Collective Dominance Under Scrutiny: Closing the Enforcement Gap or Complicating EU Competition Policy?
Article
Marinova, M. 2025. Collective Dominance Under Scrutiny: Closing the Enforcement Gap or Complicating EU Competition Policy? Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies. p. In press.
Authors | Marinova, M. |
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Abstract | This paper examines the European Commission’s Draft Guidelines on Article 102 TFEU, focusing on their treatment of collective dominance in oligopolistic markets. While the Guidelines adopt a structured framework derived from merger control, they fail to address a key challenge specific to Article 102: the need for clear evidentiary standards in retrospective enforcement. The paper argues that parallel conduct by independent firms can, in certain cases, serve as evidence of collective dominance where such behaviour is not rational absent joint market power. However, the Draft Guidelines offer little guidance on how to integrate such conduct into the dominance analysis. This gap risks leaving the collective dominance conceptually recognised but practically underenforced, thereby limiting the EU’s ability to tackle anticompetitive outcomes in concentrated markets. |
Journal | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies |
Journal citation | p. In press |
ISSN | 1689-9024 |
2545-0115 | |
Year | 2025 |
Publisher | Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw |
Accepted author manuscript | License File Access Level Anyone |
Web address (URL) | https://press.wz.uw.edu.pl/yars/ |
Publication process dates | |
Accepted | 04 Jun 2025 |
Deposited | 04 Jun 2025 |
Copyright holder | © 2025 The Author |
https://repository.uel.ac.uk/item/8zq20
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