An Appraisal of Financial Penalties under Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the UK

Article


Osemwengie, C. E. 2021. An Appraisal of Financial Penalties under Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the UK. Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law. 36 (6), pp. 439-441.
AuthorsOsemwengie, C. E.
Abstract

Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) are gradually
becoming an established alternative that corporate offenders in the UK are turning to. The concept which encourages corporate offenders to self-report and pay the cost of the criminal acts allegedly committed, while affording them the opportunity to rectify their internal malfeasance have, since its introduction in 2014, recorded large scale financial penalties against corporate offenders. This Update argues that although the financial penalties agreed and arrived at by the courts appear to be effective, the computational methodology employed in arriving at the financial penalties gives room for inconsistency.

KeywordsDeferred Prosecution Agreements; financial penalties; corporate offenders
JournalButterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law
Journal citation36 (6), pp. 439-441
ISSN0269-2694
Year2021
PublisherLexisNexis
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Anyone
Publication dates
Print06 Jun 2021
Publication process dates
Accepted08 Apr 2021
Deposited17 Aug 2021
Copyright holder© 2021 The Author
Copyright informationThis article was first published in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 36 (6) 439-441.
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