easily curbed.

### **8.2.2 Strong Political Will Rather Than Social Marketing Campaigns**

Citizen trust in the government is an essential factor when it comes to fighting corruption (Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998) and since Moroccan citizen support for the newly elected administration had rapidly deteriorated after the 2011 election (Desrues, 2013b) any effort by the government to address corruption was destined to fail. Lack of trust was identified as a major limitation to government efforts to fight corruption. Paxton (1999) defined trust in institutions as the trust a citizen has towards the police, the regime and judiciary system. As Uslaner posited, “Societies with more trust and less corruption have better governance, stronger economic growth, spend more on redistribution and have greater respect for the law among the citizenry” (Uslaner, 2004, p. 3). A way to palliate citizen wariness would be to set up an authentically independent body to address corruption. This was successfully done in Hong Kong (De Speville, 1999) and in Singapore. Article 6 from the United Nations Convention against Corruption recommends, as a chief measure, the creation of a “tailor-made AC investigation and prosecution system (Article 36) that has the powers and resources to pursue all cases without fear or favour, has the ‘necessary independence’ and can resist political interference (Article 6)” (Painter, 2014). In the same vein, Article 20 of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption suggests the creation of dedicated and independent bodies to fight corruption (De Sousa, 2010). Although Singapore's Corruption Prevention and Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has the power to investigate any minister or senior civil servant and do so, its level of independence is questionable since its main office resides in the Prime Minister's office (Painter, 2014). For Painter, the chief reason why the CPIB has historically been so successful in its task is not because it is truly an independent body, but rather because it originates from a strong political will to curb corruption. According to Painter, strong support of the government, which granted superior powers and resources to the CPIB, was also the reason for the success of Indonesia's anti-corruption agency. One may then question Benkirane's true dedication in fighting corruption when he declared: “My policy against corruption is as follows: ‘God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God will take revenge from him’” (Morocco World News, 2012). The government anti-corruption campaign which suggested that “citizens are the sole persons responsible for corruption and petty corruption” (L'economiste, 2012a) and consistently avoided to prosecute senior level civil servants was, for Moroccan public opinion, further signs that the Prime Minister's commitment to truly tackle the issue was mostly cosmetic in nature.

Barr and Serra (2010, as cited by Rosenbaum, Billinger, and Stieglitz, 2013) suggested that corruption could be curbed by reinforcing social norms built on personal values such as selflessness and trust. However, when corruption becomes part of the norm, deterrence is lost. In countries where social norms are strong and the government is perceived as weak, as is the

case in Morocco, individuals would rather ignore unlikely and loosely implemented legal sanctions than face more certain social sanctions by not complying to (questionable) norms (Landa, 1981). Hence as Rosenbaum, et al. (2013) posited, top-down reform — such as harsher penal sentences aimed at increasing the risk of a dishonest transaction — might be needed. So despite widespread evidence of the potency of social marketing campaigns, at this early stage of development one should question the opportunity of launching the campaign.

### 8.2.3 Advancing Democracy and Fostering Social Capital

The poor efficiency of the campaign observed in this study raises the question as to the suitability of a social marketing campaign at this early stage of democracy, freedom of the press and citizen rights. The kingdom's relatively early move to establish democracy has preserved the country from the chaos experienced by many countries following the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. However, the palace has been accused of maintaining its hold on the country, mostly through the implementation of cosmetic measures, and corruption is still an endemic and an everyday threat to the economic and social stability of the country. For Morocco, advancing democracy — as a concept of enhancing most aspects of a country's social life — might be fundamental to efficiently tackle corruption. In a democratic system, openness is the norm. Corrupt acts can be exposed by the press without penal risks, whistle-blowers are granted legal protection and the overall the risk for a corrupt agent to be uncovered and charged is greater (Treisman, 2000). Morocco has, over recent years, embarked on a path to democracy. Time is required for a culture of openness to become the norm and as Treisman (2000) states, it is not the degree of democracy, but rather the duration of uninterrupted democracy, that is linked to lower levels of corruption. Hence, as Morocco strengthens its democratic institutions, corruption should gradually decline.

La Porta, et al (1997) and Rose-Ackerman (2001) suggested that corruption prospers in the absence or dearth of social norms. A number of researchers — such as Warren, Sulaiman, and Jaafar, (2014) and Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela, (2012) — posited that social media can contribute to increasing a nation's social capital by promoting stronger social engagement. Social media has been instrumental to the mobilization of the Moroccan population and had led to some of the successes of the February 20 Movement in 2011 (Zaid, 2016). Previously, the palace, under King Hassan II, had exercised strict control over the media and mostly used it to promote the regime (Zaid, 2016). Under the reign of Mohamed VI, the modernization and liberation of the telecommunication sector was permitted. The kingdom saw an exponential growth of Internet penetration. Facebook, the dominant social media channel in Morocco, grew

to around 10 million Moroccan accounts in 2015 compared to 860,000 in 2009 (Zaid, 2016). In many aspects, social media, since it has reached such a large swath of the population, contributes to the creation of a norm as posited by Crawford, “the rapid uptake of social media services will result in an accelerated development of norms, habits and conventions” (Crawford, 2009, p. 527). The February 20<sup>th</sup> movement, with its cry to moralise public life and end corruption, contributed to the awakening of Moroccan moral values and heightened Moroccan society’s aversion to corruption. Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes (2010) suggested that social media could be used as tool to create a culture of transparency, openness and anti-corruption. Just as the “Targuist Sniper” raised public awareness about corruption in the police forces by uploading videos of policemen demanding bribes from motorists (the Targuist Sniper video’s were viewed over a million times, Hibou and Tozy, 2009), the Moroccan government, via an active presence on social media, could open a dialogue with the general public, increase transparency and ultimately regain the trust of their citizens.

### 8.3 Theoretical Contribution and Perspectives

Although this research used a Post-Positivist, quantitative approach to unearth some causal relationships linking the corrupt intention of Moroccans to particular socio-cultural traits, it is important to underline that the underpinning philosophy of Post-Positivism is that findings are speculative. The central tenet of Post-Positivism is that hypotheses are not validated, but are “not rejected” (Creswell, 2003). Hence in this work, to acknowledge the fallibility of the models, hypotheses were not “validated”, rather they were “not rejected”. This is an important difference in particular in the case of socio-demographic factors and corruption intention. Using logistic regression, specific factors — such as age, education, and gender — were found to have a significant impact on an individual attention toward corruption. Logistic regression is often used as a predictive tool (Harrell, 2015). i.e. What is the impact of age on corruption intention? In this sense it would be tempting to profile “at risk” individuals based on their socio-demographics. The consequences for the society are indeed dire. For example the RAND corporation — a "nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis", initiated in 1945 by the Douglas Aircraft Company (RAND, 2016) — used logistic regression to predict suicide attacks (Perry et al. 2013). Similarly, Hamelin et al. (2011) used logistic regression as a tool to profile potential terrorists in Morocco. Schneier (2015) shows how such mathematical models have been used to build disputable discriminatory lists, such as the ‘no fly list’ established by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), barring individuals from flying in and out of the US on commercial airlines. Moroccan

microcredit agencies are already using discriminatory practices by favouring women and the temptation is indeed strong for policy makers to use such models and extend discrimination to other sectors. However, the resulting increase in unemployment would certainly lead to higher level of crime and mistrust in the government (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002) as well as corruption (Mocan, 2008). An individual's nature is highly complex and the context in which he or she evolves is constantly changing, in this sense the reductionistic nature of Post-Positivism must be emphasized. So what are the outcomes of a Post-Positivist approach to research on corruption? Outcomes do not need to be about profiling an individual, but rather providing a generalized model for deterrence. The research clearly points to the importance of education and social justice as major tools to fight corruption.

