Commons
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Summary

Hang the man and flog the woman
Who stole the goose from off the common
But let the greater criminal loose
Who stole the common from the goose
– Popular rhyme, originating in the 17th century

The leaves, the roots, the trunk, the orchard, and the ecosystem? It is our Western conceit to focus on the apple. — David Bollier

We live in the midst of one of the potentially worst social and economic crisis in the history of capitalism, while the environmental crisis, according to the predictions of the vast majority of scientists, is approaching catastrophe. Neither states nor markets seem to have been able to offer solutions. Indeed, on the contrary, many believe that they are the main sources of these crises. It is in this context that talks of (and social movements for) commons have become not only increasingly commonplace, but also increasingly relevant. In general terms, the commons are social systems in which resources are shared by a community of users/producers, who also define the modes of use and production, distribution and circulation of these resources through democratic and horizontal forms of governance. But these commons are far from being utopia, if nothing else because they exist and are produced vis a vis a social force, capital, that often demands their cooptation, if not enclosure.

1. Introduction

Talk of commons has become commonplace. Interest in the category reached a new plateau in 2009 with the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to political economist Elinor Ostrom, for her ‘analysis of economic governance, especially the commons’. But commons (and common goods) have not always been so mainstream. Indeed, until a few years ago, the category was all but forgotten and seemed an intellectual and political backwater. So-called primitive accumulation, the process by which commons are enclosed, was understood to be a one-off process, moreover a process that was completed several centuries ago. Thus commons could only be of historical interest.

In this chapter we begin by challenging this understanding of enclosures as a one-off, historical event. We instead suggest that primitive accumulation is better interpreted as a continuous process, an interpretation that opens up the possibility that commons may still exist. We then review arguments in favour of enclosing – that is, destroying – commons, focusing on Garret Hardin’s influential 1968 ‘tragedy of the commons’ argument. In the next two sections, we critically assess two recent intellectual traditions that not only refute Hardin’s thesis, but expand our understanding of the way in which commons may be sustained and extended: first, that of Ostrom and the International Association for the Study of Commons, whose primary focus is (material) resource systems; and second, that of the
peer-to-peer network, which is more focused on software and other forms of information commons.

In the final part of the chapter we return to the relationship between commons and capital. We suggest that capital might need a commons ‘fix’ in order to resolve its crisis (and avoid ecological and social catastrophe), but that commons also constitute the basis for anti-capitalist modes of social organisation. We thus suggest that commons are the terrain of a clash between capital and commonism.

2. ‘Letters of blood and fire’: enclosures, the flipside of commons

Our discussion begins with the flipside of commons, with the process that results in their destruction: enclosures or primitive accumulation. (Throughout the chapter we use the terms ‘enclosure’ and ‘primitive accumulation’ interchangeably.) According to the traditional Marxist interpretation, Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation indicates the historical process that gave birth to the preconditions of a capitalist mode of production. These preconditions refer mainly to: first, the creation of a section of the population with no other means of livelihood but their labour-power – their capacity to work – which must be sold on a nascent labour market in exchange for wages; and second, the accumulation of capital that may be used for nascent industries.

In part 8 of the first volume of Capital, which remains essential reading, Karl Marx provides rich historical detail of this process as it occurred in England (where it has ‘the classic form’) and Scotland over the course of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. He describes the frequently violent way in which peasants, serfs, bondsmen and other ‘commoners’ were forcibly expelled from the land that had sustained them – from Henry VIII’s Dissolution of the Monasteries, to the Highland ‘Clearances’, to Parliamentary Acts of Enclosures. He describes the ‘bloody legislation against the expropriated’, the extensive series of laws against ‘vagabondage’, with vicious penalties for those that broke them, by which those newly created proletarians were further ‘encouraged’ to become wage-labourers. And he describes the ‘genesis’ of both the capitalist farmer and of the industrial capitalist, who were the beneficiaries of this process of expropriation: they gained either from ‘augmented’ stocks of land and livestock or from a plentiful supply of ‘free’ labourers – or both. Contrasting his account of the origins of the capitalist mode of production to that of Adam Smith and ‘Political Economy’, Marx summarises:

