Towards Understanding of Contemporary Migration

Causes, Consequences, Policies, Reflections

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Contents

1.2. Bordering and Rebordering Security: Causes and Consequences of Framing Refugees as a 'Threat' to Europe

Maja Korac-Sanderson

The so-called refugee crisis in Europe, and the related rise of and concern about illegal migration have transformed its 'borders and border thinking' (Kallious et al., 2016) into spaces of advanced surveillance technology, watch towers, and naval patrols along its Mediterranean 'liquid' border, as well as razor wire, armed guards and guard dogs along much of the Hungarian 'solid' border facing the 'non-EU world'. All these exceptional procedures and practices are considered necessary for the governance of migrations and mobility more generally. They are regarded as legitimate security measures of 'defence' of EU borders from 'invading' migrants, the notion created by portraying the people who are currently trying to reach the EU borders as seeking welfare not asylum.[1] This has created a 'risk discourse' and a security response according to which the border is seen as 'vulnerable', while the people crossing it are construed as a threat (Spijkerboer, 2017).

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[1] Fargues (2015: 2) quotes an official in the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade who explained the situation of 'countries like Hungary, Croatia, and Austria', as facing 'an unprecedented quantity of (unarmed) *invaders* who do not have, and do not ask for, refugee status. Their intended destination is Germany, where they believe a new life in wealth and social security awaits them' (*emphasis added*).

The security measures undertaken by EU governments emerge in a different light when statistical data on the global displacement are consulted. The global data tell us that in 2015, one person in 113 has been forcibly displaced by war, which constitutes the rise of over six million persons fleeing armed conflict compared to 2014 (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, in 2015, 24 persons were fleeing conflict every minute, compared to six persons in 2005 (ibid.). These data, therefore, show the continuation of rise and proliferation of armed conflict and violence in the Global South, causing displacement, deepening poverty, and producing high levels of human insecurity. Further consideration of the data on global displacement also demonstrate that Europe, i.e. EU, is far from being the principal area of refuge for the people fleeing war. A word of caution is required here. The UNHCR data on the number of the displaced people in Europe include figures from Turkey. This is, however, distorting any reliable assessment of the pressure felt by, and the humanitarian support required from, the EU member states, the ones that allow for the European continent to be seen as part of the Global North. With this methodological problem in mind, it is safe to argue that it is the developing regions of the world that took a vast majority of the displaced people in. They hosted 86 per cent of the world's refugees, or 13.9 million persons, in 2015, while the least developed countries provided asylum to 4.2 million refugees or 26 per cent of the global total (UNHCR, 2016). Data also show that the three top receiving countries in 2015, were Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon, ranked by the number of displaced people they took in: 2.5 million, 1.6, and 1.1 million respectively (UNHCR, 2016).[2] Additionally, and very importantly, the most accurate way to determine which countries or regions have been most affected by the rising numbers of displaced people is to look at their relative numbers, that is – the number of migrants in relation to country's population. In this sense, a country such as Lebanon, with total population of just under 4.5 million is clearly experiencing a crisis, given that it currently hosts some

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2   Given the significance of the number of the displaced that Turkey took in, and for clarity of discussion here, it is important to compare this figure with the number of refugees in 'other countries of Europe', as the Report states (UNHCR, 2016: 14): Germany (316,100), the Russian Federation (314,500), France (273,100), Sweden (169,500), the United Kingdom (123,100), and Italy (118,000) (ibid.).

1.1 million people who fled war or 183 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants (UNHCR, 2016).[3] Moreover, out of 65.3 million displaced people in the world, according to data for 2015, as many as 40.8 million are internally displaced, meaning that well over 60 per cent of the world's displaced populations remain in their countries as *de facto* but not *de jure* refugees (UNHCR, 2016). This brief consideration of data on global displacement, hence, demonstrates that EU has built a fortress to protect itself from 'illegal' migrants who in actual fact are the peoples fleeing civil unrest, armed conflict and devastating poverty in the Global South. The basic global displacement trends outlined here also remind us that human insecurity is directly linked to existing global structures of power, which determine 'who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not' (Thomas, 2001: 160). From this perspective the 'refugee crisis' and the 'illegal' migration concerns emerge as the notions produced by the processes of social construction of threat in Europe and show that 'the relation between security and migration is fully and immediately political' (Bigo, 2002: 9).