#### 8.4 Methodological Contribution

Propensity Score Methods (PSM) were first propositioned by Rosenbaum and Rubin in 1983 as tool to assess the causal effect of a treatment by alleviating the effect of bias due to confounding variables. In a randomized experiment both groups – treated and untreated – are statistically similar, so there is no need to account for confounding variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1993). With PSM, randomization is no longer necessary since the effect of confounding variables are removed by comparing treated and untreated groups with similar characteristics. PSM has been used in very diverse areas, initially in medicine, pharmacology, epidemiology, and later in economics and education, in fields where randomized trials are unlikely. Today, PSM has become often used in the field of Marketing. Rubin and Waterman also posit that Marketing researchers have traditionally used tools such as regression or data mining leading to utterly incorrect findings. “[V]isiting the high-prescribing doctors rather than the low-prescribing doctors ‘causes’ them to continue to write more prescriptions” (Rubin and Waterman, 2006, p. 206). Thoemmes and Kim 2011 systematically reviewed 111 articles using propensity score methods in the social sciences and found that out of the 111 articles, 25 of them were purely methodological and out of the 86 remaining publications 34, the majority, were conducted in the field of Education (39.5 per cent), with 11 (or 12.8 per cent) in the field of Public Health, 10 (or 11.6 per cent) in Criminology, 8 in Psychology and the remaining other in diverse fields such as Sociology or Family Studies. The use of PSM in Social Marketing has been scarce. A few authors (such as Yanovitzky, Zanutto, and Hornik 2005) posited that causal effects of public health education campaigns can be properly assessed by using propensity score methodology. In a recent book by Banks, De Pelsmacker, and Okazaki, *Advances in*

*Advertising Research (Vol. V): Extending the Boundaries of Advertising* (2014), PSM is used in a few cases but logistic regression remain the main methods employed to investigate causality. The novel contribution of this work resides without doubt in providing a statistically significant evaluation of the campaign efficiency by removing the socio-demographic biases altering respondent response to the campaign.

### **8.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research**

Although this study is built on the assumption that micro-level data on corruption closely reflects secondary data on corruption, as demonstrated by Torgler and Valev (2006), a key limitation is still the reliability of respondent information. Corruption is a taboo topic in Moroccan society. During data collection a large rejection rate was experienced. The initial questionnaire requested that the respondent indicate his or her city of residence. This question drove many respondents to abandon the survey. Another limitation was the sample size for the questionnaires. To improve validity, it would be suitable for future research to embrace a larger number of respondents throughout Morocco with the understanding of the sensitive nature of publicly discussing acts of corruption. The Theory of Reasoned Action, which was used to predict intention, considers attitudes and subjective norms as distinct uncorrelated objects; however, much research has found a clear link between subjective norms and the formation attitudes (Bailey and Spicer, 2007). In future research, a causal link between these two entities should be tested. Finally assessing the campaign effectiveness was carried out using Propensity Score Methods to cancel the impact of socio-demographic disparities on the respondent perception of the campaign. This technique is perfectly justified in the field of medicine and pharmacology where a patient's background may impact the effect of the intervention or the drug administered. However, in the case of a social marketing campaign, ideas are administered, not drugs. Hence factors, such as the individual's religiosity, personality or values, could act as confounding variables that may impact how the campaign is perceived. Further research should therefore include, not only the socio-demographics of the respondent, but also their psychographics as confounding factors.

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**Appendix I: Operational Construct for the Questionnaire Measuring the Campaign Efficiency**

Constructs	Reference	Survey Items
<b>Cognitive</b>		<p>Rate your understanding of corruption:</p> <p>Corruption is a standard occurrence</p> <p>Corruption is unlawful</p> <p>Corruption is an amoral</p> <p>Corruption is approved in morocco</p> <p>Corruption is the receiving money,</p> <p>Corruption is taking - obtaining a gift (2 questions)</p> <p>Corruption is accepting - providing a service (2 questions)</p> <p>(Not at all <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Agree entirely))</p>
<b>Affect</b>		<p>Affective evaluation of the above:</p> <p>(Totally Dislike) <u>-2 -1 0 1 2</u> (I tolerate)</p>
<b>Social Norms</b>		<p>I value the judgment of my family – friends – Iman :</p> <p>(Do not Consider at all) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Totally value)</p> <p>Respect for the justice or the police authority:</p> <p>(No respect at all) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Totally respect their authority)</p>
<b>Attitude scores</b>	(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980)	<p>Computed with the values from the questions above</p> <p><math>A = C \times A</math> Cognitive x Affect</p>

<b>Campaign Awareness</b>	<b>(Hovland, Janis, Kelley, 1953)</b>	<p>I am aware of the anti-corruption-campaign: no or yes</p> <p>I understand the message in the campaign</p> <p>I think the campaign is interesting</p> <p>I can recall the campaign</p> <p>(completely disagree) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Totally agree)</p>
<b>Campaign Effectiveness</b>		<p>This campaign will change things (Not at all) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Very much)</p> <p>This campaign is efficient (Not at all) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Very much)</p>
<b>Campaign provider credibility</b>		<p>I trust the Government</p> <p>(Completely disagree) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Completely agree)</p>
<b>Intention Toward Corruption</b>		<p>I think I will alter my behaviour regarding a corrupt behaviour</p> <p>(Will stay the same) <u>1 2 3 4 5</u> (Will change)</p>



		<p>1) 2 persons or less    2) From 3 to 5    3) 6 or more</p> <p><b>Q23:</b> Do you feel your neighbour is?</p> <p>1 richer than you 2 Same 3 We are better off.</p> <p><b>Q24:</b> Where do you live?</p> <p>1 Fez    2 Casablanca    3 Agadir 4 Meknes 5 Tetouan6 Marrakech    7 Rabat 8 Tangier    9 Other</p>
--	--	---

## Appendix II: Questionnaires

### Questionnaire: Justifiability of corruption (English Version)

#### 1. Personal Factors

##### 1. What is your level of education?

- (1) Coranic School
- (2) No education
- (3) Primary school
- (4) Secondary school
- (5) Deug
- (6) Licence
- (7) Master's degree or equivalent
- (8) Doctorate

##### 2. What is your age ?

- (1) < than 21 years
- (2) [21 -30] years
- (3) [31-40] years
- (4) [41-50]years
- (5) > 51 years

##### 3. Could I ask how well-off your household is? Do you consider the household to be:

- (1) considerably/a lot better off than most households
- (2) slightly better off than most households
- (3) slightly worse off than most households
- (4) considerably/a lot worse off than most households

##### 4. What is your monthly income?

- (1) < 1500 DH    (2) [1501-3000] DH    (3) [3001-5000] DH    (4) [5001-7000] DH  
(5) [7001-9000] DH    (6) [9001-11000] DH    (7) [11001-13000] DH    (8) >13000 DH

##### 5. What is your profession?

.....