As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic. … The history of [nascent wage-workers’] expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire. (Marx 1976, pp. 874–75)

In this conception, the adjective ‘primitive’ corresponds to a clear-cut temporal dimension that separates the past understood as feudalism from the present understood as capitalism. However, by focusing on a definition of capital as social relation rather than as capital as stock as in Adam Smith, Marx’s definition of primitive accumulation leads to another possible interpretation. For primitive accumulation to be a precondition of accumulation it must be a precondition to the exercise of capital’s power. But the exercise of capital’s power is nothing else but human production — or humans’ creative and purposive activity — carried out through the relation of separation that characterises capital. With his discourse on ‘primitive accumulation’ Marx is thus able to point out the presupposition of this capital-relation: ‘a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realisation of their labour’. From this it follows that ‘so-called primitive accumulation … is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Marx 1976, pp. 874–75).
There is, however, a fallacy in the way the traditional Marxist literature has dealt with the issue of enclosures. As De Angelis (2007: 133-149) argues, Primitive accumulation is marginalised from theory by making it not just a question of genealogy, but of genealogy within a linear model of development. The narrative goes something like this: before capitalism there are enclosures or ‘primitive accumulation’. These processes of expropriation are preconditions of capitalism because they create and develop markets for commodities such as labour-power and land. But once the job is done, we can stop talking about enclosures (or primitive accumulation) and must talk instead about ‘capital logic’. ‘Primitive accumulation’ and ‘capital logic’ are thus distinctly separated, both theoretically and temporally (or spatially) – and social practices occurring right in front of scholars’ noses are ignored as having nothing to do with real and ongoing enclosures, since in their framework these have already occurred some time in the past.

This framework is problematic, both theoretically and politically. Theoretically, because if we understand capital not as a totalised system, but rather as a social force with totalising drives coexisting with other drives which limit it, then we can argue that enclosures are not a one-off occurrence but instead a continuous characteristic of ‘capital logic’. In fact, primitive accumulation plays a central role in the world we live in; we can understand it as a value practice clashing with other value practices. One drive is capital’s, to make and remake the world through commodification and enclosures; another is drive is that of ‘commoners’ or ‘humanity’ to make and remake the world through counter-enclosures and commons. ‘Class struggle’ was how Marx described the clashing of these social forces and their correspondent value practices; Karl Polanyi (2001) theorised the resulting social development in terms of a ‘double movement of society’.

The framework is problematic politically because the confinement of enclosures to a question of genealogy within a linear model of capitalist development paralyses Marxian-inspired contributions on the question of ‘alternatives’. (Here we understand ‘paralysis’ to mean a state of powerlessness, an incapacity to act.) Indeed, in the linear model of historical development inherited and practised by classical Marxism, the alternative to capitalism can only be another ‘ism’. Thus ongoing struggles within global justice and solidarity movements are not appreciated for what they are: budding alternatives to capital. Marxian-inspired thinking frequently cannot connect the intellectual and political endeavours to shape alternatives in the here and now because its framework is for another ‘ism’ projected into an unqualified future, and generally defined by a model of power that needs a political elite to tell ‘the masses’ why power cannot be exercised from the ground-up starting from the now.

We owe much of this understanding of primitive accumulation to the political and theoretical work of the Midnight Notes Collective, who recovered the twin concepts of enclosures and commons as still-relevant political-economic categories in their 1990 document The New Enclosures. Midnight Notes coined the term ‘new enclosures’ to understand processes at work both in Africa and Latin America, in the wake of the international debt crisis of the 1980s, as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank imposed so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes, and also in cities such as New York and Zurich where there were fierce struggles around urban space and gentrification. SAPs involved privatisation, liberalisation of markets, removal of subsidies and price controls of food staples and other essentials such as cooking oil and... land enclosures. Silvia Federici (1990, p. 11) described what was at stake:

[T]o this day at least 60% of the African population lives by subsistence farming, done mostly by women. Even when urbanized, many Africans expect to draw some support from the village, as the place where one may get food when on strike or unemployed, where one thinks of returning in old age, where, if one has nothing to live on, one may get some unused land to cultivate from a local chief or a plate of soup from neighbors and kin.
Reflecting on this ‘discovery’, three decades on, another member of the Midnight Notes Collective writes:

It took a while after my arrival [in Nigeria] for me to recover and begin to ask, where is the class struggle here? The answer that eventually came was a surprise to me: the commons still existed in Nigeria and made it possible for many who are outside of the waged labor market to have collective access to land and for many waged workers with ties to the village common land to subsist when on strike. (Caffentzis 2010, p. 28; emphasis added).ii

3. ‘The tragedy of the commons’: in defence of enclosure

Primitive accumulation has not only its critics, but also its defenders and proponents. Commenting on the same processes described in The New Enclosures, for example, The Economist insisted that Africa’s land ‘must be enclosed, and traditional rights of use, access and grazing extinguished’, because everywhere ‘it is private ownership of land that has made capital work’ (cited by Federici 1990, p. 11). Here The Economist is only echoing the assessment of influential economic historians Chambers and Mingay (1966, p. 52) on the ‘old’ English enclosures: ‘Nevertheless, enclosure was necessary because not all open-field villages showed much progress or efficiency and because even where there was progress there were limits.’

For the past 500 years, i.e. from the very first acts of enclosures in 16th-century England, a lively argument about primitive accumulation – with great political import, of course – has raged, from pulpits and university lecterns, and on the pages on tracts, pamphlets, books and scholarly journals. Rather than attempting to review this now-sprawling debate, we instead focus on one key contribution, by ecologist Garret Hardin. In his seminal article ‘The tragedy of the commons’, published in the prestigious journal Science, Hardin (1968) assumes a group of herders sharing common grazing land, to which each has open and free access. Hardin argues that since each herder wants to maximise the fodder for his or her cattle, or the number of animals feeding, this will inevitably lead to a problem of resource depletion.

Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (1968, p. 1244)

Hardin’s analysis is clearly relevant to the problem of pollution and climate change. Indeed he states that the ‘rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of “fouling our own nest,” so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers’. (ibid.)

This approach to commons has some clear policy and political-economic implications. To avoid the tragedy, Hardin advocates replacing commons rights with private property rights (where possible) or direct state management (where not). In other words, Hardin advocates enclosure.

Hardin’s Science paper has been cited tens of thousands of times and remains enormously influential. But the analysis is partial. Hardin analyses commons; yet entirely absent from this
analysis is any consideration of community or commoners, of commong. To be more precise, Hardin’s commons are populated by a collection of selfish, maximising individuals. In other words, the problem with Hardin’s model concerns the fact that its players are cast in a rationality and measuring process that is uniquely the type of subject portrayed by capital, Homo economicus – economic man. We can uncover the ‘apologetics’ and ‘vulgarity’ of this argument, only by reclaiming different types of measures for ourselves.

4. From tragedy to comedy: the scholarly rehabilitation of the commons

An important moment in the intellectual rehabilitation of the commons was the establishment in 1989 of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, which in 2006 became the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). A key figure in this current of thinking is political scientist Elinor Ostrom who, over a number of important contributions, spanning several decades until her death in 2012, has explored the institutional arrangements that govern ‘common property’. The work of Ostrom – and her IASC colleagues and coworkers – thus provides an essential refutation of Hardin.

Ostrom (1996) had no difficulty in pointing out that the model set up by Hardin was not one of a commons, but a case of open access. For Ostrom, commons are ‘where the members of a clearly demarked group have a legal right to exclude non-members of that group from using a resource. Open access regimes (res nullius) – including the classic cases of the open seas and the atmosphere – have long been considered in legal doctrine as involving no limits on who is authorized to use a resource’ (Ostrom 2000, pp. 335–36). If Hardin’s pasture was a commons, the community (or communities) that utilised it would have set up rules of access and governance to ensure its sustainability. Through this communal governance of the shared resource, with correspondent systems of monitoring and enforcement, the ‘tragedy’ of resource depletion is avoided. Ostrom thus begins the journey of conceptualisation of commons as social systems.