In the following sections of this Chapter, I shall first critically engage with the trend of turning migration, and the forced migration in particular, into a 'border security' issue. In doing so, I outline the concept of human security that, as I argue, needs to be centre stage in any discussions about security. To do so, as my discussion points out, it is critical to tackle the emerging global social order characterised by historically unprecedented levels of inequality that is causing global reproduction of insecurity of peoples, of the Global South as well as the Global North. My discussion of the global economic and development trends supports the argument that security of peoples cannot be pursued for one group at the expense of another. This approach requires a shift from the focus on state security to that of security of people. The discussion of the security question is followed by a critical overview of the EU responses to the contemporary challenges of displacement and migration in general. I argue that the measures taken are in effect re-b/ ordering security concerns. My discussion points to a range of problems and shortcomings of the current security measures, all of which raise social, political, legal, as well as moral questions. I conclude this

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3   The second and thirds ranked countries in 2016 for the largest intake of refugees in relation to their population were Jordan (87) and Nauru (50) (UNHCR, 2016).

critical analysis of the contemporary trends in framing migration and policies to curb displacement of people in Europe, by arguing that there is an urgent need to reconceptualise security and to link it to a model of mobility that recognises its global and systemic character.

The security question: Can 'we' be safe if 'they' are not?

Migration constructed as a threat has been central to the EU immigration policies since the 1990s,[4] increasingly turning migration, and forced migration in particular, into a 'border security' issue. Since 2001, and the events of 9/11, it has taken a more extreme form, because of the association between (forced) migration and terrorism. As Bigo (1994) has argued, migration and asylum have become part of a security continuum in the EU and beyond, which facilitates transferring security concerns from terrorism, the fight against organized crime and border controls to the free movement of displaced people. Viewing migration within the security frame has political, social and economic consequences. Sabet (2013) and Cornelius (2004) note, for example, that since September 11, 2001, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) service is the most heavily funded administrative body in the federal government, creating as well as mirroring the notion of threat and a need to 'confront associated risks'.

Framing (forced) migration in security terms sustains fear of refugees/migrants and policies of territorial and administrative exclusion, Huysmans (2006) study shows, because it implies a particular way of arranging social and political relations. The one that is centred on state security concerned with threats to country's borders and linked to the military and arms solutions to protect them. This state security paradigm has detrimental consequences for the security of people who are in need of protection and sanctuary. It is not surprising, therefore, that

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4   My analysis and foucus in this chapter is on EU immigration policies, thus, measures developed and introduced to control entry of immigrants, i.e. borders. Consequently, I am not discussion EU immigrant policies that regulate different realms of lives of migrants once they are allowed in. These policies range from various elements of selective workforce participation to selective and hierarchichal way of settling in, and other specific ethnic rights policies, which EU member states introduce to various degrees.

in April 2015, the UN Security Council president rebuked Europe over a plan for destroying smugglers' boats in the Mediterranean carrying thousands of people fleeing armed conflict and civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, by saying that the issue was 'not about protecting Europe, it is about protecting the refugees'. [5]

Thinking about security requires, however, to move beyond considering state borders alone, and to focus instead on human security, that is – 'the ability to protect people as well as to safeguard states' (Heinbecker, 1999: 6).[6] To do so, it is paramount to consider humanity and human security embedded within a global social structure of the capitalist world economy that has been developing for over four centuries, rather than within discrete sovereign states (Thomas, 2001: 162). This further requires moving away from notions of 'security of the individual' currently conceived in neoliberal sense of 'competitive and possessive individualism' embedded in 'property rights and choice in the market place' (ibid.: 161).

Without a shift in focus to human security within the security approach to migration, the tension between border security and security of the people fleeing war will continue and will only amplify when confronted by fear from being besieged and encircled, the anxiety that has been reinforced by EU governments' border security actions, which breed the 'warrior culture' (Hage, 2016). Framed as a state security matter, migrants are perceived as 'public enemy' (Bigo, 2002), feeding into the siege mentality. In turn, this justifies legally, morally and politically the emphasis on combating irregular migration over protecting lives of the people who have been smuggled illegally (Spijkerboer, 2017). Spijkerboer shows that the right of states to exclude aliens from their territories leads to exclusion of illegal passengers/ migrants from their main positive obligations under the right to life (2017). In other words, a limited notion of the right to life is used for illegal cross-border passengers/migrants, compared to those who cross borders by travelling legally. States, consequently, do not have any reporting system of deaths of people who attempt to cross borders illegally, and act as if they do not have any responsibility for their deaths,

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5   Available at: https://migrantsatsea.org/2015/04/30/un-security-council-president-on-mediterranean-migrant-crisis-its-not-about-protecting-europe-its-about-protecting-the-refugees/ (accessed February 2017).