##### 6. Do you work in the private or public sector?

- (1) Private sector
- (2) Public sector
- (3) None

##### 7. What is your marital status?

- (1) Single                      (2) Married                      (3) Separated / Divorced/ Widowed

8. How many people, including yourself, live in your household?

- 2 or less       3 to 5       more than 6

**II. Perception of corruption**

9. It is known in some countries the problem of corruption among government or public officials is highly perceived by citizens. Imagine a person who needs something that is entitled to him/her by law. Is it likely or not likely that this person would have to offer money, a present or a favor (i.e., more than official charge), to get help from:

- (1) Likely      (2) Not Likely      (3) Don't know

- 9 01 Members of Parliament
- 9 02 Officials in ministries
- 9 03 Elected municipal councilors
- 9 04 Municipal officials
- 9 05 Customs officials
- 9 06 Police officers
- 9 07 Tax/revenues officials
- 9 08 Doctors/nurses
- 9 09 Inspectors
- 9 10 Teachers/Professors
- 9 11 Officials in courts
- 9 12 Private sector

10. According to your personal opinion what justifies corruption. (We use a 1 to 5 likert scale questionnaire).

**Being Poor**

	Not at all			A lot		
Low inf	1	2	3	4	5	gh influence

**No alternative to afford life expenses**

	Not at all			A lot		
Low inf	1	2	3	4	5	gh influence

**Perception of insecurity for the future**

	Not at all			A lot		
Low inf	1	2	3	4	5	gh influence

**Everybody is doing it**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**No trust in the government**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**Low career advancement prospects**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**You want to help a friend, a relative to access service faster (Hospital, Admin documents)**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**Unfairness in society, hard work will not make me rich**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**It is normal to accept someone's gift**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**11. If you are affected by one of more of these factors would you accept corruption money**

(1) yes (2) no

**12. What factor might prevent corruption? (We use a 1 to 5 likert scale)**

**Higher wages**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1		2		3		4		5
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

 gh influence

**Influence of living abroad**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Fear of the authority**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Personal & Moral conviction**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Influence of Family/Friend (Hshuma factors)**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Influence of religion/imam**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Corruption authors being cited on different media**

Not at all A lot

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**Training employees (anti-corruption and ethics seminars etc.)**

Low inf 

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

 gh influence

**III. Definition of Corruption**

**13. How do you define corruption?**

- (1) Accepting money
- (2) Accepting a service
- (3) Accepting gift
- (4) Giving money
- (5) Giving gift
- (6) Giving a service

**14. In some areas there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 2009, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his service?**

- (1) yes (If yes go to question 1a.1)
- (2) no
- (3) don't know

**1a.1 << IF YES >> What type of official was involved (The last time)?**

- (1) government official
- (2) customs officer
- (3) police officer
- (4) inspector
- (5) elected municipal councilors
- (6) municipal officials
- (7) tax-revenue official
- (8) doctor-nurse
- (9) teacher-professor
- (10) officials in courts
- (11) private sector
- (12) other

**1a.2 Did you report this to the police?**

- (1) yes
- (2) no
- (3) don't know

**1a.3 Did you or anyone else report it to any public or private agency?**

- (1) Yes (if yes go to question 1a.3.a)
- (2) no
- (3) don't know

**1a.3.a << IF YES >> who did you report it to the police?**

.....

**Gender (1) Male (2) Female**

**Questionnaire : Justifiability of corruption (French Version)**

**I. Informations personnelles :**

1. **Sexe :**       Masculin      1       Féminin 2

2. **Quel est votre état civil ?**

Célibataire (1)	Marié (e) (2)	Divorcé(é)/ veuf (ve) (3)
-----------------	---------------	---------------------------

3.

**3. Quel est votre niveau d'éducation ?**

Sans éducation (1)	Ecole Coranique (2)	Ecole primaire (3)	Lycée (4)	Deug (5)	Licence (6)	Niveau Master ou équivalent (7)	Doctorat (8)
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4.

**4. Quel est votre âge ?**

Moins de 21 ans (1)	Entre 21 et 30 ans (2)	Entre 31 et 40 ans (3)	Entre 41 et 50 ans (4)	Plus de 50 ans (5)
---------------------	------------------------	------------------------	------------------------	--------------------

5.

**5. Quel est votre salaire mensuel ?**

Moins de 1500 DHS (1)	Entre 1501 et 3000 DHS (2)	Entre 3001 et 5000 DHS (3)	Entre 5001 et 7000 DHS (4)	Entre 7001 et 9000 DHS (5)	Entre 9001 et 11000 DHS (6)	Entre 11001 et 13000 DHS (7)	Plus de 13000 DHS (8)
-----------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------

6.

**6. Quelle est votre profession ?**

.....

**7. Travaillez-vous dans le secteur privé ou public ?**

Secteur privé (1)	Secteur public (2)
-------------------	--------------------

8.

**8. Combien de personnes, y compris vous, vivent dans la maison ?**

2 ou moins (1)	Entre 3 et 5 (2)	Plus de 6 (3)
----------------	------------------	---------------

9.

**9. Est-ce qu'il est probable qu'une personne offre de l'argent, un cadeau ou une faveur pour obtenir un service :**

Jamais	Je ne sais pas	Peut être
--------	----------------	-----------

10.

**10. Notez de 1 à 5 les points suivants**

	Complètement contre				Complètement pour
J'ai peur de la pauvreté					
Je ne vois pas de sécurité pour mon futur					
Je n'ai pas de confiance dans le gouvernement					
Je ne vois pas de progrès dans la carrière					
Un ami en difficulté					
La santé					
Il est normal d'offrir des cadeaux					
Accepter un cadeau fait partie de la culture					

1.

**11. Si vous êtes confronté à un de ses facteurs, accepteriez-vous une corruption ?**

Non (0)	Parfois (1)
---------	-------------

1.

**12. Comment faire face à la corruption ?**

Comment faire face à la corruption ?	Complètement contre (1)				Complètement pour (5)
Des salaires plus élevés peuvent prévenir la corruption					
La crainte des autorités					
Je pense que c'est moralement mauvais					
Je vais avoir honte devant mes amis					
Sensibiliser les personnes vulnérables					
Je vais avoir honte si mon nom apparaît au media (journaux & télévision)					
Assister à des séminaires et comprendre ce fléau					
Le Imam nous averti contre la corruption					

2.