Figure 1. Commons as a type of good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtractability of use</th>
<th>High (‘rivalrous’ good)</th>
<th>Low (‘non-rivalrous’ good)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Common-pool resources (common goods); groundwater basins, lakes, irrigation systems, fisheries, forests, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Private goods: food, clothing, automobiles, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2010: fig. 1)

The starting point for Ostrom’s analysis of commons is the 2×2 matrix by which she classifies different types of good. (See figure 1.) Her focus tends to be on the top-left cell: goods that are rivalrous (my consumption of the good detracts from yours), but for which it is hard for me to prevent you from consuming the good. That is, she focuses on the commons as analysed by Hardin. But what makes such resources commons is that set of rules preventing
the tragedy Hardin thought inevitable. Analysing several empirical studies, Ostrom goes on to distil eight such rules or ‘design principles’ necessary for sustainable commons:

1. **User boundaries and resource boundaries**: legitimate users must be clearly separated from non-users; the common pool resource must be clearly separated (or distinguished) from its wider environment;

2. **Congruence with local conditions**: the rules that govern the commons must be appropriate to the local social and environmental conditions;

3. **Collective-choice arrangements**: individuals affected by the resource regime must be able to participate in making and modifying its rules;

4. **Monitoring of users and monitoring of the resource**: users of the resource monitor other users’ appropriation of the resource and the condition of the resource;

5. **Graduated sanctions**: there are sanctions for violations of the rules, which start very low but become more severe for repeat violators;

6. **Conflict resolution mechanisms**: arenas exist for the rapid and low-cost resolution of conflicts amongst users;

7. **Minimal recognition of rights**: local users’ rights to make their own rules are recognised by the government;

8. **Nested enterprises**: when a common-pool resource is connected to a larger social-ecological system, there are multiple and nested layers of governance (Ostrom 2010, p. 422).

In this tradition, commons are defined as common pool resources (CPRs), and resources are understood, although with some limitations, in terms of systems that are operationally closed.

The term ‘common-pool resource’ refers to a natural or man made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. … Examples of resource systems include fishing grounds, groundwater basis, grazing areas, irrigation canals, bridges, parking garages, mainframe computers, and streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water (Ostrom 1990: p. 30)

Three classical examples of ‘sustainable’ traditional commons, in which community decisions set the boundary of what is ‘sustainable’ showing the limitations of Hardin analysis, are the following:

very spring, as the snow melts and the edelweiss blooms, Swiss farmers coax their dairy cows out of the valleys and up into Alpine meadows to graze. In each village, the farmers decide collectively how many cows each farmer can send to the mountain commons. That decision is based on the number of cows the farmer can overwinter, which is, in turn, based on the farmer’s valley pasturage and barn space. Overwintering capacity has little connection, if any, to the meadow’s grazing capacity but somehow the system works. And it has worked year after year, with no evidence of overgrazing, for at least 500 years. …

In the Lofoten Islands in the far north of Norway, a portion of the cod fishery is set aside for sail-powered boats. Factory trawler ships are prohibited entirely. These Norwegians know perfectly well that modern techniques would bring them greater yields. But they’re not sure modern techniques will ensure them fish for their lifetime
and that of their children and grandchildren. Despite repeated attempts by the government to emphasize revenues, the fishermen’s primary goal is not maximum yield or profit; it’s a secure fishery. The result is a relatively ‘inefficient’ management regime, but one with a track record: 100 years of successful management … and some 500 years of cod export to the Mediterranean. Similar stories can be told for long-standing small-scale, inshore fisheries around the world. …

On Marajo Island, a large chunk of land in the mouth of the Amazon River, ranchers graze beef cattle on native grasses, getting respectable but not great yields of meat. Nearby, on the mainland, ranchers use modern methods of feeding to produce superior quantities of beef. The land and water in the mainland ranches are degrading, though, making uncertain whether their practices can continue. Meanwhile, the Marajo ranchers are expected to continue their relatively low-yield practices for a long time to come. After all, they’ve been doing it for some 400 years. (Princen 2005, p. 23)