6   For more on human security see: Gasper (2005), Heinbecker (1999), Owen (2004), Spies and Dzimiri (2011), Thomas (2001).

because they rely on non-state actors, that is – smugglers, and die outside their territory (Spijkerboer, 2017).

Although so-called irregular cross-Mediterranean migration was initially triggered by visa requirements imposed on third-country nationals in the wake of Europe's economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the number or irregular migrants, as Fargues (2015) reminds us, stayed at the same level of tens of thousands until 2013. In 2014, however, their number sharply increased to over 200,000, and in 2015, to over one million (Fargues, 2015). As analyses point out, security measures implemented in response to this increase have not solved the border problem. Rather, more controls in one area push people towards riskier crossings, increasing human insecurity (Fargues, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2017). This well documented consequence of restrictive immigration policies is embedded in the fact that agency 'is central to forcible displacement', hence, forced migrants as people who have agency, 'search actively for options' to their predicament (Korac, 2009: 45). In doing so, many opt for dangerous opportunities, the decisions that are hard, if not impossible, to understand without the research strategies that can 'reveal the subjective world of the actor's experience' (Korac, 2003: 53). To understand why people opt to put their lives at risk, in the hands on unknown smugglers and criminals, it is necessary 'to read the world through "illegal" eyes' (Khosravi, 2010: 6). That can help understand how and why the Mediterranean has become the most lethal 'liquid' border crossing of the 21st century. Between 2000 and 2015 (Nov 13), 26,018 deaths were reported for 1,277,399 persons crossing, meaning that every time an 'illegal migrant' took a decision to pay a smuggler to cross the Mediterranean, s/he was also taking the risk of a 2.0% probability of death during the journey (Fargues, 2015). As Spijkerboer suggests, these people die not because they are targeted by states, but because they are ignored. In that sense, he rightly associates these deaths with Bauman's (2004) notion of 'wasted lives' of the 'surplus population' that is systematically ignored by states, because it consists of people whose position is a by-product of impersonal global processes (Spijkerboer, 2017).

Complexity and brutality of these global processes caused by the systemic changes of economies of the globalised world have been well documented. Studies show (e.g. Sassen, 2014; Thomas, 2001) that during the closing decades of the 20th century global economy agenda, and development policies in particular, were dominated by a neoliberal vi-

sion of the economy,[7] causing unprecedented deepening of inequality – between states, within states and also between private corporations. As Thomas (2001: 160) argues, 'this has a direct impact on the contemporary *human experience of security*' (emphasis added). Indeed, these global trends have been affecting the emerging and fast growing insecurities experienced and deeply felt by people in relation to job security, income security, health security, environmental security, and security from crime. Related concerns for the security of people have led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to drew attention to the concept of human security in its Human Development Report, in 1994.

Although UNDP has played a critical role in bringing attention to human security, this was not sufficient to change the global trends that are undermining it. Since the late 1980s and the mid-1990s in particular, inequality has actually increased dramatically and with it also the levels of human insecurity in the contemporary world. Oxfam Report (Hardoon, 2017) reveals that at the end of 2016, eight men owned as much as the poorest half of the world's population. They do so, at the time when one in ten people survive on less than US$2 a day (ibid.). Furthermore, between 1988 and 2011 the incomes of the poorest 10 per cent increased by just US$65 per person, while the incomes of the richest 1 per cent grew by US$11,800 or 182 times as much (Hardoon, 2017). The report also shows that big businesses did very well in 2015–16, resulting in the world's 10 biggest corporations together to have revenue greater than the government revenue of 180 countries combined (ibid.). If this trend continues, the report points out, over the next 20 years, 500 people will hand over US$2.1 trillion to their heirs, the sum larger than the GDP of India, a country of 1.3 billion people (Hardoon, 2017).[8] Due to this global trend in the past nearly three decades, the world is faced with a brutally acute increase in poverty and related abuse of human rights. This often prompts populations to challenge gross injustices created by this sharp rise in inequality by violent means. This in turn, is

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7   The neoliberal model of the economy places its faith in the market rather than the state. It focuses on export-led growth based on free capital mobility. It has been promoted since the 1980s by IMF, the World Bank and other so-called global governance institution.

