Competition Law in Limbo: Intel, Fidelity Rebates, and the Price of a Procedural Error

Article


Marinova, M. 2025. Competition Law in Limbo: Intel, Fidelity Rebates, and the Price of a Procedural Error. European Competition Journal. p. In press.
AuthorsMarinova, M.
Abstract

The latest judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Intel case confirmed the General Court's decision that annulled the EU Commission’s decision from 2009, imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing its dominant position by offering fidelity rebate schemes. The article critically evaluates the judgment and discusses the extent to which the CJEU judgment can influence the substantive assessment of fidelity rebates under Art. 102 TFEU. The article concludes that the Intel case is an example of a procedural error that led to the annulment of a decision and a missed opportunity to bring clarity to the most complex area in competition law – a price too high to bear in terms of administrative cost and effective enforcement. The paper provides some recommendations on how the Commission could integrate the judgment to streamline Article 102 enforcement in the new Art. 102 Guidelines.

JournalEuropean Competition Journal
Journal citationp. In press
ISSN1744-1056
1757-8396
Year2025
PublisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)
Accepted author manuscript
License
File Access Level
Anyone
Publication process dates
Accepted26 Feb 2025
Deposited04 Mar 2025
Copyright holder© 2025 The Author
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https://repository.uel.ac.uk/item/8z198

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