An important theoretical distinction is that between the resource system and the flow of resource units that the system produces, and which are appropriated by individuals. We can understand the resource system as a stock variable, while the number of resource units it yields is a flow variable. As we would expect, there is a maximum flow of resource units above which a resource system is unsustainable. According to Ostrom and her IASC colleagues, it is the resource system to be a commons (say a forest, a river, sea waters along the coast and so on), not the resource units (woods, water and fish) that are individually appropriated by the members of the community. Within this framework, resource units, such as the fish removed from a fishery (which fall into the bottom-left cell of figure 1) are not part of the commons, since they ‘are not subject to joint use or appropriation’ (Ostrom 1990: p. 31).

This understanding of commons is summed up by one of Ostrom’s IASC colleagues:

The word ‘commons’ refers to resources for which people do not have to pay for to exercise their user and access rights within a confines of a set of institutions or rules to protect the resources from overuse by people who do not respect the resources’ fragility or limits. (Jumbe 2006: p. 5)

The Ostrom/IASC definition certainly captures some crucial aspects of commons. The realm of the shared is understood as being a realm beyond the money nexus and therefore a realm in which social connectivity is not mediated by commodity relations, but by institutional forms of participatory governance that sustain the shared resource system by regulating individual appropriation.

But there are in fact also many examples of common property regimes which have not been based on common-pool resources, where the fish are cooked in a communal pot, and resource units and pooled together by a community of users, who then established the governance rule of the common pool.

[M]oney income, personal belongings, literary texts, and even children have been communalized. Thus the 15th century Taborites’ first act of forming their community was to dump all their personal belongings in large open chests and begin their communal relations on an even footing. (Federici 2004: 54). On the basis of the history of common property regimes it is difficult to decide what types of goods are ‘conducive’ to private property and what kinds of goods are ‘conducive’ to common property. (Caffentzis 2004: p. 22)

So what the IASC definition fails to capture are both resources that might be claimed as commons, such as city-centre public spaces (as in the Occupy movement of 2011) and also
'rivalrous’ goods (‘resource units’) that communities might collectively decide to treat as commons by pooling them into a ‘common pot’. We will return to these questions in the final section, where we discuss commoning.

5. From peer to peer: the creation of the ‘information commons’

Where Ostrom and the IASC have traditionally focused on physical resources, more recently there has been a growing trend to consider as commons also immaterial “public goods” such as knowledge and information. For example, the starting point for the scholars and activists of the Foundation for P2P [peer to peer] Alternatives is information: software, scientific databases, the electro-magnetic spectrum, the arts and so on. Such ‘things’ have no physical limits that must be managed to ensure ‘sustainability’; they are ‘non-rivalrous’ goods – your use of the good does not limit mine or anyone else’s – and fall into the right-hand cells of figure 1. In fact, when limits in the use of these resources are present, they are entirely socially constructed, embedded in processes of enclosures promoted by state policies on ‘intellectual property’.

More recently the P2P Foundation has extended its understanding of commons from cyberspace into other realms. This gives rise to long lists of commons types and several possible taxonomies of commons. A key classificatory remains a commons’ material quality. Thus Michael Bauwens, the P2P Foundation’s founder, distinguishes three categories: ‘inherited commons’, such as earth, water and forests; ‘immaterial commons’, essentially information and ‘culture’; and ‘material commons’, which are human-created resources, such as ‘common stock, common machinery’ (Betz 2011).