## **II. Définition de la corruption :**

**13. Comment définirez-vous la corruption ?**

- (1)  Accepter de l'argent
- (2)  Accepter un service
- (3)  Accepter un cadeau
- (4)  Donner de l'argent
- (5)  offrir un cadeau
- (6)  Rendre un service

**14. Est-ce qu'il vous est déjà arrivé qu'un fonctionnaire du gouvernement tel qu'un policier, ou un inspecteur vous a demandé de lui payer un baksheese pour un service qu'il vous a rendu ?**

- (1)  Non
- (2)  Je ne sais pas
- (3)  Oui

**15 (1) Si « OUI », quel type de fonctionnaire a été impliqué (la dernière fois) ?**

- (1)  Fonctionnaire du gouvernement
- (2)  Fonctionnaires clients
- (3)  Policiers
- (4)  Inspecteurs
- (5)  Conseillers municipaux élus
- (6)  Fonctionnaires municipaux
- (7)  Fonctionnaires des taxes et revenus
- (8)  Médecins et infirmiers
- (9)  Enseignants et professeurs
- (10)  Fonctionnaires des tribunaux
- (11)  Secteur privé
- (12)  Autres

**15 (2) Avez-vous dénoncé cet acte à la police ?**

- (1)  Oui
- (2)  Non

**15 (3) Avez-vous en personne ou une autre personne dénoncée cet acte à un organisme public ou privé ?**

- (1)  Oui
- (2)  Non

### Appendix III: Articles published during the course of the PhD

- Book chapter in: Gray, Doris H. and Sonneveld, Nadia (Eds). *Gender, Law and Social Change in North Africa*. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming, Fall 2016).: **“Microcredit, Gender and Corruption: Are Women the Future of Development?”** Nicolas Hamelin, Bouchra Hader, and Sonny Nwankwo.

Introduction: In Morocco, microcredit agencies largely favour women: The Zakoura foundation, one of the country’s first and leading microcredit agencies, estimates that 87% of its beneficiaries are women. This is partly due to the general tendency, both in Morocco and elsewhere, to believe that women are more honest, trustworthy and responsible, and are therefore more likely to use the loan money judiciously and repay the agencies. Most research provides theoretical arguments to explain the preference for financing for women but very little of this is based on actual data. One key rationale is that women are perceived as less inclined toward corruption than men. This notion was partly challenged, however, by the events leading to the 2011 uprising in Tunisia, where momentum grew with the people’s anger against not only dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali but also with his wife Leila Trabelsi. The public despised Leila Trabelsi for her corrupt lifestyle and her involvement in a multitude of financial scandals. Similarly, Suzanne Mubarak, wife of ousted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, attracted public anger and was accused of illegally accumulating wealth. Thus, despite the popular idea that women are less prone to corruption than men, the issue is far more complex than what preconceived notions would allow.

This chapter is based on a study of beliefs about corruption among over 200 respondents in the Middle Atlas region of Morocco. The chapter is based on qualitative as well as quantitative research that addresses the following questions: What gender gaps exist among Moroccans in their attitudes toward corruption? What gender gaps exist in their definitions of corruption? What gender gaps exist in perceptions of the causes of corruption? What gender gaps exist in their perceptions of the factors that are possible deterrents against corruption?

- **“Faking brands”: Consumer responses to counterfeiting.** Hamelin, N., Nwankwo, S., & El Hadouchi, R. (2013). *Journal of Consumer Behaviour*, 12(3).

Abstract: Although counterfeiting is described as one of the ‘oldest crimes in history’, contextualised treatments of Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) are rare despite growing interconnections with the global economy. Accordingly, this paper explores consumer motivations to purchase counterfeit products and identifies possible counter-influences. Data from a survey of 400 respondents drawn from Morocco was tested with logistic regression models to determine the significant factors which trigger responsiveness and deterrence to counterfeit products. The tests were conducted based on three product categories: clothing, cosmetics and mobile phones. Additionally, consumer demographics and selected social triggers were evaluated to build a profile of consumers typically most likely to consider buying (or avoiding) counterfeit goods. Results show that concerns related to health, disappointment risk, and integrity are the most significant

countervailing factors for counterfeits. On a socio demographic level, it was found that low-income consumers are more positively disposed to buying counterfeits. Gender also seems to have an explanatory force. Women with higher educational backgrounds are less likely than men to consider buying counterfeit goods. For all the products evaluated, quality and price are consistently the most important factors driving the intention to buy counterfeits. The implications are highlighted; combating counterfeiting is not an exclusive preserve of any single entity (governments, business or para-governmental agencies) but a shared responsibility. There is a lot at stake for consumers, manufacturers and the industrial nations if the menace is not effectively checked.

- **Managing the environment, people and herds: sustainability of the Moroccan cedar forest.** Hamelin, N., & Nwankwo, S. (2013). *World Journal of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development*, 10(4), 2-2.

Abstract: The cedar forest in Morocco occupies approximately 133, 000 ha, distributed in the Middle Atlas, High-Atlas, the Rif Mountains and Tazekka. The cedar forest of the middle Atlas region in Morocco has been experiencing a dramatic decline. In the last 30 years it has been estimated that over 40% of the Moroccan forest has receded. Vast amounts of money have been injected by national or international organizations to understand the mechanisms behind this decline. The research carried on by the forest authority, or local researchers have often attributed the causes of the decline to climate change, and human impact has been deemphasized. Using the available data and linear regression analysis we proved that indeed climate change plays a significant role in the decay of the Cedar forest. Significant correlation between forest decay and temperature variation during the 1986 to 2006 period was found. However we strongly believe that this is only the 'feel good' part of the story. Climate change data, such as precipitation and temperature variation are easily measurable and often used as a scapegoat to conceal the fact that authorities have been unable to curb various revenue-generating practices a lot more damaging to the forest, either because of lack of resources or because they are too involved in deals, since. Illegal logging and illegal grazing routes generate important revenue. This paper attempts to give a comprehensive view of the various factors responsible for the decline of the forest. Both climate change factors and human factors have been investigated. Although climate change is no doubt part of the equation, we found that human factors are indeed most significantly correlated to the rapid decline of the cedar forest, climate change solely accentuating the issue. Overgrazing and illegal logging are believed to be the factors most severely endangering the forest. Subsequently we discuss land management solutions in order to preserve one of the last cedar forests of the planet.

- **Entrepreneurship Education for a Renascent Africa**, N. Hamelin, S. Nwankwo, "The Routledge Companion to Business in Africa". Chapter 23: <http://www.amazon.co.uk/Routledge-Companion-Companions-Management-Accounting/dp/0415635454>

Introduction: To date, numerous initiatives have been funded in various locations around the world in an effort to boost entrepreneurship amongst youth. Most entrepreneurship training programs can be described as 'ad on', that is added on top of the formal curriculum. However, inappropriate pedagogical modes of in Entrepreneurial Education/Training have been shown to have a negative impact

on entrepreneurship intentions; and as Davies and Gibb (1991) stated using traditional education system is like “to drive using the rear mirror”. In western Africa, the education system is very much rooted in its colonial past. In this research we have conducted two independent surveys and measured values of Moroccan business students and management styles (based on a survey of 234 students), and compared those measurements to similar groups from the United States, Canada and China (963 university students). Although Morocco gained its independence in 1956, its educational system has mostly remained based on the French system. Regarding values our results - based on a survey of 257 (Correct) Moroccan respondents showed that, while US students preferred values are self respect and warm relationship with others, Moroccan student consider self respect and security as their main values. Regarding management style Moroccan students also reported the highest Machiavellianism scores among the four countries. From these results we could identify a possible link between educational system and entrepreneurship spirit and show that to be efficient entrepreneurship training program should not be ‘ad on’ to a the standard curriculum, but should deviate radically from the traditional educational system and educate students from the ground up, by cultivating, central to their education the values of community and team spirit.