8   To put the figure trillion into perspective requires imagining wealth that can be consumed within 2738 years, if one spends US$1 million every day (Hardoon, 2017).

causing increase in violence and armed conflict as means to secure a fairer share of the worlds wealth (Smith, 1997), and by the same token, it also causes a rise of displacement we are witnessing today.

Sassen's (2014) study discusses these global inequality trends. They were made possible by growing expulsions from the workforce and growing exploitation, caused by continuous lowering of wages (ibid.). While the global processes brought about the unprecedented inequality globally, causing extreme conditions in quite a few countries of the Global North (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal), its effects on the Global South have been particularly brutal. Sassen's detailed analysis shows that over 20 years of restructuring programmes imposed by IMF and World Bank, have resulted in a far greater burden of debt than before international financial intervention was introduced. This is due to the particular model of neoliberal development that has been pro-moted and implemented by these so-called global governance institu-tions, since the 1980s and the 1990s, in particular (Sassen, 2014). One of the consequences of this neoliberal model of development is that many governments of the Global South currently pay more to their international lenders than they invest in basic components of develop-ment such as education and health (Sassen, 2014: 27; 80–116). This has grave consequences for human security of their populations, because it relates to both income poverty as well as human poverty, measured by illiteracy, short life expectancy and health (Thomas, 2001: 162).

What makes critical analyses of the global neoliberal economic trends and rising inequality illuminating and relevant for a critical analysis of the on-going framing of (forced) migration as a 'threat', is the argument that the dynamic of neoliberal, economically driven globalisation is 'resulting in the global reproduction of Third World problems' (Thomas, 2001: 165). Growing inequality, risk and vulner-ability have become 'an emerging global social order' and not simply linked to the state system (ibid.). In this regard, Sassen's argument that these distinct global processes are caused and shaped by what she terms the 'systemic edge', is particularly important (2014; 2015). This 'edge' is characterised by expulsion as its key dynamics. Expul-sion from the diverse systems, such as: economic, social, biospheric, is 'fundamentally different from the geographic border in the interstate system' (Sassen, 2014: 211). These 'emergent transversal geographies' of 'power/privilege/extraction' cut across the traditional divides of the modern state system, and comfortably coexist with them (Sassen, 2015: 175). Beneath the specifics of each of global domains and enor-

mously diverse social orders 'lie emergent systemic trends', which are shaped by a 'very basic dynamics of liberated profit seeking and indifference to the environment' (Sassen 2014: 215). They are linked to the emergence of 'predatory *formations*', which go well beyond the power of elites, and involve 'pieces of law and accounting, technical capacities, the willingness of the executive branch of government to see with the eye of global corporations, and such' (Sassen, 2015: 176). This is not to say, Sassen clarifies, that the destructive forces associated with expulsions at the systemic edge are all interconnected. Rather, they cut across our 'conceptual boundaries' and, consequently, remain invisible to our 'conceptual eye' (ibid.). Thus, Sassen points out, it is necessary to destabilize 'master categories and powerful explanations, in order to re-theorise' (2015: 176).

Instead of capitalizing on this type of insight and knowledge, by engaging in an informed debate about the sources of threat to security in order to elucidate strategies to increase human security that cannot be pursued 'for one group at the expense of another' (Thomas, 2001: 161), the EU response to the workings of the systemic edge and related global and local expulsion dynamics have remained within the familiar highly generalized discourse about global security, as well as old, well-established boundaries related to the notions of sovereignty and state security. Consequently, it continues to put emphasis on ensuring national border security, by widening the area of control.

Outsourcing and re-b/ordering security

As 'the politics of insecurity' continues, characterised by security framing as a technique of government, in Foucauldian terms (Huysmans, 2006),[9] security remains the frame of reference in which migration is discussed. Consequently, EU has implemented 'parallel migration strategies' such as 'the externalisation of EU borders' through the establishment of cooperation agreements with seventeen third countries that now support 'EU border management objectives' (Koff, 2014).[10] In other words, as Koff explains, it is 'a policy strategy that

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9   This refers to governmentality linked to the particular technologies and strategies that currently rationalize and invest the space of borders in western states.