There is much to inspire in the peer-to-peer commoners’ extensive understanding of commons and there is no doubt that they are giving shape to their own autonomous and non-commodified social space. There is lots we can learn from these practices; and we should also remember that the evolution of social networks has allow the acceleration of waves of social movements – witness the North African revolutions of 2011 (see, e.g. Mason 2012: pp. 127–52). According to Bauwens (2005: p. 1), this is a ‘form of human network-based organisation which rests upon the free participation of equipotent partners, engaged in the production of common resources, without recourse to monetary compensation as key motivating factor, and not organized according to hierarchical methods of command and control’. Although there is the attempt to consider and expand P2P production into other “material” domains, in the purest form it is possible through internet-based coordination. Few examples of the many in existence of the ongoing P2P productions are the online free encyclopaedia Wikipedia; and the thousands applications of FLOSS, i.e. Free/Libre/Open Source Software. In these examples, resources are shared and there is no central place of decision-making and decisions arise from the free cooperation of the people, who freely participate in the production of the (mainly digital) “output”.

But we must also sound a note of caution too. Any expansion of the digital commons must also problematise this commons’ relationship to sustenance commons (and their potential enclosure). In spite of peer-to-peer commoners’ autonomy, in spite of their creation of their own system of horizontal and non-hierarchical sharing, and in spite of this is where we might judge them part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Peer-to-peer commoning that goes on in cyberspace, i.e. in the realm of immaterial commons, does not resonate with the experience of commoners who depends on material resources for their reproduction. For it is these material resources – water and fossil fuels, as well as rare minerals and ores – that must frequently be enclosed and privatised so as to ensure the IT infrastructure upon which the digital commons depend.

Richard Pithouse, an activist and researchers involved in the community struggles of the poor in Durban, South Africa, puts it in this way:
My first concern about all the P2P stuff . . . is . . . the fact that it depends on both other modes of labour and extraction (like digging coltan in the Eastern Congo)\textsuperscript{iii} and other modes of enforced and very material (guns, fences, guards, borders, etc.) social division within and between societies. (Pithouse 2010)

Any distinction between immaterial and material therefore, becomes meaningful only from the perspective of relatively isolated spheres of practices. In the P2P Foundation approach, the various spheres—and, indeed, the various types of commons within these spheres—are operationally closed: that is, the social practices in each sphere occur as if there were no relation between the different spheres. In short, despite the global information and technology industry accounting for roughly 2\% of global CO\textsubscript{2} emissions (on a par with aviation), with every Google search causing an estimated 5–10g of CO\textsubscript{2} to be emitted (boiling a kettle results in 15g of emissions) (Leake and Wissner-Gross n.d.), this is not a problem for the peer-to-peer commoner at the moment in which ‘exploitation’ or ‘climate change’ are typed into a search engine.

From the perspective of another world—which is possible if we accept the alter-globalist slogan—and the constitution on new social relations, then this isolation of operationally closed systems must be overcome if commons are to form the basis of any transformative politics.

6. Capital’s commons ‘fix’ versus commoning

We started this chapter by discussing the enclosure of commons as part of a process of capitalist ‘development’ and (primitive) accumulation. In this final section we return to an explicit discussion of capital. We explore the both the possibility of a new ‘accommodation’ between capital and the commons, and that of moving beyond capital through practices of commoning.

The award, in 2009, of the Nobel prize to Elinor Ostrom was undoubtedly a significant moment in the history of the conceptualisation of the commons. (It was also a significant moment in the history of the economics Nobel, for Ostrom was the first woman and the first non-economist to receive it.) Her award may well reflect the fact that there are some forces pushing a paradigm-shift in economics. Possibly then this award is as significant as Hayek’s in 1974, which anticipated the shift from Keynesian to neo-liberal orthodoxy. This should be an occasion for celebration—but also for concern. Celebration, because Nobel-prize recognition puts commons discourse firmly within the mainstream, in turn making more visible emancipatory politics grounded in commons. Concern, because any paradigm shift signaled by the Nobel may not be an epistemic shift away from capitalism, but rather a paradigm shift within the strategies of management of capitalist social relations.