- **Does religiosity impact Moroccan Muslim women’s clothing choice?** Bachleda, C., Hamelin, N., & Benachour, O. (2014).. *Journal of Islamic Marketing*, 5(2), 3-3.

Abstract: Currently there is little literature that explores the relationship between religiosity and a women’s choice of dress, outside of the hijab. This study aimed to fill this gap by exploring whether religiosity impacts the clothing style Moroccan Muslim women choose to wear in the public setting. Results indicate that religious commitment has little impact on choice of clothing. From a practical marketing perspective, this study suggests that factors other than religiosity, such as age, marital status and education may offer greater value as a segmentation tool for marketing female apparel in Muslim countries where women have freedom to choose what they wear.

- **Consumer values, motivation and purchase intention for luxury goods.** Nwankwo, S., Hamelin, N., & Khaled, M. (2014). *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 21(5), 735-744.

Abstract: There is considerable ambivalence in how different societies and cultures view the consumption of luxury goods. Whilst knowledge of this phenomenon is fairly stable in most western economies, the emerging economies, with equally emerging ‘super rich’ social class constitutes an inflection point from which to gain refreshing insights into the phenomenon. Of particular interests are rich Moslem states where the concept of luxury may be in tension with religio-cultural beliefs. Accordingly, using Morocco as a contextual base, this paper explores consumer purchase intentions towards luxury goods. Based on a sample of 400 respondents and using logistic regression models, the papers finds correlations between the intention to buy luxury goods, motivation and personal values. Socio demographic factors were found to strongly influence the nature of purchase of luxury goods. Paradoxically, the influence of religion appears to diminish but not completely obliterated as consumer affordability of luxury goods increase. Whilst this may not be surprising but there is an embedded gender

underpinning to it especially when considered alongside perceived gender biases in consumption decision-making in many Islamic countries. Women were found to be more positively disposed to impulse purchasing of luxury goods compared to men while more educated people, generally, indicated a greater tendency towards rational than impulse buying decisions.

- **Hamelin. N. Nwankwo, S. Filali Moulay Idriss (2014): Investigating the efficiency of the Moroccan Anti-Corruption Campaign** Anti Corruption Research Network (ACRN) : <http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/featured-articles/acrn-news/blog/investigating-the-efficiency-of-the-moroccan-anti-corruption-campaign/view>

Abstract: ACRN Guest Blogger Nicolas Hamelin discusses a recent investigation he conducted into a 2012 social marketing campaign against corruption in Morocco. While it was widely publicized (reaching 60% of survey respondents), the campaign failed to make a real impact for two key reasons: the overly simplistic nature of the message and, ironically, the general public distrust of the government.

## Appendix IV: Ethics Form



### APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, HUMAN DATA OR HUMAN MATERIAL

This application should be completed by **members of staff and postgraduate research degree students (i.e. MRes, MPhil, PhD and Professional Doctorate)** undertaking research which involves human participants, sensitive human data (personal or otherwise) and human material (including human tissue, embryos, fetuses and bodily fluids, from living or deceased participants).

No form of contact with potential participants for the proposed research should occur until written approval has been received from University Research Ethics Committee (UREC). Where a member of staff or student is found to have breached this expectation, they may be subject to disciplinary action.

**This application should be submitted alongside copies of any supporting documentation which will be handed to participants, including a participant information sheet, consent form, self-completion survey or questionnaire.**

For further guidance please contact [researchethics@uel.ac.uk](mailto:researchethics@uel.ac.uk) or refer to the guidance at <http://www.uel.ac.uk/qa/research/index.htm>. Only those applications received by the submission deadline date shown on the University's Research Ethics web page will be considered at the next meeting. Where a form is submitted and sections are incomplete, the form will not be considered by UREC and will be returned to the applicant for completion.

#### PROJECT DETAILS

<b>Current project title</b>	A social marketing approach to combating corruption: The case of Morocco.		
<b>Is this project externally funded?</b>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>Does the project require UREC approval before consideration by the funding body?</b>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> If YES, please indicate funding body deadline below:		
<b>If externally funded, please provide details of funding body.</b>			
<b>How will participants be informed of the source of funding?</b>			
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONSENT FORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER <input type="checkbox"/>			
If OTHER, please specify further below:			
<b>Proposed project start date</b>	October 20 <sup>th</sup> 2013	<b>Anticipated project end date</b>	Dec 2013

**APPLICANT DETAILS**


<b>Name of Principal Investigator (PI)</b> (For research degree students, the Director of Studies)	Prof Sonny Nwankwo
<b>School</b>	Royal Docks London Business School, University of East London, UK
<b>Status (please tick relevant box)</b>	UEL STAFF <input type="checkbox"/> RESEARCH DEGREE STUDENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>Email address</b>	nhamelin@gmail.com
<b>Contact telephone number</b>	+212610055336
<b>Name of co-researchers</b>	Dr. Nicolas Hamelin
<b>Will parts of the proposed research or research administration be carried out by independent contractors or partner institutions, domestic or international?</b>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If YES, please provide a brief explanation of who the contractor or partner is, what their role will be and how their contribution will be monitored. Please note, responsibility for proper conduct of all parties involved in the research resides with the Principal Investigator.

**CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

<p>Will any of the researchers or their institutions receive any other benefits or incentives for taking part in this research over and above their normal salary package or the costs of undertaking the research?          YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>          If YES, please detail below:</p>
<p>Is there any further possibility for conflict of interest? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>          If YES, please detail below:</p>

**FOR ALL APPLICANTS**


<p>Has external ethics approval been sought for this research?          (i.e. submission via Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) to the Health Research Authority (HRA) or other external research ethics committee)</p>	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
If YES, please supply details below:	

<b>DEAN OF SCHOOL OR ASSOCIATE DEAN</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does the proposed research as detailed herein have your support and endorsement to proceed?              YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> </ul>	
Signed	
Date	15/10/2017

**APPLICANT DECLARATION**


I confirm that:

- The information contained in this application is, to the best of my knowledge, correct and up to date.
- I have attempted to identify all risks related to the research.
- I acknowledge my obligations and commitment to upholding our University's Code of Practice for ethical research and observing the rights of the participants.
- I am aware that cases of proven misconduct, in line with our University's policies, may result in formal disciplinary proceedings and/or the cancellation of the proposed research.