10   For more information on externalisation of EU borders see Geddes (2005) and Lavanex (2006).

attempts to manage migration closer to its source' (2014:6). In doing so, the EU has funded technical assistance in third countries and integrated migration into regional development strategies (ibid.). However, the latter, as Gabrielli's analysis demonstrates (2007), actually means that the signing of trade agreements and concessions of economic aid are now subject to the application of 'best practices' in curbing migration. This link, as it will be discussed below, has far reaching human security consequences, as well as political and socio-economic costs.

The process of 'outsourcing border controls' (Andersson, 2016) or 'outsourcing the process of bordering' (van Houtum, 2010) has in effect led to *rebordering security* in Europe and beyond, by establishing bordering mechanisms in places that are far away from a border that is intended to reach. This practice has also led to people being forced to remain in places that 'appear on no maps used by ordinary humans', as Bauman points out (2004:80). In addition to treating (forced) migrants as 'human waste', as Bauman contends, the 'export of a security model' has created stronger smuggling networks, and higher, not lower, numbers of people using them, as Andersson's analysis shows (2016). Moreover, and very importantly, he argues that by creating a security path of dependency in bilateral cooperation, the migratory 'threat' becomes self-perpetuating (ibid.). It becomes strategically used, for example, by 'co-operating states' as a bargaining chip, as was the case of Libya until 2011, or Turkey since 2015, with far-reaching political consequences.[11]

It is worth referring here to just one example of *quid pro quo* arrangements made in exchange for outsourcing border security that is linked to the so-called externalisation of the EU borders. It relates to a bilateral readmission agreement signed between the Italian and Libyan governments. It aimed to 'foster collaboration in matters of irregular migration' and triggered a well-known collective expulsion, using military airplanes, of some 1,500 migrants from Lampedusa to Libya, in October 2004 (Andrijasevic, 2010). At the time, it was announced by the EU officials as an example of improvement in political relations between Libya, Italy and Europe. Shortly after the incident of collective expulsion, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported that the EU's eighteen-year long arms embargo on Libya was lifted (HRW 2006, note 282). In this sense, migratory 'threat' becomes the asset to be used by 'cooperating states' for their political and economic ends (Andersson, 2016).

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11   Geenhill (2010) terms this type of strategic use of migration and its consequences – 'weapon of mass migration'.

Migratory 'threat' and the border security demands it creates is also an asset for a European defence sector, as Bigo shows (2001), in need of new market niches and for security forces that need to justify their role in times of austerity and as their traditional role is at risk of diminishing. Analyses demonstrate how this dynamic has contributed significantly to the momentum for more research funding from the EU for this sector (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010; Andersson, 2016). Such a context, even though border controls are failing, has created a market for even more controls, in a self-perpetuating dynamic, as Andersson's (2016) study shows. In other words, the so-called externalisation of the EU borders, linked to framing migration as a 'threat', aims to transfer the 'risks' of migration to third states. In doing so, however, it generates further risks, feeding into the need for more reinforcements. This situation, Andresson further argues, is also politically useful, because it dissipates blame and accountability across a multitude of actors and over a large geographical area, allowing most actors to escape accountability and responsibility (2016).

The process of rebordering security, discussed so far, and its consequences for the displaced are grave and alarming. Particularly so, when the regime of border security transforms borders into a matter of life and death for certain segments of the world's migratory population (Albahari, 2006).

Humanitarianism embedded in the regime of migration control

Disturbing images of people struggling for life in the border zones of Greece, Italy and Hungary that resemble those from the edges of the war zones have become an integral part of daily lives of the citizens of the Global North and the EU, in particular. The recent levels of displacement, combined with the current restrictive regime of migration control in Europe, have caused the transformation of some of the actual borders of the EU states or gateways to the EU territory into 'zones of humanitarian government' (Walters, 2011). Walters argues that when the border becomes a site of suffering, violence and death, and a political zone of injustice and oppression, they become 'humanitarian borders', which tend to compensate for the 'social violence' emanating from the border security approach to the migration control system (ibid.).