With the ongoing crisis that started in 2007/8, capitalism has clearly reached an impasse. If accomplished purely on capital’s terms, overcoming this impasse will produce a social and ecological apocalypse at worst, and an intensification of social conflict at best. Capital’s difficulty lies in the fact that if the system is to survive it must continue to push for strategies of growth. Growth is necessary not only because of capital’s essential need for accumulation, but also as a way to reconcile a profit-maximizing mode of production with hierarchical modes of distribution: if ‘all boats are lifted by a rising tide’ there will be less pressure to address inequality and redistribution contested by struggles for social justice. But today, all the strategies and ‘fixes’ available for capital to pursue growth in the world system will only intensify the crisis of social and ecological reproduction, amplifying and widening the range of resistance even if there is no programmatic focus.\textsuperscript{iv}

A possible way out is a shift in the mode of governance of social relations, or at least a fine-tuning of neoliberal governance such that it can contain the costs associated with the crisis of
social reproduction, which include public expenditures necessary to police and control rebellions generated by this crisis. Such a ‘fine-tuning’ might involve commons, or at least specific, domesticated versions of them. Capital needs a commons fix. (De Angelis 2012) Since neo-liberalism is not about to give up its management of the world, it will likely have to ask the commons to help manage the devastation. And if the commons are not there, capital will have to promote them somehow – a strategy George Caffentzis (2005) has described as neo-liberalism’s ‘plan B’.

But the relation between commons and capital is necessarily ambiguous, since their co-dependence and co-evolution makes it difficult to point out which of the two systems uses the other. We can illustrate this by looking at the paradigmatic role that the ‘village commons’ has in relation to capital. In a classic study, the anthropologist Claude Meillassoux argued that the work of reproduction and subsistence performed, mostly by women, in the village commons in South Africa allowed male labourers to migrate and be available for various types of waged work. The village commons work reduced the cost of reproduction of these male workers since capitalists who hired them did not have to pay for the cost of their upbringing, or contribute to any social security in case of illness, unemployment or old age retirement (Meillassoux 1981: pp. 110–11). Meillassoux also recognised the ambiguity of the capital-commons relationship. If the subsistence-producing commons is too ‘unproductive’, capital loses important aspects of the ‘free gift’ of labour-power; but if the commons is too ‘productive’, fewer workers would migrate out of the village commons and would more generally have more power to push up wages (Caffentzis 2004).

We can see many other examples of this relationship between commons and capital. (Capital’s increasing dependence on commons has not curbed its enthusiasm for continued enclosure, however, as in the case of international land grabs (Bollier 2011). Indeed, primitive accumulation and commons co-optation seem to be the two complementary coordinates of a new capitalist strategy.) We can see it in the World Bank’s approach to development in the global South where, for years, it has emphasized the importance of some aspects of commons management, such as pooled resources, community participation and ‘trust’ as the basis of ‘social capital’. We can also see it in Britain, where, since 2010, the Conservative-Liberal-Democrat coalition government is attempting to impose massive public-spending cuts whilst simultaneously promoting a vision of a ‘Big Society’ that claims to support community empowerment to address social upheavals. Implicitly rejecting his Conservative predecessor Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal claim that society ‘does not exist’, Cameron wants to harness society’s social power: governments urgently need to ‘open up public services to new providers like charities, social enterprises and private companies so we get more innovation, diversity and responsiveness to public need’ and to ‘create communities with oomph’ (The Economist 2010).

Such an approach requires recognising that resources are not simply financial, that wealth doesn’t just take the form of commodities. Rather, resources and wealth lie dormant in fragmented and atomised communities and must be activate through some form of what Peter Linebaugh (2008) has called commoning. Of course, in the case in which capital uses the commons as a fix for its crisis, commoning is turned into something for a purpose also for capital, thus limiting the possibility of expansion of the commons. The purpose here is not to provide alternatives to capital, but to make a particular node of capital – a region or a city, a ‘sustainable community’ – more competitive, while somehow addressing the problems of social reproduction at the same time.

But commons could create a social basis for alternative ways of articulating social production, independent from capital and its prerogatives. Indeed, it is difficult today to conceive emancipation from capital – and achieving new solutions to the demand of *buen vivir*, social and ecological justice – without at the same time organising on the terrain of commons, the non-commodified systems of social production. The deepness of the many crises of today,
directly threatening various aspects of social reproduction (food, social care, health, education), and the failures of markets and states to address these crises, indeed, their co-responsibility in producing them make the development of commons a necessity.