<b>Applicant</b>	Dr Nicolas Hamelin
<b>Signed</b>	
<b>Date</b>	September 9 <sup>th</sup> 2013

**FOR RESEARCH DEGREE STUDENT APPLICANTS ONLY**

<b>Name and School of Director of Studies</b>	Prof S. Nwankwo
<b>Qualification for which research is being undertaken</b>	PhD (direct)

<b>Director of Studies (DoS) –</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the student have the necessary skills to carry out the research? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Is the participant information sheet, consent form and any other documentation appropriate? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Are the procedures for recruitment of participants and obtaining informed consent suitable and sufficient? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Where required, do all members of the research team have current Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) clearance? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> N/A</li> </ul>	
<b>Signed</b>	
<b>Date</b>	7 October 2013

**DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH**

<p><b>1. Provide a brief description of the proposed research, including the requirements of participants. This must be in lay terms and free from technical or discipline specific terminology or jargon. If such terms are required, please ensure they are adequately explained (Do not exceed 500 words)</b></p> <p><i>A model identifying possible factors triggering potential attitude change towards corruption will be generated, using regression analysis. This model will be developed along with a nationwide survey carried out in Morocco. Through standardized regression analysis, we hope to identify the factors that contribute positively or negatively to a change of state leading to potential corruption activities. We identify a potential corrupt profile, blocking factors, which prevent a change of state, and we also intend to measure the impact of the anti-corruption campaign recently launched by the government.</i></p>
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<b>APPLICANT DECLARATION</b>	
I confirm that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The information contained in this application is, to the best of my knowledge, correct and up to date.</li> <li>• I have attempted to identify all risks related to the research.</li> <li>• I acknowledge my obligations and commitment to upholding our University's Code of Practice for ethical research and observing the rights of the participants.</li> <li>• I am aware that cases of proven misconduct, in line with our University's policies, may result in formal disciplinary proceedings and/or the cancellation of the proposed research.</li> </ul>	
<b>Applicant</b>	Dr Nicolas Hamelin
<b>Signed</b>	
<b>Date</b>	October 4 <sup>th</sup> 2013

**FOR RESEARCH DEGREE STUDENT APPLICANTS ONLY**

<b>Name and School of Director of Studies</b>	Prof S. Nwankwo
<b>Qualification for which research is being undertaken</b>	PhD (direct)

<b>Director of Studies (DoS) –</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the student have the necessary skills to carry out the research? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Is the participant information sheet, consent form and any other documentation appropriate? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Are the procedures for recruitment of participants and obtaining informed consent suitable and sufficient? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></li> <li>• Where required, do all members of the research team have current Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) clearance? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> N/A</li> </ul>	
<b>Signed</b>	
<b>Date</b>	20/10/13

**DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH**

<p><b>1. Provide a brief description of the proposed research, including the requirements of participants. This must be in lay terms and free from technical or discipline specific terminology or jargon. If such terms are required, please ensure they are adequately explained (Do not exceed 500 words)</b></p> <p><i>A model identifying possible factors triggering potential attitude change towards corruption will be generated, using regression analysis. This model will be developed along with a nationwide survey carried out in Morocco. Through standardized regression analysis, we hope to identify the factors that contribute positively or negatively to a change of state leading to potential corruption activities. We identify a potential corrupt profile, blocking factors, which prevent a change of state, and we also intend to measure the impact of the anti-corruption campaign recently launched by the government.</i></p>
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**2. Provide a statement on the aims and significance of the proposed research, including potential impact to knowledge and understanding in the field (where appropriate, indicate the associated hypothesis which will be tested). This should be a clear justification of the proposed research, why it should proceed and a statement on any anticipated benefits to the community. (Do not exceed 700 words)**

*Our research questions are quite simple: What triggers corruption? How can it be checked?, if not stopped? Was the government campaign efficient? Given the robustness of social marketing techniques in combating social problems (e.g. smoking, HIV/AIDS pandemic, population control), can a social marketing model productively guide actions for controlling corruption?*

**3. Provide an outline of the methodology for the proposed research, including proposed method of data collection, tasks assigned to participants of the research and the proposed method and duration of data analysis. If the proposed research makes use of pre-established and generally accepted techniques, please make this clear. (Do not exceed 500 words)**

Four hundred surveys will be distributed in various locations around the country, from large towns to smaller villages: Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Tetouan, Meknes, Fez, Ifrane, and Azrou. The questionnaire will also be made available online via Kwiksurvey.com . The duration of the data collection shall be around 1 months. Data analysis using logistic regression or propensity score analysis should be done over a period of 1 month.

#### **PARTICIPANT DETAILS**

**4. Provide an explanation detailing how you will identify, approach and recruit the participants for the proposed research, including clarification on sample size and location. Please provide justification for the exclusion/inclusion criteria for this study (i.e. who will be allowed to / not allowed to participate) and explain briefly, in lay terms, why this criteria is in place. (Do not exceed 500 words)**

The analysis will be based on a sample of Moroccan citizens between ages 18 and 65 applying a convenience, non-probabilistic, sampling method. To avoid interviewers' bias and increase the objectivity of the study, the questionnaire will be self-administered and standardized. 400 survey instruments will be administered around the country. We will ask people if they are willing to answer a set of questions. If they say no, we move on to another person. Once a person is given the survey, the pollster stays with the person to guide them through the survey (in Morocco 50% of the population is illiterate, so sometimes the questions need to be asked orally and answers are written down on the form). For respondents' convenience the questionnaire is also made available in French.

**5. Will the participants be from any of the following groups?(Tick as appropriate)**

- Students or staff of this University (i.e. recruitment on-site at University of East London).
- Adults (over the age of 18 years with mental capacity to give consent to participate in the research).
- Children or legal minors (anyone under the age of 16 years)<sup>1</sup>
- Adults who are unconscious, severely ill or have a terminal illness.
- Adults who may lose mental capacity to consent during the course of the research.
- Adults in emergency situations.
- Adults<sup>2</sup> with mental illness - particularly those detained under the Mental Health Act (1983 & 2007).
- Participants who may lack capacity to consent to participate in the research under the research requirements of the Mental Capacity Act (2005).

- Prisoners, where ethical approval may be required from the National Offender Management Service (NOMS).
- Young Offenders, where ethical approval may be required from the National Offender Management Service (NOMS).
- Healthy volunteers (in high risk intervention studies).
- Participants who may be considered to have a pre-existing and potentially dependent<sup>3</sup> relationship with the investigator (e.g. those in care homes, students, colleagues, service-users, patients).
- Other vulnerable groups (see Question 6).
- Adults who are in custody, custodial care, or for whom a court has assumed responsibility.
- Participants who are members of the Armed Forces.

<sup>1</sup>If the proposed research involves children or adults who meet the Police Act (1997) definition of vulnerability<sup>2</sup>, any researchers who will have contact with participants must have current Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) clearance.

<sup>2</sup>'Adults with a learning or physical disability, a physical or mental illness, or a reduction in physical or mental capacity, and living in a care home or home for people with learning difficulties or receiving care in their own home, or receiving hospital or social care services.' (Police Act, 1997)

<sup>3</sup>Proposed research involving participants with whom the investigator or researcher(s) shares a dependent or unequal relationships (e.g. teacher/student, clinical therapist/service-user) may compromise the ability to give informed consent which is free from any form of pressure (real or implied) arising from this relationship. UREC recommends that, wherever practicable, investigators choose participants with whom they have no dependent relationship. Following due scrutiny, if the investigator is confident that the research involving participants in dependent relationships is vital and defensible, UREC will require additional information setting out the case and detailing how risks inherent in the dependent relationship will be managed. UREC will also need to be reassured that refusal to participate will not result in any discrimination or penalty.