Indeed, over the past years of so-called 'refugee crisis' in Europe, there has been a number of well-meaning and generous civil society initiatives and actions in various troubled borders zones on the edges of the EU or places through which the displaced people pass. Their activism ranges from providing basic assistance (e.g. health, food, clothing), as well as legal, administrative and technical support (e.g. advice on asylum rights, access to shelter, or transporting people to the desired border crossings),[12] to lobbying governments to lessen the restrictive border controls and immigration policies. Initiated and lead by local NGOs, church organisations, and hundreds of thousands of local and international volunteers/citizens, they 'made visible the social and human consequences behind such a migration process' (Zugasti, 2016:5) and forged 'horizontal political solidarities' (Kallious et al., 2016).

While humanitarianism connected to civil society's actions has been softening as well as challenging many brutal aspects of the current migration control mechanisms, they have also enabled politicians to continue to use a rhetoric of threat, fear and insecurity without having to face accusations of inhumanity. In this sense, as Walters (2011) points out, 'humanitarian border' delineates 'politics of alienation and politics of care' happening in one place and at the same time. In other words, when humanitarianism is embedded in the regime of migration control, NGOs activities, and those of international NGOs (INGOs) in particular, often become mechanisms that normalise the very regime that produces the need for humanitarian intervention.

There is no doubt that INGOs initiatives in the current EU zones of humanitarian engagement, follow key elements of a humanitarian script in which intervention is mobilized as an act of charity and protection (Aradau, 2004). However, analyses show that often, such as in the case of deporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Libya, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is jointly responsible for any violation of fundamental rights asylum seekers and irregular migrants might have suffered (Anrejevic, 2010). In this regard, some may be prone to take this and other similar examples as clear signs that humanitarianism and 'humanitarian government', associated with border zones, is 'completely immersed in the biopolitical

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12   Most of these types of civil society engagement are well documented on internet and on social media, iz special reports and other publications (e.g. Bojovic, 2016; *Forced Migration Review* 2016; Kallious et al., 2016).

context of the constitution of Empire' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 36). I am inclined, however, to support Walters' point, that there is enough evidence to argue that humanitarianism is susceptible to co-option and capture by EU border strategies of policing and control (Walters, 2011).

Reconceptualising security: Concluding remarks

The discussion in this Chapter has outlined how the EU policies on migration, and those on external border security strategies in particular, are developed around traditional notion of security, rather than in relation to the people centred, human security questions, such as: What is security? For whom is security? What threatens security?

My discussion of the current so-called 'refugee crisis' in Europe aimed to bring together often distinctly separate fields of study, as well as separate policy spheres. In doing so, my analysis linked migration to the global economic and development trends, reminding us that the emerging global social order characterised by unprecedented inequality is causing insecurity of peoples globally. In this sense, it supports arguments that to pursue the security of peoples it is necessary to move away from the notion of security that focuses on the state.

To avoid social, legal, political, and moral shortcomings of the contemporary security framing of migration and their grave consequences, migration and displacement cannot be treated as separate policy spheres. Rather, they need to be considered in relation to larger political and economic fields. In other words, a shift is required from persisting with short-term, state security-focused controls of migration to an overarching political strategy that takes into consideration the globalised nature of human mobility and its embeddedness within wider, global socio-economic realities. Some of the latter trends as outlined in this Chapter, cause global reproduction of insecurity of peoples, across and within state and regional borders and boundaries. Consequently, there is an urgent need to reconceptualise security by putting human security centre stage, and by linking it to a model of mobility that is global and systemic. In this sense, human security introduces an alternative vision of political community, the one that is not solely state bound.

To develop and implement a security strategy that is embedded in such a model of mobility, it is necessary to move away from national/

state or narrowly regional approaches. Reconceptualization of security and the related strategy, requires a shift from threat scenarios to considering opportunities and rights, because the former have been counterproductive and abusive, as the discussion in this Chapter has pointed out. In this sense, instead of framing migration as a 'threat' to Europe, it is paramount to address global-level expulsion dynamics, outlined in this Chapter, in order to shift their destructive mechanisms towards a model of 'human economy' that is not based on obscene inequalities in wealth and opportunity, but on human security for all. Furthermore, it is also necessary to tackle the destructive ground/state-level dynamics of the chaos-producing border security model, discussed earlier in this Chapter, by reintroducing legal pathways for migration, the move that would refute politically constructed 'doomsday scenarios' of migration 'threat' to Europe. This will, in turn, acknowledge that migration and displacement, as its 'forcible mode', are structural phenomena that cannot be remedied by punitive border policies embedded in state security concerns.

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