Claiming ownership of the conditions needed for life and its reproduction constitutes Commons. We can understand the demands for greater democracy, which have grown louder since the 1970s and which are now, in the face of social and economic crisis, reverberating across the planet, as grassroots demands to control the means of social reproduction. This because democratic freedoms imply personal investments and responsibilities, and negotiating these responsibilities and corresponding social relations and modes of production through the praxis of commoning is what constitute commons.

Ostrom and IASC tradition, has thus an important limitation, in spite of all its strengths. The institutional forms it conceptualizes as governing the commons serve only the purpose of putting fetters on social action (“a set of institutions or rules to protect the resources from overuse”), rather than also promoting social practices that put constraints on and push back practices based on commodity production and capital accumulation. Struggle is conceptualized only as competition among approproators, that is a struggle within the commons, not also as a struggle of the commons vis a vis an outside social force, i.e. capital. But how the continuous character of primitiva accumulation demonstrates, the real ‘drama of the commons’ (Dietz et al. 2002) is one in which commons (and commoners) exist within a web of antagonistic social relationships, in which – to repeat a point we made above – value practices clash with other value practices.

Thus, if we look carefully, we can see many examples of this type of commoning which is also antagonistic to capital – practices that some may see opening “cracks” in capitalism (Holloway 2010) and others as expanding the material base and powers of a social force alternative to capital (De Angelis 2007). In recent years, there has been the development of the Occupy movement in the United States, the mass occupation of the Tahir square in Egypt, of the plaza the Mayo in Madrid. This movements, distinguish themselves by making social reproduction necessary to maintain the occupation for weeks an organic part of the struggle. But other examples are the occupations of Argentinian factories during the crisis at the beginning of this century. These occupations continued production in factories closed down and abandoned by the boss. In all these cases the social relations among the participants are horizontal, not vertical, and governance of the common resources—which often are also pools of resource units— is characterized by a democratic participation that include all in the decision making process through various forms of consensus.

Conclusion

The ‘ambiguity’ between commons-within-and-for-capital and commoning-beyond-capital is in fact a razor edge that both capital and social movements must attempt to negotiate. And this ‘ambiguity’ at the heart of the relation between commons and capital means that questions of social powers are pivotal. Moreover the social contingencies of this struggle between capital and commoners means that questions of whether a commons can be co-opted cannot be addressed ideologically. The question of cooptation is instead a matter of strategic power.

Hence, there a double impasse, for both capital and anti-capitalist social movements. Capital needs the commons in order to deal with the crisis as much as social movements need to confront not only capital’s enclosures of commons, but also its attempts to co-opt commons — and to create new, non-capitalist worlds on the basis of commons. We can thus understand commons as a crucial terrain of antagonistic struggle, not as a resource that may or may not
be depleted by the actions of competing individuals, but as the site upon which alternative value practices clash. In spite of capital’s strategies to deploy a commons fix to its problems, commons may well be part of a different historical development. Capital may in fact help conjure up social powers that will destroy it: in fact, the spectre of commonism may already be haunting the globe.

Resources


The Foundation for P2P Alternatives: [http://p2pfoundation.net/](http://p2pfoundation.net/)

The International Association for the Study of the Commons: [http://www.iasc-commons.org/](http://www.iasc-commons.org/)


References


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i On value practices see De Angelis (2007), Graeber (2005) and McMurtry (1998); Graeber (2011: pp. 89–126) discusses the three coexisting yet alternative ‘moral principles on which economic relations can be founded … communism, hierarchy, and exchange’.

ii More recently – and working in a different current of Marxism to Midnight Notes – geographer David Harvey also ‘rediscovered’ and popularised the category of enclosure or primitive accumulation. Harvey, however, prefers to describe the process as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. See, for example, Harvey (2003)

iii Coltan is a relatively rare ore, whose derivatives are used in the manufacture of mobile phones, computers and other similar devices.

iv David Harvey (2007) uses the term ‘fix’ to discuss different capitalist strategies to deal with crises.