**6. Will the study involve participants who are vulnerable? YES  NO**

For the purposes of research, 'vulnerable' participants may be adults whose ability to protect their own interests are impaired or reduced in comparison to that of the broader population. Vulnerability may arise from the participant's personal characteristics (e.g. mental or physical impairment) or from their social environment, context and/or disadvantage (e.g. socio-economic mobility, educational attainment, resources, substance dependence, displacement or homelessness). Where prospective participants are at high risk of consenting under duress, or as a result of manipulation or coercion, they must also be considered as vulnerable.

Adults lacking mental capacity to consent to participate in research and children are automatically presumed to be vulnerable. Studies involving adults (over the age of 16) who lack mental capacity to consent in research must be submitted to a REC approved for that purpose.

**6.1. If YES, what special arrangements are in place to protect vulnerable participants' interests?**

If YES, the research activity proposed will require a CRB check. (NOTE: information concerning activities which require CRB checks can be found via <http://www.crb.homeoffice.gov.uk/> .

**7. Do you propose to make any form of payment or incentive available to participants of the research? YES  NO**

If YES, please provide details taking into account that any payment or incentive should be representative of reasonable remuneration for participation and may not be of a value that could be coercive or exerting undue influence on potential participants' decision to take part in the research. Wherever possible, remuneration in a monetary form should be avoided and substituted with vouchers, coupons or equivalent. Any payment made to research participants may have benefit or HMRC implications and participants should be alerted to this in the participant information sheet as they may wish to choose to decline payment.

**8. What special arrangements are in place for eliciting informed consent from participants who may not adequately understand verbal explanations or written information provided in English; where participants have special communication needs; where participants have limited literacy; or where children are involved in the research? (Do not exceed 200 words)**

in Morocco 50% of the population is illiterate, so sometimes the questions need to be asked orally and answers are written down on the form so once a person is given the survey, the pollster stays with the person to guide them through the survey. For respondents' convenience the questionnaire is made available in language French that is along Arabic, one of the main language in use in the country.

#### **RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT**

**9. Does the proposed research involve any of the following? (Tick as appropriate)**

- use of a questionnaire, self-completion survey or data-collection instrument (attach copy)
- use of emails or the internet as a means of data collection
- use of written or computerised tests
- interviews (attach interview questions)
- diaries (attach diary record form)
- participant observation
- participant observation (in a non-public place) without their knowledge / covert research
- audio-recording interviewees or events
- video-recording interviewees or events
- access to personal and/or sensitive data (i.e. student, patient, client or service-user data) without the participant's informed consent for use of these data for research purposes
- administration of any questions, tasks, investigations, procedures or stimuli which may be experienced by participants as physically or mentally painful, stressful or unpleasant during or after the research process
- performance of any acts which might diminish the self-esteem of participants or cause them to experience discomfort, regret or any other adverse emotional or psychological reaction
- investigation of participants involved in illegal or illicit activities (e.g. use of illegal drugs)
- procedures that involve the deception of participants
- administration of any substance or agent
- use of non-treatment of placebo control conditions
- collection of body tissues or fluid samples
- collection and/or testing of DNA samples
- collection and/or testing of gametes or embryo tissue
- participation in a clinical trial
- administration of ionising radiation to participants
- research undertaken at an off-campus location (risk assessment attached)
- research overseas (copy of VCG overseas travel approval attached)

**10. Does the proposed research involve any specific or anticipated risks (e.g. physical, psychological, social, legal or economic) to participants that are greater than those encountered in everyday life?**

YES  NO

If YES, please describe below including details of precautionary measures.

<p><b>11. Where the procedures involve potential hazards and/or discomfort or distress for participants, please state what previous experience the investigator or researcher(s) have had in conducting this type of research.</b></p>
<p>NA</p>
<p><b>12. Provide an explanation of any potential benefits to participants. Please ensure this is framed within the overall contribution of the proposed research to knowledge or practice. (Do not exceed 400 words)</b>  <b>NOTE:</b> Where the proposed research involves students of our University, they should be assured that accepting the offer to participate or choosing to decline will have no impact on their assessments or learning experience. Similarly, it should be made clear to participants who are patients, service-users and/or receiving any form of treatment or medication that they are not invited to participate in the belief that participation in the research will result in some relief or improvement in their condition.  <b>NA</b></p>
<p><b>13. Provide an outline of any measures you have in place in the event of adverse or unexpected outcomes and the potential impact this may have on participants involved in the proposed research. (Do not exceed 300 words)</b></p>
<p>NA</p>
<p><b>14. Provide an outline of your debriefing, support and feedback protocol for participants involved in the proposed research. This should include, for example, where participants may feel the need to discuss thoughts or feelings brought about following their participation in the research. This may involve referral to an external support or counseling service, where participation in the research has caused specific issues for participants. Where medical aftercare may be necessary, this should include details of the treatment available to participants. Debriefing may involve the disclosure of further information on the aims of the research, the participant's performance and/or the results of the research. (Do not exceed 500 words)</b></p>

NA

#### **PARTICIPANT CONSENT AND WITHDRAWAL**

**15. Have you attached a copy of your participant information sheet (this should be in *plain English*)? Where the research involves non-English speaking participants, please include translated materials.**  
YES  NO   
If NO, please indicate what alternative arrangements are in place below:

**16. Have you attached a copy of your participant consent form (this should be in *plain English*)? Where the research involves non-English speaking participants, please include translated materials.**  
YES  NO   
If NO, please indicate what alternative arrangements are in place below:

**17. The following is a participant information sheet checklist covering the various points that should be included in this document.**

- Clear identification of UEL as the sponsor for the research, the schools(s) involved, the project title, the Principal Investigator and other researchers along with relevant contact details.
- Details of what involvement in the proposed research will require (e.g., participation in interviews, completion of questionnaire, audio/video-recording of events), estimated time commitment and any risks involved.
- A statement confirming that the research has received formal approval from UREC.
- If the sample size is small, advice to participants that this may have implications for confidentiality / anonymity.
- A clear statement that where participants are in a dependent relationship with any of the researchers that participation in the research will have no impact on assessment / treatment / service-use or support.
- Assurance that involvement in the project is voluntary and that participants are free to withdraw consent at any time, and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied.
- Advice as to arrangements to be made to protect confidentiality of data, including that confidentiality of information provided is subject to legal limitations.
- A statement that the data generated in the course of the research will be retained in accordance with the University's Data Protection Policy.
- Advice that if participants have any concerns about the conduct of the investigator, researcher(s) or any other aspect of this research project, they should contact [researchethics@uel.ac.uk](mailto:researchethics@uel.ac.uk).
- Confirmation on any limitations in confidentiality where disclosure of imminent harm to self and/or others may occur.

**18. The following is a consent form checklist covering the various points that should be included in this document.**

- University of East London letterhead or logo.
- Title of the project (with research degree projects this need not necessarily be the title of the thesis) and names of investigators.
- Confirmation that the project is research.
- Confirmation that involvement in the project is voluntary and that participants are free to withdraw at any time, or to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied.
- Confirmation of particular requirements of participants, including for example whether interviews are to be audio-/video-recorded, whether anonymised quotes will be used in publications advice of legal limitations to data confidentiality.
- If the sample size is small, confirmation that this may have implications for anonymity any other relevant information.
- The proposed method of publication or dissemination of the research findings.
- Details of any external contractors or partner institutions involved in the research.
- Details of any funding bodies or research councils supporting the research.
- Confirmation on any limitations in confidentiality where disclosure of imminent harm to self and/or others may occur.

#### **CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY**

**19. Below is a checklist covering key points relating to the confidentiality and anonymity of participants. Please indicate where relevant to the proposed research.**

- Participants will be completely anonymised and their identity will not be known by the investigator or researcher(s) (i.e. the participants are part of an anonymous randomised sample and return responses with no form of personal identification)?
- The responses are anonymised or are an anonymised sample (i.e. a permanent process of coding has been carried out whereby direct and indirect identifiers have been removed from data and replaced by a code, with no record retained of how the code relates to the identifiers).
- The samples and data are de-identified (i.e. direct and indirect identifiers have been removed and replaced by a code. The investigator or researchers are able to link the code to the original identifiers and isolate the participant to whom the sample or data relates).
- Participants have the option of being identified in a publication that will arise from the research.
- Participants will be pseudo-anonymised in a publication that will arise from the research.
- The proposed research will make use of personal sensitive data.
- Participants consent to be identified in the study and subsequent dissemination of research findings and/or publication.

**20. Participants must be made aware that the confidentiality of the information they provide is subject to legal limitations in data confidentiality (i.e. the data may be subject to a subpoena, a freedom of information request or mandated reporting by some professions). This only applies to named or de-identified data. If your participants are named or de-identified, please confirm that you will specifically state these limitations.**

YES  NO

If NO, please indicate why this is the case below:  
NA- as the survey is strictly anonymous

NOTE: WHERE THE PROPOSED RESEARCH INVOLVES A SMALL SAMPLE OR FOCUS GROUP, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT THERE WILL BE DISTINCT LIMITATIONS IN THE LEVEL OF ANONYMITY THEY CAN BE AFFORDED.

**DATA ACCESS, SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT**

21. Will the Principal Investigator be responsible for the security of all data collected in connection with the proposed research? YES  NO   
If NO, please indicate what alternative arrangements are in place below:

22. In line with the 5<sup>th</sup> principle of the Data Protection Act (1998), which states that personal data shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes for which it was collected; please state how long data will be retained for.

1-2 years  3-5 years  6-10 years  10> years

NOTE: Research Councils UK (RCUK) guidance currently states that data should normally be preserved and accessible for 10 years, but for projects of clinical or major social, environmental or heritage importance, for 20 years or longer. (<http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/reviews/grc/grcpoldraft.pdf>)

23. Below is a checklist which relates to the management, storage and secure destruction of data for the purposes of the proposed research. Please indicate where relevant to your proposed arrangements.

- Research data, codes and all identifying information to be kept in separate locked filing cabinets.
- Access to computer files to be available to research team by password only.
- Access to computer files to be available to individuals outside the research team by password only (See 23.1).
- Research data will be encrypted and transferred electronically within the European Economic Area (EEA).
- Research data will be encrypted and transferred electronically outside of the European Economic Area (EEA). (See 23.2).

NOTE: Transfer of research data via third party commercial file sharing services, such as Google Docs and YouSendIt are not necessarily secure or permanent. These systems may also be located overseas and not covered by UK law. If the system is located outside the European Economic Area (EEA) or territories deemed to have sufficient standards of data protection, transfer may also breach the Data Protection Act (1998).

- Use of personal addresses, postcodes, faxes, e-mails or telephone numbers.
- Use of personal data in the form of audio or video recordings.
- Primary data gathered on encrypted mobile devices (i.e. laptops). NOTE: This should be transferred to secure UEL servers at the first opportunity.

All electronic data will undergo secure disposal.

NOTE: For hard drives and magnetic storage devices (HDD or SSD), deleting files does not permanently erase the data on most systems, but only deletes the reference to the file. Files can be restored when deleted in this way. Research files must be overwritten to ensure they are completely irretrievable. Software is available for the secure erasing of files from hard drives which meet recognised standards to securely scramble sensitive data. Examples of this software are BC Wipe, Wipe File, DeleteOnClick and Eraser for Windows platforms. Mac users can use the standard 'secure empty trash' option; an alternative is Permanent eraser software.

All hardcopy data will undergo secure disposal.

NOTE: For shredding research data stored in hardcopy (i.e. paper), adopting DIN 3 ensures files are cut into 2mm strips or confetti like cross-cut particles of 4x40mm. The UK government requires a minimum standard of DIN 4 for its material, which ensures cross cut particles of at least 2x15mm.

23.1. Please provide details of individuals outside the research team who will be given password protected access to encrypted data for the proposed research.

NA (Main researcher only)

<p><b>23.2. Please provide details on the regions and territories where research data will be electronically transferred that are external to the European Economic Area (EEA).</b></p>
<p><b>All data collected and analysed in Morocco</b></p>

**OVERSEAS TRAVEL FOR RESEARCH**

<p><b>24. Does the proposed research involve travel outside of the UK? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/></b></p>
<p><b>24.1.</b> Have you consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website for guidance/travel advice? <a href="http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/">http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/</a> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>24.2.</b> If you are a non-UK national, have you sought travel advice/guidance from the Foreign Office (or equivalent body) of your country? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>24.3.</b> Have you completed the overseas travel approval process and enclosed a copy of the document with this application? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>  Details on this process are available here <a href="http://www.uel.ac.uk/ga/research/fieldwork.htm">http://www.uel.ac.uk/ga/research/fieldwork.htm</a></p>
<p><b>24.4.</b> Is the research covered by our University's insurance and indemnity provision? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>  (Please seek confirmation via <a href="mailto:researchethics@uel.ac.uk">researchethics@uel.ac.uk</a>)</p>
<p><b>NOTE:</b> Where research is undertaken at an off-campus location within the UK or overseas, the Risk Assessment policy must be consulted:  <a href="http://dl-cfs-01.uel.ac.uk/hrservices/documents/hshandbook/risk_assess_policy.pdf">http://dl-cfs-01.uel.ac.uk/hrservices/documents/hshandbook/risk_assess_policy.pdf</a>.  The Dean of School or Director of Service has overall responsibility for risk assessment regarding the health and safety of staff or students conducting research where UEL is the sponsor.</p>
<p><b>24.5.</b> Please evidence how compliance with all local research ethics and research governance requirements have been assessed for the country(ies) in which the research is taking place.</p>
<p><b>University research fall under Al Akhawayn University research policy in Morocco. Royal Dahir stipulates no limitation on this research topic.</b></p>
<p><b>24.6.</b> Will this research be financially supported by the United States Department of Health and Human Services or any of its divisions, agencies or programs? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p>